From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Fri Jun 18 2010 - 13:42:05 EDT
Featured Article: The Horn of Africa: Critical Analysis of Conflict
Management and Strategies for Success in the Horn's Future
18/06/2010
Conflict management in the Horn of Africa has been relatively unsuccessful.
Foreign colonialism created boundaries that have yet to be resolved, and
newly independent nations engaged in conflicts responsible for human rights
atrocities, child conscription, and collapse of state infrastructure. Cold
War superpower intervention did little more than arm opposing parties with
millions of dollars in military weapons that continue to propagate violence
and death. Oppressive regimes rise and fall in the form of communist juntas,
dictators, and rivaling militias, warlords, and clan leaders. Ethiopia and
Eritrea continue to slaughter one another with little reprieve, and Somalia
is a failed state.
Mediation of conflicts in the Horn occurs locally, regionally, and through
the international community. Each form requires different communication
strategies that must be implemented to be successful. Local conflict
management requires communication channels to be easily accessible and
frequently utilized. States that communicate often tend to be more rational
in their policies toward one another because aims are better defined and
have less chance of being unresolved or misunderstood. However, the Horn's
nations hardly promote communication. Little is said between nations before
action occurs and even less is communicated mid-conflict. When negotiations
do occur, parties are typically accusatory, and more than once parties have
walked out on negotiations.
To be sure, frequent communication is best face to face; it fosters trust
and negotiation through mediation instead of violence. Unfortunately, the
culture of the Horn is characterized by distrust and suspicion, so regional
intervention has been necessary. Usually regional intervention offers
rivaling states a third party's good offices. These services must be offered
by a mutually trusted, neutral agent otherwise arbitration will fail. Often,
third parties will simply provide a neutral location for negotiations to
occur. Locations that are biased toward one party or the other will
immediately put the visiting party in a defensive posture and can limit the
efficacy of collaborative talks before they begin. Third parties may also
perform an inquiry to establish the facts of the dispute and subsequently
offer acceptable solutions. Regional third parties have acted in the Horn,
but resulted in little success for reasons to be later examined. In this
region, third parties must be carefully selected; mediators have been
difficult to designate due to alliance swapping, perceptions of illegitimate
representatives, and a deep-rooted cultural adherence to war, deception, and
distrust.
Finally, conflict management is conducted through the international
community. Various nations have influenced the Horn, including the colonial
powers of Britain, France, and Italy, later replaced by the Cold War
superpower influence of the United States and the Soviet Union. The United
Nations has attempted interventions since the early 1990s, most notably
through peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is strictly defined as UN troops
physically separating two sides after an armed conflict and is not meant to
be enforcement or collective security. UN peacekeeping in the Horn developed
into peace enforcement, which resulted in disaster for the United States and
the UN immediately following the fall of Somali dictator, Siad Barre. Later
examination will suggest that intervention by the international community is
a primary reason for continued conflict in the Horn.
Total conflict resolution in the Horn may be chimerical, but conflicts can
be successfully managed if diplomatic strategies focus on opening political
space through communication between leaders of nations, factions, militias,
and clans. In Ethiopia and Eritrea, the boundary has yet to be demarcated,
and the political elite push their agenda through violence. Minimal
communication between nations suffocates political space, and people living
on the border are forced into violent action. In Somalia there is also
little room for dissention, but the problem there rests on the validity of
representatives. Peace conferences have previously excluded certain groups,
and the resulting backlash was often violent. Opening a forum for all
parties to actively communicate could negate the winner-take-all mentality,
and allow diplomacy to be effective. However, political space can allow
peaceful dissent only if it is simultaneously promoted with public
accountability and representation.
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF STATE CONFLICT
The Horn of Africa is known for being riddled with conflict. The great
northeastern shield of Africa is comprised of Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and
Djibouti, and conflict persists in all four nations. The disagreements
between these nations are longstanding and complex, described as first a
clash of tribes, then imperial consolidation and foreign colonialism. Once
independent, these expectant nations desired to test their newfound
sovereignty, which was complicated by superpower support during the years of
the Cold War. Violence continued through revolution, fractured militia
competition, and a failed state. To understand the progression of the Horn's
conflicts, colonization of the region must first be examined.
Colonialism
The Horn of Africa, not including Ethiopia, was colonized at the end of the
nineteenth century between the French, British, and Italians. Djibouti was
designated French Somaliland in 1885; British Somaliland included the region
of the Gulf of Aden, and Italian Somaliland included control of the region
nearest the Indian Ocean, as well as the Red Sea colony of Eritrea.
In Ripe for Resolution, I.W. Zartman suggests Ethiopia's expansion eastward
into colonial Somaliland necessitated the boundaries that were established
through European agreement in 1897. The British eventually demarcated their
frontier in 1932-34 by joint agreement, but the Italian boundary was never
demarcated. In an effort to claim more territory, the Italians launched an
invasion against Ethiopia under the pretext that the Ethiopians were within
Italian Somaliland. In fact, the Ethiopians were within their own border,
but the invasion effectively moved the Somali boundary westward to include
the grazing area of the Ogaden, an Ethiopian portion of the Horn of Africa.
Subsequently, the Ogaden was returned to Ethiopian administration. However,
the boundary became a barrier to nomadic migration. This was an unacceptable
proposition for the Somalis, and a border dispute between Italian Somaliland
and Ethiopia followed. Despite negotiation, arbitration, and mediation,
little was resolved.
