From: Biniam Tekle (biniamt@dehai.org)
Date: Thu Mar 11 2010 - 11:17:20 EST
*Note from contributor: Original report can be obtained from here:*
http://www.cfr.org/publication/21421/somalia.html
or viewd/downloaded from here
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Somalia_CSR52.pdf
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*Excerpts from report:*
**** "The State Department should also continue to pursue opportunities for
dialogue and negotiations with Asmara. These attempts are unlikely to
succeed, but Asmara can exert considerable influence over the Shabaab, and
the effort is worth making. The United States may also increase its
credibility among Islamists in the region by adopting a more neutral posture
between Eritrea and Ethiopia. (Hizbul Islam, for example, has vocally
protested the hypocritical imposition of sanctions on Eritrea, arguing that
Ethiopian military incursions into Somalia have been far more visible and
destabilizing.)"
**** "The United States should also work to ensure the sustainability of its
partnership with Ethiopia by publicly urging the Ethiopian government to
cease human rights abuses, implement democratic reforms, and resolve its
border dispute with Eritrea. Ethiopian cooperation is critical to the
pursuit of U.S. strategic interests in the region, but anti-U.S. sentiment
in the Horn is closely linked to the perception of U.S. complicity with
Ethiopian human rights abuses in Somalia and Ethiopian abuses against ethnic
Somalis in the Ogaden region. The United States’ ability to successfully
pursue its counterterror objectives depends on resolving that dilemma"
**** "The Shabaab’s radical leadership is believed to be concentrated along
the southern coast, primarily in the port city of Kismayo. These
leaders—Abdi Godane (“Sheikh Mokhar Abu-Zubeyr”), Ibrahim Haji Jama
(“al-Afghani”), and Fuad Mohamed Khalaf (“Fu’ad Shangole”)—have known
connections to international jihadist groups and are committed to the
Salafi-Wahabist strand of Islam. Access to extensive resources and support
from the Middle East (and allegedly Eritrea, though these claims have been
poorly substantiated) has allowed these Shabaab leaders to develop an
unusual degree of centralized control over several mixed-clan militia
groups"
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**
*http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50631*
*SOMALIA:
U.S. Should Accept Islamist Authority, Report Says
Charles Fromm and Mohammed A. Salih*
*WASHINGTON, Mar 11 (IPS) - The United States should accept an "Islamist
authority" in Somalia as part of a "constructive disengagement" strategy for
the war-torn country, according to a new report released here by the
influential Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) on Wednesday.*
The 39-page report urges the U.S. to recognise that "Islamist authority"
even if it includes al-Shabaab, or "the youth" in Arabic, an Islamist
insurgent group that has declared loyalty to al Qaeda.
It calls the current U.S. approach toward Somalia of propping up the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) "counterproductive". Not only is it
alienating large sections of the Somali population, but it is effectively
polarising its diverse Muslim community into so-called "moderate" and
"extremist" camps, the report says.
While the report encourages an "inclusive posture" by the U.S. toward local
fundamentalists, it suggests the U.S. should show "zero-tolerance' toward
transnational actors attempting to exploit Somalia's conflict", apparently
referring to al Qaeda.
"The Shabaab is an alliance of convenience and its hold over territory is
weaker than it appears. Somali fundamentalists - whose ambitions are mostly
local - are likely to break ranks with al-Qaeda and other foreign operatives
as the utility of cooperation diminishes," says the report, authored by
Bronwyn Bruton, a CFR international affairs fellow. "The United States and
its allies must encourage these fissures to expand."
However, David Shinn, a former U.S. ambassador to neighbouring Ethiopia in
the 1990s, disagrees that the al-Shabaab leadership will be ready to join
any future political arrangement in the country.
"I think al-Shabaab has become more radicalised and I don't see any
pragmatic leaders in al-Shabaab today. Many in the rank and file maybe
pragmatic, the gun-carriers, but they are not the leaders," said Shinn, who
also served as U.S. ambassador to Burkina Faso in the late 1980s.
"I don't see cracks in the leadership and I don't see pragmatics in the
leadership. A lot of the report is predicated on the idea that it is
possible to negotiate with al-Shabaab and I think that's wishful thinking,"
he said.
The report also warns against continued support for the U.N.-backed TFG
since it has proven "ineffective and costly".
