Sudanese flags are waved at an anti-government protest outside the defence ministry in Khartoum on Tuesday. Photograph: Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah/Reuters
It is evidence, observers say, that the long influence of Sudan’s political Islamists is being challenged as never before, a fact that is unsettling many in the Islamist parties, fearful that the current negotiations between the army and Freedom and Change, the umbrella group representing the street protesters behind Sudan’s revolution, will leave them in the cold.
“We are not bound by any agreement that we are not part of,” Ali al-Haj, the PCP’s secretary general, declared testily on Sunday about the ongoing talks for a joint civilian military council to guide the country’s post-Bashir political transition. “We will not accept any agreement excluding the other political forces [ie parties like his]. This is a principled position.”
All of which is significant in a country where, for three decades, the military and Islamist political parties have operated hand in hand even if – as so often in Sudan’s turbulent and fractured politics – that meant alliances made, broken and refashioned as Bashir manoeuvred to shore up his power.
The story of the PCP’s founder, Hassan al-Turabi, a lawyer and Islamic scholar who died in 2016, is a case in point.
The ideological architect of the National Islamic Front, which later morphed into Bashir’s National Congress party, Turabi first codified sharia law in Sudan’s legal system in 1983 as attorney general – and then helped Bashir take power through a military coup in 1989 in alliance with Islamists.
At the height of Turabi’s influence, he tried to transform Sudan into an Islamist centre inviting everyone from moderate Islamist political figures such as Tunisia’s Rachid Ghannouchi to Osama bin Laden, who was based in Sudan in the 1990s.
After falling out with Bashir in the late 1990s, Turabi formed his own opposition party but Turabi and the PCP moved back in recent years towards Bashir. They did not oppose the Bashir regime in the last major round of street protests in 2013 and remained part of the governing coalition until Bashir’s removal earlier this month.
That remained the model of Bashir’s way of doing business until his fall: co-opting an Islamist ideology into a military regime while keeping the Islamist parties at arms’ length when they threatened his power or bringing them back in when he needed their support.
Analyst Hafiz Ismail is among those who sees the fall of Bashir as a significant setback for Sudan’s Islamist parties in the mould of Turabi’s PCP. “It is very significant change,” he said, explaining that political Islam’s association with the regime had become toxic for it.
“Before the coup [in 1989], the slogan was ‘Islam is the solution’. But after 30 years of power, after 30 years of corruption and killing, they can’t claim high moral ground any more.
“[These parties] won’t be able to get elected again. The Islamist parties exposed themselves with the way they have behaved since they took over after the military coup, which is why I don’t think they have any chance in a democratic process. It’s the reason political Islam has no future.”