This Italian Somali-Ethiopian border dispute was a direct result of
colonialism in the region. Borders imposed on Somalia and Ethiopia were
something that the "Somali nomads had neither needed nor encountered before"
and were ambiguously assigned, hung on non-existent points, or established
around nomadic tribe and clan territory (1985 p.75). This resulted in
tensions between two nations that both relied on a common region for nomadic
survival. The Ethiopians were "arguing a legal case over where the border
was, and the Italians [were] arguing a social-moral case on behalf of the
Somalis over where the border should be" (1985 p.76). The Ethiopians were
justified to claim the territory by law, and the Somalis were convinced of
their claim through colonial power support.
Despite Italian support, colonial Somaliland gained nothing from the
dispute. Somali bitterness toward colonial rule led to independence
movements that resulted in a united Somalia by 1960. This newly emergent
state of Somalia was comprised of tribal leadership and had no continuity
for central governance. Consequently, tumultuous power struggles ensued and
the development of relationships between bordering nations created conflict
as the new state struggled to establish its identity in the region.
States that must develop fundamental structures of their relationships,
compared with altering established relationships, have difficulty
maintaining order because their diplomatic process has no continuity. In the
border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia, the nations were forced to
develop a new system of interaction because of the formation of boundaries
and creation of the Somali state. This claim is also observable in Eritrea's
call for independence from Ethiopia. When Ethiopia's government changed from
a traditional empire to that of a military junta, a new form of negotiation
was forced to occur, and the conflict grew in complexity. The following
section examines the conflicts associated with independence movements in the
region.
Independence and Rising Conflict
British and Italian Somalilands gained independence the summer of 1960 and
formed the Somali Republic. Newly united inhabitants shared the general hope
that Somalis living under Ethiopian rule would soon join them once the past
fluctuation of the region's provisional boundary was resolved. However,
Ethiopia was not willing to offer Somalia control of the region.
Unexpectedly rebuffed, irregular Somali guerillas began harassing residents
of the Ogaden. The guerillas' numbers steadily rose until Ethiopia sent its
army in October 1963, causing the conflict to evolve into conventional war
until a ceasefire was called in April 1964.
The United States became the principal source of external support to
Ethiopia as early as 1950. Still, the United States attempted to provide
economic and military aid to Somalia during the Ogaden conflict in an effort
to undermine Soviet influence. In 1963, the United States, Italy, and
Germany offered a $10million package to Somalia to build its conventional
army in order to face large Ethiopian armed forces. However, Somalia was not
persuaded to reject its treaty of friendship with Russia for so meager an
offer, and contracted Soviet military aid for three times the sum.
Bargaining with Cold War superpowers became typical in the region, and
eventually contributed to alliance swapping that directly resulted in
continued regional conflict through endless arms supplies.
At the same time, Eritrea, which had been an Italian colony from 1882 to
1941, was federated with Ethiopia from 1952 to 1962. It was then that the
emperor of Ethiopia "made the great tactical error of abolishing [Eritrea's]
privileged status" by dissolving its parliament and annexing the country.
Eritrea adamantly refused to forfeit its autonomy and broke out in revolt,
"led by a number of faction-ridden but highly effective Marxist movements"
that would last for 30 years, between the years 1961-1991, before gaining
independence from Ethiopia (1985 p. 78).
Djibouti continued under French Rule, to the chagrin of the Somalis who had
expected it to join their new nation state. Unlike the Ogaden, Djibouti was
a part of the Ethiopian economy. However, it had little chance of being
joined with Ethiopia since it had never been under Ethiopian rule. Ethiopian
interests were therefore served, along with those of the French, by staving
off the Somali claim. The French refusal of a union with the other Somalis
kept the colony from being absorbed by Somalia. In 1967, the colony became
the French Territory of the Afars and Issas before attaining its
independence as the Republic of Djibouti in 1977.
Many Third World nations, once receiving independence from colonial rule,
continue to be influenced by a stronger party. This is true in the Horn as
well, but colonial powers were replaced by the United States and Soviet
Union. This is important because superpower influence and East-West rivalry
kept military stocks in endless supply, allowing rising conflicts to develop
into crises that would continue far longer than they would have been able to
otherwise.
The Cold War and East-West Intervention
The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Horn
of Africa helped destroy international credibility in conflict mediation;
instead of lending their influence for resolution, they used it to
perpetuate conflict to continue their interests in a geostrategic location.
Their presence funded wars that would have otherwise been unable to
continue. This funding additionally propped up dictatorial regimes that were
guilty of horrific crimes against humanity, and led to the eventual collapse
of Somalia and its armament of dozens of militias.
The entire region was important to the United States and Soviet Union,
particularly before the age of satellites, for its location. Additionally,
Somalia's extensive coastline allowed for port development opportunities to
the East and the Indian Ocean. An alliance with Ethiopia provided a regional
power base with opportunities for internal economic/political cooperation.
Both Ethiopia and Somalia had reason to make strong allies of world
superpowers. Ethiopia desired regional hegemony, and its "size, military
strength, and geographic position would make it the dominant state. [but]
underdevelopment and tenuous national unity kept this role out of its reach"
(1985 p. 82). Somalia desired control of the Ogaden region, but could not
do so without matching Ethiopia's conventional army. Before the United
States and Soviet Union left the region, they each intervened in both
countries and dramatically reversed alliances mid-conflict.
