From: Biniam Haile \(SWE\) (eritrea.lave@comhem.se)
Date: Tue Sep 09 2008 - 16:13:50 EDT
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Ethiopia: Domestic and Regional Challenges
By Terrence Lyons
Saturday, 09 September 2008
Ethiopia is becoming increasingly authoritarian and potentially faces a
convergence of challenges that will stretch the regime's capacity to
manage multiple crises. The ruling Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF) party weathered the immediate domestic crises
that followed contentious national elections in 2005. Non-competitive
local elections in April and the promulgation of a draft proclamation to
restrict civil society organizations in July indicate that the regime is
intent on deepening its control. Across the strife-torn Horn of Africa,
Addis Ababa faces an extraordinarily tense and militarized border with
Eritrea as the debilitated Algiers peace process that brought their
1998-2000 war to an end has collapsed. Eritrea remains intensely
militarized and totalitarian, and recently clashed with Djibouti over
their border. The December 2006 intervention into Somalia in support of
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has left the Ethiopian
military bogged down in Mogadishu, unable to withdraw, yet provoking a
violent reaction. The interlinked conflict within the Ogaden region has
developed into a massive humanitarian disaster where brutal military
tactics have left large areas depopulated. Ethiopian Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi has been in power since 1991, and he and his party have
demonstrated resiliency and the capacity to outmaneuver rivals in the
past. If internal and regional conflicts escalate simultaneously,
however, this convergence may destabilize Ethiopia and the broader
region.
The Bush administration has viewed Ethiopia as a strategic ally in the
war against terrorism, but Meles has ignored Washington on questions of
democratization, human rights, and the need to implement the Algiers
Agreement. Furthermore, the close links between Washington and Addis
Ababa associate the United States with a sometimes brutal regime as well
as its regional conflicts in Somalia, in the Somali-inhabited Ogaden
region of eastern Ethiopia, and with Eritrea. The next administration
will need to balance interests in retaining a strategic partner in an
increasingly dangerous neighborhood with interests in democratization,
human rights, and regional stability. In particular, Washington should
look for opportunities to encourage both the EPRDF government and the
full range of opposition parties to initiate talks to re-create the
opportunities for peaceful political competition in the period leading
up to the 2010 national elections.
The prospects for meaningful electoral politics in Ethiopia has declined
sharply since the 2005 elections. In contrast to boycotted elections in
1992, 1995, and 2000, the 2005 elections presented the Ethiopian people
with a meaningful choice. Two large opposition associations, the
Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and the Union for Ethiopian
Democratic Forces (UEDF), contested the ruling party, swept the urban
areas and won significant votes across the major regions. A chaotic
counting process and allegations of fraud, however, generated
demonstrations that ended in violence and mass arrests. Despite
increasing the number of opposition seats in parliament from 12 to 172
key CUD leaders boycotted the parliament. This decision represented a
historic miscalculation that has cost the opposition dearly. In November
2005, top CUD politicians along with journalists and civil society
leaders were arrested and charged with genocide and treason. In July
2007 the CUD leaders were convicted but then pardoned and released. The
damage, however, had been done: the opposition coalition was shattered,
civil society was silenced, and many activists despaired that peaceful
change through the ballot box was not possible.
While the opposition had been marginalized, by its own decisions as well
as by official repression, the EPRDF continued to face fundamental
challenges in relating to two large constituencies that are essential
for any Ethiopian regime to govern successfully. First, the EPRDF's
Oromo wing, the Oromo People's Democratic Organization, has failed to
develop a significant base of support among the Oromo people and remains
in power through intimidation and ever more pervasive systems to monitor
the population. Second, the May 2005 elections saw an almost complete
sweep by the CUD in Addis Ababa and the other main cities. Without a
firm basis for support in these two key constituencies, the EPRDF's
ability to govern is inherently precarious and must rely upon force,
which in turn alienates more of the population.
Cynicism and disillusionment with electoral politics has replaced the
hope and optimism that characterized the period leading up to the 2005
vote. Disenchanted with nonviolent strategies, some now argue that "all
kinds and means of struggle" are necessary to remove Meles. A 2007 poll
conducted by Gallup found that only 13 percent of Ethiopians have
confidence in the honesty of their elections, 25 percent have confidence
in the judiciary, and 28 percent have confidence in national government.
These numbers are approximately 30 percent points lower than the (very
low) average for sub-Saharan Africa and suggest that the population has
acquiesced to-but not endorsed-the regime's authority. The 2005
elections demonstrated high levels of opposition, but failed to usher in
an orderly transition based on peaceful multiparty competition.
