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From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Sat Nov 06 2010 - 19:08:16 EST
Somalia: The Story Behind Farmajo [Intelligence Brief]
Nov 7, 2010 - 1:52:21 PM
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
President Sharif and the new PM
On October 13, 2010, the president of Somalia's Internationally-recognized
Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad, announced
his selection of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmajo) to replace the T.F.G.'s
former prime minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, who had resigned his
post on September 21 after he had spent the preceding summer locked in a
power struggle with Sh. Sharif.
The nomination of Farmajo came as a surprise to politicians and observers.
In the weeks succeeding Sharmarke's resignation, the Somali media reported
lists of contenders for the position representing factions within the Somali
political class; on none of those lists, among them those published by
Garoweonline. Shabelle Media, and Suna Times, did Farmajo's name appear. He
was not brought up in the reports of the discussions between Sh. Sharif and
sub-clan leaders, parliamentary groups, and stakeholders such as Ethiopia,
Uganda, the United States, and the United Nations Political Office for
Somalia (UNPOS), all of which had their own favorite candidates.
Farmajo, indeed, appeared to come out of nowhere. A political unknown, he
had worked as a young man at the Somali embassy in Washington between 1985
and 1988 under the regime of dictator Siad Barre, and, after Barre was
overthrown, became part of the Somali Diaspora in the United States,
pursuing a career as a municipal official in the Buffalo region of New York
State. He had no experience with Somali politics on the ground and no base
of his own from which to lead. Commentators politely said that he had "no
political baggage."
Closed sources in the Horn of Africa region have shed light on the selection
of Farmajo and the subsequent conflict over his approval by Somalia's
Transitional Federal Parliament, which was consummated on October 31. The
sources' intelligence reveals a continued evolving fractionalization in the
Transitional Federal Institutions that has been exacerbated.
The Story Behind the Story
According to one source, a member of the transitional parliament confirmed
that the nomination of Farmajo had come without any forewarning to the
Somali political class; on October 12, Sh. Sharif arrived in Mogadishu from
Nairobi with Farmajo - "an individual whom we do not know and whom he wants
to name as prime minister."
On further inspection, however, the unknown Farmajo is not entirely innocent
of connection to the intrigues of current T.F.G. politics. According to a
source, Farmajo was chosen from within the presidential palace by Sh.
Sharif's chief of staff Abdikarin Jama, who according to public reports had
grown up with Sh. Sharif in the town of Jowhar in the Middle Shabelle
region, had been an associate of his in the Islamic Courts Union, and had
been his favorite chose for prime minister (he had been prominent on every
list of candidates published by the media). According to the source, Farmajo
is related through his mother to Jama, and both are affiliated with the Ahlu
Sheikh sect, Sh. Sharif's religious group. Farmajo, says the source, is a
supporter of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (A.R.S.), the
organization through which Sh. Sharif entered the T.F.G. in the Djibouti
agreement of 2009. Farmajo, then, is a factional candidate, representing a
small group within the presidential palace that is, in particular,
determined to reduce the power of erstwhile Sh. Sharif ally and A.R.S.
associate, transitional parliamentary speaker Sharif Hassan Sh. Adan, who
was not consulted in the selection of Farmajo and had his own favored
candidate, Said Farah Garad, who was backed by Ethiopia and also did not
appear on lists of candidates published by the media.
The source adds that the bid of the Ahlu Sheikh faction to insert Farmajo
could not have been successful had Washington not become exasperated with
the delay in naming the candidate for prime minister and sided with the Jama
group against Sharif Hassan, while at the same time urging compromise
between the disputants.
Taking Sharif Hassan out of the loop in the selection of the nominee for
prime minister insured that the speaker would fight back when Farmajo faced
parliament for a vote of confidence. The ostensible disagreement between the
president and speaker came over the president's claim that voting was
legally required to be conducted by an open show of hands, and the speaker's
counter-position that voting was required to be by secret ballot.
According to a source, the legal issue, which caused the vote to be delayed
three times, was a based on Sharif Hassan's attempt to bribe
parliamentarians in his favor, and Sh. Sharif's blocking move to insist on
an open vote that he believed would not allow parliamentarians to make
secret deals with the speaker. According to the source, both sides had funds
to influence the vote, with Sharif Hassan having received $(U.S.)1.5 million
from Ethiopia and Sh. Sharif $(U.S.)7.5 million from Arab countries in
addition to $(U.S.)1.5 million more that had been used to buy off Sharmarke.
The machinations of both sides and the delays led to a visit to the airport
in Mogadishu by a delegation of regional actors led by United Nations
special representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, that met with the two
Sharifs and warned them to reach an agreement immediately. The adversaries
reportedly met privately directly afterwards and the deadlock was broken,
with an open vote being held approving Farmajo 297-92-3 on October 31.
According to the source, the next moment of the intrigue will be revealed in
Farmajo's list of proposed cabinet ministers that must be submitted for
approval to parliament within a month after the vote of confidence. The
source reports that some politicians believe that Sharif Hassan has
capitulated and has even lost support among his Rahanweyne clan backers,
whereas others believe that a deal was struck, partly at the behest of
Washington, between Sh. Sharif and Sharif Hassan, giving the latter the
right to stack the cabinet in favor of the old corrupt political elite.
Indicative of the power of Sharif Hassan is the fact that, breaking with
precedent, he was the one, as speaker, swore in Farmajo as prime minister on
November 1.
In any case, says the source, the power struggle will continue with the Ahlu
Sheikh faction making a bid to have the transitional institutions extend
beyond August, 2011 in order to preserve A.R.S. power in the T.F.G., and
Sharif Hassan attempting to unseat Sh. Sharif. New splits are also possible
when parliament convenes to approve Farmajo's cabinet list; some members of
parliament have warned that they will not endorse a list that includes
figures from the old corrupt political elite.
Within this maelstrom of intrigue, Farmajo appears as an inexperienced
player who represents a narrow faction and cannot even serve that base fully
because he is checked by Washington's desire for a compromise with Sharif
Hassan.
Bottom Line
Reports from closed sources make Farmajo's selection intelligible. Farmajo
is an indicator of an ever more narrow hyper-factionalization within the
T.F.G. aided and abetted by default by Washington.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science,
Purdue University in Chicago weinstem@purdue.edu
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