"... So it is not insignificant that, in January 2015, a PRC company
contracted to undertake a $400-million expansion of the port of
Massawa, to include a 70,000 ton bulk cargo terminal and a 50,000 ton
multi-purpose terminal. This was the biggest commercial undertaking in
Eritrea since independence. This also indicated the strength of the
mineral projects starting to get underway in Eritrea ..."
http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Middle-East/The-Beginning-Of-A-Dynamic-Century-In-The-Middle-East.html
The Beginning Of A Dynamic Century In The Middle East
By Gregory R. Copley
Posted on Tue, 20 October 2015 20:45 | 0
Historical trends are combining once again to make the
Mediterranean-Red Sea-Indian Ocean linkage the nexus in a dynamic
phase of the evolving global strategic architecture. The relationships
of states within the region, and the relationships of the regional
states to the rest of the world is changing, and will evolve
significantly over the coming few years.
This Mediterranean-Red Sea-Indian Ocean region is an
indissolubly-linked set of subzones, a reality which has often been
inadequately understood from a strategic perspective.
The great societies and the historical and modern states at the
linkage between Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, are rarely
considered in a holistic fashion. Focus on the region has been mainly
about crises and superpower competition. The prospect now exists,
however, for the region to gradually emerge as a major, integrated
economic trading zone; perhaps the next major global marketplace,
linking Africa, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean.
So if I can make one point today it is that all of the elements of
this greater strategic theater are intercon-nected, interactive, and
collectively are critical to the emerging global balance. What happens
around the Eastern Mediterranean littoral and around the Indian Ocean
theater impacts the Persian Gulf, Arabia, and the Red Sea/Horn; and
vice-versa. If we look just at the littoral states of the Suez-Red
Sea-Horn, we see a population base of some 316-million people, and a
combined 2014 GDP estimate of at least $1.5-trillion. And this
grouping interacts, of course, with its neighbors in Africa, Europe,
and the Indian Ocean basin.
Stepping back for an even broader perspective, we saw in the 20th
Century the creation of some 100 new Westphalian-style nation-states
in the process of cratogenesis: the birth of nations. We witnessed the
demise (the cratocide, or murder), or cratometamorphosis (total
restructuring), of others. Major structural change in human society
began with the end of the Cold War. As a result, and particularly in
the Middle East and Africa, we are often seeing a reversion to more
historical and basic human groups: clans; lin-guistic, cultural, or
religious groupings; some ancient groups, such as Persia, Egypt,
Ethiopia, and so on. These emerging, or reviving, divisions
demonstrate that there are durable strands in human identity which
survive thousands of years.
In the past two decades or so, in either the heart or the peripheries
of the Suez / Red Sea / Horn of Africa region — the nub of the
Mediterranean-to-Indian Ocean linkage — we have already witnessed, for
exam-ple:
• The break-up of Ethiopia with the separation of Eritrea;
• The break-up of Sudan to create a separate South Sudan;
• The de facto break-up of Yemen;
• The de facto break-up of Iraq;
• The breaking-up of Syria;
• The de facto break-up of Libya; and
• The return to separate status of what had been the Italian and
British Somalilands into Somalia and Somaliland, and the concurrent
fracturing of the rump Somalian state.
• And there is now speculation as to the possible break-up, or
breakdown, in the coming decade or so of Turkey and Saudi Arabia, two
of the most significant economies in the region.
Yet this is only the tip of the iceberg; the start of a dynamic
century. Neighboring Europe is, for example, undergoing massive
transformation, and at least two European Union member states still
face significant separatist tendencies: the United Kingdom and Spain.
The EU as a geopolitical entity is also, itself, undergoing unplanned
transformation.
Strategic transformation is now occurring on a global scale. This will
largely be as a result of what seems to be a gradual return to a
bipolar world, but that may or may not occur as anticipated, and it
almost cer-tainly will not mirror the bipolar world of the last half
of the 20th Century.
The transformation of human society over the coming few decades will
also see the peaking and antici-pated decline of global population
levels, accompanied by mass population movement, particularly the
dislocation of people and the migratory flood across borders and into
cities. This was discussed at length in 2012 in my book,
UnCivilization: Urban Geopolitics in a Time of Chaos, and is now
becoming evident statistically and in media reporting. Clearly, the
transformation of the Western European population base will affect the
Mediterranean basin framework, and this, in turn, impacts or interacts
with the Suez/Red Sea/Horn region. Indeed, much of the European
population frenzy has been fed from Eritrea (and not just from Syria),
as we will discuss.
