From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Tue Aug 18 2009 - 06:43:26 EDT
Somalia: Preparing for Battle in Mogadishu and Beyond
By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
Aug 18, 2009 - 7:31:10 PM
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/uploads/2/13somalia.600.jpg
With the cautious Western donor and military powers on the sidelines – with
a foot gingerly pressed on the playing field – the stand-off between the
African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its armed
opposition, mainly composed of the transnationalist Islamist Harakat
Al-Shabaab Mujahideen or Youth Mujahideen Movement (Y.M.M.), and the
nationalist Islamist Hizbul Islam (H.I.), has persisted in Mogadishu through
mid-August. Armed clashes have continued, but there has been no perceptible
change in the balance of power, in which the opposition surrounds the
territory protected by AMISOM that consists of key political and
transportation infra-structure; but is unable to break through its armor.
Meanwhile Somalia’s internationally recognized Transitional Federal
Government (T.F.G.), which AMISOM is charged with defending from attack, has
become a “ghost government,” as Somali political intellectual Mohamud Uloso
calls it.
The stand-off covers the moves being made by both sides to prepare for major
battle, as closed sources in the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula have
reported.
Closed-Source Assessments
The first source reports on the strategy of the armed opposition, agreeing
with the public statement by the Y.M.M. that it would replicate its tactics
against the 2007-2008 Ethiopian occupation of drawing the enemy into armed
responses that alienate the population and disturb domestic opinion. The
armed opposition, says the source, plans a six-month war of attrition in
which it picks off AMISOM forces on a regular basis. The opposition believes
that such a strategy would work to make domestic support for AMISOM beyond
repair in states that contribute to the force – Uganda and Burundi.
Meanwhile, says the source, AMISOM is immobilized, waiting for T.F.G.
forces to take the initiative, which is an indulgence in fantasy.
The second source reports on the strengthening of the armed opposition
militarily and diplomatically. The source says that 15 thousand opposition
fighters are being trained in Merka, the capital of the Lower Shabelle
region, which is the center of power for the hardline faction of Y.M.M., in
order to wage a publicly-announced jihad against AMISOM during the month of
Ramadan. The source also reports that the preponderance of Arab countries
have come to view the Y.M.M. “as their only available alternative,” adding
that Arab support has set up a process of change in the Y.M.M.’s “political
stand.”
The third source reports on the AMISOM side of the equation, saying that the
mission is looking for legal grounds to expand its activity from
peacekeeping to peace enforcing without an expansion of its present United
Nations peacekeeping mandate. The source adds that the decision makers in
the African Union and AMISOM “are in a state of denial.”
If what the sources say is true in whole or parts, then the armed opposition
has become stronger during the stand-off and has a clearly defined strategy,
whereas AMISOM is sharply restricted by the Western powers and is forced to
play defense in a waiting game. The stand-off, says the first source,
“systematically gives the opposition the advantage.”
Context
Open-source corroboration of the structure of the stand-off was provided by
Somali analyst Ali Abdullahi in an August 11 interview with Voice of
America’s Peter Clottey. Remarking that the T.F.G. “does not have anyone to
fight for them,” Abdullahi added that the Y.M.M. “has a lot of spirit and
they have a well-disciplined group of militants and the government is not
well prepared to challenge them on the battlefront.” Abdullahi reports that
clan militias are deserting the T.F.G. and that a “peaceful party” is being
organized to provide an alternative to the T.F.G. for external actors.
Abdullahi concludes that “most of the Somali elite don’t see this government
as representative of them.”
Abdullahi’s assessment provides a corrective to the analysis widely
circulated by Somalia expert Prof. Kenneth Menkhaus that the Y.M.M. is
losing support in Somali society. That analysis has been hyped-up by
Washington Post correspondent Stephanie McCrummen who threatens to become
the Judith Miller of Somalia reporting. The Y.M.M.’s momentum is at least an
open question.
The armed opposition has remained quiet about their intentions publicly
through mid-August, except for the Y.M.M.’s call for jihad during Ramadan.
The same was not the case for AMISOM, which persists in its radically
compromised position. The third source’s remark on “a state of denial” among
decision makers is balanced by the first source’s comment that AMISOM’s
forces on the ground are perfectly aware of the threat that they face.
