The 2006 Ethiopian invasion had three grave consequences which can be broadly summarised as follows:
First, the progress of the ICU in improving security and developing
relations with civil society was immediately torpedoed. The ICU's
emergenceas a major provider of law and order had a great impact on
the lives of
ordinary Somalis caught up in the conflicts of various warlords and clan
militias. Through an overarching Islamist ideology, which was able to
transcend clan allegiance, and a working network of sharia courts in
Mogadishu, the ICU had gone a long way to improving security in the capital
prior to intervention.
Second, the Ethiopian forces were responsible for serious human rights abuses and indiscriminate attacks on Somali civilians. In one incident in Baidoa on April 30, 2006, Ethiopian troops responded to the death of two ENDF soldiers in a roadside bomb blast by opening fire into a crowded area, killing 21 civilians. This practice of firing indiscriminately into crowds of civilians was noted by a Human Rights Watch report in 2008. For two years, the international community had simply been looking on as undisciplined ENDF troops acted with impunity in the name of security and supported the recently-formed and as yet unpopular Transitional Federal Government (TFG).
Third, and most ominously for the future of Somalia, the invasion served to empower and energise extremist elements within the country. Al Shabaab, formerly a militia allied to the ICU, mounted a counter-campaign against the ENDF, in which they used mortar attacks and suicide bombings with little regard for civilian life, whilst also targeting prominent government and security service figures for assassination. This particular legacy of the ENDF invasion is one that continues to wreak havoc in both Kenya and Somalia today."
http://thinkafricapress.com/somalia/history-intervention
The Force of History in the Somalian Intervention
Will Kenya's intervention yield better results than previous attempts by
Somalia's neighbours?
Article | 4 November 2011 - 10:52am | By Peter
Lockwood<http://thinkafricapress.com/author/peter-lockwood>
Nairobi, Kenya:
After hearing the surprising news of Kenya's intervention in Somalia last week, I found myself further taken aback at the Western media’s remarkably pro-Kenyan stance. In the British newspaper, The Guardian, Simon Tisdell actually claimed<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/17/kenya-intervention-somalia>that Kenya should be “applauded” for its invasion.
History shows that outside intervention has brought grave structural changes and has been destabilising. No other actor is as decisive<http://www.boell.or.ke/downloads/Somalia-engl-i.pdf>to the outcome in Somalia as the government of Ethiopia. Its military occupation of southern Somalia in 2006 is the main catalyst for the armed insurgency; its troops constitute an essential source of protection for the TFG, without which the government would quickly be driven out of the capital; and it enjoys direct backing by the United States.
It is too early to tell what effects the Kenyan invasion will have on
Somali politics, and what new challenges might arise from it. To use Donald
Rumsfeld’s turn <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/3254852.stm> of phrase, there
are countless “unknown unknowns” – things we don’t know we don’t know – and
there is therefore no reason for commentators to assume that improved
security for both Kenya and Somalia is a foregone conclusion. Our best
resource for examining this invasion is to look at cases from the recent
past, and they do not bode well for ordinary Kenyans or Somalis.
The Consequences of Intervention: the Ethiopian National Defence Force
(ENDF) in Somalia
The 2006 Ethiopian invasion had three grave consequences which can be broadly summarised as follows:
First, the progress of the ICU in improving security and developing relations with civil society was immediately torpedoed. The ICU's emergence<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5051588.stm>as a major provider of law and order had a great impact on the lives of ordinary Somalis caught up in the conflicts of various warlords and clan militias. Through an overarching Islamist ideology, which was able to transcend clan allegiance, and a working network of sharia courts in Mogadishu, the ICU had gone a long way to improving security in the capital prior to intervention.
Second, the Ethiopian forces were responsible for serious human rights
abuses and indiscriminate attacks on Somali civilians. In one incident in
Baidoa on April 30, 2006, Ethiopian troops responded to the death of two
ENDF soldiers in a roadside bomb blast by opening fire into a crowded area,
killing 21 civilians. This practice of firing indiscriminately into crowds
of civilians was
noted<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Somalia.pdf>by
a Human Rights Watch report in 2008. For two years, the international
community had simply been looking on as undisciplined ENDF troops acted
with impunity in the name of security and supported the recently-formed and
as yet unpopular Transitional Federal Government (TFG).