The United States initially aligned itself with Ethiopia, which retained
control of Eritrea where the U.S. had a base for strategic global military
communications. When conflict erupted between Ethiopia and Eritrea,
Washington pressured Ethiopia's leadership against using an untrained
peasant militia in Eritrea. In a subsequent slaughter of Eritreans, Ethiopia
was rendered ineligible for military aid when the Carter administration
placed Ethiopia on a list of human rights violators. United States arms
shipments to Ethiopia were suspended just as the nation was running out of
ammunition in its struggles against Eritrean and Somali insurgents.
Therefore, to continue fighting Eritrea and Somalia, Ethiopia needed
military aid. Since arms were no longer provided by the United States or
other western powers, Ethiopia turned to communist nations. The Soviets,
recognizing the benefits of allying with Ethiopia, brokered a $1 billion
arms deal and signed a treaty of friendship with Ethiopia. Simultaneously
the Soviet Union continued their presence in Somalia. This transition of
alliances briefly afforded the Soviet Union friendly relations with both
nations, providing an opportunity for conflict management. This is evident
when, in 1977, both sides were so low on military supplies that a stalemate
would have resulted if arms providers had refused to continue stocking the
region. Instead, Russia exacerbated the conflict when it signed a treaty
with Ethiopia, swapped alliances, and instigated continued arms build-up.
Meanwhile, the United States had lost its influence in the region and was
left to the sidelines as an ineffective bystander.
The war in the Ogaden is representative of conflicts that require mutually
painful stalemates before bilateral solutions are considered conceivable.
During the Ogaden conflict, Somali leadership ambiguously defined success
against Ethiopia, and overextended Somalia's means, which drew out the
conflict. This resulted in a stalemate, but not as intolerable to Ethiopia
as it was to Somalia. The continued military funding by the U.S. and Soviet
Union provided each side the resources to continue, and a conclusion could
not be reached.
In the midst of conflicting East-West interests, tumultuous civil
environments emerged. Newly independent states struggled with their identity
and the result was violent opposition to emerging political ideologies.
Power struggles in every nation of the Horn are responsible for regional
volatility and hundreds of thousands of deaths, as highlighted below.
CIVIL STRIFE
Internal conflict has emerged in every nation of the Horn. In Ethiopia,
resistance emerged when the Dergue, a communist military junta, came to
power. Opposition groups eventually dissolved the Dergue, but the key
players remained in power and conflicting political ideologies instigated
the emergence of various rebel groups. In Eritrea, rebels fought for their
independence against Ethiopia after the dissolution of the Eritrean
parliament and revocation of its right to autonomy. However, once control
of the region was wrested, Eritrean guerilla groups and fighters from the
Tigre turned on each other. Conflict in Somalia surfaced when Somali
dictator, Siad Barre, attempted to promote greater Somali nationalism
through the dissolution of clan power. Fierce clan opposition eventually led
to his overthrow and to the power vacuum that, to this day, has yet to be
filled. Even Djibouti, which had abstained from much of the region's
conflict, was not immune to internal power struggles.
Through the examination of these nations' civil conflicts, a common thread
can be established. It will be determined that civil turbulence in the Horn
will continue until the public takes ownership of the resolution process.
Only after public accountability is established, and an option created for
opposition groups to meet their goals through peaceful disagreement, can
progress can be made.
Ethiopia: The Dergue, Mengistu, and Opposition Groups
Ethiopian civil conflict emerged with the Dergue, a communist military junta
that came to power following the removal and imprisonment of Emperor Haile
Selassie. The monarchy was formally abolished in May 1975, and Marxism was
proclaimed the ideology of the state. Up to this point, the United States
was allied with Ethiopia; the declaration of Marxism as the state's ideology
created a stark divide between those subscribing to the political doctrine
of either superpower. The rise of the Dergue, along with this division,
brought civil war. During the years 1975-1977, called the Red Terror, the
Dergue and its opposition engaged in a brutal policy of "execution,
assassination, torture, and imprisonment of tens of thousands without
trial." After the Dergue destroyed its opposition, it successfully fought
off an invasion from Somalia and then engaged in war against Eritrean rebels
(Library of Congress 1993 DT272.E83).
Guerrillas fighting for Eritrean independence took advantage of the
opportunity to further frustrate Ethiopian leadership by aligning themselves
with various opposition groups, such as the Tigrean Peoples' Liberation
Front (TPLF), Ethiopian Democratic Union, and the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Party. While countering these rebels, the Dergue leadership
fought one another. The struggle for power resulted in numerous appointments
and removals (or executions) of various heads of the Dergue.
Of the many Dergue commanders, Mengistu Haile Marian was able to retain
control after being appointed Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. He
utilized his post to wrest control of the country and gained popularity by
formally dissolving the Dergue. He replaced it with the People's Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) but, despite the leadership party change and
construction of a new constitution, many government positions within the
Central Committee and the Politburo of the Worker's Party of Ethiopia (WPE)
were filled by Dergue members. Mengistu continued his role as Commander in
Chief of the Armed forces but additionally acted as President of the PDRE
and Secretary General of the WPE (Library of Congress 1993 DT272.E83). He
remained in power until deposed in 1991.
During Mengistu's reign, discord in Ethiopia was further aggravated by
conflict in Eritrea. Conflict was created during Emperor Selassie's reign
when Ethiopia dissolved Eritrea's parliament and negated its right to
autonomy. Eritrea's subsequent declaration of independence and revolt by
various rebel groups prompted a venerable crisis between the two nations,
characterized by human rights atrocities committed by both sides.
