[dehai-news] (TelegraphNepal) Ethiopian Ethnic Federal System Under a microscope


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From: Biniam Tekle (biniamt@dehai.org)
Date: Thu Feb 10 2011 - 08:33:28 EST


*http://www.telegraphnepal.com/news_det.php?news_id=8819* *2011-02-09
07:36:10* Ethiopian Ethnic Federal System
Nepal Constitution Foundation

Ethiopia’s population is seventy-eight million and comprises of at least
sixty-four distinct ethnic groups. The Tigray, Ethiopia’s third largest
ethnic group, is politically dominant, despite comprising only six percent
of the population, because of its military prowess during Ethiopia’s civil
war. In 1994, Ethiopia adopted its present Constitution. The Constitution
creates an ethnically based federal republic, which is a break from prior
authoritarian central rule because the Constitution includes the interests
and concerns of ethnic rebel groups.

*Federal Government under the Ethiopian Constitution*

The Constitution creates a parliamentary government, with power distributed
between a centralized federal government and regional states. The Federal
Government is responsible for national policy and strategy with respect to
economic, social, and development matters. Further, the Federal Government
controls national standards and policy related to public health and
education, enacts laws related to land and natural resources, administers
the armed forces, oversees the national bank and regulates currency, handles
foreign policy matters, and is responsible for other matters traditionally
reserved to federal governments operating within a federalist system.

The Constitution recognizes and grants rights to Ethiopia’s ethnic groups.
Further, the Constitution sets forth the shared powers and responsibilities
of the federal and state governments with regard to Ethiopia’s ethnic
groups. The Constitution creates nine states on the basis of settlement
patterns, language, identity, and the consent of the people living within
them. Further, each of Ethiopia’s “Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples” has
an unconditional right to self-determination.

The Constitution’s unconditional right to self- determination includes the
right of secession. The grant of such power is rare in governing documents
attempting to foster unity among disparate ethnic groups within a single
state. However, the measure may have been necessary in Ethiopia to
accommodate the military forces of the ethnic- based groups because each
pressed for an independent state.

Alternatively, the Constitution grants Ethiopia’s ethnic groups the right to
seek the creation of independent states that add to the nine enumerated in
the Constitution. An ethnic group may make a demand upon the State Council,
the highest body of regional state power, for a referendum held among its
people on the question of creating their own state. To pass, the referendum
requires a simple majority. If the referendum passes, then the State Council
of the state within which the new state is to be created must transfer its
powers to the newly created state. The new state receives all the powers and
responsibilities of its fellow states.

The Constitution’s right of self-determination also includes the right of
each ethnic group to use its own language. Though the Constitution adopts
Amharic as the official language of the Federal Government, each ethnic
group has the right to establish its own official language within its
regional territory. Further, the Constitution’s right of self-determination
includes the right of each ethnic group to promote its own culture and
preserve its own history. Also, the Constitution furthers Ethiopia’s goal of
cohesiveness through the right of ethnic groups to participate and be
represented in the Federal Government and federal institutions. The
mechanisms used to elect members to Ethiopia’s federal legislature as well
as the structure of the Council of Peoples’ Representatives and the Council
of the Federation illustrates the Constitution’s right of ethnic groups to
participate and be represented in the Federal Government.

The Council of Peoples’ Representatives is the highest authority of the
federal government and consists of a maximum of 550 members elected from
districts throughout the state. The political party or coalition of
political parties that has the greatest number of seats in the Council forms
and leads the Executive Branch. The Constitution ensures representation for
minority nationalities and peoples believed to deserve special
representation though they lack populations sufficient to assure a seat. The
powers of the Council include the full legislative powers of the Federal
Government.

The Council of the Federation, as opposed to the Council of Peoples’
Representatives’ legislative powers, consists of 110 members and has broad
power to interpret the Constitution. The Council comprises the “Nations,
Nationalities, and Peoples” enumerated in the Constitution. Further, the
Constitution guarantees each of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups at least one member
in the Council. Also, ethnic groups receive an additional representative for
every one million people that comprise its population. Thus, both Councils
protect ethnic representation in the Federal Government. The Council of
Peoples’ Representatives constitutionally ensures representation for all
ethnic groups, even those that do not meet minimum population requirements
to acquire a seat, and the Council of the Federation constitutionally
guarantees at least one seat to each of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups.

