From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Thu Jul 15 2010 - 18:20:31 EDT
Kampala Bombings Cause Somali Blackout
by James Gundun
Global Research <http://www.globalresearch.ca> , July 15, 2010
Somalia has finally "surprised" and "shocked" the world - but predictability
doesn't make the obtuse international reaction any easier to digest. The
bombings in Kampala are atrocious. Yet with inane reports like
<http://www.newsweek-interactive.com/2010/07/12/the-rise-of-al-shabab.html?f
rom=rss> "Who is al-Shabab" and
<http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Al-Shabab-Militant-Group-Seeks-
to-Replace-Somali-Government--98273344.html> "al-Shabab seeks to replace
government," the setup is clearly on too.
The lights have been switched off.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/world/africa/13policy.html?_r=1&ref=world
>
Reporting from the Western media is dangerously blacked out, distorting
Somalia's instability to generate the appropriate reaction in their
populaces. Africa's media offers a more complete account, although it's
trending in the same direction. The possibility of military retaliation has
quickly arisen as Western governments orchestrate the media machine to their
best ability.
"The links between al Qaeda and al Shabaab are stronger" and training
together,
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703283004575363421023828364.h
tml?mod=googlenews_wsj> according to some brilliant analysis by David Shinn,
former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia and "expert on al Shabaab."
But using public relations to deflect reality ends in futile strategy.
Rather than illuminating Somalia's crisis, the Kampala bombings are being
exploited to destroy incriminating evidence. Why single out al-Shabab and
al-Qaeda when so many other factors are equally to blame? "Evil terrorists"
only explains so much. All the blame is being pinned on them in the heat of
the moment.
Thus less attention has fallen on the weak Transitional Federal Government
(TFG), whose commendable attempt to survive merely funnels US arms to
al-Shabab through Somalia's black market. Corruption of millions in US and
EU aid remains rampant.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/world/africa/17somalia.html> Child
soldiers wielding US arms go unmentioned as do heavy-handed, unpopular
African Union (AU) troops untrained in counterinsurgency and responsible for
scores of civilian deaths.
<http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/africa/decapua-congress-somalia-17jun1
0-96580309.html> African experts recently testified to the US Congress that
supporting the TFG without oversight does more harm than good.
Meanwhile Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, al-Qaeda's former chief in Somalia, pops
up sparingly and only to invoke the SEAL strike that killed him in September
2009. That al-Shabab and al-Qaeda
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8491329.stm> officially allied together
in February 2010 goes unsaid. It's useless for people to realize that
targeted assassinations have minimal effect.
And scant reporting has downplayed Uganda's
<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hvJv3reg2E5mOaGC1hsYXOp-
fc2A> new deployment of 2,000 emergency troops to Mogadishu, as requested by
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Uganda's story runs
deeper than being one of two contributors to the AU force (Burundi being the
other), and the deployment sparked fears that Ethiopia, generally disliked
in Somalia, is on deck. Specific references that Somalia had reached a
tipping point are similarly neglected; most reports opt for the standard
copy-and-paste biography. Yet Blackhawk Down hasn't been referenced much
either. None of Washington's sordid history in Somalia is.
All the back-story to Kampala has been edited out, leaving it the hollow
shell of a "pointlessly brutal" al-Qaeda attack. A freeze frame of
explosions and blood soaked American teenagers for Western consumption.
Kampala's tragedy isn't isolated, but orbits the larger tragedy in Somalia.
Uganda deployed more troops without a strategy and al-Shabab retaliated.
This war is ongoing and more troops beget more violence, as they've already
started to do. One cannot expect Uganda or other African nations to deploy
troops without consequence when blood has stained everyone's hands. Nor can
one blame al-Qaeda for outmaneuvering America from Afghanistan into Somalia.
Unfortunately President Barack Obama automatically pledged "any support and
assistance" to Uganda. Helping a US ally is one thing but FBI teams are just
the beginning of a security rollout, thus Obama's decision will likely
exacerbate the conflict. Lt. Col. Felix Kulaigye, army spokesman for Uganda,
ominously told reporters, "Al-Shabab is the reason why we should stay in
Somalia. We have to pacify Somalia."
That attitude has brought and will continue to bring chaos to Somalia.
Glints of truth can still be spotted amidst the smoke of Kampala. William
Braniff, a US instructor at the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point,
advises, "Regionalization of the conflict is a rational strategy for al
Shabaab. They are stronger when there are foreign boots on the ground, and
weaker otherwise." Where he is at a time like now?
