If insecurity was the thorniest problem that plagued Somalia's previous
governments, the new one will be dogged by multiple political challenges.
Chief among those is the status of Kismaayo, Somalia's third largest city.
At the center of the Kismaayo conundrum is a rancorous clash of two
narratives. A Kenyan-backed armed group that recently captured the port city
from al-Shabaab fighters wants to unilaterally decide the fate of the city
and, ultimately, form a regional administration called 'Jubbaland' - this
would theoretically come under the control of the Federal Government.
But the new Mogadishu-based government wants to shape the administration of
Kismaayo as well as the future regional state. The current administration
views itself as the legitimate authority in the country, but with 4,000
soldiers from neighboring Kenya still deployed in the region, the Somali
government is understandably nervous about the possibility of a proxy
regional state based in Kismaayo.
I was in Mogadishu last week and witnessed an impasse over these two
narratives - each 'side' sticking to its guns at the expense of national
unity and regional cooperation. Yet both must understand that their
narratives are not mutually exclusive. Each has a legitimate point and an
understandable fear.
The 'Raskamboni' militia has been fighting for years to dislodge al-Shabaab
fighters from Kismaayo. They've paid a considerable human and financial toll
in pursuit of 'liberating' the city. And they do, to an extent, represent
the clan composition of Kismaayo and, more broadly, the 'Jubbaland' regions.
The Federal Government, on the other hand, has every right to play a role in
the formation of an administration in the city and in the wider region.
Kismaayo - and Jubbaland, for that matter - cannot live in isolation from
the Federal Government.
The Middle Ground
Notwithstanding the acrimonious tone being adopted over the issue, there is
some common ground: a power-sharing mechanism. The Raskamboni leadership
should be allowed, with the consultation of the federal government, to form
a temporary administration for the city, lasting no more than two years. A
broadly representative local parliament should be selected and
operationalised during this timeframe. This legislative body should
ultimately elect a president and a vice president for the future Jubbaland
state.
For its part, Raskamboni should merge its militia with the Somali National
Army, to be commanded by a General appointed by federal officials. This
would allow the federal government to control the security of the area,
while 'Raskamboni' directs the political administration.
This is, however, only a temporary solution. Ultimately, direct elections
must be held for both the executive and legislative branches of 'Jubbaland',
and all armed groups must be disbanded and folded into a national military
or police force.
Failure to seek common ground over the administration of Kismaayo would
spell disaster for the hundreds of thousands of people who haven't known
peace for nearly 20 years. The Federal Government and 'Raskamboni' must
recognize that Kismaayo is the graveyard of many Somali powers, starting
with the former dictator Mohamed Siyad Barre, going through Gen. Mohamed
Said Morgan, the Jubba Valley Alliance under Barre Hiiraale and ending with
al-Shabaab.
Neighbours' hands
Both Kenya and Ethiopia are understandably worried about the future of
Kismaayo, but for entirely different reasons. Kenya wants a buffer zone to
protect its nearby tourist sites and a friendly regional administration.
Some of its key politicians - who are ethnic Somalis - have a vested
interest in who dominates the region.
But Ethiopia fears that its own Somali ethnic rebel group - the Ogaden
National Liberation Front - would be emboldened if their kinsmen become the
dominant group in Jubbaland. The two countries, which claim that they are
allies, are in effect rivals on the issue of Kismaayo.
This toxic mix of proxy war, clan rivalry and a chronic contestation over
political control renders the city a policymakers' nightmare. The sooner
neighboring countries realize that it is in their best interest to work with
the Somali government and local actors to find common ground, the closer we
get to a stable and prosperous Somalia.
Neighboring countries should know that they're not only notoriously
unpopular in Somalia, but that warring Somali factions have taken them for a
ride. The US, Ethiopia and Eritrea have all fallen into that familiar trap
before. Kenya appears in danger of sinking into that particular abyss. It
can, however, still recover.
In many ways, Kismaayo is a good indicator for the future trajectory of the
rest of the country. Unlike the other 'ghettoized' urban centers, it is one
of the most diverse cities in the country in terms of clan composition. If
its elites focus less on domination and more on finding common ground, it
could be a catalyst for a period of cooperation and renewal in the rest of
Somalia.
Unfortunately, the window of opportunity to set Kismaayo on the right path
is rapidly closing.
