From: Berhane Habtemariam (Berhane.Habtemariam@gmx.de)
Date: Wed May 27 2009 - 06:12:06 EDT
Somalia: The Battle for Mogadishu - Round One
May 27, 2009 - 9:40:49 PM
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
After more than a week of intense fighting between forces loyal to Somalia's
Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) and its armed opposition in the
country's capital Mogadishu, it has become abundantly clear that Somalia's
southern and central regions are locked in the grip of a cycle of civil
conflict that began in mid-winter.
In an accurate assessment of Somalia's political future (excluding the
provisionally autonomous region of Puntland and the self-declared
independent republic of Somaliland), posted on the Mareeg website on May 13,
the author considers four scenarios that have become familiar in recent
months: the T.F.G. defeats the armed opposition, the armed opposition
defeats the T.F.G., the opposing forces reconcile, and the opposing forces
enter a period of protracted fighting. The author concludes that the last
projection is the most likely one "in the short- and medium-term."
Substantiation of the judgment that Somalia faces "protracted fighting
without a definitive outcome" can be gained through an analytical chronicle
of the events that occurred between mid-April and mid-May that describes how
the positions of the major actors in the conflict have developed.
Phase 1 - Build-up
A deeper stage of civil conflict was signaled on April 13, when the T.F.G.'s
minister of internal security, Col Omar Hashi Adan - an ally of the T.F.G.'s
president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad, and the former commander of militias
affiliated with the Islamic Courts Union (I.C.U.), which forms the backbone
of Sh. Sharif's military support - addressed T.F.G. security forces and
stated that "government troops are expected to wage war on the opposition
who are still fighting in Mogadishu and other parts of the country and who
have refused to accept the peace." Hashi added that the armed opposition was
"working for the enemy" and "welcomes foreign fighters."
Hashi's call to arms, which followed a week of artillery duels between
T.F.G./I.C.U. forces and the opposition, marked a decisive shift in the
T.F.G.'s position, which had previously emphasized reconciliation with the
opposition. His remarks provoked an immediate response from the Islamic
Clerics Council (I.C.C.) and the Tradition and Unity Council (T.U.C.), which
represents powerful Hawiye sub-clans in Mogadishu, both of which had been
working in tandem to mediate between the T.F.G. and the opposition. I.C.C.
chairman, Sh. Bashir Ahmed Salad warned that Hashi's rhetoric could disrupt
the peace process; T.U.C. chairman, Mohamed Hassan Haad, called on Hashi to
retract his statement and "apologize" to Mogadishu residents.
Refusing to heed the mediators' warnings, the T.F.G.'s interior minister,
Sh. Abdikadir Ali Omar, another of Sh. Sharif's allies, urged the civilian
population to "confront" those responsible for a string of assassinations
and attempted assassinations of T.F.G. and I.C.U. officials. Hashi claimed
that al-Shabaab, the most militant and uncompromising faction in the armed
opposition, had sent 90 trained assassins to Mogadishu. On the ground,
Abdullahi Isse Abtidon, a member of Sh. Sharif's parliamentary faction, and
I.C.U. official Sharif Mohamud Hassan were gunned down. The latter incident
triggered armed confrontation when I.C.U. forces moved against al-Shabaab
positions.
Al-Shabaab spokesman, Sh. Mukhtar Robow denied that the group was involved
in assassination; I.C.U. spokesman Abdirahim Isse Adow, claimed that
al-Shabaab had phoned warnings to Abtidon and Hassan, adding that "this is
the last chance" for the I.C.C. and T.U.C. to mediate. Dr. Omar Iman, the
chair of the militant faction of Hizbul Islam (H.I.), the other major armed
opposition group, urged the I.C.U. and al-Shabaab to "stop inciting war," to
proceed with the mediation that H.I. was conducting, and to concentrate on
attacking the African Union peacekeeping mission (AMISOM), which protects
the T.F.G.