Eritrea and Its Call for Independence
Eritrea demanded its independence when Emperor Selassie dissolved its
parliament and created fierce opposition between the two nations. When the
Dergue came to power, they imposed a military settlement on the Eritean
Liberation Front and the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front (EPLF). However,
the Dergue's invasion of Eritrea was unsuccessful; by 1978, Eritrean rebel
groups controlled nearly all of the countryside. Despite controlling major
cities, the Dergue were unable to suppress the rebellion.
In addition to the Eritrean secessionists, other rebel groups remained
highly active, including the TPLF, the Oromo Liberation Front, and the
Somali Abo Liberation Front. These groups gained control of the countryside
in southern Eritrea, while other groups remained active in the cities in an
effort to frustrate Ethiopian military operations. By 1978, Eritrea was no
longer under Ethiopian control. Between years 1982-1985, the EPLF and
Mengistu's regime held an unsuccessful series of talks in an effort to
resolve the conflict. However, both parties were convinced that their goals
would be met through victory, and both believed that they would soon be
victorious. Each side remained resolute in an effort to demonstrate its
commitment to its objectives; they each believed the time was ripe for
winning, not for resolving.
By 1987, rebel groups in "Eritrea and the Tigre controlled at least 90
percent of both regions" and in 1991, the EPLF "set up a provisional
government. under Issaias Afwerki," (ACED 2000). In 1993, a referendum
resulted in 98 percent of voters favoring Eritrean independence, and the
nation received its independence later that same year. Believing the
conflict resolved after Eritrea won its independence, the international
community expressed its relief. This relief was, however, short lived.
Barely five years passed before war broke out between the two nations under
a different pretense. This demonstrates the multiple dimensions of conflict,
and will be further examined.
Meanwhile, in neighboring Djibouti, a different type of civil conflict
erupted. The civil unrest in Djibouti was the result of ethnic
disgruntlement. While many African nations have experienced similar clashes,
many of those conflicts occur from historic resentment of one group toward
another. The hostility in Djibouti was not deep-rooted, and the government's
response to opposition demonstrated adequate local mediation procedures
that allowed it to resolve its internal unrest quickly and effectively.
Djibouti and FRUD
Djibouti was historically nomadic, comprised of Issa Somalis and Afars.
After gaining independence in 1977, Djibouti's first election was held and
resulted in Hassan Gouled Aptidon, an Issa, being elected the nation's first
president. He appointed both Issas and Afars so that his cabinet was roughly
balanced, but the dominance of Issas in his administration led to political
criticism. Despite this, Gouled was reelected, without opposition, in 1981
and 1987.
Throughout the 1980s, Gouled faced growing dissatisfaction from the Afar
population, who believed that his administration did not accurately
represent Afars. The height of this criticism resulted in an uprising in
1991 by Afar guerrillas, calling themselves the Front for the Restoration of
Unity and Democracy (FRUD). FRUD's activities resulted in the deployment of
French troops; after some skirmishes, a ceasefire was declared by the Afars
in 1992. When fighting persisted, the government launched a successful
counteroffensive that disarmed the majority of the FRUD by 1994. The
conflict was further resolved through the integration of a portion of the
FRUD into Djibouti military ranks, and two FRUD leaders later accepted
ministerial posts. In March 1996 the FRUD was given legal recognition as a
political party.
Djibouti leadership provided the political space for opposition groups to
disagree peacefully by assimilating them into the political landscape. The
government asserted its power to control violence, but did not
authoritatively forbid disagreement or react with unnecessary bloodshed to
assert its dominance.
Somalia: Siad Barre, Clan Opposition, and the Emergence of Warlords
In complete contrast to Djibouti's conflict management, Somalia shows little
hope for resolution in the near future. In Somalia: A Country Study by Helen
Chapin Metz, instability and conflict arose almost immediately following
Somalia's independence in 1960. Somalia's second president was assassinated
in 1969, and during the power vacuum that followed, the military staged a
coup. Siad Barre was installed as the president of Somalia's new government,
the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), which arrested members of the
former government and banned all political parties. The National Assembly
was also abolished, and the constitution suspended (1992 p. 2).
Barre attempted to promote a stronger sense of nationalism by minimizing the
importance of clan affiliation within government and civil society. If
successful, he might have negated the ability of clans and sub-clans to
undermine the rule of central government, but he succeeded only in
instigating fierce opposition with various clan-based rebel groups. In an
effort to quell opposition, Barre engaged in oppressive dictatorial rule,
characterized by persecution, jailing and torture of political opponents and
dissidents. The United Nations Development Program described "the 21-year
regime of Siad Barre [as] one of the worst human rights records in Africa,"
(2001 p. 42). The Africa Watch Committee agreed, submitting, "both the urban
population and nomads living in the countryside [were] subjected to summary
killings, arbitrary arrest, detention in squalid conditions, torture, rape,
crippling constraints on freedom of movement and expression and a pattern of
psychological intimidation" (1990 p. 9).
In an effort to incorporate various territories inhabited by Somalis into a
Greater Somalia, Barre sent the Somali national army into the Ogaden in
1977. War subsequently broke out in the region, and the Somalis were
initially successful, capturing much of the territory. When the Soviet Union
shifted its support to Ethiopia and halted its supplies to Barre's regime,
the invasion abruptly ended and the Somali troops were forced out of the
Ogaden by 1978. Following this event, Barre tore up his treaty with the
Soviets and welcomed United States military and economic aid. This action
ensured that his offensives would be adequately armed, and additionally
facilitated the alliance swapping that occurred between Ethiopia, Somalia
and the Cold War superpowers.