*State Powers and Responsibilities*

Ethiopia’s Constitution is unique among African nations because it creates
regional states based on inhabitants’ ethnicity. Each of Ethiopia’s nine
states has extensive legislative, executive, and judicial authority as well
as their own constitutions, flags, executive governments, legislatures,
judiciaries, and police. The Constitution’s reserved-powers clause confers
all powers not given expressly to the Federal Government or concurrently to
the Federal Government and regional governments exclusively to the regional
governments. The Constitution authorizes each state to establish a regional
administration that “best advances self-government,” which furthers the
Constitution’s goal of self-determination for all of Ethiopia’s ethnic
groups.

The Constitution enumerates the basis of state creation. The Constitution
creates states based on the settlement patterns, language, identity, and
consent of those living within territories. Article 47 sets forth the nine
regional states and each is named for the predominant ethnic group
associated with a particular territory. In addition to the nine regional
states, Ethiopia has two self-governing administrations located in Addis
Ababa and Dire Dawa. To date, no ethnic group has successfully seceded from
a state or gone through the procedures necessary to establish an additional
autonomous state.

*District and Neighborhood-Level Organizations*

The State Council serves as the highest organ of political power at the
state level and has authority to establish its own institutions and
administrations. Further, the State Council has authority to create
regional, local, and neighborhood administrations as deemed necessary. The
district and neighborhood administrations provide for self- rule by
increasingly smaller and decentralized units of government. Thus, even
extremely small ethnic groups have the potential to acquire representation
and participation in the governance of their local affairs.

*Possible Benefits of the Ethnic Federal System*

*Unification of Ethiopian Polity*

Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism provides several long-term benefits for the
state. Ethnic federalism promotes the central government’s recognition of
the importance of individual ethnic rights and the individual needs of the
state’s many ethnic groups. Further, ethnic federalism aids in the
prevention of ethnic splintering and violent civil war through fostering
ethnic and regional autonomy while maintain Ethiopia as a formal political
unit. Also, the creation of a formal political space for ethnic identities
and social ties allows the state to harness the available political strength
as a unified polity. Together, these long- term benefits of ethnic
federalism contribute to overall state unity.

*Aspirations of State Unity*

The Constitution’s description of ethnic federalism provides a benefit
through its unifying language and aspirations toward a stronger political
entity. The preamble of the Constitution begins “We, the Nations,
Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia,” which acknowledges the state’s
multi-ethnic character and honors the existence of the many distinct ethnic
groups that comprise Ethiopia. Further, the phrase indicates that all ethnic
groups collectively, rather than individual citizens, are the authors of the
Constitution. Also, the Constitution reflects on the “rich and proud
cultural legacies” that unite in a “full and free exercise of the right to
self-determination” to build a unified political and economic community
based on “common interest, common outlook, and common destiny.” The drafters
included these precise phrases to underscore the need for political and
economic unity among constituent ethnic groups and regions. The aspirations
of state unity reflected in the Constitution provide a benefit in creating a
clear foundation for a unified federal state.

*State Concerns for Individual Ethnic Rights*

Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia provides the state citizens with assurances
that the state is committed to the protections of individual ethnic rights.
Ethiopia provides this assurance through the Constitution and state
practice. The Constitution sets forth the goal of expressing its “Nations,
Nationalities, and Peoples’ sovereignty.” Each “Nation, Nationality or
People of Ethiopia” enjoys “the right to a full measure of self-government.”
The right includes locally organized governments within the individual
ethnically based regions and equitable representation at the federal level.
Further, ethnic groups possess the “unconditional right to
self-determination” that includes the right to form its own state through
secession. The Constitution serves as a foundation of trust between the
central government and individual federalist entities.