On April 18, intense fighting broke out between I.C.U. and al-Shabaab forces
in southern Mogadishu. In the first such incident, a residence housing
al-Shabaab officials was bombed. I.C.U. spokesman Adow said that his group
had launched a crackdown on bandits and insurgents, and advised members of
the transitional parliament to carry guns for their protection. On April 21,
I.C.U. commander, Sh. Mohamed Mohamud Jimale, was gunned down and T.U.C.
spokesman Ahmed Diriye Ali was attacked by gunmen. Diriye blamed al-Shabaab
for the attack. On April 22, Haad denounced targeted assassinations and
called on Mogadishu residents to form armed "civilian security forces." The
I.C.C. echoed Haad's call and criticized the T.F.G. for failing to provide
security. On the same day, the chairman of Mogadishu's Hodan district barely
escaped a mine explosion targeting him.
Phase 2 - Wait-and-See
In the last week of April, Sh. Hassan Dahir Aweys, leader of the
Asmara-based Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (A.R.S.-A), which
forms the most significant component of the militant faction of H.I.,
returned to Mogadishu after a period of exile that followed the Ethiopian
invasion of Somalia in December 2006. The arrival of Sh. Aweys, who had
shared power with Sh. Sharif during 2006, when the I.C.U. exerted dominant
control over the southern and central regions, was greeted with speculation
about his intent. On April 23, Iman's spokesman, Abubakar Sh. Usman Haji,
said that Sh. Aweys was in Mogadishu to reconcile the conflicting Islamist
factions. In an appearance on April 24, Sh. Aweys condemned the
assassination of I.C.U. leaders and said that he would "meet with everyone
concerned with Somalia."
Sh. Aweys' remarks were met by Sh. Sharif with the comment that his arrival
showed that Mogadishu was safer than it previously had been. The T.F.G.'s
justice minister, Sh. Abdirahman Janaqow, hailed Sh. Aweys' arrival and said
that his presence would "help reconciliation."
On April 25, Sh. Aweys clarified his position, stating that he did not
recognize the T.F.G., because it was "not a sovereign government and is
commanded by foreign powers." Sh. Sharif's response was reported differently
in various media. Garoweonline quoted him as saying that "we will speak with
anyone who can change the situation in Somalia, but we will see if Sh. Aweys
returned to wage war." The Mareeg website quoted Sh. Sharif as saying that
"Sh. Hassan [Aweys] is a Somali patriot and I am ready to talk with him
directly or indirectly, but he does not have the right to say the government
is illegitimate." The BBC reported that Sh. Sharif said that he would talk
with Sh. Aweys "and even accept him into the government" if that would
help to stabilize Somalia.
As the dance between Sh. Aweys and Sh. Sharif proceeded, parliament was hit
by a mortar attack, as was an AMISOM base manned by Burundian forces.
On April 26, Sh. Aweys' spokesman, Sh. Hasan Mahdi, told the Puntlandpost
website that Sh. Aweys was planning to form a "parallel government" and
would not recognize the T.F.G. Sh. Sharif commented that if Sh. Aweys wanted
to engage in fighting, it would "be seen in the next few days." The IRIN
news service reported that Sh. Aweys was working through local clans to
initiate "informal talks" with the T.F.G. and had agreed to negotiate an
accord. BBC correspondent Mohamed Mohamud reported that al-Shabaab had
attended the rally welcoming Sh. Aweys to Mogadishu and that Sh. Aweys was
talking to that group and H.I. Mohamud stated that the I.C.U. was on the
verge of hostilities with the armed opposition and that, if serious conflict
occurred, Mogadishu was likely to be divided into "fiefdoms," as it had been
before the I.C.U.'s 2006 revolution against local warlords. Mohamud
concluded: "From here, opposition and conflict look the most likely
outcome." Sh. Sharif, on Egypt's Nile TV, warned that a "new cycle of
violence" was looming, but did not commit to engaging in armed conflict. In
an interview with the Financial Times, Sh. Sharif said that he was not
speaking directly with Sh. Aweys, but that mediators were exploring the
possibility of dialogue. Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke said
that the T.F.G. had "plans to defeat violent groups."
On April 27, the head of al-Shabaab's finance department and one of its top
commanders were shot down in Mogadishu in separate incidents.
On April 29, a closed source in East Africa reported that Sh. Aweys was
under pressure from his Ayr sub-clan (Hawiye) to halt "non-strategic
clashes" or leave Somalia. Sh. Sharif admitted that the T.F.G. did not
"control most parts" of Somalia and that the opposition was determined "to
continue fighting." He said that the T.F.G. would "embark on all steps that
are at our disposal" to gain control, and that the opposition would either
surrender or flee from Somalia. In a May 2 press conference, Sh. Sharif
repeated his offer to negotiate with Sh. Aweys on power sharing, but added
that the T.F.G. was training ten thousand security forces to control
Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia. He condemned the armed opposition, but
did not mention specific groups.