Barre never gained control of the Ogaden, and in the early 1990s, his brutal
dictatorship was overthrown. Warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid and his rebel
group, the United Somali Congress, invaded the country's capital and fought
government forces. Aidid ousted Barre in January 1991, and later declared
himself President of Somalia in June 1995. Aidid's government was not
internationally recognized and his leadership was fiercely contested,
particularly by Ali Mahdi Muhammad. However, Aidid and Mahdi were not the
only figures vying for power. With an absence of established government, a
power vacuum emerged and all political and military leaders from Barre's
fallen regime took up arms, made available through the millions of dollars
worth of weaponry provided by the Soviet Union and United States.
Militias sprouted under the leadership of members of Barre's fallen regime
as well as that of the various clans. Clans had been a target of Barre's
regime; when the clans had a common enemy, they worked commonly. With that
enemy fallen, their ideals began to clash, and each clan hungered to
establish itself superior over the others. Warlords emerged from the ranks
of the former military and also through the endorsement of clan elders and
sub-clan leaders. The number of warlords is as numerous as the various
freedom movements they lead: Botan Ise Alin and the Somali Transitional
Government, Osman Hassan Ali Atto and the Somali National Alliance, Mohamed
Omar Habeb and the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council, Hussein
Mohamed Farrah, former U.S. Marine and replacement for father Aidid as
president, Omar Muhamoud Finnish and Muse Sudi Yalahow of the joined United
Somali Congress/Somali Salvation Alliance, Abdi Hasan Awale and the Somali
National Alliance, Aaden Saransoor Rahanweyn and the Resistance Army, just
to name a few.
Internal conflict in Somalia follows a similar pattern to its conflict with
Ethiopia; there is no clear stalemate in the region, no representative that
conflicting parties consider valid. Power-sharing has been unsuccessful and
anarchy threatens to tear the nation apart. The social fabric of Somalia has
been so fractured by the various clan alliances, public support, and secret
international interests in different liberation groups and ideological
organizations that no single entity has emerged as the predominant power in
Somalia. Since the fall of Barre, Somalia's only constant is general
lawlessness, aggravated by famine and disease. A vicious cycle of resistance
continues, and no one is a viable candidate for conciliation.
NEW DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT
Conflict in the Horn follows general patterns: decolonization power
struggles, independent consolidation, and liberation movements. Complicating
matters further are disputes over poorly defined territory and civil
rivalries over state power-structure. The new dimension to these conflicts,
however, is Somalia's status as a failed state.Somalia's central government
controls little more than a section of the national capital of Mogadishu. A
separatist government controls the North, and rival warlords and clan
leaders control the remainder of the country. This adds a unique dynamic to
conflict resolution in the region because, quite simply, how do you mediate
domestic anarchy? Efforts were undertaken by the international community to
establish peace, but intervention was met with disaster when the United
Nations and United States implemented peace enforcement rather than
peacekeeping.
UN Intervention and the U.S. Debacle
In 1992 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 794 which
overrode the principle of non-interference with domestic affairs on the
legal grounds that Somalia's conflicts endangered international peace and
security. The text demanded that "all parties, movements, and factions in
Somalia desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law" and
confirmed the deployment of 3,500 UN personnel while "welcom[ing] any member
state to establish an operation to create a secure environment [and any
other] member state to participate in that operation," (Res 794).
This resolution was necessary after the cessation of central government
resulted in multiple rival militias. The skirmishes between those militias,
combined with drought, disrupted the nation's food supplies. Famine
decimated Somalia, killing more than 300,000 people. Endorsed by the United
Nations, the Bush Sr. administration sent 30,000 troops to Somalia to assist
in the distribution of supplies and aid.
Somali response to United States aid was mixed. While many Somalis were
grateful for the supplies, others expressed skepticism and distrust of the
United States, which previously supported the hated dictator, Siad Barre.
Skepticism was fair; the United States did not merely provide aid. In what
is known as mission creep, the U.S. role included disarmament of various
warlords, resulting in armed engagements that were often in urban
environments. The most famous of these engagements led to the death of 18
U.S. marines and army rangers, as well as 1000 Somalis, popularized in the
book and movie, Black Hawk Down.
In 1993, the United States transferred the failing mission to the United
Nations, also distrusted by Somalis because the UN Secretary General,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, also previously supported Barre. The United Nations
shocked the world when they left Somalia, still leaderless, one year after
the Clinton administration recalled all U.S. troops from the region in 1994.
Somalia continues to spiral; internal conflict persists due to the distrust
and competition between the country's network of clans, sub-clans, and
warlords. One of the greatest challenges to conflict management is this very
entrenched clan system that can easily break down into sub-clan rivalries.
Several peace conferences have been called in an effort to bring rival clans
and militias to agreements, but this fundamental issue continues to cause
peace efforts to fail because groups are left out or their legitimacy is
undermined. Mediation is challenged by the task of establishing
reconciliation, and power sharing continues to occur. The latter almost
always fails once party goals are compromised; in Somalia, the mentality
prevails that only complete subjugation of one's opponent through violence
indicates successful resolution.
Ethiopian Intervention
After years of unsuccessful UN-sponsored peace conferences in Somalia,
Ethiopian forces were rumored to be in there training local militias in
support of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). In December 2006,
fighting erupted in Baidoa and Mogadishu between the Ethiopian forces
supporting the TFG, and the militias led by clan leaders of the Puntland
and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that oppose the TFG.
