[dehai-news] Markacadeey.com: MEETING OF US ALLIES IN THE HORN REGION – An inventory and observation


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From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Thu Oct 16 2008 - 11:44:25 EDT


      MEETING OF US ALLIES IN THE HORN REGION – An inventory and observation

      Venue: New York, USA

      October 14, 2008 Markacadeey
     

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            Participants:

            1. President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda and his Foreign Minister - Sam Kutesa

            2. Premier Ato Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and his foreign minister - Ato Seyoum Mesfin

            3. Jendayi Fraser – US assistant Secretary of State for Africa

            4. Antoinette Batumubwira - Foreign Minister of Burundi

            5. Ali Ahmed Jama Jangeli - Minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation - TFG

            6. Jeng Ping - Chairperson of the AU Commissions

            Date of the meeting: September 24, 2008

            I. Summary of the proceedings

            This was a close door session and has lasted for 2 hours with most of the time reportedly taken by PM Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. A source in attendance reported that PM Zenawi was overtaken by anger directed at the TFI leadership and in particular their failure to meet Addis expectations. In some cases the PM has made a personal attack on the TFG leadership noting serious gaps on their capacity, competence, commitment and willingness to deliver.

            Below is an inventory of the notable areas of the proceedings: -

            President Museveni (Uganda):

            · Escalations in Somalia and attacks on AMISOM and other targets on increase.

            · Need for timely international engagements to boost the capability of the boots on the ground to expand the interventions and contain reigning chaos. The situation on the ground is deteriorating and calls for both commitment of the Somalis as well as sustained engagement of the international community.

            PM Zenawi (Ethiopia):

            · First and foremost, a brief advice to President Museveni over the situation in Somalia and value of engagements; no hope in Somalia and hence no need to waste your precious time and resources.

            · Not happy with the situation in Somalia because breakthrough is unforeseeable unless there is change of leadership. The leaderships have failed even on recruitment of the security forces that are fundamental to short and long-term stabilisation of Somalia. Their recruitment drive has targeted those serving in the late Barre regime that are in retirement age and cannot undertake challenges of the moment. In contrary, the insurgents force power is drawn from the young generation and this is the reason for its advantage over the TFG forces. The challenges on the ground are continuous and exhaustive and would only allow those in their youthful ages to remain actively engaged and on a regular basis. That is why the insurgents overrun the TFG forces in combat operations.

            · We have trained good number of the TFG forces with an aim to boost their capability. However, the president has insisted for transfer of the units to the TFG while the PM Nuur Adde preferred the troops to remain under our control. Thereafter, we handed-over the units to the TFG and most have dispersed and joined the insurgents. There is a serious leadership problem in Somalia that threatens any sort of progress. ENDF were sent to Somalia in order to support the TFG, but not as they insisted to be hostage for their personal agendas. The problem in Somalia is exclusively caused by the Hawiye and the Darood clans. The Hawiye had their lesson in the course of our engagement and we would obviously withdraw ENDF to positions within our border with Somalia. That will not restrict us from carrying out operations to neutralise terrorist threats within Somalia. If Islamist leadership is appointed we would obviously return to crush.

            · TFG is responsible for fall of Kismayo town to the Al-Shabab. It is through their willingness that this has happened and is unacceptable. We cannot remain engaged with the current leadership whose only contribution is failure. We would withdraw our forces and no need to wait for such leadership anymore. We would position our forces into our border areas but with effective response for an offensive in any area within Somalia where the terrorist are engaged in reorganisation or plans to launch threats.

            · The international community has also failed to meet its part of the obligation. The widening scale of the burden in Somalia deserves not underestimation or to be treated as an assignment for few. The danger posed by the situation in Somalia is clear and self explanatory today than ever. Now the magnitude of the crisis is felt by everybody, and if not on the mainland through pirates operating both in the Somali and the international waters. Mushrooming of piracy is a sign of the threat’s spill over beyond Somalia.

            · We have remained at the disposal of the TFG and hailed our advice from time to time. We have recommended actions on several fronts to promote reconciliation: inter-Hawiye dialogue, removal of the Banadir mayor and his replacement constituted through election. We invested and negotiated towards institutionalised approach in overcoming recurrent intra-TFG leadership’s dispute. This was adopted by the TFI leaders in form of a roadmap in Addis on 26th August, 2008. The leaders committed themselves for an immediate implementation. However, the same leaders failed to implement the deal as agreed. Therefore, the problem within the TFI is about the leaders and this must come to an end in order to resolve the challenges once and for all. The mandate of the TFG is on its verge, and success is likely, if the transition is well managed, and above all carryout within set timeframe tasks as stipulated on the TF charter.

            · Successful transition is unlikely in the current situation and settings. The leadership must be challenged with a strong message including serious loopholes in their conduct and resultant frustration of all stakeholders. The best opportunity is to invite the TFI leaderships and the Parliament to the IGAD Summit in the 1st Week of October 2008. This opportunity must be used to revisit the current realities for an informed decision on the way forward.

