Journalists and diplomats had paid little attention to the war in Yemen until the scale of the humanitarian crisis, the military deadlock, and the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018 made it impossible to ignore.
Saudi Arabia is now under international pressure as head of a regional coalition that since March 2015 has tried to restore to power President Abdu Rabu Mansur Hadi, who was deposed by Houthi militias from the Zaydi Shia minority. With the war deadlocked, Saudi war crimes are now openly condemned (1) and Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS) has lost much of his credibility. He has failed to present himself as a reformer, despite his hiring major PR firms including Publicis Groupe (the wealthy French philosopher Elisabeth Badinter is its largest shareholder) and the Glover Park Group, founded by former US Democratic party campaign officials.
The issue of western arms sales to the Saudis has moved up the agenda. In March 2018 Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the UK’s Labour party, accused prime minister Theresa May of ‘collusion’ with war criminals. In the US, the Senate voted to halt military support for the coalition on 13 December 2018, and this has been endorsed by the House of Representatives, which has a Democrat majority. Spain, Germany and the European parliament announced arms embargoes and deal freezes (2), though they later tempered them after threats of litigation over breach of contract. It has become much harder for western powers to boast about selling arms to Saudi Arabia, or to the other major regional coalition force, the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Given the support base of the Houthi movement, there can be no conflict resolution without full Houthi involvement in the political process
Last December, the opening of peace talks in Stockholm was a success for the UN secretary-general’s special envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths of the UK. Three months earlier, talks scheduled in Switzerland had broken down even before the Houthi delegation arrived, so the warring parties had not sat round a table for over 18 months. But in Stockholm, the international context favoured progress, notably a truce at the strategic port of Hodeida on the Red Sea and an exchange of prisoners. Since then, the prospect of further talks in Jordan or Kuwait has sustained an optimism rarely seen since the war began.
Houthi resilience
When the Stockholm talks opened, the Houthis seemed to be in retreat, especially after the offensive launched in June 2018 against Hodeida, which the Houthis controlled. Since then, their armed groups have seemed ready to abandon sites outside their traditional spiritual homeland in the northern highlands, where the Zaydi Shia are the majority. The mainly Sunni city of Taiz, long a key front, has been calm and the Houthi rebels have begun to ease their siege of it. But they certainly have not lost the war, despite claims by some of their opponents — especially Sunnis supported by the Saudi-led coalition — and it would be wrong to talk of Houthi defeat.
For four years the Houthis have shown surprising resilience. Their progress from the remote highlands to the capital, and their military engagement in Sunni-majority areas where they lack popular support, demonstrate unexpected strength. In December 2017 they assassinated former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, an ally by necessity who suddenly turned against them. This was prematurely judged to be a strategic mistake, for which they would pay a price. But despite the shock of the fall of the man who had ruled Yemen for over 30 years, the Houthis encountered little resistance, which shows their grip on Yemen’s institutions and resources, as well as their skill at ideological mobilisation. The Houthis are here to stay, especially in their northern stronghold around Saada, Sanaa and Dhamar, where tribespeople mostly support them (3).
How did an initially marginal rebel movement (4) manage to take on a coalition of some of the best-equipped armies in the world, backed by the US, the UK and France? The answer may be the ‘powerlessness of power’, as political scientist Bertrand Badie put it; in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq and now Yemen, ‘great’ states keep losing ‘little’ wars. Despite much speculation, Iran’s support for the Houthis is minor, though it may be turning more solid, according to UN experts (5), through the supply of long-range missiles that are regularly fired into Saudi territory.
The Houthis’ staying power is due in part to their nationalist message. Their leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, is a charismatic figure, as seen in his rare interventions, and his standing is enhanced by his descent from the Prophet (the movement takes the Houthi family name). Al-Houthi has condemned ‘Saudi aggression’ that seeks to end ‘Yemenis’ thirst for freedom and dignity’. In the areas controlled by his forces there is a sense of challenging the international order — associated with US domination and Saudi interference — and asserting the distinct identity of the people of the northern highlands.
