[dehai-news] Jamestown.org: Priorities and Challenges in China's Naval Deployment in the Horn of Africa


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From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Tue Dec 08 2009 - 11:35:31 EST


Priorities and Challenges in China's Naval Deployment in the Horn of Africa

Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 24

December 8, 2009 02:01 PM Age: 5 days

Category: China Brief, Foreign Policy, Military/Security, China and the
Asia-Pacific, Africa, Home Page

By:
<http://www.jamestown.org/articles-by-author/?no_cache=1&tx_cablanttnewsstaf
frelation_pi1%5Bauthor%5D=69> Richard Weitz

For a few days in mid-November, it looked like the Chinese government was
prepared to take the unprecedented step to lead a multinational security
operation involving the armed forces of Russia, the United States, the EU,
and other countries. Following the seizure of yet another Chinese commercial
vessel by Somali-based pirates, Beijing convened a two-day conference to
enhance international coordination of the many foreign fleets currently
seeking to defend shipping around Somalia from pirate attack. Participants
included senior navy officers from EU and NATO countries along with
representatives from India, Japan, Russia, and other navies whose warships
have joined the maritime patrols around the Horn of Africa (BBC, November
6).

According to some media reports, at a subsequent meeting of the Shared
Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) group, which includes representatives
of the some three dozen navies currently participating in the maritime
counter-piracy mission, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) delegates
expressed a willingness to integrate their operations more closely with the
other navies on the mission (Fox News, November 10). In addition, they
reportedly told officials from the European Union Naval Force for Somalia
(EU Navfor) that they wished to assume more of a leadership role in the
multilateral maritime patrols. In particular, the PLAN members suggested
they favored rotating the SHADE co-chairmanship among the other
participating navies so that China could serve in that role. Thus far, these
monthly meetings have been co-chaired by the EU Navfor and the multinational
Combined Maritime Force led by the United States (Telegraph, November 10).

Both of the existing co-chairs supported the proposal. At an international
anti-piracy conference in Hong Kong that convened a few days later,
Commodore Tim Lowe, the deputy commander of the Combined Maritime Forces,
said that the chairmanship position was "a leadership role in terms of
making sure that the meetings and the agendas for the meetings are properly
coordinated." Lowe added that he hoped "that perhaps in April or May next
year, we would see China taking on that lead coordinator role for the
corridor" that the international fleets established for protecting the
commercial vessels (Reuters, November 13).

A few days later, however, the Chinese government reverted to their previous
stance of simply calling for greater international cooperation against the
pirates. Rather than leading or even joining a combined multilateral force,
Chinese representatives called for a division of the sea lanes currently
being patrolled into separate national sectors. Writing in China Daily,
Zhang Haizhou observed that Chinese "officials deftly parried appeals for
China to lead the anti-piracy mission" that were made by Lowe (China Daily,
November 20).

For example, senior Colonel Huang Xueping, a Defense Ministry spokesman,
said that, "China is always open to boosting international patrolling
cooperation (and) wishes to cooperate, bilaterally and multilaterally, with
all nations involved" in the counter-piracy operation off Somalia. But he
added that Beijing wanted to "reach consensus" on an arrangement for
defining specific national patrol areas (China Daily, November 20). Liu
Zhenmin, deputy permanent representative of the People's Republic of China
(PRC) to the UN, likewise proposed to the UN Security Council that the
navies engaged in the counter-piracy mission "define areas of
responsibility." He argued that such an approach would improve escort
operations and reduce the risks of pirates hijacking vessels. Liu also
called for an "integrated solution" to overcome the piracy problem, which
would include promoting political stability in Somalia and enhancing the
ability of the country's neighbors to counter regional piracy. He further
urged that the navies now supporting the counter-piracy mission off Somalia
"should expand maritime escort operations and other countries should also
improve how they carry out maritime escort operations" (Xinhua News Agency,
November 18).

Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo maintained that allocating specific areas for each
patrolling country would "significantly increase" the efficiency of the
operation. He observed that, "When each country takes care of a specific
area, density of the patrolling mission will grow," though he added that the
navies involved had to have effective means of coordinating their activities
(China Daily, November 20). When discussing appropriate coordinating
mechanisms, Beijing's reluctance to engage in close military cooperation
with NATO was again evident, a factor also seen in China's cautious policies
toward the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.
The Chinese press quoted Admiral Yin as arguing that the United Nations "is
the best candidate to take the leading coordinating role" in countering the
pirates because China lacks formal relations with NATO (China Daily,
November 20).