            President Museveni (Uganda):

            · May be my experiences of guerrilla movements would be relevant; the best approach to put in place an effective security force is not just joint operations in the background of incompatible standard of trainings. If there is capability gap between the TFG security apparatus and the other allied forces, then it is unlikely to be successful. Attachments of TFG units to the allied forces would sharpen their skills and empower ultimately to take control of their future. On another note, the magnitude of the happenings on the ground calls for integrated international community engagement; military and political fronts among others.

            Madame Fraser (USA):

            · Why is AU failing to lobby for more troops engagement in Somalia. What is the difference between Somalia and other hotspots? I think it is the time for the AU to seriously advocate and convince member states for timely deployment in Somalia.

            II. Related events

            In another movement, the Ethiopian leaders met the UK minister for Africa and briefed him on their planned events to strengthen the TFG, including meetings with the TFI leaders and the parliament in Kenya during the IGAD Summit slated for the 1st week of October 2008. The UK minister later met Somalia delegation and enquired about the logic of relocating the entire parliament for a meeting in Kenya.

            Additional reporting indicated that the Ethiopian leaders have informed some of the IGAD member state officials involved in the separate meeting on Somalia over their success for funding to the initiative. Ethiopian leaders reportedly noted breakthrough in a meeting with Commissioner Louis Michel of the EC over IGAD’s project aiming relocation of the entire TFI members for consultations in Kenya.

            III. Observation

            Anger by the Ethiopian leadership centralised on frustration has seemingly dominated this meeting that is exclusively by design for US allies in the region. Though message by the PM was not sinking well with Madame Fraser, in the bottom-line Ethiopia is both a liability and an asset. Both continued engagements in Somalia and its withdrawal without a replacement is a liability to the US foreign policy in the region. Addis engagement at least in the remaining days of the Bush administration would be an added value. An abrupt withdrawal without deployment of significant forces would endanger both the existence of the TFG and presence of AMISOM. In practical terms, AMISOM is there by virtue of the Ethiopian force-power. Resultant deterioration and further desperations in case of Ethiopian troops pullout in the absence of effective replacement would be a slap in the face of the Republican bid for presidency in addition to the unpopularity harnessed by the financial crisis. May be that is why Fraser has shifted blame to a soft target, namely the AU.

            The statement by Zenawi suggests recognition of their failure in Somalia and manoeuvre on options for damage limitations. Its leadership of IGAD gives an opportunity to explore agendas without minimal explanation to the entire regional body members. The blame on the TFI leaderships may hold water, but Ethiopia is not the one to make such claims. Ethiopia has played a key role in the selection of TFI members and election of the leaderships, except for the PM to some extent. Ethiopia has made a hasty decision in the original onslaught in Somalia whose ramification to Addis may be emerging day by day, but worst would unfold if it pursues indecisive withdrawal. Predictably, the initial incursion was a strategic error and same may be true for a withdrawal that leaves a vacuum. Tactical error could be repairable not double strategic errors and in particular for the case of a third world country with progressive intra and interstate conflicts.

            Ethiopian military movements were reported in Gedo and the Bakool region in the last few days. The convoy in the Gedo region were spotted in Bohola-Garas area (near Luuq) on 5th October 2008. The offensive through Gedo region is reportedly headed towards Lower and Middle Juba regions. Though reports indicate Kismayo, i suspect it to be tactical pressure to deescalate mounting insurgents’ offensive in Mogadishu. Insurgents groups responsible for the recent attacks in Mogadishu are coming from Lower Juba region including Kismayo.

            It is rainy season and offensive to Kismayo without intelligence and logistical support of a third party with technological advancement may be suicidal to the ENDF at this point in time. Again, we cannot underestimate hawkish nature of the ENDF and preoccupation to the strategic settings of Kismayo to its internal opposition movements. However, of importance in operations of this nature apart from knowledge of the enemy capability is whether there is structure in place to take over and sustain the gains. Clan is not a predictable force to go for such a gamble but state does. Is TFG capable of mobilising for such an assignment? At this point in time, TFG is unlikely to assume assignment of this nature.

            Lastly, Yussuf is unaware of the details pertaining to the IGAD initiative and would be reportedly unwilling to attend. The Speaker is faced with a fear factor over the initiative and is unlikely to resist an agenda pushed by Ethiopia. An official from the TFG foreign ministry has reported over the media (5th October) that the IGAD meeting is rescheduled for 26th October 2008.

            The challenge on the Somali political environment is not limited to the TFG. Despite covet at this stage, bubbles of dispute is in the making within the ARS (D). Some key elements within the ARS are displeased with the mix-up on roles of the Central Committee and the Executive body. Both Sharifs are together most of the time and manage business of day without clear lines on who is what? The Central Committee Chair - Sharif Hassan is engaged on the role of the Executive organ. There are no internal regulations and procedures to govern how members or officials should conduct themselves in business. Some members attributed the challenge that led to the deadlock in the 2nd session of the High Level and Joint Security Committees in Djibouti between 17th to 22 September 2008 to misinformation by 3 members of the ARS. Lack of clear policy or agreed plan on how to proceed on the dialogue with the TFG remains another grey area exploited by rejectionists
           
     

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