But it is within that framework — and before the delineation of the
new global strategic architecture be-comes clear — that we are
witnessing a dramatic transformation in the band of geography which
runs from the Atlantic, across the Mediterranean littorals, and then
across the Arabian heartland and Horn of Africa to the Indian Ocean.
This may be the great and urgent dynamic which plays out over the
coming one or two decades. It is probably even be more critical, more
complex, and less stable — in positive as well as negative terms —
than the concurrent transformation of the South China Sea waterways.
These strategic scenarios are very much interlinked, because the
Indian Ocean is, for much of global trade, the transit space, not the
desti-nation. But that, too, is changing. In other words, much of the
trade which enters or leaves the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea/Suez
sea lane or the Strait of Hormuz, also enters or leaves it through the
ASEAN waterways and the South China Sea. The recent expansion of the
Suez Canal also means that the Red Sea/Suez SLOC will become even more
significant because its preferred status over the Cape of Good Hope
sea route will continue to be compounded.
The nexus within this “Gibraltar to Socotra strategic space,” then, is
the Suez/ Red Sea/Horn of Africa region. This is the pivotal junction
of global trade and energy, a key component in the question of refugee
flows to Europe, and a new determining area of competition between the
U.S. and the People’s Republic of China. But for the first time in
centuries, the regional powers in this region hold considerable power
over their own fortunes.
History has, since the emergence of humanity from the Rift Valley and
across into Arabia and the Levant, some 60,000 years ago, given a
centrality to this region. Rarely has the area been less than central,
his-torically facilitating the civilizational links between East and
West, a situation which was compounded by the opening of the modern
Suez Canal in 1869.
Today, the region is re-shaping as the nexus of the new global
strategic framework, and not merely be-cause it facilitates trade and
provides energy resources to the world market.
Even if we look back at the 20th Century pattern, we have yet to
calculate the true cost to the global econ-omy of the closures of the
Suez Canal in 1956-57, and between 1967 and 1975, or even during the
brief interruption to shipping caused by the mining of the Red Sea by
the Libyan minelayer, Ghat, in July 1984. Today, the Red Sea/Suez Sea
Lane is of substantially more importance, a situation which clearly
will con-tinue in the near future. We will discuss that in more detail
in later sessions.
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Apart from anything else, the growing importance of the Red Sea/Suez
sea lane makes the stability, prosperity, and security of the region —
the Suez, the Red Sea, and its littorals on the Arabian Peninsula and
the Horn of Africa — of concern to every society in the world. But
there is much more to consider than the region’s effect on the world.
We must also consider the world’s effect on the region. Global
transformations and fluctuations affect the fortunes of the region, as
we saw with the decline in Suez Canal revenues in 2008-09 with the
global economic crisis. First, we need to consider the outlook for
stability and instability in the region itself, and what that might
portend for the world.
To start with an overview of the threats to the region, and some of
the internal, dysfunctional factors, we need to consider the reality
that several established states in the region are in that process of
cratometa-morphosis: total restructuring.
Several key states may not exist in their present or 20th Century form
or relative power within a decade: Libya, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia. There are varying de-grees
and forms to this change, or restructuring. If Saudi Arabia, for
example, was to fracture, the pro-spect is that Qatar, and possibly
the UAE, or even Jordan and Oman, could expand to reclaim some of
their former clan areas. And what happens in the Arabian Peninsula
affects what happens on the Horn of Africa, and vice-versa, as we
recall from the cross-Red Sea Kingdom of Queen Makeda of Saba, some
three millennia ago.
On the other hand, if Saudi Arabia was to survive its present downward
economic spiral due to finite re-sources, it would be because of a
strong alliance and trading structure with, for example, Egypt and
possibly Israel, and potentially Ethiopia. And it would be because the
Saudi Arabian economic model transformed from its present dependence
on oil and gas, through new water desalination and distribution means,
into a more balanced economy, and one which was able to limit, rather
than grow, its population.