*Creation of Political Space*

Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism creates political space in which ethnic groups
can operate, exercise their respective rights, and achieve more equitable
political representation. The Constitution provides for the creation of
political space through the recognition and prioritization of respect for
the cultures, identities, and languages of Ethiopia’s individual ethnic
groups. In providing political space, the Constitution reflects a powerful
first step towards a true multiparty system of government. Ethiopia recently
experienced an increase in voter participation as almost twenty-six million
Ethiopians cast ballots in the most recent elections in 2005, of which
almost half were women. In the same election, the opposition coalition party
won 170 of the 547 seats in the federal legislature, as compared with twelve
seats in the previous term. Thus, the creation of political space in
Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism provides greater political representation and
thereby creates a more stable state.

Calming Ethnic Conflict and Promoting Cooperation

Ethiopia’s creation of political space and individual self- expression
allows for a higher level of cooperation among ethnic groups and a stronger
Ethiopian polity as a whole. Since the inception of ethnic federalism, no
ethnic splintering or violent civil wars occurred in Ethiopia. Also, in at
least one instance, different ethnic groups cooperated with one another to
strive for a common goal under one Ethiopian banner. In 1998, the border war
with Eritrea united Ethiopians of diverse ethnic groups such as Somali,
Afar, and Gambella together to fight as part of a coordinated force in the
war effort. The united front reflects the potential long-term benefit of a
united Ethiopian polity because security in one’s individual political space
allows for a higher level of cooperation among groups that in turn promotes
stronger national unity.

*Improved International Recognition*

Ethiopia’s international reputation is also bolstered through the political
stability created by ethnic federalism. The improved reputation manifests
itself through heightened monetary donation and aid. The current Ethiopian
government enjoys support internationally and receives extensive funds from
Western states. The United Kingdom’s Department for International
Development reversed its suspension of financial support in June 2006 and
distributed ninety-four million pounds sterling to a World Bank health,
water, and education program for the Ethiopian government to implement. The
heightened monetary contribution reflects international appreciation of the
improved structure for the distribution of donor funds and the management of
development opportunities throughout the state. Therefore, the stability of
ethnic federalism provides Ethiopia with the opportunity for greater
international recognition.

*Challenges to Ethiopian Ethnic Federalism*

Though Ethiopia’s institution of ethnic federalism resulted in several
long-term benefits, the system harbors short- term challenges. Challenges
include practical implementation regarding how to delineate ethnic entities
and the challenge of combating disunity. Also, some experts suggest the
Ethiopian Constitution creates a more unstable state as opposed to a united
and stable state. An unstable state may result from entrenched ethnic
differences implicated in the Constitution, a disparate regional history,
and ethnic group pursuance of the right of secession. It is unclear how the
potential benefits and challenges will unfold in Ethiopia’s future.

*Difficulty in Distinguishing Between Ethnic Groups*

Ethnic federalism presents the challenge of how to make accurate ethnic
distinctions in order to demarcate territorial lines for the respective
federalist entities. A close analysis of the ethno-federal lines drawn in
Ethiopia’s system reveals doubt as to whether it is possible to make clear
distinctions between the ethnic groups. Other states face similar challenges
in the implementation of ethnic federalism. Eritrea as an ethnic entity does
not exist and reflects the difficulties of drawing regional lines of
separation. Eritrea comprises many different ethnic groups with different
languages. Also, some of the ethnic groups spill over international Eritrean
boundaries. The challenges faced by Ehtrea are comparable to Ethiopia’s
situation. Uncertain and poorly demarcated boundary lines could contribute
to greater state instability. Therefore, ethnic federalism may present the
challenge of implementation in creating ethnically consistent entities.

*Entrenched Ethnic Difference*

Though the potential for long-term political unity exists, ethnic federalism
also promotes instability through entrenchment of ethnic difference rather
than promotion of state unity. The demarcation of territories based on
ethnic lines in Ethiopia may promote ethnic identity as more important than
state identity. The emphasis of ethnic identity could transform Ethiopia’s
federal system into a system of treaties between autonomous regions that has
only helped to prevent outbreak of civil war. However, no ethnic group has
seceded from the nine states enumerated in the Constitution.