On May 3, Sh. Aweys finally resolved the doubts about his intentions. In an
interview with Mogadishu's Radio HornAfrik, Sh. Aweys said that he would not
meet with Sh. Sharif, whom he claimed was "more interested in pleasing the
international community than in working for the Somali people." "I call on
the various Islamist groups to fight our common enemy. . We are open only to
talking with the international community," Sh. Aweys added. On May 4, the
T.U.C. held its first meeting with Sh. Aweys and failed to reach an
agreement with him.
Phase 3 - The Armed Opposition's Surge
The first round of the battle for Mogadishu began on May 4 when the militant
faction of H.I. and al-Shabaab attacked the key base of H.I.'s pro-T.F.G.
faction controlled by the latter's strongman, ex-warlord Yusuf Indha'ade,
whom they accused of being in the pay of the T.F.G.
On May 6, Garoweonline reported that weapons destined for militant H.I. and
al-Shabaab forces were flooding into Mogadishu and that H.I. was preparing
for "all-out war." Al-Shabaab spokesman, Sh. Hassan Yakub declared that even
if AMISOM withdrew from Somalia, his group would continue its jihad
against the T.F.G. "until there is no obstacle to Islamic rule." On the
ground, a member of AMISOM's Burundian contingent was gunned down.
On May 7, I.C.U. forces mounted an assassination attempt on an al-Shabaab
official. Al-Shabaab forces rushed to the scene and a firefight ensued.
Meanwhile, Sh. Sharif and Sharmarke held a meeting with the Indha'ade
faction of H.I. at which the latter agreed to work with the T.F.G. on
security and curbing assassinations. Militant H.I.'s leader Iman urged
Islamist factions to halt armed conflict against one another.
On May 8, Indha'ade stated that "from this day onward, we will support and
defend the government." He said that he had spoken with Sh. Aweys and that
they had disagreed politically. Indha'ade's spokesman, Daud Mohamud Abtidon,
announced that his faction was preparing to join the T.F.G. On the ground,
fighting escalated when al-Shabaab and I.C.U. forces engaged in a major
battle at Mogadishu's football stadium. The T.F.G.'s interior minister, Sh.
Abdulkadir Ali Omar, stated that al-Shabaab had initiated the clash by
attacking I.C.U. bases. The I.C.U. reportedly took up new positions in the
north of Mogadishu. The I.C.C.'s chair, Sh. Bashir Ahmed Salad, said that
Sh. Sharif had accepted the clerics' proposal for a ceasefire, but that the
opposition had not replied.
Fighting continued on May 9, when I.C.U. forces attacked a police station
held by the militant H.I. in north Mogadishu. The I.C.U. and al-Shabaab
engaged in a firefight in the south of the city and two I.C.U. militiamen
were gunned down in Bakara market. Al-Shabaab leader, Ali Muhammad Hussein,
accused the I.C.C. of sheltering in districts controlled by the "enemies of
the people" and said that the clerics would be "losers" if they failed to
preach in areas under al-Shabaab's control. I.C.C. chair Salad denied
al-Shabaab's accusation and said that his group had sent a committee to
mediate between the government and opposition. Salad praised Iman's faction
of H.I. for promoting a ceasefire.
On May 10, fighting spiked in the north and south of the city. Iman,
claiming that the I.C.U. had attacked H.I. positions, abandoned his support
for a ceasefire. Al-Shabaab joined forces with H.I. and al-Shabaab spokesman
Sh. Ali Mohamed claimed that the armed opposition held all contested
positions. The T.F.G.'s information minister, Farhan Mohamoud, denied
Mohamed's assertions and said that the armed opposition was led by foreign
fighters.