Of pivotal importance because of its regional reach would be the
possible break-up over the coming decade of Turkey, which has
historically and currently been active in the Maghreb, Red Sea, and
Horn. This, along with possible changes on the Arabian Peninsula,
would substantially alter the way in which out-of-region powers (such
as Russia, the PRC, and the U.S.) are channeled in their engagement in
the area. It would probably lead to the return of Egypt, Iran, and
Ethiopia as the anchoring poles of the greater Middle East, because
they represent actual historical civilizations. Iran and Egypt each
have substantial, but not overwhelming, economies; indeed, their
economies are not substantially larger than that of Israel, and
Israel’s per capita economic wealth dramatically exceeds that of
either Egypt or Iran. Ethiopia’s economy, however, is nascent, but
growing, and could grow even more rapidly.
What is critical about the revival of Egypt, Iran, and Ethiopia is
that they represent cohesive civilizational structures which can
command a sense of national unity and productivity, but, most
importantly, they all function — for the first time in generations —
as fully sovereign entities, making strategic decisions based on their
own perceptions of national requirements. Both Egypt and Iran are
making strategic decisions today largely without reference to other
powers. Ethiopia is once again re-emerging in this context after four
decades of difficult internal preoccupation, much of it governed by
Cold War politics. That does not mean that these civilizations have no
allies; nor that they disregard external influences. But they have
determined their own strategic goals and are moving toward them.
Within this framework, while we are already seeing the significant
restructuring of Egypt, it is worth noting that we should start to see
the restructuring of Iran begin to become visible within a few years.
And similarly with Ethiopia.
What is emerging, then, in this broad arena from the Maghreb to the
Indian Ocean is a bloc of states which share many vital and direct
interests: Egypt, Israel, Jordan as a core, and, because of their
shared direct or indirect interest in the new, great Eastern
Mediterranean energy resources offshore, linking with Cyprus and
Greece. These represent the Western end of a the framework, with
absolutely vital interests in protecting the Eastern Mediterranean and
by default the entrance to the Suez Canal/Red Sea, quite apart from
their secondary interest in supporting the global trade links which
utilize the Canal and Red Sea. It is conceivable that Lebanon and
Syria, and possibly even Turkey, could have shared interests with this
core bloc of Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, but for a variety of
reasons they are at present peripheral to the bloc.
Egypt, Israel, and Jordan — all Red Sea (and therefore Indian Ocean)
littoral states — are engaged as well in the Eastern end of the
equation through shared vital interests with Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia,
and Dji-bouti. There are other regional states which have interests:
Sudan and South Sudan, Eritrea, Yemen, Somaliland, and Somalia. Oman,
although outside the Red Sea, nonetheless also has a significant stake
in the stability of the Red Sea littoral.
Yemen, the Sudans, Eritrea, Yemen, Somaliland, and Somalia have short-
and long-term preoccupations at present which keep them partially or
wholly marginalized from the core Red Sea bloc of Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. And even Saudi Arabia is itself gravely
distracted at present, because of eco-nomic issues and its
debilitating involvement in the conflict which threatens to break up
Yemen.
Some key states just outside the region are also involved in either
helping or destabilizing the Red Sea region: Iran, Qatar, the United
Arab Emirates, and Kenya.
And a number of major external powers — the U.S., France (and the EU
generally), the People’s Republic of China, Turkey, India, Pakistan,
Japan, Australia, and Russia — are also engaged in the protection or
projection of their own interests into the Red Sea / Horn of Africa
region. Indeed, the 30-nation Combined Maritime Force (CMF), based in
Bahrain, in the Persian Gulf, has enabled a significant number of
maritime states to express their involvement in the security of the
region, through participation in the combined task forces,
particularly CTF-150 on counter-terrorism and maritime security, and
CTF-151 on counter-piracy. These have been particularly helpful, for
example, in reducing Somalia-based piracy against commercial shipping.
Engagement in the anti-piracy work enabled Japan and the PRC — neither
of which is in the CMF — to significantly expand their long-term
maritime presence in the north-western Indian Ocean.
Indeed, it is the question of Djibouti which is a key pivot point in
international engagement in the region. The US, France, and Japan
already hold secure basing in Djibouti, and the PRC has been
negotiating — for a reported $100-million a year in basic rental — a
long-term agreement to base naval and other forces in Obock, on the
northern shore of Djibouti’s Gulf of Tadjoura, across the Gulf from
the capital, Djibouti, which is closer to the French, U.S., and
Japanese basing.