*Imposition of Ethnic Classification*

Similarly, Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism requires citizens to identify
themselves foremost as members of an ethnic group rather than members of the
state. All interactions with government offices require Ethiopians to
declare their ethnic affiliation to one of the eighty-four officially
recognized classifications. The imposition of ethnic classification is
counter-productive to state unity because ethnic federalism forces citizens
to identify predominately as part of one of the recognized ethnic
classifications rather than as Ethiopians. Further, Ethiopians may be
offspring of parents from two different ethnic groups but forced to identify
as just one ethnicity. The imposition of ethnic classifications and division
may contribute to state instability.

*Lack of Equitable Power Sharing*

Ethiopia’s ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF), controls all levels of government either directly or
indirectly through allied ethnic parties. The EPRDF consists of just three
ethnic and one multi-ethnic organization. Inequitable control of government
creates political fragility. Further, a politically fragile Ethiopia creates
the potential for military seizure of the state or complete ethnic fracture
and state disintegration. The EPRDF must disengage itself from democratic
centralism in order to deepen and extend Ethiopia’s democratization and
equitable power sharing arrangement.

*Divide and Rule*

Ethnic federalism creates the potential for a ruling political party or
coalition to acquire and retain political power through a policy of divide
and rule. A dominant political party may pressure and persuade less
organized ethnic groups to join a coalition in order to gain more seats in
government. A larger coalition acquires more government seats but does not
have to equitably and proportionally confer the seats to the ethnic groups
that comprise the coalition. In Benishangul Gumuz Region of Ethiopia, the
Benishangul ethnic group pressured and persuaded Gumuz and Shinasha
politicians to join the Benishangul coalition without their consent or
freewill. The practice of divide and rule over small ethnic groups is not
limited to the Benishangul Gumuz Region of Ethiopia. Further, such practice
creates inequitable treatment and undermines the Constitution’s intent of
cooperation and compromise. Also, divide and rule reduces the effectiveness
of the government and fosters intra-ethnic rivalries. Therefore, without
further mechanisms to protect small minority ethnicities, the practice of
divide and rule will sustain an inequitable balance of power.

*A History of Disunity and the Right of Secession*

An ethnic federal structure coupled with a history of disunity and the right
to secession may promote state division, If Eritrea, freely associated with
Ethiopia prior to 1993, had a right to independence, then other regions of
Ethiopia could claim a similar right to independence. The Oromo ethnic
group, the largest in Ethiopia, is committed to seceding from Ethiopia. The
Oromo Liberation Front’s desire for independence is so great that if the
right of secession had not been included as part of the Constitution, then
the OLF would not have signed on to the Transitional Government of Ethiopia.
The institution of the right to secede within the ethnic pluralism structure
may encourage already passionate separatist groups in Ethiopia to secede and
hurt the overall goal of a unified Ethiopian polity.

*Conclusion*

The Constitution creates an ethnically based federal republic that
recognizes and grants rights to Ethiopia’s ethnic groups and sets forth the
shared powers and responsibilities of the federal and state governments with
regard to Ethiopia’s ethnic groups. The Constitution creates nine states on
the basis of settlement patterns, language, identity, and the consent of the
people living within them. Also, each of Ethiopia’s “Nations, Nationalities,
and Peoples” has an unconditional right to self-determination. Ethiopia’s
ethnic federalism provides several long-term benefits for the state that
include promotion of individual ethnic rights, prevention of ethnic
splintering and violent civil war through fostering ethnic and regional
autonomy while maintain Ethiopia as a formal political unit, and creation of
a formal political space for ethnic identities and social ties that allow
the state to harness the available political strength as a unified polity.
However, Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism harbors short-term challenges that
include practical implementation regarding how to delineate ethnic entities
and the challenge of combating disunity. Also, some experts suggest the
Constitution creates a more unstable state. Further, an ethnic federal
structure coupled with a history of disunity and the right to secession may
promote state division and create the potential for a ruling political party
or coalition to acquire and retain political power through a policy of
divide and rule. It is unclear how the potential benefits and challenges
will unfold in Ethiopia’s future.

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