Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 22:03:18 +0200
RENAMO: A three-sided coin?
Fredson Guilengue
2014-09-26
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General elections will be held in Mozambique on 15 October. Incumbent
president Armando Guebuza is constitutionally barred from seeking a third
term. RENAMO is key player in these polls and the politics of Mozambique
generally, although its influence has waned in recent years and its real
agenda remains confusing
The government of Mozambique and the former rebel organisation RENAMO
finally signed a ceasefire agreement on 24 August 2014. This agreement which
was subsequently ratified by the Mozambican President Armando Guebuza and
RENAMO’s president Afonso Dhlakama and passed into law by the country’s
national assembly on 8 September 2014 is likely to put an end to the
political and military instability which started in 2012. In 2012, after 20
years of peace and stability in the country, some RENAMO operatives reverted
to the armed struggle to, amongst other issues, force Mozambique’s
government to change the electoral legislation and to (re-) integrate part
of its troops into the national army and the police. This article sheds
light into the dynamics of permanence and change within RENAMO, in order to
identify common and divergent trends in RENAMO’s political evolution. It
argues that since its formation in 1976 to date RENAMO has operated in three
distinct forms: as a merely guerrilla movement (1976 - 1992), as a political
party (1994 - 2012) and more recently as a hybrid of both political party
and guerrilla force (2012 to date). The analysis provides inputs into
current debates on the political future of RENAMO and the democratic
settlement in Mozambique.
INTRODUCTION
In June 1975, after 10 years of armed struggle against the Portuguese
colonial ruling, Mozambique finally proclaimed its independence. The
struggle over independence was conducted by the guerrilla movement Frente de
Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO). However, in 1976 the Rhodesian Central
Intelligence Office (CIO) created the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR),
later called RENAMO, to fight the FRELIMO government and the Zimbabwean
nationalist guerrillas operating from Mozambique in 1977. After the
Zimbabwean independence in 1980 RENAMO’s basis of support had to move to the
apartheid state of South Africa where it started getting military,
political, financial and sociological support (Vines 2013). After the demise
of the apartheid regime and the end of the cold war, in October 1992 a
General Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed between the government of
Mozambique and RENAMO. Amongst others, the GPA comprised the transformation
of RENAMO from a guerrilla movement into a political party. From 1994 to
date (2014), RENAMO has contested four general (parliamentary and
presidential) and three local elections (two municipal and one provincial
election). Meanwhile, since 2012 some RENAMO operatives led by its president
Afonso Dhlakama have been constantly calling off the GPA and conducting
guerrilla attacks against Mozambique’s army and civilians, while others
continue to normally develop the party political activities countrywide
including in the national parliament, where RENAMO has been represented
since the first multiparty elections in 1994.
In this context, I argue here that RENAMO’s trajectory has witnessed three
distinct phases in the Mozambican political landscape. From 1976 to 1992
RENAMO has operated a merely a guerrilla movement without any visible power
or political ambitions. From 1994 to 2012 it was transformed into and
operated as a political party with functioning political structures and
power ambitions. Finally, most recently, from 2012 onwards, it has behaved
as a hybrid of a guerrilla movement and political party with both
functioning military and political structures.
RENAMO: THE ANTI-FRELIMO GOVERNMENT GUERRILLA MOVEMENT
There is abundant literature about the origin of RENAMO as a guerrilla
movement created by the Rhodesian CIO in the 1970’s (Pinto 2008; Robinson
2009; Funada-Classen 2012; Vines 2013; and others). The Rhodesian CIO was
deeply and actively involved in the creation of RENAMO. Because the white
Rhodesians feared the impact of FRELIMO government on its own existence,
they gathered anti-FRELIMO network members to overthrow the FRELIMO
government. This network gathered in Rhodesia in 1976/77 to form MNR/RENAMO
(Funada – Classen 2012). RENAMO also benefited from the significant
disgruntlement amongst large swaths of the rural population (mainly from the
northern and central) Mozambique who felt marginalised by FRELIMO’s
socialist policies and by the manner in which these policies were being
implemented (Pinto 2008).