The gains of the armed opposition on May 10 marked a turning point in the
first round of the battle for Mogadishu, spurring rapid repositioning and
rebalancing of the contending forces. On May 11, the I.C.U. had abandoned
its bases, forcing the T.F.G. back into the few areas protected by AMISOM
tanks. Indha'ade surrendered his arms to Sh. Aweys, as did T.F.G. commander
Muhammad Roble Gobale. Sh. Sharif ceded commanded of T.F.G. forces to the
T.F.G.'s police chief, Abdi Qeybdid, an unpopular ex-warlord. Forces from
the southern regions dominated by the armed opposition were reported to be
reinforcing H.I. and al-Shabaab. Hashi said that the T.F.G.'s Council of
Ministers had declared war on the armed opposition, but had not "closed the
book" on reconciliation. Sh. Sharif held emergency meetings with AMISOM and
the T.U.C. and I.C.C., urging the latter to issue a fatwa denouncing the
armed opposition, a proposal that the Somaaljecel website reported the
I.C.C. refused to accept. Sh. Sharif said that the opposition had refused to
honor "initial agreements" with the T.F.G. and vowed to "defend the
existence of the government." Waagacusub Media quoted a senior T.F.G.
official as saying: "If the president and prime minister do not do something
to deal with the insurgents, we will nearly all quit this government."
Another source in East Africa reported on a tape of a T.F.G. National
Security Council meeting recorded by al-Shabaab intelligence, in which
former commander Gobale, who was conducting a briefing, complains that the
T.F.G.'s security apparatus has been infiltrated by the armed opposition,
lacks a unified command, and has been betrayed by Indha'ade. On the ground,
fighting was reported around the presidential palace, Sh. Sharif's last
redoubt. Repositioning continued on May 12, when the traditionalist Sufi
group, Ahlu Sunna wal-Jamaa (A.S.W.J.), whose allied militias are dominant
in the Galgadud region and have a presence in the southwest, and which had
previously backed the T.F.G., announced that it would only join Sh. Sharif's
forces on the condition that he would no longer "cooperate with foreign
Islamic ideals," by which was meant not only the armed opposition, but also
Sh. Sharif's own and predominantly Salafist clerical base. Reports surfaced
in Somali media that al-Shabaab was planning an attack on the presidential
palace.
On May 13, fighting resumed in northern and southern districts of Mogadishu,
with the armed opposition gaining more territory. Al-Shabaab spokesman Sh.
Mukhtar Abu Subeyr said that the T.F.G. could not be described as an Islamic
government, despite its adoption of Shari'a law. Senior al-Shabaab official
Hussein Ali Fidow acknowledged that non-Somalis were in his group's ranks,
but refused to call them "foreign fighters," arguing that "only non-Muslims
are foreigners."
Flying in the face of the facts on the ground, the international
organizations supporting the T.F.G. and fronting for Western donor powers,
attempted to downplay the gains of the armed opposition and the desperate
plight of the T.F.G. The United Nations special representative for Somalia,
Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, denounced the armed opposition, saying that Sh. Aweys
had come to Mogadishu "to take power and topple a legitimate regime" by
mounting a "coup attempt," and that al-Shabaab was "a ragtag alliance" with
exclusively economic aims of protecting "often shady business interests."
Admitting that the T.F.G. was "weak," Ould Abdallah quickly added that "to
perpetuate the idea that it is a civil conflict for political reasons is
very easy." The African Union's peace and security commissioner, Ramtane
Lamamra, said, "The Shabaab's attack was defeated. The situation is under
control."
Addressing the U.N. Security Council, which was considering the possibility
of replacing AMISOM with a U.N. mission, the U.N.'s chief political
officer, B. Lynn Pascoe, argued that the "latest violence" in Mogadishu was
a response to the T.F.G.'s "success in reaching out to opposition groups."
Pascoe continued that the T.F.G. is supported by "large segments of the
Somali people." Neither Pascoe nor Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon came out in
favor of the immediate deployment of a U.N. force, saying that until
security conditions improved and political progress advanced, AMISOM should
not be replaced. The U.N.S.C. decided to follow their advice.
Responding to Ould Abdallah's criticism of him on May 14, Sh. Aweys told
Reuters that the U.N. special representative "consistently defends the
government's policies as if he is the president of this country and he is
not playing his role of engaging every side of the conflict." Speaking to
Agence France Presse, Sh. Aweys called on Sh. Sharif to resign the
presidency, adding that "we have no real Somali government to speak of, but
foreign puppets who call themselves the leaders of Somalia." In his first
public statement for more than a year, al-Shabaab's titular leader, Sh.
