From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Fri Jul 16 2010 - 10:56:50 EDT
The Realist Prism: In Somalia and Afghanistan, It Takes a Province
Nikolas Gvosdev | Bio
<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/authors/309/nikolas-gvosdev> | 16 Jul
2010
World Politics <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/> Review
U.S. strategies in two key fronts of the ongoing struggle against terrorism
and extremism -- Afghanistan and Somalia -- are predicated on one critical
element: the eventual emergence of a central government that can establish
its writ throughout the territory nominally under its jurisdiction.
And in both cases, the central governments that exist on paper seem to offer
little hope for success. Diplomats may recognize Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed,
the head of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), as president of
Somalia, and Hamid Karzai has held the presidency in Afghanistan for many
years now. But oftentimes it seems that both men are, in essence, the mayors
of Mogadishu
<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/4192/somalia-the-center-cannot-
hold> and Kabul, respectively.
Testifying before the Africa subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs last month, professor
<http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/men061710.pdf> Ken Menkhaus had this
to say (.pdf) about the TFG, which he called the "cornerstone" of U.S.
strategy in Somalia:
Six years into its initial five-year transition, the TFG has utterly failed
across the entire range of tasks it assumed in late 2004. It has failed to
establish itself as a minimally functional government, advance key
transitional tasks, broaden itself as a unity government, and extend its
authority beyond a few neighborhoods of Mogadishu protected by African Union
peacekeepers. It has done nothing to improve the security of its citizens or
provide them access to basic services. It has not improved conditions for
the private sector. It has not facilitated the flow and planning of
international development aid and humanitarian assistance. And it has not
proven to be a useful partner for external states seeking to monitor and
reduce the security threats emanating from Somalia.
The problems faced by the central government in Afghanistan are perhaps more
widely known. Former Deputy National Security Adviser Bob Blackwill summed
<http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/39432.html#ixzz0tff2D64L> them
up as follows:
Afghan President Hamid Karzai's deeply corrupt government -- as unpopular as
the Taliban -- shows no sign of improvement, and Afghanistan has no history
of a robust central government. Allied efforts to substitute Western
nation-building for Afghan nation-building will continue to fall short.
In both cases, however, the U.S. approach is to focus on strengthening a
central government in the hope that it can somehow extend its control, with
Washington providing aid and assistance, as well as direct military
intervention in the case of Afghanistan.
Less time, of course, has been spent on the fundamental question of whether
or not the two countries really have central governments that can fulfill
the roles envisioned for them. Moreover, Washington has been reluctant to
engage more-promising regional governments for fear of encouraging
separatism.
That may change, however, as the Obama administration faces the prospect of
diminishing resources, which could spur Washington to rethink its insistence
on dealing with central governments.
J. Peter Pham, a longtime Africa observer, argues
<http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.6671/pub_detail.asp>
that just such a course correction
<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/4182/time-to-stop-meddling-in-s
omalia> is now needed in U.S. policy toward Somalia:
It is high time that the United States and Somalia's other international
partners look after their own legitimate interests and refocus their
energies on minimizing and containing the harm caused by the interim
regime's ineffectiveness and corruption, while strengthening those
functional parts of the former Somali state and integrating them into the
framework for regional security and stability.
In particular, he makes the case for dealing directly with Somaliland, even
if, for political reasons, the United States and Europe are reluctant to
endorse its claims to full independence.
When it comes to Afghanistan, Blackwill similarly advises the administration
to pursue a de facto partition, which "offers the best available U.S.
alternative to strategic defeat. . . . We would then focus on defending the
northern and western regions -- containing roughly 60 percent of the
population. These areas, including Kabul, are not Pashtun-dominated, and
locals are largely sympathetic to U.S. efforts."
These are provocative positions, at odds with current U.S. policies in both
Somalia and Afghanistan, and Blackwill, in particular, is under no illusions
that a de facto partition will offer an automatic guarantee of success. But
in the absence of any signs of real progress in terms of creating a viable
central government in Somalia, and with real concerns about whether the
McChrystal-Petraeus strategy can turn things around in Afghanistan given the
timetable imposed by U.S. domestic politics, having "plan Bs" is important.
The State Department is understandably concerned about encouraging anything
that might challenge the territorial integrity of a state -- particularly
when it comes to Somalia, given the fragility of countries throughout Africa
and the damage that encouraging separatism can do in terms of stability. But
our experience in balancing Kurdish demands for independence with preserving
the overall territorial integrity of the Iraqi state might give us a model
for being able to work much more effectively -- and directly -- with
regional authorities that have proven track records in both Afghanistan and
Somalia. In particular, if local leaders are offered guarantees that they
will be able to retain their autonomy in an eventually united Somalia or
Afghanistan, they might be willing to forego any separatist claims they are
currently advancing.
We already have such entities in place in Somalia -- Somaliland and
Puntland. In Afghanistan, more of an effort should be devoted to
strengthening provincial institutions. While the Afghan presidential
election took up much of the time and effort of the international community
in 2009, working from the district level upward -- to create effective
provinces and groups of provinces, rather than putting all our hopes in a
strengthened and responsive central government -- might be a better use of
resources that will grow increasingly scarce over time.
Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest, and a
frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media.
He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. The views
expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the Navy or the U.S.
government. His weekly WPR column, The Realist Prism
<http://worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/articles/therealistprism> , appears
every Friday.
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