The Djibouti-PRC negotiations have, as I said in a report in August
2015, put Djibouti strategically “in play.” It is “in play” because
the U.S. Government, if it wishes to sustain any dominance in the
region, must attempt to constrain, contain, or balance the PRC
projection. The PRC relationship with Djibouti and Ethiopia is already
well-established, and the PRC recently completed the new Djibouti-Dire
Dawa-Addis Ababa rail link which is of profound strategic significance
to Ethiopia and Djibouti, but also to the PRC in its hope to dominate
logistical lines for resources leaving Africa and Chinese products
entering the Continent. It is not insignificant, when thinking about
the potential for economic development of the region, as well as for
the PRC’s resource transportation, that the plan exists for the rail
link to be extended from Addis Ababa to Juba, the South Sudan capital,
and then on to Lamu Port, in northern Kenya.
[The signing of an agreement in October 2015 to build a 550km long,
$1.4-billion, 20-inch fuel pipeline from Djibouti to Awash, in Central
Ethiopia, is also a significant sign of the new infrastructure
emerging. That project will be complete by 2018.]
But as we look at the southward reach of the infrastructure, it is
clear that resolution of the civil war in South Sudan is critical for
the Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor
pro-ject, and to the economy of Ethiopia and Djibouti. Significantly,
the August 2015 “peace accord” between the factions of South Sudan may
not have resolved the civil war or the threat of ongoing hostility
toward South Sudan from Sudan.
We will discuss the overall PRC projection into the north-western
Indian Ocean shortly. But on the imme-diate question of Djibouti, we
are seeing that the Djibouti-PRC negotiations on the Obock basing have
finally set off alarm bells in Washington. In a report on October 2,
2015, I noted that Djibouti was in a dynamic state; that is, in a
state of flux, and suggested that we should expect it to come under
massive U.S. pressure soon. It is likely that the U.S. would attempt
to pressure incumbent President Ismail Omar Guelleh either not to seek
re-election in April 2016, or to empower the Djibouti opposition, in
order to en-sure that Djibouti does not offer military or strategic
basing to the PRC.
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What, then, would be Beijing’s options, knowing that the PRC must have
a stake in the control of the Red Sea? Perhaps to move toward the use
of Berbera, the great naval basing option in Somaliland? That would
imply some additional steps by Beijing to stabilize and transform the
Republic of Somaliland, and to upgrade the Berbera to Ethiopia
transportation links. At this stage, if anything, the People’s
Republic of China is as committed as the U.S. — perhaps even more so —
to securing a naval presence which would help facilitate its
transportation of vital resources out of Africa and the Middle East.
And if not Berbera, then Beijing’s options would have to include the
Eritrean ports of Assab or Massawa, even though the stabilization of
Eritrea and the mending of Ethiopian-Eritrean links would be far more
difficult and expensive than mending the problems of the now
dysfunctional Administration of Somaliland in Hargeisa. So it is not
insignificant that, in January 2015, a PRC company contracted to
undertake a $400-million expansion of the port of Massawa, to include
a 70,000 ton bulk cargo terminal and a 50,000 ton multi-purpose
terminal. This was the biggest commercial undertaking in Eritrea since
independence. This also indicated the strength of the mineral projects
starting to get underway in Eritrea. But what was also significant was
that the Chinese firm, CHEC (China Harbor Engineering Company) was
also engaged in building new port infrastructure in Walvis Bay,
Namibia, and in Venezuela: both ports which are integral to the PRC’s
emerging global naval strategy, which is tied closely to its trade
ambitions and actualities.
[It is not coincidental that Landbridge Group, an energy and
infrastructure company from the People’s Republic of China, on October
13, 2015, bought control of a 99-year lease on the strategic
Australian port of Darwin, at the Eastern end of the Indian Ocean, and
at the southern end of the ASEAN straits up into the South China Sea,
just as the PRC some years ago acquired control of the Panama Canal
Company. There is little doubt that Beijing sees the vital nature of
acquiring the key maritime assets at the choke-points, and has moved
through economic means to acquire them, rather than starting through
military projection. For Beijing, the flag will follow the trade,
rather than the other way around.]
