Date: Sun, 30 Aug 2015 23:16:57 +0200
Posted Sunday, August 30 2015 at 19:37
In Summary
- Uganda says it will honour the requirement of the latest peace agreement to withdraw its army from South Sudan territory, but on condition that the safety of its citizens is guaranteed.
- Uganda’s army leader is voicing fears that Ugandans in South Sudan have been targeted by rebel leader Riek Machar’s group, especially after the conflict started and Uganda swiftly deployed its army to support President Kiir’s crumbling government.
- The army has hinted in the past that even in the event of its withdrawal from South Sudan, it would maintain a buffer force south of Nimule to safeguard the export route to Juba.
Uganda says it will honour the requirement of the latest peace agreement to withdraw its army from South Sudan territory, but on condition that the safety of its citizens is guaranteed.
Chief of Defence Forces Gen Edward Katumba Wamala told The EastAfrican that the Uganda People’s Defence Forces will comply with the directive in the agreement that all foreign forces in the war must leave South Sudan within 45 days.
Uganda’s exit and a replacement force are key to building confidence within the rebels [Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement - In Opposition] but Gen Katumba Wamala said UPDF’s withdrawal depends on the safety of Ugandans living and working in Juba and elsewhere within South Sudan.
“We will go with what’s in the agreement, so long as there is no danger to our citizens in Juba. Otherwise if there is any danger... we shall cross that bridge when we get there. But for now, what is in the agreement is what we will comply with,” he said in a phone interview on August 27.
Uganda’s army leader is voicing fears that Ugandans in South Sudan have been targeted by rebel leader Riek Machar’s group, especially after the conflict started and Uganda swiftly deployed its army to support President Kiir’s crumbling government.
Initially, Uganda sent in troops within hours of war breaking out in the South Sudan capital Juba mid December 2013, apparently to secure key installations like Juba Airport and other transport routes for safe evacuation of its citizens, but it soon became clear that the UPDF presence in South Sudan was beyond evacuation of stranded Ugandans.
Uganda’s expressed fear echo those of South Sudan President Kiir, who said that despite signing, he had “serious reservations” about how the mediation was conducted and some of the clauses in the peace deal.
President Kiir was forced to sign the agreement after the United Nations threatened to impose sanctions on him.
Among the major clauses of the agreement that could be the cause of Mr Kiir’s reservations is the fact that the UPDF — the biggest foreign force on South Sudan territory — which all along has been allied to his government, would be forced to pull out, along with the rest of the foreign armies and militia. The other militia include rebels from neighbouring Darfur region and the Nuba Mountains of Sudan.
The peace agreement also demands that no troops be allowed within a 25-kilometre radius of the capital Juba, a clause that amplifies the fears of Uganda considering that the majority of Ugandans in South Sudan work and live in Juba.
Only the presidential guard, police and troops protecting key infrastructure in the city are allowed to remain in the capital.
The onus is now on the replacement force comprising Rwandan, Ethiopian and Kenyan forces to allay fears of both President Kiir and Uganda.
It is assumed that trade between Kampala and Juba will regain its vibrancy as South Sudan is an important export market and source of foreign exchange for Uganda. It is estimated that Uganda has been losing $621.3 million annually since the war started.
But central to this trade is the security of the Nimule-Juba highway.
The army has hinted in the past that even in the event of its withdrawal from South Sudan, it would maintain a buffer force south of Nimule to safeguard the export route to Juba.
President Yoweri Museveni was one of the regional leaders alongside Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn and Kenya President Uhuru Kenyatta who witnessed as Mr Kiir signing the agreement in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa On Wednesday.
President Museveni described the war between Mr Kiir’s government and the SPLM-IO as the “wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time” in comparison with South Sudan’s long struggle for Independence.
But President Museveni’s comments echo the a sentiment expressed by his CDF Gen Katumba Wamala, that a young nation that chose this time to go to war, impacting on its own stability and the security of its neighbours, needs a security buffer.
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South Sudan faces long road to genuine peace despite signing agreement
South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir (left) shakes hands with Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni after signing a peace agreement in Juba, on August 26, 2015. AFP PHOTO
Posted Friday, August 28 2015 at 04:00
In Summary
- President has failed to defeat renegade forces militarily or get rid of them politically.