At its inception, the primary objective of RENAMO creators and supporters
was to overthrow FRELIMO’s government because of its open support to the
Zimbabwean independence struggle through the Zimbabwe African National
Liberation Army (ZANLA) which had training camps and offices in independent
Mozambique. In March 1976, the Mozambican government imposed total sanctions
against Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). These sanctions, based on a United
Nations resolution, are estimated to have cost Mozambique $2 million per
year from the loss of employment and railroad and ports usage fees (Funada –
Classen 2012). RENAMO was first led by Orlando Cristina, a former Portuguese
agent of the Portuguese secret police (PIDE). After Cristina, RENAMO was
then led by André Matsangaissa (former FRELIMO commander) and after his
death in 1979 by Afonso Dhlakama. Dhlakama remains RENAMO leader to date.
After the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, RENAMO enjoyed considerable
support from the South African apartheid regime and, to some extent, from
the Banda regime in Malawi and others (Robinson 2006).
RENAMO’s guerrilla operations started with targeting government
infrastructure (road, pipelines, bridges, etc). They progressively expanded
to attacking ZANLA bases in Mozambique and their supporters. This strategy
aimed at punishing and discouraging FRELIMO’s government from supporting
Zimbabwean nationalists. From 1980 onwards the conflict escalated and the
focus of RENAMO’s target moved from facilities and ambushes to larger
villages (mainly the FRELIMO designed communal villages). This aimed at
sabotaging FRELIMO’s rural development policy and to secure food and new
recruits (mainly via forced recruitment). This escalation was made possible
by the involvement of the apartheid regime after the independence of
Zimbabwe in 1980. The South African backing came at a time in which, with
the advent of a black government in Zimbabwe, FRELIMO hoped that RENAMO
after having lost its external support would become an easy target to
defeat. In FRELIMO’s view the conflict did not have internal roots. This
argument proved to be wrong as RENAMO continued to enjoy and consolidate
both its internal support and the continued support from the apartheid
regime.
By the end of the civil war in 1992, the social and economic impact had
assumed devastating proportions. Nearly one million direct and indirect
casualties had been registered, 13 percent of the country’s total population
(of 15 million in 1990) was forced to become war refugees and nearly 4.5
million were internally displaced. The economic infrastructure of the
country was also ruined. Schools, hospitals, roads, bridges and
communication systems were extensively damaged. Furthermore, Mozambique’s
debt had grown from $2.7 billion in 1985 to $4.7 billion in 1991 - and at
the same time the country had become one of the most aid dependent in the
world. (Juergensen 1998)
THE PEACE AGREEMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF RENAMO
In 1990 Mozambique adopted a new constitution, which finally included most
of the issues RENAMO allegedly had been fighting for. They comprised: a
multiparty democracy system, freedom of organization, free and secret
elections, individual basic rights and direct vote of the president
(Ostheimer & Lalá 2003). Coupled with the new international political and
economic context brought by the end of the cold war and domestic factors,
the new constitution paved the way for the end of the war and the signature
of the GPA on October 4, 1992.
Amongst others, the GPA had specific provisions on formation of a new army,
social and economic re-integration of demobilized troops, and the necessary
conditions for the formation of political parties. Under Protocol IV, for
instance, on military issues, it was agreed that the country should have a
30 thousand strong army and both the government and RENAMO should contribute
50 percent. The remaining troops from both sides which would not be
integrated into the country’s new army would be disarmed, demobilised and
socially re-integrated. However it’s said that an arrangement was made which
allowed RENAMO to maintain a small military reserve to provide security to
its leadership. These guards were estimated to be 150 armed troops until
October 2012 and 10 of them served as Dhlakama’’s presidential guard (Vines
2013). RENAMO also maintained some of its military bases in some parts of
the country in particular in the provinces of Nampula and Sofala (Guilengue
2013). There have been contradictory versions of the process of disarmament
of RENAMO’s remaining troops after the GPA. While Raúl Domingos[1], Chief
RENAMO negotiator during the peace talks in 1992, points that the government
of Mozambique rejected RENAMO’s offers to demobilise and integrate its
remaining troops with the national police force (Muduakane 2014), Vines
(2013, p. 381), however, points exactly to the opposite.
Under Protocol III, which concerns itself with the criteria, modalities and
recognition of political parties, the GPA introduced clear provisions for
the formation and functioning of political parties under the new political
dispensation. It introduced aspects such as the nature of the political
parties, general principles, rights and obligations. Under line a), number
six of the same protocol it reads that “(...) immediately after the
signature of the General Peace Agreement, RENAMO shall start functioning as
a political party under legal provisions (....)”.