Mukhtar Abdirahman Godane, stated in a videotape that the T.F.G. could not
"be described as an Islamic government, because it was created to destroy
Islamists in Somalia." Godane explained that the T.F.G. includes former
warlords from the coalition that the I.C.U. expelled from Mogadishu three
years ago, and that after assuming the presidency, Sh. Sharif had sought
advice and military support from external powers. On May 14, Sh. Sharif
signed legislation instituting Shari'a in Somalia and promised to appoint a
committee of experts to reconcile the T.F.G.'s clan-based secular
constitution with Islamic law, a concession that was unlikely to assuage the
armed opposition.
On the ground, international and local media reported a stand-off at the
presidential palace between the armed opposition and AMISOM/T.F.G. forces.
Fighting continued in the north and south of Mogadishu, as the armed
opposition made further gains and sought to clean out T.F.G. positions in
areas that had previously been spared from the conflict. Writing for the
Afrik website, Kanya Obaje Ori reported that T.F.G. forces were defecting to
the armed opposition, and that the latter now counted six thousand fighters
in Mogadishu facing four thousand T.F.G. troops and the 4300 AMISOM forces.
AMISOM was reported to have redeployed forces from bases in the city's north
to a new base in the south in order to protect supply lines. The T.F.G.
replaced its top military commander with senior police commander, Gen Yusuf
Osman Dhuma, consolidating police control over the T.F.G.'s frail security
forces.
Commenting on the situation, AMISOM spokesman Maj. Barigye Ba-Hoku said that
"we do not see anything new in Mogadishu. The insurgents launch attacks and
then cool down." Ba-Hoku added that reports of opposition advances on the
presidential palace were "propaganda" aimed at demoralizing T.F.G. forces
and frightening the population. The United States embassy in Kenya condemned
attacks on the T.F.G., expressed concern about the presence of foreign
fighters and commended Sh. Sharif for "the important progress the T.F.G. has
made in the past several months."
On May 15, international and local media reported a lull in the fighting,
with Xinhua's Abdurrahman Warsameh writing that "opposing forces are
stationed in close proximity, seeing eyeball to eyeball," as businessmen,
clerics and clan elders attempted to broker a ceasefire. Shabelle Media
reported that there was no mediation, but that traffic had resumed in some
districts that had been conflict zones. Associated Press correspondent
Mohamed Olad Hassan reported that the T.F.G. remained in control only of the
road connecting the presidential palace and the city's airport and some
government buildings, including the palace, (all of them protected by
AMISOM) and quoted T.F.G. spokesman Abdulkadir Damaareh, who admitted that
the armed opposition had taken two T.F.G. facilities, including the football
stadium, which served the T.F.G. as a weapons depot. The Somaaljecel website
reported that the armed opposition was now present in every neighborhood,
that it was receiving fresh reinforcements from the southern regions, and
that the T.F.G. was receiving reinforcements from clan militias in the
Middle Shabelle region, Sh. Sharif's home base. Somaaljecel confirmed the
A.P. report, saying that T.F.G. forces backed by AMISOM were concentrated at
the palace, the port, the airport, and the airport road. The BBC quoted H.I.
chair Iman as saying that most pro-government forces had disbanded and that
the rest were being protected by AMISOM.
The BBC reported an offer from Sh. Sharif to negotiate with the armed
opposition and its rejection by Sh. Aweys, who remained firm in his demand
that AMISOM withdraw before a new peace process involving "all stakeholders"
would be possible. The T.F.G.'s minister for planning and international
cooperation, Abdishakur Warsame, vowed that the T.F.G. would "clear the
rebels from the country in the coming days." AMISOM spokesman Ba-Hoku told
Voice of America's Peter Clottey that the peacekeepers would not be tempted
to engage in warfare with the armed opposition: "We know their tactics, we
are prepared for those tactics, and we are not ready to fall into their
tactics of pulling us into the conflict." Ba-Hoku admitted that the T.F.G.
had not "been able to consolidate its power and that is the advantage that
the forces that oppose the peace process are taking."
The international actors supporting the T.F.G. ratcheted up their rhetorical
attacks on the armed opposition, focusing on the presence of foreign
fighters in their ranks. While repeating a pledge to try to remove
opposition figures from U.N. and U.S. terrorist lists, if they joined the
peace process, Ould Abdallah said that 280 to 300 foreign fighters had been
involved in the wave of clashes, remarking that some were mercenaries and
others Islamic ideologues. The A.U.'s special representative to Somalia,
Nicholas Bwakira, was even more assertive, claiming that al-Shabaab was
controlled by al-Qaeda and was "a group of war criminals." Bwakira set the
tally of foreign fighters at 300 to 400 and said to Kenya's Daily Nation
that "the African Union forces are tracking them down."
