http://africanarguments.org/2016/10/27/what-ethiopias-withdrawal-from-amisom-means-for-somalia/
What Ethiopia’s withdrawals from AMISOM mean for Somalia
Posted on October 27, 2016 by James Barnett
Why is Ethiopia bringing back some of the best-trained and
best-equipped soldiers fighting al-Shabaab?
This month has seen multiple withdrawals of Ethiopia National Defense
Force (ENDF) units from Somalia. On 11 October, ENDF soldiers under
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) unilaterally departed
from two strategic towns in the Hiraan region of central Somalia. On
23 October, another contingent abandoned a base in Halgan district of
northern Hiraan. Then on 26 October, the BBC reported that ENDF units
operating independently of AMISOM had vacated their positions in the
Bakol region near the Ethiopian border.
At this point it is unclear how many of the Ethiopian troops deployed
in Somalia (numbering roughly 4,400 of AMISOM’s 22,000 total troops)
have departed, but it is clear that the withdrawals will have a
significant strategic effect on the multinational counterinsurgency.
Both towns that were abandoned in Hiraan – El-Ali and Moqokori – were
shortly thereafter occupied by al-Shabaab, and residents have
reportedly already fled from villages Bakol in fear of further
advances by the Islamist militants.
As al-Shabaab looks to exploit the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of
Ethiopian forces, the crucial question is whether AMISOM can overcome
the loss of strategic positions and manpower at a critical juncture in
Somalia’s stabilisation.
The ENDF withdraws
Ethiopia has a complex history of conflict with its neighbours in the
Horn of Africa, beginning in the late 19th century when Emperor
Menelik II conquered the ethnic Somali region of Ogaden. Thousands of
Somalis died trying to regain the Ogaden in an unsuccessful 1977-78
war, and Ethiopia backed various Somali warlords as proxies following
the disintegration of the Somali state in the 1990s.
In 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia with full force to oust the Islamic
Courts Union and help install the internationally-recognised
Transitional Federal Government. In the wake of this intervention
al-Shabaab emerged, drawing on a Salafi-jihadist narrative to exploit
the nationalist backlash against the return of Ethiopian
“imperialists”, the ENDF’s brutal treatment of civilians, and the
transitional government’s lack of popular legitimacy.
In 2007, the African Union established AMISOM, which the ENDF joined
as a troop-contributing country in 2014 to protect the fledgling
government and degrade al-Shabaab through combined-force offensives.
The ENDF brought with it significant war-fighting capabilities that
other AMISOM nations lack. Ethiopia’s military is well-trained,
well-equipped, and is more competent in the field of logistics than
most African armies.
Combat capabilities aside, the ENDF is an unaccountable institution
with a disturbing human rights record at home and abroad. In Somalia,
ENDF troops have been accused of widespread rape, torture, and
extrajudicial killings. Meanwhile, as the mostly Oromo and Amhara
protests have grown in recent months at home, there have been hundreds
of deaths as the Tigrayan-dominated government has bypassed regional
security forces and deployed the ENDF in traditional police roles such
as riot control.
Why is Ethiopia pulling out troops?
The ENDF had remained silent about the withdrawals from Somalia until
yesterday, when Communications Minister Getachew Reda denied that they
were related to the nationwide state of emergency that was declared in
Ethiopia on 9 October in response to the ongoing protests. Instead, he
blamed the EU for failing to sufficiently support AMISOM.
While the rationale behind the withdrawals is undoubtedly
multifaceted, claims that the domestic unrest is irrelevant to the
decision are unconvincing, and not only because of its conspicuous
timing. For one, the ethnic tension behind the Ethiopian protests has
already manifested itself in Somalia, with several reports of
infighting between Oromo soldiers and Tigrayan officers in certain
units. It has been the practice of governments since antiquity to
bring potentially disloyal troops home to facilitate their
surveillance (or punishment) rather than allow them to scheme abroad.
The Tigrayan-dominated EPRDF government in Addis Ababa could be
following this logic.
