Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2014 22:17:31 +0200
PSC to focus on the faltering South Sudan peace process
19 September 2014
On 17 September 2014, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to
review the South Sudanese mediation process and finalise its preparations
for a field visit to the country. The visit was initially planned for the
end of August, but was postponed because members of the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) wanted to wait until after the IGAD summit
in late August, which was expected to bolster the peace effort.
Regrettably, eight months down the line the IGAD-led mediation effort has
yet to achieve a breakthrough. If anything, ending the civil war in South
Sudan is as illusive today as it was at the beginning of the peace process
in January 2014.
Summit to bolster the mediation effort
On 26 August 2014, at an extraordinary summit on South Sudan held in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, IGAD, the Horn of Africa regional grouping, oversaw the
signing of two instruments. The first was the matrix of implementation of
the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA) and the other the Protocol on
Agreed Principles on Transitional Arrangements towards Resolution of the
Crisis in South Sudan.
IGAD
<http://southsudan.igad.int/attachments/article/260/08_27_2014_Press%2520Rel
ease%2520on%2520the%2520Signing%2520of%2520the%2520COH%2520Implementation%25
20Matrix%2520and%2520Adjournment%2520of%2520Talks.pdf> hailed the signing as
a major step that 'brings .expectations .that the guns will be silenced and
the senseless conflict in South Sudan will end'. United Nations (UN)
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon also
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48567#.VA8VtkhYCbI> welcomed
what is described as a blueprint to implement the South Sudan ceasefire.
This is despite the fact that thus far only the government has signed the
final document.
The 26 August IGAD summit, the sixth such summit on South Sudan since the
war broke out in December 2013, was, in the words of IGAD mediators, aimed
at ending the parties''intransigence'involving 'the continued resort to
delay-and-stalling tactics'. However, these tactics continue to plague the
mediation efforts. The fear expressed in the previous
<http://www.issafrica.org/pscreport/situation-analysis/continued-frustration
-over-senseless-killing-in-south-sudan> analysis on South Sudan- that the
round of talks that had resumed on 4 August 2014 were likely to stall - has
materialised.
Talks again reach a deadlock
While the multi-stakeholder talks that took place from 8-15 August helped to
articulate the principles enshrined in the protocol referred to above , they
did not deal with some of the demands by the principal parties.
Despite the fact that the talks proceeded after provision was made for
bilateral talks between any two parties within the multi-stakeholder peace
process, the process encountered further challenges. The bilateral talks had
been initiated to accommodate the South Sudan People's Liberation
Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), which stayed away on 5 August,
demanding direct talks with the government. Then, on 16 August, the
government delegation set two preconditions for participating in the talks:
it demanded that government agreement be required for the decision-making
process in the multi-stakeholder talks and that the implementation matrix
for the CHA be signed. The SPLM/A-IO on its part refused to sign, demanding
the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from South Sudan.
The matter was thus referred to the IGAD summit. Rescheduled from 17 August
and further postponed for a day from 25 August, the IGAD summit finally took
place on 26 August. Apart from the signing of the two agreements mentioned
above, the warnings issued at previous IGAD summits - that it would take
action against any party that failed to honour its commitments - were placed
on the agenda of this summit as well.
Last-minute changes scupper deal
The IGAD mediation team, headed by former Ethiopian chief diplomat
Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin, tabled the implementation matrix and the protocol
that it had compiled on the basis of previous agreements and subsequent
negotiations between the various parties. While both the implementation
matrix and the protocol are important, a lot of attention has been paid to
the protocol, as it is meant to serve as an acceptable road map for the
formation of the national unity government, whose 10 August deadline was not
honoured.
When these documents were tabled before the IGAD Council of Ministers,
Uganda and Kenya initiated changes that dramatically altered the proposed
framework for the formation of the transitional national unity government.
While the initial draft separated the head of state and the head of
government, with an offer to the SPLM/A-IO that it could nominate the prime
minister heading the government, the final document had a proviso stating
that the SPLM/A-IO's nominee for the position of prime minister must be
acceptable to the president, who is the head of state. This proviso has
proven to be very controversial.