Ba-Hoku said that although AMISOM had not been able to confirm that the
armed opposition was holding businessmen hostage and extorting money from
them on pain of execution, "we would not have any doubt in our minds that it
is possible." Also on May 15, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved
a non-binding "presidential statement" demanding that the armed opposition
renounce violence and join the peace process, reserving special condemnation
for al-Shabaab.
The I.C.C. ended a two-day meeting in Djibouti attended by clerics from
outside Somalia that was devoted to the role that the I.C.C. could play in
the peace process. I.C.C. spokesman Sh. Ahmed Abdi Dhisow told Shabelle
Media that the causes of the failure of previous mediation efforts were not
discussed.
Conclusion
The foregoing chronicle of the political/military events in Mogadishu from
mid-April through mid-May has been written to provide evidentiary support
for the thesis that the most probable future for southern and central
Somalia is a period of "protracted fighting without a definitive outcome."
The analytical component of the chronicle is mostly implicit; its
description of the moves of the major domestic actors should speak for
itself and lead to the conclusion that a cycle of civil conflict has taken
root and has deepened, having entered a new stage. One can make what one
will of Ould Abdallah's claim "that to perpetuate the idea that it is a
civil conflict for political reasons is very easy." Indeed, it is "easy,"
but that is because it is obvious - we are not engaged in rocket science
here.
The chronicle traces a trajectory from the initiation of an assertive policy
by the T.F.G. and I.C.U. that led to a build-up of armed conflict; through a
"wait-and-see" phase (as an editorial in Garoweonline termed it), marked by
the return of Sh. Aweys to Mogadishu; to the surge of the armed opposition
and its success in pushing back the T.F.G. and I.C.U. On the way, efforts at
mediation by the I.C.C., T.U.C. and the militant faction of H.I. collapsed,
generating the present condition of intensified polarization. Any expected
gains for the T.F.G. from cooperation with Indha'ade's faction of H.I.
dissolved when the latter was swept from the field.
That is not to say that the armed opposition has won the battle of
Mogadishu; only that it can claim victory in the first round. AMISOM, with
its tanks and other heavy weapons, remains in the city and might even be
reinforced, if Burundi fulfills a pledge to send a new battalion and Sierra
Leone honors its promise to provide a battalion. As long as AMISOM remains,
the T.F.G. is unlikely to be routed altogether and will exist in protective
custody with dwindling credibility, popular legitimacy and effectiveness. It
will become ever more clear that the T.F.G. is a creature of external
powers, which will fortify the position of the armed opposition. Ba-Hoku is
correct that the armed opposition "launches attacks and then cools down,"
but that hardly means that there is nothing "new in Mogadishu." The new
wrinkle is that the balance of power has changed and that the T.F.G. is no
longer the protagonist in the conflict; it is simply one of the players and
a weak and wasting "asset "of the Western powers and international
organizations, whose pledges of financial support for the T.F.G. in April
are now less likely to be fulfilled - why throw good money after bad? Even
if the donors come through with their (U.S.)$213 million, two-thirds of
which they apportioned to AMISOM and only one-third to train and equip the
ten thousand envisioned T.F.G. forces, it is unlikely to come in time to
bolster the T.F.G., especially in light of the donors' demands for
"accountability mechanisms." It should also be mentioned that this chronicle
does not consider the burgeoning civil conflict in the central Hiraan region
where the I.C.U. administration faces challenges from al-Shabaab, the
militant H.I., and warlord militias trained by Ethiopia, which has renewed
its own incursions across the border; the central Galgadud region, where the
dominant A.S.W.J. is contested by al-Shabaab; the deep southern Jubba
regions, where tensions have surfaced within the dominant hardline Islamist
coalition; and political opposition to the T.F.G. in Puntland. If the period
from mid-April through mid-May does not spell a cycle of civil conflict, it
strains the imagination to conceive of what would.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University
<mailto:weinstem@purdue.edu> weinstem@purdue.edu
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