In the cases of Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, it is already
apparent that Beijing has interests in maintain-ing the stability and
prosperity of the Red Sea region, without even yet addressing its
interests in Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Egypt.
The bottom line is that the PRC is not going to leave the region: not
the north-western Indian Ocean nor the north-eastern end of it. Its
massive and vital commitments to building and dominating the port
infra-structures — and transportation links — at Lamu, in northern
Kenya, and Gwadar, in Pakistani Baluchi-stan, absolutely require that
centerpiece which the Djibouti port facilities would represent. But it
does, with Massawa, have a fallback position already underway.
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[As an aside, India is also making moves into the Western Indian Ocean
choke-points. From October 26 to 29, 2015, the Indian Government was
to host more than 40 African heads-of-state at the third India-Africa
Forum Summit, this time being the first that all members of the
African Union were invited to at-tend.]
So whatever steps the U.S. takes in Djibouti — and it is already
taking steps there — will need to consid-er the downstream impact on
Beijing’s decision-making. The U.S. is heavily invested in Djibouti.
The U.S. combined military presence at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, which
hosts some 4,200 U.S. service person-nel, serves as a vital support
for the U.S. and allied maritime presence on the Bab el-Mandeb, but
also links with the U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, mostly represented in the form of
RQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations of the U.S. 17th
Air Force, based at the 2,800 meter Ethiopian airfield at Arba Minch,
in the country’s south. It is understood that the Reaper missions link
with those operating from Mahé, in the Seychelles. These operations,
of course, linking with the U.S. facilities at Diego Garcia, in the
British Indian Ocean Territories, and the U.S. air and naval support
facilities in Bahrain, and al-Udeid Air Force base, which hosts the
U.S. Central Command and U.S. Air Force Central Command headquarters
near Doha, Qatar.
We discussed earlier the reality that all segments of this greater
region were interactive. In the lower Red Sea region, actions on one
side of the Red Sea affect conditions on the other side.
For a number of years, young Eritrean men fled their country to escape
military service. Those who could not find safe-haven in Ethiopia, or
Sudan, or Djibouti, took the short sea-voyage to Yemen. Now, the war
in Yemen has forced the exodus of military-age men from Eritrea to
find their way across to North Africa, and thence to Europe. This is
no small surge of people. Eritrea is breaking down, particularly with
the decline in support from Egypt, Israel, Libya, and other former
supporters. Egypt no longer wishes to pursue the Mubarak- and
Morsi-era confrontation against Ethiopia; Cairo now prefers diplomatic
solutions in its discussions with Ethiopia, and no longer supports
Eritrea’s covert war against Ethiopia.
Libya, without Qadhafi, also no longer funds Eritrean-run guerilla
operations into Ethiopia, which it had run through Somalia and
Somaliland, as well as directly across the Ethiopian borders.
The aggressive opportunism of Eritrean Pres. Isayas Afewerke seems
close to an implosion, but the pro-spect exists that the 69-year-old
former revolutionary will lash out in a final attempt to reassert some
re-gional relevance and to preserve his Government. Certainly, he had,
until the recent mineral and port deals, done little to build an
economic base in his state.
Despite these recent steps, the crisis for Isayas can be seen in the
upsurge of Eritreans fleeing across North Africa and into Western
Europe, adding to the swelling tide of illegal immigrants there. The
situation is far worse than is seen in international media and
intelligence reporting. The outpouring of Eritreans comes at a time
when Eritrea is ostensibly at peace, unlike Syria, where conflict has
driven the population outflow.
The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported in November 2014
that, during the first 10 months of that year, the number of Eritrean
asylum-seekers in Europe from Eritrea had nearly tripled: to nearly
37,000. Some 22 percent of “boat people” arriving in Italy during that
period were from Eritrea, the second largest number of asylum-seekers
after Syrians. The numbers of Eritreans crossing into Ethiopia swelled
to 5,000 in October 2014. More than 216,000 Eritreans were already in
Ethiopia and Sudan. But 2015 saw these already serious figures
skyrocket. Many, until late 2015, were also fleeing across the Red Sea
to Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
Isayas’ primary bid for survival has been based on conflict with
Ethiopia, to destroy the Government there in order to force a
compromise which would restore trade from Ethiopia to the Red Sea via
Eritrean ports. To achieve this objective, apart from the direct
state-to-state conflict which Isayas instigated against Ethiopia in
1998, Eritrea backed numerous armed opposition groups inside Ethiopia.