News networks reported Ethiopia's intervention, airing the public rebuke of
Ethiopia by the leader of the ICU, Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, who declared,
"Somalia is in a state of war, and all Somalis should take part in this
struggle against Ethiopia," (CNN 12-2006). This particular statement is of
interest because it highlights that there is still an unresolved issue
between Somalia and Ethiopia, and that this resentment is potentially strong
enough to unite fragmented allegiances to one banner. While it may be
encouraging to note that there is hope for aligning scattered loyalties, it
must be reiterated that the problem has still not been reconciled between
the two nations. Assuming a central government can be reestablished, the
problem will likely be framed again in terms of a national issue and another
conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia is likely.
Following Aweys statement, Ethiopia subsequently stated that it would
actively combat the ICU. Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi,
additionally attested that they were not intending to "meddle in Somalia
affairs" and were only there because they were "forced by the
circumstances," (New York Times 12-2006). By targeting the ICU, Ethiopia was
justifying its presence in Somalia. However, this compounded border disputes
with Eritrea, whose troops were fighting on behalf of the ICU.
Faring little better than the United States or the United Nations,
Ethiopian troops withdrew in 2009. That decision followed a two-year
insurgency that led to a loss of territory as well as a forced power-sharing
deal between the TFG prime minister and an Islamist splinter group, the
Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia. The withdrawal of Ethiopian
troops, and election of the new Islamist leadership in early 2009, has not
brought a conclusion to the conflict. Instead, fighting has merely shifted
into a struggle between hard- line Islamist factions and more moderate
factions within the government.
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT & RESOLUTION IN THE HORN
Crises occur when there is a perceived belief in irreconcilable differences
between parties. Often, the parties simply have different aims or different
interpretations of the change that they want to implement. The primary
barrier to resolution in the Horn is that there are "incompatible
perceptions of a solution. [and] also because the time has been perceived as
ripe for winning, not for resolving." Throughout the Horn's conflicts, a
"sharp identity [has] prevailed," and it becomes difficult to "move away
from the zero-sum problem of sovereignty and turn to more subtle issues of
relations. as a means to make the sum more positive," (1985 p. 96-99).
The sharp identity indicated by Zartman is the fundamental culture of the
Horn, which glorifies war and violent behavior. Perhaps this explains why
four decades of human rights atrocities and child conscription between
Ethiopia and Eritrea has failed to produce any level of anti-war movement.
Attitudes are characterized by deception, suspicion, and domination, and
this mentality directly inhibits conflict management.
Diplomatic Success and Failure in the Horn
What constitutes successful diplomacy in the Horn of Africa? First,
distinctions must be made between conflict management and conflict
resolution, as there are fundamental differences in success between these
two terms.
Conflict itself cannot be totally eliminated. However, resolution can be
reached through careful analysis of the conflict situation by mediators to
help conflicting parties reach goals that no longer conflict. It is rarely
accomplished by direct action, and if it occurs, typically is a result of
the passing of long periods of time. Conflict management is an effort to
prevent conflict from erupting into crisis, or limit the worst excesses of
ongoing conflict through mitigation. If a conflict evolves into violence,
management is restored through such measures as truce agreements and other
conflict settlement, which are historically enacted only after conquest,
defeat, or submission.
The Horn's conflicts are long-standing and complex, and success comes in
tenuous form. In March 1964, Sudanese good offices brought a ceasefire on
the Ethiopian border after inconclusive clashes between the Somali and
Ethiopian armies in the Ogaden, showing successful regional management. In
the late 1960s, after a change in Somali leadership, border disputes were
perceived as a population grievance rather than territorial sovereignty.
However, conflict management was not simply the result of a new Somali
government; while it was managed under the pretense of a local issue, it was
revived when the conflict was again defined in national terms of territory.
This demonstrates that mediation can be successful on a regional level as
long as a trusted third party can be agreed upon. More importantly, it
highlights that the clear definition of party aims allows nations to
interact without violence, but relies on continued communication and
adequate continuity between leaders. When communication and continuity is
not preserved, dormant issues can be revived.
In 1973, the OAU Commission of Eight investigated the conflict, but
"Ethiopia maintained there was nothing to mediate and Somalia maintained
there was nothing to manage." Hoping to reach an agreement, the commission
investigated the possibility of the joint development of an autonomous
Ethiopian Ogaden. The OAU attempted to hold hearings, but Somalia walked out
and Ethiopia's call for a special OAU Council of Ministers was never
endorsed for "fear that Somalia would leave the organization and carry the
Muslim member states with it" (1985 p. 103). This is typical of regional
mediation in the region, and illustrates the ineffectiveness of a third
party that is unwilling to fulfill its responsibilities.
Because regional mediation was generally fruitless, international
intervention replaced regional management by the end of the 1970s. The US
proposed that Somalia return the border in exchange for Ogaden autonomy,
with an international aid program for the Somali inhabitants of the
Ethiopian territory. However, the Ethiopian response was typical of the
region: no negotiations before victory. Even though Somalia had a
significantly smaller army and fewer resources for Ethiopia, Somalia's
armament (first by Russia and later by the United States) made it a viable
thorn in Ethiopia's side. There was no decisive victory and conflict
resolution was little more than a ceasefire that took place without
mediators.
Mediation by regional actors was overshadowed by global interests, which
only worsened a conflict with historic roots, denoted by land rights
insecurities and local fears of interference. The prolonged war in the
Ogaden was clearly a case where the "local conflict dominated global
politics.historic opponents sold themselves to global competitors for
armaments, and evicted their suppliers and offered themselves again for
further military support," (1985 p. 108). Without superpower intervention,
the Ogaden conflict would have ended when the supplies ran out.