Afyare Abdi Elmi, another al-Shabab expert,
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201007121280.html> predicts of the bombing,
"It will invoke an interventionist mood in the region and within the
international community. This might create an atmosphere where Somalia is a
free for all and a number of troops are invited and come and go."
Many Somalis themselves, much as they dread al-Shabab, also fear that
overreaction from the West or Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia - all US allies.
Unfortunately none of this seems to matter. The world's strategy up until
Kampala and its subsequent reaction offers few reasons to expect a sound
counter-response. In fact the main hope is that very overreaction.
Washington officials closely monitoring the US and international media
understand the threat of military retaliation is highly anticipated. But
al-Shabab and al-Qaeda's actions suggest that its bombs possess dual
motives: deterrence against additional forces and bait into the trap. They
expect retaliation and will strike US allies if attacked by US forces; if
not they continue about their war.
Either outcome serves their purpose.
The West can keep blaming al-Shabab and al-Qaeda, but that won't stabilize
the conflict. Though the temptation may be to perceive AU or US troops as
liberators, given that al-Shabab's popular support is low, they would likely
throw dynamite on the fire. Going in is easy. Instead Somalia needs a
full-spectrum exit strategy, and the countdown for a solution is running
out. The smart political play thus aligns with the best counterinsurgency:
fusing international and regional diplomacy into a tone-down reaction that
doesn't further inflame the region.
What's needed to avert a military catastrophe is a grand political strategy
- an international Task Force for Somalia. The failed state rivals Iraq or
Afghanistan and yet receives a fraction of the time and resources. Not only
does a Task Force appear to be the most realistic solution to the conflict
(despite its apparent idealism), nearly every actor is calling for
international intervention.
Last week President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, armed with an AK-47, spearheaded
the front lines to rally the nation.
<http://af.reuters.com/article/ugandaNews/idAFLDE66901V20100710> He told
Reuters after returning to Mogadishu, "Things have gone beyond a level we
can tolerate so there is an urgent need for international or regional help.
My government can do little to forge its institutional duties because of
constant attacks."
The same demand came from Sunni militia Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, formerly
allied with the government and now dangerously isolated
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201007090610.html> after falling out with the
TFG. Upon denouncing the TFG group spokesman Abu Yusuf Al-Qadi added, "We
are requesting from the international community to know and see that the
government had violated the deal signed." He wants international assistance
too.
And Kenya's Foreign Minister, Moses M. Wetangula, warned days before the
Kampala bombings, "The levels of engagement of the United States, the levels
of commitment, have been below our expectations. America, remember, enjoys
the status currently of the only superpower, expected to have the capacity
to do some of the things countries with limited capacity like ourselves
cannot do, including enforcing Security Council resolutions."
Now add in General David Petraeus's
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/25/world/25military.html?_r=1&hp> Special
Forces directive that expanded operations in Somalia, plus the SEAL raid on
Nabhan, an event which solidified al-Qaeda and al-Shabab's alliance. It
becomes clear that the West's response to Somalia has remained
military-centric despite a change in rhetoric. Reversing this mindset is
critical to the mission.
Wetangula illuminates what a potential Task Force may look like: several US
officials to act in the UN, EU officials to oversee regional initiatives, a
heavy African unit comprised of high-level officials from all of Somalia's
neighbors, and representation from Somaliland and Puntiland to exercise
regional authority with TFG. Egyptian and Saudi Arabian officials may also
be enlisted for the purpose of Islamic reintegration programs. A dozen or so
members could form the team, America operating from the back and Africans up
front.
Restoring the TFG to working order would be the first task, either by
reforming it or disbanding and replacing it with a more solid structure.
This would necessitate a deep level of participation from Somalia's local
power-brokers, who must be recruited to play an active role in the Task
Force. A bottom-up strategy will never succeed without assistance from the
top, making it essential to promote diplomats who sincerely understand they
serve the Somali people.
Among many secondary issues to address are investigations into the TFG's use
- and America's arming - of child soldiers and the harassing of journalists
who reported on the story. At the top of the list: a regional construct for
Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland, a peace treaty with Ethiopia, piracy
(which will never be solved at sea), and proxy negotiations with militant
groups. None of this will be easy, cheap, or quick.
The Task Force's ultimate objective, as politics alone won't resolve the
conflict, is devising an all-encompassing framework to run potential
AU/EU/US military operations through, or a more robust UN peacekeeping
mission. This isn't advocation of those operations, only the acceptance of
their inevitability. The Task Force must minimize the need for military
action and alleviate negative reaction through the proper political and
cultural knowledge. And it must act before al-Qaeda strikes a Western target
from Somalia, before Ethiopian or US brigades are forced to storm Mogadishu
and other al-Shabab positions.
Before the war is lost for good.
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