In a cautious, nuanced and diplomatic analysis, Lt. –Col. Felix Kulaligye,
the spokesman for the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (U.P.D.F.), concluded
that there are “increased worries about the [U.N.] Security Council’s
ability to address serious threats to international peace and security.”
Kulaligye spoke of a “new international security management paradigm,” in
which regions and sub-regions “assume co-responsibility” for conflict
resolution. On the ground, AMISOM spokesman Maj. Barigye Ba-Hoku denied all
pretensions to peace enforcement by AMISOM, saying, “We are a peacekeeping
force. We do not leave our camps.” Ba-Hoku added that AMISOM had proven that
“Somalia’s conflict is surmountable.”
Questioning of AMISOM continued in Uganda with the country’s auditor
general, John Muwanga, accusing the Defense Department of using public
monies to finance the mission to make up for arrears from the A.U., which is
supposed to fund it; and of having bank accounts administered by itself
without oversight and approval from other state bodies. Muwanga’s
accusations spurred the political opposition to demand repayment from the
Defense Department. Kulaligye responded that the A.U. would make up the
arrears, adding that the U.P.D.F. could “not be expected to account for
money” that it gets from the A.U. and was never approved by parliament.
On August 16, Press TV reported widespread fighting in several districts of
Mogadishu near AMISOM’s base. Press TV said that AMISOM had “expanded their
operations” against the Y.M.M. in districts where the T.F.G. claims that the
Y.M.M. is using residents as “human shields.” The fighting has appeared to
have resulted in T.F.G. militias retaking some areas that had fallen to the
opposition in the spring.
>From the T.F.G. came a statement on August 14 by its new interior minister,
Mohamed Abdullahi, that the T.F.G. was holding “indirect talks” with Y.M.M.
“commanders” and “high-profile members “ of H.I., and had been getting
“quite positive signals.” “In the coming weeks there would be a good
development,” he said.
Adding to the complexity is a report from August 7 on the Allpuntland
website that Washington, Addis Ababa and the T.F.G. had formulated a
“six-sided plan” as a result of Washington’s successful brokering of talks
between the other two in which they had “reconciled their differences” and
done away with their “widespread suspicion of each other.” The next step
would be to mount attacks on the armed opposition in various regions with a
mélange of anti-opposition forces, presumably warlord militias and the
forces ranged under the Sufi movement Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama’a (A.S.W.J.).
The report was echoed by Sh. Mohamed Ibrahim Bilal speaking for the Somali
Islamic Council who accused the T.F.G. of giving responsibility to AMISOM
for the recapture of Mogadishu and to Ethiopia for the recapture of the Bay
region.
Signs that the “six-sided plan” was in motion appeared on August 17, when
A.S.W.J. was reported to have captured the town of Bulo-Hawo in the
southwestern Gedo region from the Y.M.M., which had held it previously and
withdrew without a fight. The opposition administration in the town of
Bardheere in the Gedo region imposed a curfew there and stepped up security
patrols.
Conclusion
The foregoing compilation of closed- and open-source assessments, possible
strategies and forecasts indicates a ferment of repositioning going on among
the major actors directly involved in the armed stand-off in Mogadishu. The
situation is currently fraught with uncertainty and raises questions rather
than evincing conclusive tendencies.
Will the Y.M.M. carry out a well-organized campaign of attrition against
AMISOM? Will AMISOM remain a peacekeeping force defending its bases or
become a peace enforcement mission taking clear sides in a civil war? Are
the Y.M.M. and H.I., or factions within them, susceptible to negotiations?
Is the T.F.G. susceptible to negotiations when it is in a weak bargaining
position? Will Uganda’s president, Yowahari Museveni, face increased
opposition to the AMISOM commitment? Are the Y.M.M. and H.I. gaining or
losing strength? Is there an operational “six-sided” plan to provoke a
full-scale civil war? Will the Western military and donor powers support a
robust military push or will they continue to be cautious?
As has been the case before, since the Islamic Courts revolution of 2006,
actors are making their calculations on the basis of what they perceive to
be other actors’ calculations and resources. Although that is always the
case in political conflict, it has become, at the moment, exaggerated, which
proliferates uncertainty and increases the probability of miscalculation by
one or more actors. In summary judgment, the pieces of the puzzle do not fit
together neatly, but, as the first source said, they show the armed
opposition with a systematic advantage.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University
<mailto:weinstem@purdue.edu> weinstem@purdue.edu
----[This List to be used for Eritrea Related News Only]----