Semblance of an organised state
Since their emergence 20 years ago, the Houthis have managed to expand their support beyond the original base, drawing on the movement’s Zaydi religious roots, with their own distinctive rituals (now influenced by mainstream Shiism), and on anti-Saudi rhetoric. Their lack of a clearly defined political project — though their enemies accuse them of wanting to restore the Zaydi imamate that ruled Yemen until 1962 — has not undermined their ability to win support.
The Houthis deserve some credit for managing to run a semblance of an organised state, despite financial constraints (in the areas they control many civil servants have not been paid for almost two years). This includes security, which compares favourably with that in the south (Al-Qaida has been defeated in the north). Given the support base of the Houthi movement, there can be no conflict resolution without full Houthi involvement in the political process.
Opponents continue to accuse some Houthi leaders of corruption. And the often savage suppression of criticism suggests they sometimes rely on fear to hold their forces together and dissuade any significant armed resistance. But the weakness of the mainly tribal opposition in Houthi-controlled areas could facilitate demilitarisation and stabilisation, and the movement’s relatively centralised structure may help end the crisis when its leadership decides the time is right.
UN Security Council resolution 2216, adopted in April 2015, which defines the legal scope of the Saudi-led coalition, does not take this context into account. It affirms the legitimacy of Hadi as head of state until indefinitely postponed elections are held (even though his tenure expired in February 2015), and demands the Houthis unconditionally withdraw and disarm. Attempts to pass resolutions more attuned to reality — such as the one proposed by the UK in late 2018 — have been sabotaged by the Saudis, forcing the UN to work within an outdated framework. Resolution 2452, adopted on 16 January 2019, deals only with secondary issues, without altering the international legal structure circumscribing the Yemen conflict.
Divided south
In a further divergence from the reality on the ground, the UN-backed negotiations fail to take account of the difficulties caused by the fragmentation of southern Yemen. Discussions seem focused on two forms of legitimacy only, excluding southern separatist movement representatives from negotiations; this is probably their worst shortcoming. In 2017 some of the southern separatists tried to enter the political process by creating the Southern Transitional Council, with direct support from the United Arab Emirates. But the Council’s relations with the Hadi government are strained, although Hadi is a southerner, and it has no support from the Saudis, who are backing his government in exile in Aden. The southern separatists are also divided, geographically and ideologically, between armed Salafists and those nostalgic for the south’s socialist past (South Yemen was an independent state, the PDRY, 1967-90).
The Houthis are here to stay, especially in their southern stronghold in the most populous regions, where tribespeople mostly support them
There are many unaddressed questions among current allies outside Houthi-held areas. This is true of the southern groups and those who had close links to Saleh, especially his nephew Tariq Mohammed Saleh, who has been fighting the Houthis in Hodeida. Clashes between Islamist factions in Taiz, and strategic differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, suggest a fractured anti-Houthi landscape where disagreements will soon emerge. Yet the framework for negotiations imposed by resolution 2216 prevents addressing these issues. This risks stopping any reconstruction of the state, and may also benefit the armed Islamists, some of whom are linked to Al-Qaida (6).
The national, binary framework imposed by the negotiations also exposes other fault lines. It is based on the idea that the conflict concerns only Yemenis, though its regional dimension is obvious. The game the main coalition partners are playing is much criticised and far from clear, whether over Iran’s real or imagined role (which is how the Saudis justify their involvement), the destruction caused by Arab coalition bombings or the motivations ascribed to the Saudis (access to the Indian Ocean) and the UAE (control of Yemen’s coastline). Amnesty International claims that arms sold to the UAE by the West have been passed on to pro-Saudi militias, though some are classed as terrorists (7).
When the time for reconstruction comes, the Saudis and UAE will not be able to avoid involvement. They need to rejoin the negotiations so that regional participants face their responsibilities and stop concealing their aims and interests.
