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WorldPoliticsReview.com: Why Sudan’s Democratic Transition Depends on Stability in Darfur

Posted by: Berhane.Habtemariam59@web.de

Date: Tuesday, 17 March 2020

Sudan’s prime minister, Abdallah Hamdok, is welcomed upon his arrival in Juba, South Sudan. Sudan’s prime minister, Abdallah Hamdok, center, is welcomed upon his arrival in Juba, South Sudan, Sept. 12, 2019 (AP photo by Charles Atiki Lomodong).
 
Tuesday, March 17, 2020

The transitional government in Sudan announced last month that it will extradite former dictator Omar al-Bashir to the International Criminal Court in The Hague, where he is wanted on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity committed in Sudan’s Darfur region. The move was a sign that the new government in Khartoum, which took over last year after Bashir was ousted by the military amid popular protests, is trying to present itself as a responsible member of the international community. It also wants to draw a clear line under the Bashir era domestically and undertake serious peace negotiations with rebel groups, including in Darfur, where armed conflict persists.

A joint peacekeeping mission led by the United Nations and the African Union, known as UNAMID, has been deployed to Darfur since 2007. But its mandate is scheduled to end this fall, and the peacekeepers have been gradually leaving.

This month, the U.N. Security Council is engaging in crucial discussions over the future of that mission. Many of the council’s members, as well as other states and multilateral organizations, have rightly decided to support the political transformation in Sudan. As the U.N. debates the further drawdown of UNAMID and what shape a possible follow-on mission will take, it should consider that supporting Sudan’s democratic transformation also requires a commitment to upholding security in Darfur.

The civilian transitional government in Khartoum, led by Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, has been in place since August 2019, but it must share power with the country’s military. Whether or not a genuine transition toward a participatory and inclusive political system will succeed ultimately depends on the fragile balance of power between civilians and the military—between pro-democracy groups, trade unions and civil society activists, on the one hand, and representatives of the old military and Islamist ruling elite on the other.

Jump-starting Sudan’s economy will be important for the civilian leadership’s legitimacy, as a failure to reverse the country’s dire economic straits would almost certainly shift the internal balance of power toward the military. But another important element of the new political beginning in Khartoum is the transitional government’s effort to seek a negotiated solution to the various ongoing armed conflicts across Sudan.

Last October in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, Hamdok’s government embarked on negotiations with rebel groups from different parts of Sudan, including Darfur. In a sign of how seriously the new government takes these talks, one member of Sudan’s Cabinet recently told us that, “We see the Juba process as different from previous processes,” referring to negotiations that took place during the Bashir era. After all, the former activists who are now in government had common cause with the rebels in wanting to get rid of the Bashir regime. Now that that goal has been accomplished, the two sides can engage in what the Cabinet member called “strategic talk over the future of the country.” There are different visions about that future, he added, but a common desire to “heal, bring communities together,” and do so both with an economic plan and security-sector reform.

Yet progress in the talks has been uneven. In the mountainous Jebel Marra region in central Sudan, rebels still clash intermittently with government forces. The only rebel group that still has a foothold in Darfur, known as the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid, so far refuses to participate in the peace talks. The tenuous security situation in Jebel Marra is further complicated by infighting between two of the group’s factions, as well as assaults on civilians, all of which prevent a return to normal life for civilians, particularly for women.

UNAMID has been trying to uphold a semblance of stability since 2007, but its presence is thinning out. It once consisted of more than 20,000 uniformed personnel deployed throughout Darfur, but it has now been reduced to just over 4,000 blue helmets and 2,500 police officers, mainly in the Jebel Marra.

The U.N. Security Council’s decision on its peacekeeping mission will have important implications for the residents of Darfur, as well as for Sudan’s democratic transition.

The decision to draw the mission down was made in 2018, when Bashir was still in power. The Darfur conflict was then unresolved, but the general assessment of U.N. and AU officials was that a prolonged presence of the mission would not lead to a solution. Bashir wanted to get rid of the international presence anyway, and Security Council members were eager to cut peacekeeping costs. A complete withdrawal of UNAMID was initially planned for June 2020.

With the overthrow of the Bashir regime, however, the political circumstances changed. At the request of the new Sudanese government, which wanted to gain time for peace talks, the already considerably reduced mission was extended until October 2020.

Discussions on the drawdawn and exit of UNAMID and a possible follow-on mission are currently ongoing in the Security Council, with a final decision scheduled for March 26. Options include a purely civilian “Special Political Mission,” possibly with a nationwide mandate, which Hamdok has indicated he would welcome. Such a mission can provide important support to peace negotiations and assist the political transformation by, among other things, training police and administrative staff, monitoring the human rights situation and helping the government coordinate with donors. But it cannot provide physical protection to vulnerable civilian communities.

The security situation in Darfur is not stable, as demonstrated by ongoing conflict in areas that were deemed safe enough for a withdrawal of the blue helmets. In January, 65 people were killed in inter-ethnic violence in West Darfur’s state capital, el-Geneina, forcing 46,000 people to flee.

In the particularly volatile Jebel Marra, UNAMID plays an important security role, as the Sudanese state only has a limited presence. During a recent field visit to the area, members of local communities, including some who have been internally displaced by conflict, told us how important it is for Darfur that a peace agreement come out of the Juba process. They also stressed the need for protection while the process is ongoing, and many of them consider UNAMID as the only trustworthy source of security on the ground. One person we spoke with put it in stark terms: “When UNAMID goes, we will follow it.” And while citizens were clearly aware of the political changes in Khartoum and the transitional government’s peace efforts, they also underlined that these changes had not yet reached them. Local populations in the Jebel Marra region are dealing with the same armed actors as before Bashir’s ouster.

To avoid a security gap in Jebel Marra, an interim security presence is necessary at the minimum until the Juba process yields more progress. It is unlikely that the Security Council will reach consensus on yet another extension of UNAMID. It could, however, extend a residual peacekeeping presence in the Jebel Marra, or mandate a small “bridging operation.” It could also provide the planned Special Political Mission with a strong U.N. Police contingent that could play a stabilizing role in Darfur.

The political atmosphere has clearly changed in Khartoum, where almost everybody agrees that the success of the transitional government depends on economic recovery and development. But Sudan remains a huge country with different realities between center and periphery. The farther one moves away from the capital, the more there is a premium on security.

The Security Council must therefore take a cautious approach to its mission in Darfur. Its decision will have an important impact on the residents of this long-troubled region, as well as for Sudan’s democratic transition.

*Dr. Wibke Hansen heads the Analysis Division at the Center for International Peace Operations (ZiF) in Berlin.

*Dr. Volker Perthes is the director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), also in Berlin.


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