Third, and most ominously for the future of Somalia, the invasion served to
empower and energise extremist elements within the country. Al Shabaab,
formerly a militia allied to the ICU, mounted a counter-campaign against
the ENDF, in which they used mortar attacks and suicide bombings with
little regard for civilian life, whilst also
targeting<http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/941/Al-Shabaab_Vows_More_Assassinations>prominent
government and security service figures for assassination. This
particular legacy of the ENDF invasion is one that continues to wreak havoc
in both Kenya and Somalia today.
Mortars in Mogadishu: the record of the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM)
The presence in Mogadishu of AMISOM, a peacekeeping mission created and
operated by the African Union since 2007, has had similarly ambiguous
results for the civilian population. Throughout 2009 and 2010, AMISOM
forces continued to fight Al Shabaab forces who often fired mortars from
populous residential areas, by indiscriminately bombarding areas in
retaliation themselves. Although it was sometimes
unclear<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/08/201081710509786842.html>exactly
where the shells had come from, there is no doubt that the heavy
artillery response of AMISOM caused numerous deaths and injuries in the
capital.
Reports from Human Rights
Watch<http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/02/05/somalia-new-violence-highlights-need-independent-inquiry>also
highlighted AMISOM’s practice of firing indiscriminately at large
groups of civilians. One media
report<http://www.shabelle.net/article.php?id=517>from November 23
2010 reported an AMISOM convoy opening fire on civilians
between Aden Adde and the KM4 roundabout in Mogadishu, a shooting which
left two dead and six injured.
AMISOM's presence in Mogadishu has no doubt been crucial in supporting the
TFG, but it has come at the cost of many innocent parties, Somali and
international. Only last month, AU soldiers were found to have been
responsible for the fatal
shooting<http://en.rsf.org/somalia-malaysian-cameraman-shot-dead-in-02-09-2011,40916.html>of
Malaysian cameraman Noramfaizul Mohd Nor in Mogadishu.
The Kenyan Intervention
One only has to look into the recent past to find clues as to what effects the Kenyan invasion might have for Somalis in the South. Though the current situation in south and central Somalia is very different from that in 2006, the presence of vast numbers of Kenyan troops has the potential to destabilise localised peace-building processes, put Somali civilians at serious risk, and engender more extreme forms of resistance from Al Shabaab.
Already, in Nairobi, we are seeing evidence of the latter occurring
following two separate grenade attacks and the
discovery<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15459960>of a
significant arms cache. The irony of this, as with in 2006, is that an
invasion that purports to establish regional security may have worsened the
situation on both sides of the border. As reports from the NGO Security
Programme have suggested, Al Shabaab's reduced capacity to act in Somalia
may be compensated for by an intensified campaign within Kenya. As
Historian Daniel Branch has recently
written<http://www.opendemocracy.net/daniel-branch/kenya-and-somalia-landscape-of-tension>,
even the suggestion that the Kenyan military will be able to successfully
hold on to a buffer zone has been met with scepticism.
This week it was confirmed that the Kenyan military are acting without the
consent<http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1871/TFG_Against_Kenyas_Incursion_into_Somalia>of
the Transitional Federal Government in invading Somalia. Perhaps the
TFG
also fear repeating the mistakes of the past. The TFG's endorsement of the
widely unpopular ENDF, who had facilitated their installation in Mogadishu,
seriously harmed its credibility and being seen to support another foreign
invasion would no doubt further undermine what is already seen as a weak
government in the eyes of many Somalis. We will have to wait and see which
other lessons from history are recalled and which are forgotten as events
unfold.
*Think Africa Press welcomes inquiries regarding the republication of its articles. If you would like to republish this or any other article for re-print, syndication or educational purposes, please contact: editor_at_thinkafricapress.com*
----[Mailing List for Eritrea Related News ]---- Received on Fri Nov 04 2011 - 07:56:02 EDT
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Nov 04 2011 - 07:56:02 EDT