A U.S. sailor assigned to Coastal Riverine Squadron 10 provided seaward security for a vessel at the Port of Djibouti in 2015. U.S. Navy
In 1999, two Chinese People’s Liberation Army colonels wrote Unrestricted Warfare, a book on the military strategy needed to defeat a technologically superior adversary like the United States. The critical insight was that the global infrastructure of U.S. dominance could be infiltrated and gradually converted into what they called “new concept weapons” against U.S. power. In this model of warfare, as China rose, Great Power competition would not take place, as the U.S. would simply fail to compete.
Recent developments in Africa show how this works. After the 9/11 attacks, the United States created an array of security arrangements intended to help African governments monitor flows of people and cargo. These fostered the growth of institutions focused on state and commercial-enterprise security, and allowed U.S. officials to track the inner workings of these governments’ security agencies and their economies’ global commercial links.
But increasingly, the United States is not the only outside power with access to this sensitive information. As Chinese firms build out the continent’s new data networks and surveillance systems, and acquire ownership stakes in ports and other facilities, they obtain not just information and data, but the use of these systems and facilities as instruments of potential attack.
Meanwhile, the U.S. is abandoning efforts to monitor and discipline other states’ participation in these security systems of its own design, continuing to privilege conventional military means, and leaving a security-leadership vacuum under the rubric of “America First.”
U.S. national security leaders must better understand these dynamics and how to combat them.
How it started
There are several security arrangements created or modified in the wake of the 9/11 attacks where this dynamic is at play.
One is the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, which led to African governments being advised on how to align their surveillance of cargos and port security measures with U.S. standards. This effort involved several U.S. government agencies to design security protocols, collect information, and arrange financing to strengthen port security in places like Berbera, Somalia. These arrangements gave U.S. officials access to sensitive information about the inner workings of these governments’ security agencies and their economies’ global commercial links.
But more recently, Chinese investments in ports and other facilities, provide host governments with cheaper ways to comply with U.S.-established codes. Chinese government-affiliated companies now have access to information that they can use to gain the upper hand in commercial deals, monitor local markets to ensure access for Chinese imports, and influence African government decisions about international trade.
Even as media and think tanks focus on the efforts of Chinese companies like GTZ to build out Africa’s 4G and soon, 5G, networks, most overlook the more immediate impact of these efforts: direct Chinese involvement in building dedicated telecommunications systems for the armed forces and security agencies of various African countries under the framework of its annual China-Africa Peace and Security Forum meetings. In the process, Chinese companies and their government gain access to information that can be used to blackmail and recruit individuals as intelligence sources as well as to monitor users’ interactions with other governments.