One was the Tigré People’s Democratic Movement (TPDM), which the
Isayas Government created, funded, trained, armed, and supported for
the past 12 years. On September 11, 2015, however, the TPDM had tired
of Isayas and the failure of his endeavors, and fled, en masse, into
Sudan and thence into Ethiopia.
Eritrean Army units were rushed to the border area, across the border
from the Sudanese town of Omhajer and close to the Ethiopian border,
and engaged the battalion-sized TPDM force (est. at around 700 men).
The TPDM forces, led by Molla Asgedom, completely destroyed the
Eritrean Army force near Omhajer and later at Seq al-Ketir, before
heading to Hamdait (all in the Sudan). The TPDM force also suffered
heavy casualties, but crossed into northern Ethiopia to be greeted by
Ethiopian Government forces at Humera and Dima towns. However, some
TPDM groups were still in Sudan, and in the hands of Sudanese security
forces.
What is significant is that the TPDM was one of Isayas’ most trusted
military units, and part of the key to his security. The Eritrean Army
is overwhelmingly dependent on forced conscription, for indefinite
periods, of unwilling Eritreans, one of the major causes of the
outflow of Eritrean men as refugees. Significantly, Eritrean State
media has mentioned nothing of the defection of the TPDM.
The ongoing collapse of Eritrea parallels the decline in support from
some of its foreign sponsors, particularly Egypt and Libya, which were
anxious — during earlier governments — to dominate the Red Sea and to
ensure that Ethiopia, a former Red Sea power, was unable to dominate
the mouth of the Red Sea. Now, Libya is in disarray, and the Egyptian
Government of Pres. Abdul Fatah al-Sisi is committed to a strong
working relationship with Ethiopia on a range of issues, particularly
the Nile water usage. Egypt’s Coptic Pope Tawadros II said on August
25, 2015, that he was willing to mediate a “convergence” of views
between the Ethiopian and Egyptian peoples on Nile water use. The
linkages between the Egyptian and Ethiopian societies — as well as
their governments — are building, despite clear differences on the
modalities of such things as Nile water use. The reality is that the
case for cooperation is now seen as more appealing than the case for
confrontation.
Thus Eritrea has lost its sponsors, other than Qatar — which supports
the Muslim Brotherhood and is therefore seeking ways to maneuver
against Egypt — and possibly Iran and Turkey, which are seeking
leverage in the Red Sea/Horn region. Iran and Turkey, however, are
rivals for influence in the region.
Pres. Isayas, in poor health in recent years, has, as part of his
posture, hinted at a reunion or confedera-tion with Ethiopia, of which
Eritrea was historically a significant part. Ethiopia could not
consider this while Isayas remained at Eritrea’s helm.
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But if the collapse of Eritrea is of concern, equally, too, is the war
in Yemen, now underway as an international conflict for nine months,
spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and a coalition of states. What is of
concern in the Yemen war is that a complete success by Saudi Arabia,
aimed at restoring the Government of Pres. Abd al-Rab Mansour al-Hadi
and Prime Minister Prime Minister Khaled Bahah might be difficult,
given that the war has now re-opened sectarian as well as geopolitical
divides in the country.
An early success in the war against the so-called Houthi forces, which
still control much of the north, in-cluding the capital, Sana’a, is
critical to Saudi Arabia if the Kingdom is not to suffer significant
economic consequences at a time when its economy is challenged. The
question is whether the Saudi coalition can, indeed, succeed in being
able to restore a sustainable government of the entire Yemen, or
whether any patchwork solution would require such “deals with the
devil” as to render any follow-on government either paralyzed or weak.
Extensive areas in southern Yemen, extending over toward the
Hadhramaut, are al-ready under the control or influence of radical
jihadist groups which are part of, or allied with, al-Qaida. It has
been argued that the Houthi Zaidi forces were, as a Shi’a sect, always
allied with and dependent on Iranian support, but this was an
overstatement of the position. It is more likely that the conflict
which ex-panded out of control, and brought in Saudi support for Pres.
Hadi, may have opened up an opportunity for Iran to inject itself into
the conflict.
