Tell it like it is: Chauvinism, in its worst form, is the real danger
......Let us get it again, the real danger, if not arrested in time, that
would trigger perhaps an irreversible political instability is TPLF's
aspiration and pursuit of ethnic chauvinism and ethnic supremacy agenda,
and its determination to maintain political supremacy at the expense of
coalition members or drag the country into political instability of
exceptional magnitude.........
by Dimetros Birku,
November, 19/11/2012
The late Meles Zenawi made, it seems, more appearance in international print
and electronic media and became a preferred topic for think thanks and
researchers alike after his demise than he did in his 21 years of rule.
Substances in discussions range from retrospective analysis of his
personality to his contribution, from his "influential" presence in
international politics to impending instability, which, for some, is
inevitable.
Emerging accounts in most cases nearly tally, except differences in wording
and presentations, with the official government account which paints Meles
simply as exceptionally mystic (political and social) in the entire history
of the country - even in the continent. Most that we read are rosy
portrayals: "selfless", "insightful leadership" and "influential in the
world stage." I have no doubt in my mind that most of the leadership of his
circle of ex-guerrilla friends do not mean it.
The motive of mystification, so to speak, has a lot to do with crafting
political legitimacy to help maintain their uneasy hold on power. Meles
Zenawi is now like an ideology unto himself: he is like the "Chairman Mao"
of Ethiopia. I get it, I hope any one would, why his friends in the
leadership position are in the business of reformation and transformation of
the image of the late Zenawi. What I don't get is the sort of confirmation
from international actors and politicians in the international stage. Among
others, Susan Rice is exceptionally annoying in that. Some organizations
seem to send similar message, subtly.
Recent analysis,
<
http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/RapidReponseBriefing1.pdf> actually they
call it briefings, (here after the paper), from a UK based
"non-governmental organization" that "aim to provide high level analysis of
rapidly emerging and unexpected global events and their impact on global
development policy and practice" is subtly rosy: ".without the steadying
hand of a practised and seasoned global player, Ethiopia's presence and
capacity for global influence may well have diminished." My question is:
"how do we measure influence?" Could the size of financial aid from "The
International Community" be an indicator as to how influential a leader is
in the world stage? If so, how is Zenawi different from Nouri Almaliki of
Iraq and/or Hamid Karazi of Afghanistan, or from the former Egyptian
president Hosni Mubarek? The more international organizations are trying to
transform an image of Meles Zenawi ( an image that never existed), the more
clues they give about their real nature and where they stand on issues like
justice, democracy and corruption, among other things. What would emerging
young critical voices in Ethiopia, who are a living witnesses of the
atrocities authorized by Zenawi, think about these organizations?
That is not just it. The paper discussed findings or observations rather in
the areas of "politics of transition", "geopolitics" and the economy as it
relates to "development" of Ethiopia. Besides numerous inaccuracies of
descriptions and statements throughout the paper, it ignores matters which
would otherwise have been essential for the discussion in the creation of
stability and democratic ambiance in the post Meles Ethiopia. I'll not do
justice if I try to address them all. I'll just focus on selected issues
which I think are even more crucially important.
First of all, it seems that an implied assumption is made that political
instability is not a thing of Meles Zenawi's administration. If that is the
case, the truth is entirely different. May be how we view political
stability/instability played into the making of the assumption. Whatever
the case is, it is not disputable that Meles Zenawi presided over one of the
most brutal regimes in Africa. And to transform Meles' image in total
disregard to his brutal aspect which caused agonies to thousands and
thousands of people amounts to condoning injustice and human rights
violation.
Among other evidences, records in the hands of reputable international human
rights organizations like the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International
vindicate repeated mass killings in the capital, south central, south
eastern and south western parts of the country among others. Civil society
is virtually non-existent. The attack on free press was and is exceptionally
brutal to the extent that vocal critics of the political system could simply
be implicated in trumped up charges of "terrorism" and the best journalists
in the country are thrown to prison. The justice system is simply serving a
distinct form of totalitarian regime -one that espoused ethnic chauvinism as
an ideology. Opposition leaders are thrown to jail with manufactured false
allegations. Opposition parties are pushed to the point of irrelevance not
just because of organizational weakness and lack of vision, as indicated in
the paper, but because "legal", political, security and economic muscle of
the government is being flexed regularly to make the idea of peaceful and
democratic political opposition nearly impossible and creation of a single
party state, like China, possible. When institutions are non-functional and
repression is considered as a norm and political virtue, they do not tell
stories of political stability. It is more like political instability.
Regular invitation and attendance at the G-20 and other international
gatherings should not blind analysts from seeing the fact that political
instability was part and parcel of 21 years of Meles rule, and in fact he
engineered it.