PLAN Procedures

The growing threat to international shipping in the Gulf of Aden and
neighboring regions from pirates operating from ports in lawless Somalia has
engendered an unparalleled global response. The UN, NATO, the EU, and
various national governments have organized separate multilateral and
single-country maritime security operations in the Horn of Africa region to
patrol sea lanes, escort merchant vessels, and respond to distress calls and
pirate sightings. Since the PLAN first sent three warships to conduct
counter-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden this January, the Chinese Navy
has focused on protecting Chinese-flagged vessels and Chinese sailors. Thus
far, PLA representatives have resisted EU and NATO proposals to join a more
centrally commanded operation (BBC, November 6).

The PLAN has traditionally concentrated on defending Chinese coastal waters
and on impeding U.S. military intervention in any Taiwan contingency.
Although Chinese warships have engaged in port visits and unsophisticated
exercises with foreign navies, the current operation represents the first
potential combat mission for the PLAN outside the Pacific. The Chinese Navy
has now sent four task forces, consisting of two or three warships,
typically frigates, along with a larger supply ship and hundreds of sailors
and special force troops, since the beginning of the year (Xinhua News
Agency, October 30). In November 2009, Liang Wei, the deputy chief of
operations for the PLAN's South Fleet, said that the four Chinese flotillas
had escorted or protected approximately 1,100 commercial vessels from
potential pirate attack (Reuters, November 13).

Yet, none of the Chinese warships on patrol thus far appear to have engaged
in large-scale combat with the pirates, raising the interesting question of
what rules of engagement the Chinese flotilla follows. At a November 2009
maritime seminar in Hong Kong, Liang Wei, deputy chief of operations for the
South Sea fleet, said the standard operating procedures were for the PLAN
first to investigate any incident "to make sure it is not a fisherman but a
pirate." The Chinese sailors would fire warning shots if the pirates
initiated the use of force. If this show of force failed to stop the pirate
attack, then the Chinese ships would fire in self-defense of themselves or
in defense of others (South China Morning Post, November 14). Yet the same
source cites another unnamed Chinese military official who acknowledged that
the PLAN weighed additional criteria when determining its response to a
pirate attack. "For us to use force is a very complex matter ... it is not
just a simple question based on an operational requirement." Rather, the
decision over how to respond also involved "political questions-and these
are not issues dealt with by military commanders alone. Our warships off
Somalia are very well aware of this. We are fully prepared to use force, but
we do not take that step lightly" (South China Morning Post, November 14).

Threats and Opportunities

Despite the large international counter-piracy operation, the Somali piracy
threat has worsened this year after showing some signs of improving in 2008
after foreign navies established a five-mile wide protection corridor that
ranged up to 300 nautical miles off Somali's coast. As of mid-October 2009,
the pirates had conducted almost 150 attacks on commercial vessels in the
waters off the Horn of Africa since the beginning of the year. They
succeeded in hijacking more than 40 ships and at least 270 hostages (RIA
Novosti, October 21). Many of the recent attacks have occurred at great
distances from Somalia's shores-including some in the Indian Ocean and even
the Gulf of Oman-as the pirates have sought to prey on vessels outside the
protection corridor (United Press International, November 19).

Chinese ships have suffered several prominent attacks. On October 19, the
pirates seized a vessel owned by China Cosco Holding, the De Xin Hai, and
its 25 crew members while they were conveying 76,000 metric tons of coal
over 700 nautical miles from Somalia's coast (New York Times, October 22).
Following the incident, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said China
would "make all-out efforts to rescue the hijacked ship and personnel," but
no such operation occurred (Time, October 27). Instead, the PRC Ministry of
Transport subsequently issued a warning that "Chinese ships must urgently
steer as far away from the area as possible. Ships within the region must
exercise caution and increase their vigilance" (RIA Novosti, October 21). In
November, the pirates launched their most distant attack to date on a Hong
Kong-flagged oil tanker sailing 1,000 nautical miles from Mogadishu.

This upsurge in maritime assaults may account for Beijing's recent efforts
to strengthen the international response to the piracy challenge. In
addition to hosting last month's international counter-piracy summit in
Beijing, the PLAN in September conducted a three-day joint exercise with the
Russian Navy in the Gulf of Aden that rehearsed capturing and detaining
pirates. The Chinese warships that participated in these simulated
search-and-detain operations included the Zhoushan and the Xuzhou along with
support vessels (RIA Novosti, September 21).