Although RENAMO’s first tangible conscious attempt to develop a political
programme can be backdated to 1988, when it held its first substantive
congress (which may have given it a political appearance), this process only
became effective in 1992 with the GPA and the legal and economic conditions
it created for the effective transformation of the movement into a political
party. In fact, very little attempts had been made to develop a political
agenda during the war. The few political gatherings organised with the
civilians (mostly in RENAMO controlled areas) were more of anti- FRELIMO
propaganda sessions than discussions on political issues per se (Tavuyanago
2011).
To aid RENAMO’s transformation from a guerrilla movement into a political
party financial support came from various sources. Immediately after the
GPA, $16 million from a UN proxy fund were made available for RENAMO. At
this time one of the challenges RENAMO was facing had to do with poor
political experience and lack of ideology - in opposition to being only an
opposition to FRELIMO (Carter Centre 2005). In addition, in the turn up of
the 1994 general elections, another $ 17 million from a UN Trust Fund was
provided to RENAMO. Since the first elections to date, $ 100 thousand has
been allocated, annually, from the public budget to RENAMO and other
political parties with parliamentary seats. The financial support coupled
with some technical support and Dhlakama’s leadership have unable RENAMO to
advance from a merely guerrilla movement into a political party to the
extent that it became the largest opposition party in Africa until 2002
(Vines 2013).
RENAMO: THE POLITICAL PARTY
In 1994, two years after the signing of the peace agreement, the first
national multiparty elections were held. Despite having lost the elections
to FRELIMO and its presidential candidate Joaquim Chissano, RENAMO captured
the majority of votes in five important provinces of the country (Nampula,
Zambézia, Tete, Manica and Sofala) and won 112 seats in the national
parliament of 250 seats. In the following national elections in 1999, again
won by FRELIMO and its presidential candidate Chissano, RENAMO almost
retained its previous number of votes. Cahen (2013) is of the opinion that
while the official results gave victory to FRELIMO and Chissano, it’s highly
probable that RENAMO may have lost this election while Dhlakama himself won
as RENAMO’s presidential candidate.
In the 2004 general elections Armando Guebuza replaced Joaquim Chissano as
FRELIMO’s presidential candidate. In this election RENAMO obtained its most
dramatic defeat since the beginning of the multiparty democratic system in
Mozambique. This was followed by important changes in FRELIMO’s attitude
towards RENAMO. Guebuza’s subsequent attitude was consistent with an
intention of reducing the scope of political opposition to FRELIMO in
Mozambique, specially of its major challenger RENAMO. Guebuza immediately
revitalised FRELIMO’s apparatus and the party local structures. The
traditional type of political dialogue the government of Mozambique had been
conducting with RENAMO since the GPA was immediately discontinued. This
reflects an apparent move to seeking for an ultra-hegemony of FRELIMO in the
country’s political landscape (Chichava 2010). However, despite not
producing significant outcomes for RENAMO, these dialogues used to give it a
certain legitimacy and relevance within the Mozambican political landscape.
As T.V. Mário puts it, “the relevance of these dialogues lies less in their
content than in its function of preserving the spirit of peace of the GPA”
(T. Mário, personal communication, 2012). Although its relevance as a
landmark shift in the relationship between FRELIMO government and RENAMO
cannot be ignored, this new context did not per se result in RENAMO‘s
immediate return to the old guerrilla strategy. The actual impact combined
with RENAMO internal dynamics only materialised eight years later, in 2012.
Meanwhile, any attempt to understand the reasons behind RENAMO’s return to
the bush should take into consideration both internal and external dynamics.
By internal dynamics I refer to issues strictly confined to RENAMO’s
structure and management pre- and post- GPA. By external dynamics I refer to
the country’s overall political environment imposed and managed by FRELIMO’s
government which is a reflection of the party-state behaviour that dominated
the period between 1975 and 1992. While the internal dynamics include the
maintenance of a military reserve within RENAMO’s structures and Dhlakama’s
autocratic leadership prohibiting effective transformation into a bona fide
political party, the external dynamics, however, include the hostile
political environment imposed by the ruling FRELIMO to opposition in
Mozambique, mainly through the so-called FRELIMIZATION of the state
apparatus, media and the economy.