It is also possible that ENDF units have redeployed to Ethiopia for
the straightforward need to bolster the government’s response to the
protests. If the protests evolve into a more organised low-intensity
conflict (a distinct possibility) the government will need to deploy
significant forces domestically. Ethiopia’s units in Somalia represent
less than 5% of the ENDF’s total forces, but battlefield experience
often counts more than sheer numbers. Assuming the EPRDF can trust at
least some of the units they have brought home, the government will
have at its disposal soldiers with significant experience in
asymmetrical warfare.
Another possibility is that the EPRDF is attempting to leverage its
participation in AMISOM to pre-empt any potential international
sanctions. So far the response from the US and EU to the state of
emergency has been quite muted, but should the domestic crackdown
intensify, the EPRDF might dangle the possibility of redeploying to
Somalia in return for US and EU agreement to temper their responses.
(No doubt President Pierre Nkurunziza, whose Burundian armed forces
constitute 5,400 of AMISOM’s troops, would be interested to see how
that plays out.)
Effects of the withdrawal
Regardless of the EPRDF’s motives and of whether a future redeployment
is likely, however, Ethiopia’s withdrawal has already significantly
affected AMISOM efforts.
Over the past years, multinational efforts have reduced al -Shabaab’s
territorial control from 55% of Somalia in 2010 to roughly 5% today,
according to a recent report by the RAND think tank. Nonetheless, the
militants remain the single greatest threat to Somalia’s stability,
employing modern guerrilla tactics to great effect.
Due to the weakness of the nascent Somali National Army (SNA), AMISOM
is crucial to containing the militants, and the abrupt withdrawal of
ENDF forces poses a significant strategic setback to these efforts.
According to standard counterinsurgency doctrine, AMISOM forces
already constitute less than half the number of troops needed to
stabilise Somalia, and the withdrawal of ENDF forces will stretch
limited resources even further.
ENDF units had also been deployed to strategically significant
positions in central Somalia. Ethiopian positions in Hiraan, located
less than 100km north of Mogadishu, had abutted one of al-Shabaab’s
two remaining areas of freedom of movement. The main highway in Hiraan
is one of only two which connect Mogadishu to the rest of Somalia, the
other running through Al Shabaab’s southern stronghold in Bay and
Lower Shabelle.
With positions along the Hiraan highway now abandoned, al-Shabaab can
more easily harass AMISOM and SNA forces in Mogadishu’s northern
environs and threaten the capital from the north and southwest. They
have done this with increasing frequency in the run up to Somalia’s
fragile electoral process, and most recently launched a bold attack in
Afgoye just 30km south of Mogadishu on 18 October.
[Al-Shabaab steps up attacks in run up to the Somalia elections]
Furthermore, the ENDF withdrawals in Bakol, which was previously a
relatively secure region, allow al-Shabaab to expand their operations
closer to the Ethiopian border. Given that Bakol borders the Bay
region, where al-Shabaab enjoys substantial freedom of movement,
increased operability in this area could translate to greater
contiguous territorial control than the militants have enjoyed for
some time.
The withdrawal also complicates possibilities of a final clearing
operation in al-Shabaab’s remaining strongholds north and southwest of
Mogadishu. This was always going to be difficult given the fledgling
state of the SNA, poor coordination among AMISOM forces, and manpower
shortages – not to mention the ease with which insurgents transition
to underground cells. But any offensive will now be even more
challenging.
A prudent strategy would have been to focus the bulk of forces on
clearing the Bay/Lower Shabelle region where al-Shabaab is stronger
and gains revenues from extorting traders in the few ports it
controls. But the fact that al-Shabaab is now bolstered in Hiraan
raises the risks of diverting substantial forces to Shabelle, which
would leave Mogadishu and central Somalia vulnerable.
Without a sufficiently capable Somali security sector, the presence of
AMISOM is crucial to this critical phase of the counterinsurgency. As
the ENDF withdrawals demonstrate, however, a successful multinational
stabilisation force is dependent on the stability of the member states
themselves.
James Barnett is a Boren Scholar in Tanzania, having previously
researched at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National
Defense University. You can follow him on Twitter _at_jbar1648. The views
expressed in this article are his own.
Received on Thu Oct 27 2016 - 20:26:25 EDT