Basic

Protestors in Addis Ababa demand justice from the Ethiopian government following a spate of ethnic violence, Sept. 17, 2018 (AP photo by Mulugeta Ayene).

The Editors Monday,

Oct. 17, 2018

Violence erupted outside the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa last month, leaving at least 23 dead as ethnic Oromo nationalists targeted members of minority groups. The perpetrators were reportedly emboldened by the return of the previously exiled Oromo Liberation Front, after it was granted amnesty by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The clashes are a setback to Abiy’s new administration, as he charts a conciliatory path in the ethnically divided country. In an interview with WPR, Terrence Lyons, a professor of conflict resolution at George Mason University, discusses last month’s violence and the prospects for Abiy’s reform efforts.

World Politics Review: What are the proximate and long-term historical factors that led to last month’s ethnic violence?

Terrence Lyons: Since Abiy’s election in April, Ethiopia has undergone a “shock therapy” of wide-ranging and ambitious reforms. These have included the release of political prisoners, a peace deal with neighboring Eritrea, the removal of key members of the old security service leadership, and promises to privatize key state enterprises. Abiy and other key reformers are from the Oromo wing of the ruling coalition, the first time in Ethiopia’s modern history that it has been led by a member of the Oromo, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group. Still, while “Abiymania” has generated extraordinary hopes among many, institutional change has been slow.

As political space opened, political actors long in exile returned and organized mass rallies to project their strength and popularity. Some, such as the Oromo Liberation Front and Ginbot 7, had been labeled as terrorist organizations by the previous government. Last month, deadly clashes broke out in Burayu, a town just outside Addis Ababa, between young supporters of Oromo nationalist organizations and rivals who support pan-Ethiopian political groups such as Ginbot 7. Oromo activists removed flags associated with Ginbot 7 and painted their own flag on buildings and pavements. Fights between the two groups escalated and the Oromo regional police seemed incapable of or unwilling to prevent deadly violence that resulted in nearly 30 deaths, thousands displaced and significant destruction of property.

WPR: How much of a setback does this represent to Abiy’s reform and reconciliation efforts?

Lyons: Abiy responded to the violent clashes with uncharacteristic sternness. Rather than his usual tone of love and reconciliation, he warned those engaging in violence not to test the regime or he would respond with far superior coercive capabilities. Some 3,000 young men were quickly arrested in one night, with 1,200 held for “re-education.” For now, at least, quiet has returned.

The Burayu clashes themselves don’t represent a significant setback for the new leadership to pursue its reforms. They do, however, represent a particular instance of a deeper set of contradictions that may destabilize Ethiopia unless they are quickly and carefully managed. One set of challenges relates to the two contradictory forms of populism that have gained prominence with the opening of political space in Ethiopia.

On the one hand, pan-Ethiopian nationalist movements, which frame their agenda as “citizenship-based politics,” are challenging the central ethno-federal political structures of Ethiopia. Since 1991, the ruling party has created ethnically defined regions and ethnically defined political parties, something that is anathema to a significant number of residents of Addis Ababa and other growing urban areas. On the other hand, protests in the Oromo region in 2016 created the context for Abiy and his colleagues to move to their leadership positions in the ruling party. Oromo nationalism, long present but further fed now by returning Oromo political parties and media, has become one of the most potent forces in Ethiopia today. Populist demands from both sides often make claims to “owning” Addis Ababa, fueling tensions and conflicts. In addition, populism is on the rise among other ethnic groups of Ethiopia, such as the Amhara and the Sidama. This can be seen in the new National Movement of Amhara that advances a highly polarizing narrative of Amhara identity, as well as in Sidama claims for self-determination and control over the city of Hawassa.

At the same time, the popular uprisings of 2016 and divisions within the ruling coalition have resulted in a weakening of the state, particularly in the Oromo region. Ethiopian security forces have struggled to manage conflicts along the borders of the Oromo and Somali regions and the Oromo and Southern regions, resulting in an alarming 2.8 million displaced persons and a major humanitarian emergency. In recent weeks, violence in the western Benishangul-Gumuz region has led to the displacement of tens of thousands of Oromo and Amhara. The violence in Burayu is another instance of this larger and more profound problem of declining state capacity and the authorities’ inability to maintain order.

WPR: How effective has Abiy been in implementing his other main policy priorities?

Lyons: Many of Abiy’s political moves have been in the form of pronouncements or statements of intention. The actual implementation remains to be completed. This is not surprising, since the new leadership has only been in power for six months. There is currently a process led by an advisory council of independent legal scholars to revise the Charities and Societies Proclamation and the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation. Previous governments used these proclamations to virtually eliminate independent civil society organizations working on human rights and to shut down most independent media. New draft laws on these issues are expected in the coming months, which will be a key test of the new government’s ability to roll back the institutions that bolstered the state’s authoritarian tendencies. Examination of electoral laws and the role of the controversial National Election Board, which is dominated by the ruling party, are also underway and will be critical in order to hold credible elections as scheduled in 2020. Other proposals, such as those relating to the privatization of state-owned enterprises, remain under consideration by different committees that have not completed their assessments.