The outcome of local and by elections in April 2008 suggest that the
EPRDF plans to increase its level and extent of control over the
population and restrict political and civil liberties. The opposition
only managed to register some 16,000 candidates for the nearly 4 million
posts up for election. The EPRDF won 137 of 138 council seats in Addis
Ababa, despite the opposition sweep in 2005, and in many areas ran
unopposed. Even those parties such as the UEDF and Oromo Federal
Democratic Movement that participate in the national parliament found it
impossible to identify candidates or to campaign, particularly in the
Oromo region. According to numerous reports, opposition supporters faced
harassment, arrest, and physical violence when they tried to run against
the ruling party.
In addition to restricting political space, the ruling party used these
elections to deepen its control over the the smallest, subcommunity
level of administration, the kebelle councils. While kebelles are quite
small, some of the councils have up to 300 members. As a result, some 4
million Ethiopians in a country of 75 million-1 in 20-are now part of an
EPRDF-controlled council. The EPRDF, always an extraordinarily effective
party, is now ubiquitous and entrenched throughout the country.
The "Charities and Societies Proclamation" under consideration in July
2008 also indicates that the lesson the EPRDF learned from the 2005
elections is that more control is needed. The government argues that the
proclamation will increase NGO accountability. Its restrictions on
organizations engaged in human rights activities and organizations that
accept foreign funding, however, seem designed to direct and monitor
civil society organizations and punish those who challenge the ruling
party. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch argue that the draft
proclamation represents an "assault on civil society." The arrest of
civil society leaders in the aftermath of the 2005 elections already had
a chilling effect and the proposed regulations will make civil society
organizations bound to the government in ways that will further stifle
independent voices.
Unless this creeping authoritarianism is reversed, Ethiopia is likely to
face a political crisis in the run up to the next national elections in
2010. Under current conditions, the opposition will almost certainly
boycott. The main opposition parties in parliament have consistently
demanded reforms to the National Electoral Board, allocation of time on
state controlled media, international electoral observation, and most
fundamentally an end to harassment, arrests, and violence against their
supporters in order for them to participate. The 2008 elections have
underlined these essential political liberties. Some opposition leaders,
particularly those in the diaspora, are increasingly convinced that the
ruling party will not be removed through the ballot box. As
opportunities to operate as a nonviolent opposition party or as an
independent member of civil society disappear, opposition will
increasingly move toward more violent options with potentially violent
and destabilizing consequences.
As the EPRDF seeks to increase domestic control, it faces regional
conflicts along its border with Eritrea, in Somalia, and in the
Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia. The Algiers
Agreement collapsed in 2008, as the Eritrea Ethiopia Border Commission
(EEBC) closed its doors without delimiting the border on the ground, the
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea withdrew from Eritrea
after Asmara cut off fuel supplies, and Eritrean troops re-occupied the
Temporary Security Zone. Ethiopia remains in control of areas that the
EEBC's demarcation placed on the Eritrean side of the border, notably
the symbolically important town of Badme, and Ethiopian and Eritrean
troops are just a few hundred meters apart. Despite these alarming
tensions, the underlying stalemate remains stable. Asmara and Addis
Ababa both believe time is on its side and that there is no need to act
immediately. More likely sites for escalation are in Somalia or through
increased support for neighboring insurgent groups. If domestic and
regional conflicts converged it will be difficult for Addis Ababa to
manage the multiple threats.
Washington feels it needs a close relationship with Ethiopia in order to
pursue its strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. This relationship,
however, comes with costs. As with other pivotal states in difficult
regions such as Pakistan and Egypt, these sometimes awkward bedfellows
receive U.S. support for security reasons but then pursue their own,
sometimes brutal, agendas regardless of pressure from Washington. Addis
Ababa and Washington both opposed the Islamic Courts in Somalia, for
example, but for very different reasons. Ethiopia worries about the
assistance these groups provide to the regime's enemies in Eritrea and
among Oromo and Somali insurgent groups, while the United States is
concerned with links to al-Qaeda. This linkage furthermore undercuts
U.S. policy toward democratization and human rights in Ethiopia and
Washington's support for the implementation of the Algiers Agreement. If
the growing domestic and regional pressures converge and destabilize
Addis Ababa, an uncontrolled and potentially very violent transition is
possible.
The next administration needs to unravel its cooperation in pursuit of
common counter-terrorism goals from policies where the two states have
less agreement. Washington should speak plainly about its concerns
regarding democracy, human rights, and humanitarian issues in Ethiopia.
The United States should press Ethiopia to implement the EEBC border
decision and remove its forces from Badme and other areas. Finally,
Washington should pressure both the government and the broad range of
opposition parties to engage in discussions so that the 2010 elections
are not another missed opportunity to promote democratization and
stability.
Terrence Lyons is Associate Professor of Conflict Resolution with George
Mason University's Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.
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