Evaluating the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, one also finds that
the absence of a mutually intolerable stalemate hindered conflict management
in the region. Liberation movements were established in Eritrea and in other
portions of Ethiopia, such as the Tigre. Any time several parties are
involved, it becomes much more difficult for a mediator to offer solutions
that satisfy each party's grievance. In Ethiopia and Eritrea, a bilateral
civil conflict transitioned into a multilateral conflict between
nation-states and opposition groups, making the conflict more difficult to
mediate.
The international community was hopeful that the violence between Ethiopia
and Eritrea had reached a conclusion in 1993 when Eritrea attained its
independence from Ethiopia. Hardly five years passed before violence erupted
between the nations with even greater ferocity. The border was never
demarcated between the two nations, and UN resolutions to demarcate the
border failed to settle the dispute because there were no actions to follow
demands. Ethiopia has demonstrated interest in using diplomatic means to
resolution, but Eritrea has signaled its desire to continue using military
force as its primary means of negotiation.
In nearly every conflict within the Horn of Africa, foreign mediators have
only exacerbated the problem, not alleviated it. Multi-lateral agencies have
failed to make meaningful interventions, and their continued failure means
new initiatives are not taken seriously. The international community in
particular works off of a concept of legitimacy and peer pressure. In a
region where the population is defined by violence, an international slap on
the wrist has no resonance, and we cannot expect the international community
to provide solutions because there is little repercussion for violent
actions besides scrutiny.
The Somali civil conflict has led to statewide destabilization and failure,
resulting in an economy with little else to offer than lawless capitalism
and piracy. Conflict management is of immediate importance to regional and
international actors because the destabilization is a threat to regional and
international peace. The United Nations' Unified Task Force intervened in
Somalia, as did the United States, but both were unsuccessful. Those
missions were aimed at restoring order, but failed when mission creep
dictated who would remain in power. Peacekeeping- to- peace enforcing
missions only aggravated conflicts between Somali factions, splinter groups,
and clan leaders. Both the United States and United Nations left the country
without restoring peace or a central government.
In Somalia and other countries of the Horn, measureable success will only
occur when there is public accountability of the region's leadership. Only
when the people stop accepting violence as the only means to attaining party
interests and begin demanding regional support and interdependence, can we
expect long-term resolution. For now, the Horn is a culture of war and
death, valuing fighting over conciliation, noted by the absence of a call to
peace despite decades of atrocities. Until the people demand that
accountability, coupled with the space to peacefully dissent, conflict will
be difficult to manage and nearly impossible to resolve.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR THE HORN'S FUTURE
As earlier noted, successful mediation must create an option that allows
political space for peaceful disagreement as well as public accountability
and representation. However, before new mediation strategies can be
implemented or redesigned, past methods must be examined. One typical method
of mediation that has been unsuccessful is "wait and see." The point of such
a policy is to ensure that national sovereignty is not impinged while
reserving the international community for the direst of circumstances. Some
conflicts cannot be resolved without a mutually intolerable stalemate, as
earlier mentioned, and so observing parties must wait for the conflict to
occur before a mutually satisfactory resolution can be implemented. However,
this policy has only allowed for more actors to enter the conflict and
complicate the mitigation process. Inhabitants of the Horn identify with
warfare; violence is a cycle that the people are willing to tolerate. As a
result, mutual stalemates rarely occur and bilateral solutions fail to be
implemented.
The Horn's conflicts are dynamic. The region needs a strong regional actor
but has none, and the international community has no legitimacy due to past
debacles. The unwarranted invasion of Italy on behalf of Somalia into
Ethiopia did not receive adequate action from the League of Nations, little
more than paper resolutions were performed during the Ogaden conflicts as
well as the Ethiopian-Eritrean clashes. The UN intervention in Somalia ended
in disaster for the United States, and both the UN and U.S. left after
thoroughly destroying any remaining legitimacy through a botched mission,
little aid distribution success, and no establishment of a centralized
government.
What diplomatic, communicative strategies will help restore peace and
stability in the region? What measures can each state take to mediate their
conflicts successfully? Currently, mediation is considered zero-sum to these
nations; successful conflict resolution is measured through military
victory. These nations must be convinced that successful negotiation can
result in positive-sum for each party involved.
This is especially true of Somalia, where their politics are susceptible to
centrifugal dynamics which are complicated by clan-based divisibility. This
has made it difficult to maintain coalitions, and each faction believes its
ends can only be furthered through violence. Peace itself may be considered
positive-sum, but Somalis fear a loss of control that can lead to a central
government dominated by a dictator such Barre. Such a proposition, then, is
considered zero or negative-sum.
Somalia's problems fit within the protracted social conflict designation,
described in Interactive Conflict Management by R.J. Fisher. Fisher
elaborates that the protracted social conflict is an "enduring set of
antagonistic perceptions between communal groups and the state" because of
the lose-lose outcome. This most obviously results in the "deterioration of
physical security, not simply because of violence but the very destruction
of physical and social infrastructures" (1997 pp. 86-87). The erosion of
these structures might have led to reduction of resources available for the
various militias, and one might expect a stalemate to be created within
Somalia. Such a stalemate might have resulted in civic reconciliation within
the country, but the Somali crisis has not produced such a stalemate.
Protraction of the conflict has continued to deepen divisions and add
additional conflict dynamics that complicate the peace process.
