It is going to be a long, hot summer in the Middle East — continuing civil wars in Syria and Yemen, tension on the Israel-Gaza border, the Iran nuclear deal being extended or ending, the opening next month of the new U.S. embassy in Jerusalem, and who knows what else will happen. Some of this turmoil may be self-inflicted, but all are challenges for U.S. policy.
How will it all work out? The recent Arab summit in the Saudi city of Dhahran provides an opportunity for assessing the state of the Arab world, which includes several important American allies, and the extent to which Washington can hope for help as the summer progresses.
The line-up for the summit official photo is illustrative. There were 23 people representing the 21 members of the Arab League, usually 22-strong but Syria’s membership is suspended. (The tally included the head of the Arab League, and, on one side, King Salman’s son, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, aka MbS.) The dress code was business suit or national dress. Just seven chose (traditional Arab) thobes or equivalent robes, all from kingdoms or sheikhdoms except for President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, a former army officer who is facing International Criminal Court indictments for war crimes. The rest were in western-style suits, including King Abdullah of Jordan.
Another striking aspect of the image is that many of these members are old. The Saudi monarch, who is 82, was hunched over. Morocco, Oman and the United Arab Emirates fielded substitutes, rather than heads of state, all of whom have reported health issues.
It is now more than seven years since the events that became known as the “Arab Spring.” The hope that a different and somehow better Middle East would emerge faded long ago. Curiously, monarchies were more resilient to the strains and stresses of these uprisings than republics. But anyone hoping for “democracy” and “freedom” now seems naïve.
Syria, Libya and Yemen are cruel examples of what can go wrong. Traditional feudal sheikhdoms with hitherto apparently anachronistic mechanisms for resolving tensions have survived and prospered. Of course, having efficient and loyal internal security forces has helped. Those with substantial oil revenues tended to fare better than others, but not always — as the example of Libya shows.
What can be so infuriating about the official concerns of the Arab world is that the leaders should objectively discuss the threat posed by Iran, but they achieved agreement in Dhahran only by heaping venom on the United States. The Palestinian cause was the “entire Arab nation’s main priority” and given the top position in the final communique of what was dubbed the “Jerusalem summit.” The U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was “illegal” and the “current stalemate” resulted “from the intransigence of Israeli positions.”
Yet, despite all this, the Arab League condemned Iran more than the United States and Israel, using wording such as “Iranian-backed terrorist Houthi militias,” “Iranian interference in the internal affairs of Arab countries,” and “We demand Iran withdraws its militias and armed elements from all Arab countries, particularly Syria and Yemen.” In terms of paragraphs mentioning its sins, Iran had the dubious honor of scoring the highest.
So how can Washington channel the Arab world’s concerns in support of U.S. policy rather than against it, and also minimize the impact of unexpected and unhelpful developments? The short answer is by ignoring — or rather, continuing to ignore — the statements of the Arab League, an institution famous for its brakes rather than breakthroughs. The slightly longer answer is that public positions, although not to be ignored, can be very different from private perspectives.
A quick conclusion from the Dhahran summit may be that its emphasis on Jerusalem may have been a correction in course by the Saudi king to the impression given by MbS, his designated successor, during MbS’s trip last month to the United States, where his public comments about allowing Israelis to live “on their own land” broke with Arab convention.
But a more considered judgment may be that the summit merely reinforced Saudi leadership of the Arab world — and the direction of Saudi policy is to confront Iran. Giving prominence to the Palestinian cause and the issue of Jerusalem may just have been camouflage. After all, the kingdom started last month to allow Air India aircraft en route to Tel Aviv to fly over its territory. Can it be so long before it also gives the same permission for the Israeli carrier El Al, or at least a code share of the airline?
Yet again, consideration of the future of the Middle East comes down to the role being played by the MbS, the Saudi king-in-waiting. The stultifying slowness of the Arab League summits has become a permanent feature of the Arab world, emblematic of its readiness for change. How long will MbS be prepared to stand on the sideline, his physical as well as figurative position in Dhahran?
Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