In regards to political transition, while the paper captured, rightly, the
insignificance of "political transition", and uselessness of assumption of
the premiership position by Hailemariam Dessalegne, it tends to employ a
reductionist approach on the explanations of it. And what that does is that
it camouflages the real sources of political instability. The paper simply
tries to explain the obvious that TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) is
more powerful -militarily, economically and in terms of controlling security
apparatus - than other members of the ruling coalition. Had the problem been
that simple, not that it really is simple from the point of view of
democratization process but relatively speaking, anticipated challenges
would have been less worrisome. They need to tell it like it is: The problem
is manifested aspiration to chauvinism and ethnic supremacy and that is the
true ideology of TPLF. Yes, this is one the most ridiculed subjects in
Ethiopian comedy but needs to be a point of political discussion, not just a
matter to laugh at. Not just it represents a malaise for the democratization
process (by the way there is no aspiration for democratization on the part
of the government. The trend is Sinification ), it may bring about total
chaos as well.
Look at the political transition itself. It generated tension within the
ruling coalition not because, apparently, other members of the coalition
have qualms, political doubt or bitter feelings about the nominated premier
but because of the ideology of TPLF. Leaked information suggests that there
was acrimonious conflict within TPLF over the idea of prime minister from
other members of the coalition. There was meetings after meetings before
confirming Hailemariam Desalege to the position of premiership. With all its
legal ambiguities, chapter 8 article 75, No. 1. section "B" of the
constitution stipulates that the Deputy Premier "Act on behalf of the Prime
Minister in his absence." Hailemariam Desalege was the Deputy Primer when
Meles passed away, and of course death is an irreversible absence. It took
months after the death of Meles for Hailemariam Desalege to be confirmed as
Prime Minister. The hurdle standing on the way of Hailemariam Dessalege was
mainly TPLF's ethnic chauvinism ideology. In the swearing ceremony, the
incoming prime minister vowed religiously, allegiance and unquestionable
commitment to the visions of Meles Zenawi. Even more laughable, after taking
over the position, he was not living in state house and had to live in a
government owned apartment and drive (well someone did it for him) to work
only because the Widow refused vacate state house. What is the vision of
Meles Zenawi after all? Anything that is not in line with the interest of
TPLF supremacy agenda cannot be a vision.
The real political issue which is either ignored or overlooked but that
which beefs up the likelihood of political instability is aspiration to
chauvinism and ethnic supremacy of the "mightiest" political entity in the
coalition which in fact seems to have tendency to take form of extremism at
some point in the future if legitimate questions of proportional power
allocation and putting legal limits to its power are pursued passionately.
Albeit not known or ignored by the donor community, "international
community" and key state actors in the international forum, ethnic
chauvinism was significant component, both as a means and an end, in Meles
Zenawi's power politics in the country. Ample evidence could be drawn from
the policy agenda of TPLF and the power structure in the military and
security apparatus. In a recent interview with a radio station owned by
TPLF, Meles' widow, Azeb Mesfin, unveiled that Zenawi had already designed a
plan to exceptionally industrialize his ethnic base region (Tigray) which is
already exceptionally industrialized, in the Ethiopian context. And his
ethnic party has everything it takes to materialise the plan.
Apart from tight ethnic based control over military and security apparatus,
the wealthiest and the not so wealthiest economic structures owned by TPLF
are pursued as means to maintain dominance. TPLF runs the biggest business
empire, perhaps in the entire continent. There are many reasons as to why
people in Ethiopia shrug off to the alleged story of economic growth -the
least of which is not exclusion from the benefit of economic growth. Most of
the beneficiaries of the growth are TPLF party members, its former guerrilla
fighters and their families but we do not see that in the growth data. What
makes this political and military dominance born affluence in Ethiopia
different from that of Chinese leadership is the fact that the one that
exists in Ethiopia is essentially a making of ethnic chauvinism ideology and
a means to maintain ethnic supremacy. And this is what makes it dangerous
and this is what is missing from discussions.
Geopolitical analysis is problematic too, to say the least. Among other
things, it foresees that "Mohammed Morsi will adopt a more Islamist
approach; aligning interests in Sudan, Somalia and Egypt with Muslim
communities in Ethiopia.There are many in the Ethiopian establishment who
fear a Muslim Brotherhood-led Egypt is capable of exploiting simmering
tensions between Ethiopia's government and its large Muslim population
(officially about 30 per cent of the population)." Whether Mursi has such a
plan or not is not something I cannot tell. What I can tell is that "many"
do not fear "Mursi agenda." Ethiopian Muslims are simply in the business of
pursuing their constitutional rights to loud their voice in opposition to
government interference in their religious affairs which in fact has support
from non-Muslim Ethiopians. There is no reasonable ground to believe that
Ethiopian Muslim would exchange their fellow non- Muslim Ethiopians to the
"Islamic approach" of Mursi in the region, if there is one. The
Christian-Muslim relation in Ethiopia is exceptionally unique and is based
on recognition and respect. I do not dare to say no extremist element could
be found among Ethiopian Muslims. But I can tell that if they exist they
could not influence the majority.
Let us get it again, the real danger, if not arrested in time, that would
trigger perhaps an irreversible political instability is TPLF's aspiration
and pursuit of ethnic chauvinism and ethnic supremacy agenda, and its
determination to maintain political supremacy at the expense of coalition
members or drag the country into political instability of exceptional
magnitude.
The writer studied Political science at York University and Public policy
and Administration at McMaster University and lives in Toronto. Could be
reached at dbirku_at_hotmail.com , twitter: _at_dimetros
Received on Mon Nov 19 2012 - 21:28:11 EST