In the most recent parliamentary and presidential elections of 2009 a new
actor came to the picture – the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM). MDM
started as a movement of ex-RENAMO members and supporters funded in March
2009. Its leader Daviz Simango was dismissed from RENAMO when he decided to
run for the City of Beira as an independent in 2008 municipal elections,
after Dhlakama dropped him in favour of Manuel Pereira[2]. It is argued that
the actual reason for Simango’s dismissal was his rapidly growing popularity
which threatened to reopen the latent discussion of succession which
Dhlakama never wanted to hear about. Previously the same fate had befallen
Raúl Domingos who then formed the Partido para Paz, Democracia e
Desenvolvimento (PDD)[3]. Giovanni (2003) details the events which
anticipated and followed Domingo’s dismissal from RENAMO:
‘Raul Domingos, the head of Renamo’s bancada [parliamentary group], emerged
as an influential and visible figure between 1994 and 2000. The (limited)
autonomy of the party’s legislative wing, however, was undermined when, on
the basis of some dubious accusations about secret deals and private
interests that Domingos was pursuing with the government, Dhlakama decided
to expel him from the party in late 2000. It is widely believed that
Domingos was perceived by Dhlakama as a threat in view of the party Congress
and of an internal election for the party leadership. Less than two years
on, the marginalisation of prominent figures developed into a pattern,
reaching a point where total confusion seemed to dominate party affairs in
mid-2002’.
Like Domingos and Simango, other skilful people who threatened Dhlakama’s
autocracy were either expelled from RENAMO or marginalised. As a result of
this the party democratic operations became weak (Tavuyanago 2011).
The 2009 general elections were once again won by the ruling FRELIMO.
RENAMO, however, saw its parliamentary seats reduced to nearly half of those
of the previous elections (49 seats). Parallel to these elections, four
municipal elections have been held since 1998. RENAMOs attitude towards
these elections has been characterized by boycotting (1998 and 2013) and
participating (2003 and 2008).
RENAMO: A POLITICAL AND MILITARY FORCE
In a move which could be interpreted as a means to pressurise the Mozambican
government to return to the same type of political dialogue they had been
having prior to 2004 elections, Dhlakama retreated to the northern city of
Nampula in January 2010. It was in Nampula where Dhlakama and Guebuza met
twice (December 2011 and in April 2012) after repeated requests from
Dhlakama. In both meetings they agreed to hold regular discussions about the
political and economic issues of the country. However, no further meetings
were held. Not having produced the desired impact, in terms of changing
FRELIMO’s attitude towards RENAMO and himself, in October 2012 Dhlakama
retreated to the Sofala Province (Gorongosa) with some of his supporters,
from where he since then conducted guerrilla attacks. This retreat and the
subsequent calling off of the 1992 GPA marked the hybridization of RENAMO.
Accurate figures are hard to come by but the conflict has so far resulted in
a significant number of casualties and in several abnormalities in road
circulation between southern and northern Mozambique. Attempts by the
Mozambican government to resolve the conflict military have all failed.
Meanwhile, after 74 rounds of political dialogues to resolve the military
instability, facilitated by national mediators, on 24 August 2014 the
taskforce composed by government and RENAMO personnel finally agreed on all
the issues which divided them including the ceasefire.
However, this context did not affect RENAMO’s political structures and
functioning. The party maintains its political functions working very
actively countrywide. The 49 members of parliament resulting from the last
elections are actively and normally participating in all sessions of the
national parliament. The same applies to the local and provincial members of
parliament. It’s National Council (the party highest organ), for example,
gathered on June 23 to appoint Dhlakama (even absent) as its presidential
candidate. Most recently, the party has submitted Dhlakama and RENAMO’s
application for the October 2014 general elections to the National Electoral
Commission (CNE) which together with FRELIMO and MDM candidate Filipe Nyusi
and Daviz Simango, respectively, has been approved. The three and their
respective parties have been confirmed as presidential and legislative
candidates, respectively, and are now campaigning for the 15 October general
elections.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Contrary to the opinions advocating the existence of two or more distinct
RENAMOs (one in the bush and the other in Maputo), the analysis above
indicates that RENAMO has never split into two or disintegrated. The parties
which have their origin in RENAMO have resulted from either dismissals (like
the cases of Raúl Domingos from PDD and Daviz Simango from MDM) or the
people who voluntarily left RENAMO (e.g. Lutero Simango from Partido de
Convenção Nacional – PCN - who later joined MDM and Manuel de Araújo, MDM).