This leads to at least one constant throughout the Horn's conflicts;
ownership of the management and resolution process by the majority of the
population, and not just among party powers, is critical. External
mediation, particularly international intervention, has marginalized the
legitimacy of the peaceful negotiation.
Regional control remains divided amongst the Horn's disagreeing factions.
Identifying valid representatives and mediators between militia leaders,
community leaders, and clan leaders remains difficult. However, the
exclusion of any group during national peace conferences ultimately leads to
hostility and undermines whatever transitional government is put in place.
An effective hybrid system, not to be confused with power-sharing, must be
established. The mediation process that occurred in Arta in 2000
demonstrated the possible success of such arbitration. The various clan
leaders of the entire Puntland region wrote their approval to the UN
Secretary General and Security Council Members:
In principal we, the Puntland Diaspora communities, strongly support the
Arta peace conference, not as a state reconstitution medium, but as a forum
for an inter-communal political dialogue aimed to foster inter-communal
trust and develop a shared understanding of the future - crucial missing
ingredients for political progress in Somalia. We view the Arta medium not
yet politically ripe and inclusive enough as a platform for state formation;
it is too haste to aspire such goal at this stage of Somali political
development (Puntland Position on Arta 2000).
Unfortunately, support was retracted when an interim national government was
formed and perceived as illegitimate by multiple groups. These groups were
either excluded or shared the mentality of the Puntland communities,
concluding that current leadership was not prepared to centralize Somali
government. Because there were multiple claims to power and no legitimate
function for selection of party leadership, various groups were convinced
that any interim government was solely supported by the international
community. This proposition was characteristically perceived as zero-sum
because they feared it could allow for central leadership to develop into a
regime similar to that of Barre's.
Before a successful central government can be established, the region must
develop inter-communal trust and shared understanding via political
discussion amongst vying parties. The fundamental distrust between faction
leaders is not conducive to peaceful arbitration. If talks are held that
focus on developing shared understanding between the groups, and not on
establishing one group over the other, distrust can be lessened and
competing groups can establish successful management internally amongst one
another with the political space to disagree without necessitating violent
disapproval. Equal power-sharing should not be encouraged, because the
resultant peace is tenuous at best and often erupts into more volatile
conflict when a party feels rebuffed, undermined, or lied to. Also, no
entity has established an ability to lead the nation as a whole, and central
government remains ineffective.
Once level negotiations occur, the parties may establish representatives
that together act as a central government without abolishing different
groups or their respective aims.
Important to the retention of each actor's legitimacy is the opportunity to
disagree without revolt. In many of these conflicts, political opposition
has been dramatically stifled, all political interests besides that of the
dominant leadership have been forbidden, and the resultant backlash was
supported by violence. Again, the establishment of political space would
lend more credibility to the leaders of the management process. Those
disagreeing with the leadership could do so without destroying the
proposition of peace.
A similar option should be implemented between the Ethiopians and Eritreans.
A peaceful forum comprised of community leaders between the nations should
be created so that the general population can demand accountability of their
leadership. They can do this through their communities; religious leaders,
women's and youth organizations, and figures of academia can help lead the
nations through meaningful conflict management. Eventual resolution can
occur through community assessment of the past, present, and potential
futures of the nations and their respective parties. Additionally, these
communities must encourage a cultural shift away from the acceptance of the
militarized option in diplomatic negotiation.
What we find is that the environment in the Horn has thus far not
facilitated democratic mentalities, although it has claimed to do so. Power,
when held, is held by few and there is little public accountability or
option to peacefully disagree. Open debate will ensure that formal
grievances are being addressed without a call to arms.
These solutions clearly advocate democracy. However, Western nations have
attempted to apply a one-size-fits-all democracy modeled after their own
governments. This has put too much effort on implementing Western
institutional structures while attempting to reconcile conflicts. This has
minimized the effectiveness of international mediation. Howard Wolpe, former
United States congressman, envoy to Africa during the Clinton
administration, and current diplomat within the U.S. State Department,
agrees. He has been deeply involved in African conflict management for over
twenty years in such places as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Liberia and East Timor. Wolpe's 2009 testimony to the U.S. Senate
Subcommittee on Africa also urges democratic influences to be "less focused
on imposing Western institutional structures than in assisting nationals in
divided societies develop a recognition of their interdependence," further
insisting that "initiatives should be directed at changing the winner take
all, zero-game conflict paradigm."
The international community must patiently watch and offer only their good
offices to allow the conflicting parties to talk but not to forcibly agree.
Somali leaders of various factions should be given equal opportunity to
cooperate in a national agenda, through recognized representation, whether
they represent a formidable militia, tribe, or clan. Voting upon the
representation will likely not occur for some time, if at all. There,
reputation is often enough to catapult someone into a position of authority.
In this regard, the democratic community cannot be too critical of the
voting process, assuming that the representative leaders offer the actual
sentiments of their region while allowing others to agree and disagree
peacefully. Additionally, some of these leaders may not hold the same
legitimacy as others do, but blatant exclusion will only continue rule by
force and undermine the representative process, as seen in earlier example.
In conclusion, conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa cannot be resolved,
or even managed, until political space is established, dialogue between
parties is opened, and international intervention is offered only as a last
resort without goals to further the aims of a particular nation, party,
group, or person. The region must take responsibility for resolution. The
people must stand together and refuse war as the only option, stand together
against the "no discussion before victory" mentality, and stand together
against the belief that one can shoot their way into power and dominance.
_____
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_____
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