- Salva Kiir must now hand over enough power to make the deal hold, while retaining some.
- The success of the deal depends on the ability of the two principals - Kiir and Machar - to find common ground in a movement with a long history of divisionism.
The peace deal signed by President Salva Kiir and his rival Dr Riek Machar to end 20 months of fighting in South Sudan is a useful first step but many challenges remain for Africa’s youngest country.
First is the deal itself. President Kiir’s refusal to sign the deal in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on August 17 – the deadline set by the region and the international community, and the day Machar signed – was seen by many as a sign of strength. It was anything but.
Without the presence of Ugandan troops, hurried in to prop up his faltering regime when the fighting broke out in mid-December 2013, it is unlikely that Mr Kiir would still be in power. His inability to defeat the renegade forces military or isolate them politically left him weak and vulnerable to internal revolt from within his government.
It is not clear whether President Kiir would have signed the deal had the UN Security Council not threatened to take immediate action if he walked away from a peace process that had blown hot and cold until world powers, especially the United States, drew a line in the sand.
The terms of the deal, which broadly allow for a power-sharing transitional government, set up a demilitarised zone in the capital Juba and whittle down executive authority, reflect the power balance in the country but one that neither side acknowledges.
Mr Kiir must now hand over enough power to make the deal hold, while retaining enough not to undermine his own position.
Although Mr Machar was quick to sign the deal, he did so with his coalition beginning to fall apart, with key top commanders withdrawing their support for and confidence in him, and the peace process. His credibility and his place at the table depends on his ability to bring all or the most important renegades into the tent.
Warlords
Secondly, the success of the deal depends on the ability of the two principals to find common ground in a movement with a long history of divisionism.
This divisionism has long manifested itself in tribal warlordism and, since December 2013, in broad ethnic warfare between President Kiir’s Dinka and Machar’s Nuer communities.
The emotional wounds of the massacres of Neur in Juba and the reprisal killings of Dinka remain sore to the touch. To resolve this, the two main principals will have to do de-escalate their disagreements from a military to a political confrontation, and to build national consensus across tribal lines, and beyond the margins of the SPLA/M.
Yet, having fallen back to personal and tribal militia, a sadly routine modus operandi, this would require them to relinquish their power bases and show the kind of long-sighted nationalism that neither has hitherto demonstrated.
The warlords in South Sudan will have to be encouraged to hand over their personal militia into a new force that, with time and training, could slowly begin to look like a national army – one that doesn’t disintegrate into tribal militia at the first sign of political disagreement.
Thirdly, and in addition to this, the demilitarisation will have to be accompanied by a process of political reform to build the institutions required to check executive authority, such as Parliament, civil society and the media, while expanding the diversity of views to political actors and groups outside the SPLA/M.
The origin of the current crisis can be found in internal dissent over the rampant corruption, abuse of office and impunity within the government. Only deep reforms will cure the underlying governance deficit.
Crucially, improved governance will create the conditions necessary for those responsible for some of the most egregious episodes of violence, including the deliberate targeting of civilians by both sides documented by an UN Panel of Experts, to be held accountable.
Breaking this cycle of violence is important. “Lack of accountability for decades of violence during Sudan’s long civil war helped fuel the conflict,” Human Rights Watch notes.
“Military and political leaders on all sides have failed to make any serious attempt to reduce abuses committed by their forces, or to hold them to account.”
Fourth, and most urgent, is the humanitarian crisis that the country has suffered for decades, and which the renewed fighting exacerbated.
According to the UN, thousands have been killed and 1.6 million forced to flee their homes. Many remain in UN-supported camps, too frightened to return to their homes. Resettlement of internally displaced persons and those who fled into neighbouring countries is a top priority, as is the provision of basic services in one of the poorest countries in the world.
The UN estimates that 6.4 million people are in need in South Sudan, including 2.5 million people without enough food to eat, and 235,000 children suffering from severe acute malnutrition.
Rebuilding a country is a hard task in the best of times. It is extremely difficult in the current economic landscape where the price of crude oil, which contributes more than 90 per cent of government’s revenues, is at record lows and not expected to rise significantly in the foreseeable future.