Moreover, RENAMO still by far maintains its status of the largest opposition
party in Mozambique. The current attitude and behaviour of both its military
and political wing is part of one and the same strategy. While on one side,
by military means, the guerrilla pushes for military and political issues
from the bush (e.g. their re-integration into the national army and police
and amendments to the electoral legislation), the political wing, on the
other, by political means pushes for the very same agenda in parliamentary
sessions and in the so-called political dialogue with the government, in
Maputo.
However, it’s possible to identify three phases in the history of RENAMO
beginning in 1976. In each of these phases RENAMO has reflected different
characteristics. Although more empirical evidence might be necessary to
prove this argument, these characteristics seem to be consistent with the
country’s political orientation or environment. RENAMO was born in a context
of the cold war and of a Marxist Leninist state ideology in which it
operated as a military guerrilla movement. With the advent of a multi-party
democratic system, RENAMO was then transformed into a political party and
operated as political party with power ambitions. Finally, when the
political environment signalled a return to a sort of authoritarian rule
somehow reminding Mozambicans of the communist era, RENAMO partially
reverted to its old guerrilla strategy to fight an overconfident
FRELIMO-Government narrowing the democratic space.
RENAMO’s relevance as an internal “actor of change” capable of forcing
FRELIMO government to rethink, redirect or change its politics and practices
cannot be ignored. Since its inception, RENAMO seems to always have been
regarded as a relevant actor in the context of the Mozambique politics
specially for being capable of dealing with FRELIMO not willing to open
spaces enough for a real multiparty democracy. If during the guerrilla phase
the actual tactics of the organization were questioned because of its
practice of terror, the relevance of its existence was never questioned, to
the extent that RENAMO’s transition to a political party relied very much on
the linkages and sympathy it gained amongst the rural population and some
urban intellectuals during and after guerrilla times. For those Mozambicans
inside or outside the country who contested FRELIMO’s communist approach
RENAMO was an important tool to raise their voices and force changes in
Mozambique.
While functioning as a political party RENAMO not only presented itself to
the Mozambicans as an alternative to FRELIMO and up until 2012 forced the
country’s political landscape to become bipolar, but its existence also gave
legitimacy to the country’s democracy. RENAMO’s status as the largest
opposition party in Mozambique only started to seriously be threatened with
the advent of the MDM in 2009 further exacerbated during 2013 municipal
elections which RENAMO boycotted. The presence of RENAMO in the Mozambican
parliament since 1994 has produced significant results for the country’s
democracy. The party is said to have pushed for the introduction of
significant bills. 53% of the county’s bills (more than half) passed by the
parliament, by 1990 are said to have been originated in the assembly (see
Tavuyanago 2011).
More recently, while operating as a hybrid of a political party and a
guerrilla movement, RENAMO has been able to force FRELIMO’s government to
introduce major changes into the electoral legislation which might reduce
FRELIMO’s control over the electoral process and results in Mozambique. The
hybrid RENAMO has been able to force FRELIMO to amend the country’s
electoral legislation concerning the composition of the CNE and Electoral
Administration Technical Secretariat (STAE), which for many favoured FRELIMO
heavily because of its politicisation. In February 2014 the Mozambican
national parliament passed the final reading of the bill on the CNE and on
the electoral registration. These two bills were submitted by RENAMO in
light of the agreements achieved in the dialogue on the county’s current
political instability which started in 2012. The CNE increases from the
previous 13 to 17 members. Seven will come from the civil society
organizations, five from FRELIMO, four from RENAMO and 1 from Movimento
Democrático de Moçambique (MDM). The STAE at the national level is now
composed of 18 members appointed by the political parties represented in the
national parliament (FRELIMO nine members, RENAMO eight and MDM one). Apart
from the electoral legislation the hybrid RENAMO has recently secured
amnesty for crimes against state security committed by its elements in the
context of the current political and military instability. The hybrid RENAMO
has also secured a commitment from the government of Mozambique to
(re)integrate its remaining troops into the national army and police.
END NOTES
[1] RENAMO’s leader who was in charge of the guerrilla finances and worked
as Chief of Defence and Security (1982-1986). Commander of the Southern 10
Zone (1986-1988); Secretary for Foreign Affairs (1989 1994). Head of
RENAMO’s of Parliament for Renamo (1994-2001). Now leader of Partido para
Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento (PDD) (Robinson 2006).
[2] RENAMO’s political delegate for the province of Sofala and Member of the
national Parliament.
[3] In 2004 presidential elections PDD got 2, 7% of the total votes.
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* Fredson Guilengue works with the Rosa Luxemberg Foundation in Southern
Africa.
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