And Iran’s long-term engagement in the Red Sea and Horn region is
something which pre-dates the cleri-cal Government which took office
in 1979. But even now, before Iran has recovered economically from the
effects of years of sanctions, and while its government is in many
respects dysfunctional, it still manages to control much of the
strategic dynamic in the region. It has been able to achieve this with
a defense budget, in 2014, of around $8-billion. Saudi Arabia, before
it ramped up defense spending to deal with the Yemen crisis, had a
2014 defense budget of around $80-billion.
I have not, in this brief overview, had the opportunity to discuss in
depth the other littoral states of the Suez/Red Sea/Horn, namely
Sudan, Israel, and Jordan. It is clear, however, that they have key
roles to play, particularly given Israel’s rapid resolution of its
water and energy challenges. What is clear is that the two significant
regional naval powers, Egypt and Israel, will increase their
capability, of necessity, into the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Egypt’s very significant contracting for new French warships — the two
Mistral-class helicopter assault ships, the two FREMM-type,
NATO-standard frigates, and the four Godwind-class corvettes — gives
it world-class naval platforms, coupled with its modern and capable
Air Force, for the Red Sea and Mediterranean. Israel’s expanding
submarine fleet — which will comprise six Dolphin-class, or modified
Type 212 boats, built by HDW in Germany — will give that navy an
expanded capability in the Red Sea, possibly supported in the future
more visibly by new Israeli surface combatant ships.
In all of this it is conceivable to see a positive, but challenging
period ahead for the players in this global nexus. The biggest
negatives, of course, are the conflicts and competitions of the
region. Those include:
• Between Egypt and Ethiopia on the resolution of Nile and Red Sea
issues because, de-spite significant differences in negotiating
styles, both states have far more to gain from cooperation than
confrontation;
• Between South Sudan and Sudan, which is less stable and predictable,
but where coop-eration could be the link which integrates the
economies of East and Central Africa with Egypt and the Horn. On the
other hand, the growing radicalization of Sudan has marked it has a
major resource of jihadist support for fighters targeting such diverse
targets as Egypt and Nigeria;
• Between Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Zaidis, where there is enormous
long-term poten-tial for damage unless a resolution could be achieved
within, say, a year, and even then there will be serious legacy
problems and almost certainly polarized societies;
• Between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which may only be resolved when
Eritrean Pres. Isayas Afewerke departs the scene; and
• Between the warring factions in Somalia, which shows no sign of an
early resolution, alt-hough, as with the Puntland region, the
combatants have been showing signs of fatigue, despite being one of
the fountainheads of jihadist support for African militant groups.
The biggest positives are based around the prospect of a substantially
and rapidly growing Egyptian economy, linked with the regional energy
basin in the Eastern Mediterranean. That alone brings Egypt and Israel
into a common economic framework with Cyprus and Greece, and gives the
ability to help alle-viate economic challenges in Jordan, for example.
Within this, too, is the fact that out-of-region powers are competing
for influence in the region. While this poses some dangers, it also
has already demonstrated that investment into the region has increased
and shows signs of increasing still further.
It is unlikely that the region will become less militarized. On the
contrary, it will be a region in which, for the first time, local
players will be increasingly capable and dynamic. The trade patterns
are already changing, too, The Indian Ocean basin, and particularly
the East African region, is beginning to show signs of activity,
because of China’s demand for resources, and the PRC’s need for sea
lane security is pushing it to direct trade up the East African coast
and across to Gwadar, for carriage across the land bridge of the
Karakoram Highway into China.
In all of this, then, the security of the Suez Canal becomes
increasingly of concern, to an even greater degree than historically.
But all that assumes that Europe and the People’s Republic of China
remain as substantial markets for the foreseeable future.
Perhaps the real concern is not that the Suez/Red Sea/Horn region is a
source of instability affecting the world, but the reverse: The
prospect that flattened economies and political stagnation and flat
energy and resource demand in Europe and China, and perhaps in the
U.S., could be the factors which adversely affect the Suez, Red Sea,
and Horn. But at least, for the first time, there is the prospect of a
growing regional marketplace which could grow significantly apart from
the old worlds of Europe, the Americas, and Asia.
By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs
Received on Sat Dec 19 2015 - 18:25:31 EST