"The TFG is unable to improve security, deliver basic services, or move
toward an agreement with Somalia's clans and opposition groups that would
provide a stronger basis for governance," the report says.
The TFG was established in 2004 through U.N. mediation in Kenya in an effort
to end the ongoing crisis in Somalia. The TFG moved to Somalia in 2005 but
has been unable to make "any progress on state building tasks" due to
internal divisions, the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG)
said.
It was hoped that the installation of Sharif Ahmed, the former head of the
Union of Islamic Courts, as president in January 2009 would attract a
sufficient number of Islamist leaders to subdue or at least fragment
al-Shabaab's forces. But Shinn says the TFG has become "marginally stronger"
in recent months.
"She [Bruton] seems to begin with the assumption that the TFG is doomed to
fail. I am not convinced that it will fail," said Shinn, who was a member of
the Advisory Committee to the report. "The fact the TFG under President
Ahmed has now existed for more than a year has already surprised many
so-called Somali experts. It's just wrong to make the assumption that it's
going to fail."
Entitled "Somalia , A New Approach", the report comes at a critical moment
in the evolution of U.S. policy toward Somalia . Earlier this week, the New
York Times reported that U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are helping
the Somali government, which has about 7,000 troops in the capital, plan an
impending TFG military offensive aimed at dislodging al-Shabaab fighters
from Mogadishu.
The report details two decades of strife in the Horn of Africa nation, the
establishment of the TFG, and its ongoing ensuing power struggle with the
al-Shabaab's movement and its allies.
Bruton contends that the U.S. policy of providing indirect diplomatic and
military support to the weak TFG has only "served to isolate the government,
and...to propel cooperation among previously fractured and quarrelsome
extremist groups."
The report calls on the United States to make a final attempt to help the
Somali government build public support by drawing in leaders of the other
Islamist groups. But it urges the administration of President Barack Obama
to consider major policy changes should the TFG fail or continue to be
marginalised to the point of powerlessness.
The TGF, which is backed by some 5,000 African Union (AU) troops in a
U.N.-authorised peacekeeping mission, controls only several blocks of
Somalia's sprawling capital of Mogadishu and the Aden Adde International
Airport, while al-Shabaab controls vast swaths of land to the south, and
parts of the capital as well.
Historically, Washington's interest in the volatile East African nation has
been limited to security issues, and most recently to denying sanctuary to
al Qaeda or its affiliates on Somali territory. In recent years, the U.S.
has carried out a number of attacks on targets in Somalia believed to be
linked to al Qaeda.
However, some analysts believe that the U.S. help could easily lead to
strengthening the insurgent movement in an already complicated set of
circumstances.
"The administration has decided to move aggressively to support the TFG and
is providing training, intelligence, military advice, and hardware to the
TFG army in anticipation of a major TFG offensive against al-Shabaab," said
David R. Smock, vice president of the United States Institute of Peace's
Centre for Mediation and Conflict Resolution.
"This is a major American gamble which could backfire. The offensive could
easily fail, which might lead the U.S. to get even more heavily engaged. We
have been burned badly in Somalia before, and we could be burned again," he
added.
In late 1992, the administration of former President George H. W. Bush sent
troops to Somalia as part of a U.N.-authorised operation to protect the
delivery of humanitarian and food relief to starving communities there. But,
in an aborted "nation-building" enterprise, U.S. military forces became
increasingly engaged in the ongoing warfare between and among clans that
followed the ouster in 1991 of the Siad Barre regime.
Then-President Bill Clinton began withdrawing U.S. troops after 18 SOF
soldiers were killed during a botched helicopter raid against one clan
leader in Mogadishu in October, 2003 and completed the withdrawal early in
2004.
The CFR report also recommends a decentralised development strategy in
collaboration with "the informal and traditional authorities" on the ground.
It calls for restraining Ethiopia, which has been involved in Somalia's
conflicts for years.
Bruton suggests that the U.S. should not "own the Somali crisis" and needs
to launch a diplomatic campaign to involve European and Middle Eastern
countries to support Somalia's stabilisation and address its humanitarian
and developments needs.
A U.N. report on Wednesday alleged that up to half of the food aid delivered
by the World Food Programme (WFP) to Somalia is being diverted to corrupt
contractors, local U.N. workers and Islamist militants in the country. The
WFP has rejected the allegations, calling them "unsubstantiated".
(END/2010)
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