Several considerations led the PRC leadership to make the unprecedented
decision to deploy the PLAN on a counter-piracy mission around the Horn of
Africa. China possesses one of the world's largest commercial shipping
fleets and relies heavily on international maritime commerce, including for
energy imports from the Persian Gulf which are carried on tankers that
traverse regions potentially threatened from long-range pirates operating
from Somalia [1]. Chinese policy makers and security experts have cited this
dependence on foreign energy imports as a Chinese security vulnerability
[2]. The PRC's counter-piracy efforts near Somalia enjoy the legitimacy of
several UN Security Council resolutions calling on UN member states to curb
piracy in the region. The counter-piracy operation also has the support of
Somalia's transitional government. In addition, many other foreign navies
are engaged in the same mission. The Somali campaign marks the first
widespread participation of the world's rising naval powers-which besides
China includes India and other non-NATO navies-in an active maritime
operation distant from their shores [3]. On January 14, 2009, a Chinese
delegation attended the founding meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy Off
the Coast of Somalia, giving Beijing a leading role in this institution from
the start (unlike in the case of such institutions as the Proliferation
Security Initiative, which the PRC has resisted joining partly because China
would have to accept a set of principles Beijing had no say in
establishing). The Contact Group provides a mechanism to allow states and
international organizations to exchange information on aspects of combating
piracy off Somalia's coast [4].

In addition to whatever protection of China's shipping that results from the
PLAN's participation in the counter-piracy operation around Somalia, the
Chinese Navy and the PRC have benefited in other ways from supporting the
mission. The Chinese sailors involved have had ample opportunities to
improve their tactics, techniques, and procedures by working in close
proximity with several more experienced navies. Rear Admiral Du Jingchen,
commander of the first PLAN task force, earlier told the Chinese media while
returning to his home port of Sanya that he used the 123-day patrol to test
his sailors' capabilities, weapons, and support mechanisms as well as
promote maritime defense diplomacy (China Daily, April 29). "The first
anti-piracy fleet had zero experience," he explained, but it had learned
valuable lessons applicable for future overseas PLAN missions. A week
earlier, Zhuang Congyong, a researcher with the Naval Command Academy,
likewise observed that, "The ability to go deep into the ocean to conduct
integrated operations is a key criterion for a strong navy. The escort
operation to the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters reflects and starts the
transformation of our military strategy," Zhuang said, adding that, "The
Chinese navy will conduct more long-distance escort missions in the future"
(Xinhua News Agency, April 22). By engaging in such a high-profile
operation, moreover, the PLAN can highlight its contribution to advancing
China's foreign interests to PRC policy makers, including those determining
the Navy's budget.

The Chinese government in turn has characterized it's support for the
counter-piracy operation as meeting Beijing's commitments as a benign
international security actor (what some non-Chinese analyst have termed a
responsible global stakeholder). It also confirms China's growing capacity
and willingness to contribute to international humanitarian missions. The
day after the PRC celebrated the 60th anniversary of the PLAN in April 2009,
an editorial in the People's Daily Online lauded the Somalia operation on
the grounds that, "The protection offered by the PLA fleet safeguards the
national interests of China and projects a favorable image of China to the
world." The commentary added that, "This mission indicates that as a
responsible power of the international community, China is fulfilling its
promise to advance the construction of a harmonious world, and is taking
actions to uphold world peace and boost mutual development. At the same
time, it is demonstrating to the world that China, currently in the course
of peaceful development, is utilizing its own military power to provide
'public goods' to the international community" (People's Daily Online, April
24).

Yet, assuming a leadership position in the international counter-piracy
coalition in the form of the SHADE co-chairmanship appears to have been a
step too far for Beijing's still cautious government, despite the
encouragement offered the PRC by European and U.S. Navy commanders. In this
regard, China's wavering over leading the maritime mission off Somalia is
symptomatic of how Beijing has approached many other international security
issues. Chinese policy makers stress their desire to support world peace and
security, but they still shun leadership roles in prominent international
institutions and endeavors seeking this end. In Central Asia, for instance,
Chinese officials continue to defer to Moscow's primacy when it comes to
many political and military questions, including those addressed in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The PRC's most prominent security role has been with respect to the Korean
Peninsula, where Beijing has played a key part in establishing and
sustaining the Six-Party Talks. But even here the Chinese government has
performed the role primarily of facilitator and mediator rather than that of
leader. Instead of defining the terms of a preferred solution and seeking to
impose it on the other parties, Beijing has sought to encourage Pyongyang
and Washington to reconcile their differences through direct dialogue and
use the multilateral framework of the talks to reach a comprehensive
agreement that would also satisfy Seoul and Tokyo, who in turn are expected
to provide financial support for any deal.

Notes

1. Andrew S. Erickson, "New U.S. Maritime Strategy: Initial Chinese
Responses," China Security, vol. 3, no. 4, Autumn 2007, p. 40.
2. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Annual Report 2009
(Washington, D.C.), p. 133,
<http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2009/chapter2_section_2.pdf>
www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2009/chapter2_section_2.pdf.
3. Brian Wilson and James Kraska, "Anti-Piracy Patrols Presage Rising Naval
Powers," YaleGlobal, 13 January 2009,
<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=11808>
yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article.
4. "First Plenary Meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of
Somalia, New York, January 14, 2009," Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State,
January 20, 2009, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/130610.htm>
www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/130610.htm.

 

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