At the summit, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni led the technical argument
that the current constitution of South Sudan, in which the president is both
the head of state and head of government, should be upheld. Many of the IGAD
member states, including Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti and even Sudan, seemed to
accede to the argument. Thus the initial formulation dividing the roles of
head of state and head of government between the president and the (still to
be determined) prime minister was changed in favour of the final provision
under Article 2 of the protocol. This stipulates that 'the Head of State and
Government, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Transitional
Government of National Unity, shall be the elected, incumbent President of
the Republic'.
Simply put, the changes made at the last minute substantially skewed the
proposed transitional government of national unity in favour of the
government and created the conditions for the opposition to reject it. Apart
from stripping the newly proposed position of prime minister of all
substantial power, the protocol also stipulated that the person appointed to
this position would, unlike the president, be barred from participating in
the elections to be held at the end of the transitional period. Similarly,
unlike the post of transitional president, whose status was unquestioned,
the prime minister should not only be acceptable to the president but should
also possess such qualities as 'credibility and professionalism'.
Despite the fact that the preamble to the protocol designated the
government, the SPLM/A-IO and other stakeholders (former detainees,
political parties, civil society representatives and religious leaders) as
the signatories to the protocol, the signature page had no space for other
stakeholders. Oddly, however, IGAD heads of state, who should have been the
guarantors of the protocol, signed as though they were also signatories,
while the actual signatories were left waiting and forgotten in the
corridors. This presumably happened in the scramble to accommodate
Museveni's request to leave the meeting.
Not surprisingly, while the protocol was signed by the government, which
announced its acceptance of the terms, the SPLM/A-IO did not sign it. Former
detainees, who are among the stakeholders, criticised the changes that the
IGAD summit introduced as 'unfair, unjust and discriminatory', and as
representing an 'obstacle'to finding peace in South Sudan.
Making matters worse, the implementation matrix for the CHA did not fare any
better. Although it was reported that the two sides had signed the
implementation matrix, only the preamble of the text that recommits parties
to the CHA was signed and initialled. The text of the implementation matrix
accompanying the re-dedication was neither signed nor initialled. Not
unexpectedly, the SPLM/A-IO rejected the announcement that both sides had
signed the implementation matrix.
Next steps and the PSC's role
The current challenge facing the peace process is finding a way to overcome
the major setback presented by the changes introduced at the summit. The
first issue is clarifying the problems in signing the implementation matrix.
Secondly, and most importantly, there is the issue of rectifying the
disputed provisions in the protocol.
Given that there is consensus about all parts of the protocol except the key
provisions on the transitional government arrangements, IGAD mediators plan
to table those provisions for negotiation in the multi-stakeholder talks
that had been adjourned on 28 August. While the SPLM/A-IO and other
stakeholders may be open to this plan, it will not be a surprise if the
government resists opening those provisions to negotiations. Additionally,
for this plan to succeed it is critical that IGAD mediators convince member
states, particularly Uganda, that the disputed provisions need to be
negotiated and agreed to by all parties and the other South Sudanese
stakeholders.
In the light of the above, the PSC stands to play a constructive role in
many respects. Given the continuing suffering of the millions of refugees
and internally displaced persons and the looming threat of famine facing the
South Sudanese, the PSC needs to elevate the role of the African Union by
convening a pledging conference to mobilise resources to save lives in South
Sudan. With respect to the CHA, the PSC could lend its support to IGAD and
urge the parties, particularly the SPLM/A-IO, to abide by the implementation
matrix. The PSC can also use its planned visit to South Sudan to convince
the parties to fully embrace and implement the implementation matrix.
Underscoring the importance of establishing the national unity government to
achieve peace in South Sudan on the basis of a workable formula, the PSC
could also endorse the IGAD Protocol on Agreed Principles on Transitional
Arrangements towards Resolution of the Crisis in South Sudan. This goes
together with expressing support for the efforts of IGAD mediators to
resolve the disagreement over the identified provisions of the protocol
through negotiations in the multi-stakeholder talks.
The difficulties in the South Sudan peace process and the continuing dire
humanitarian situation have further reinforced the need for the PSC to
undertake its field visit, postponed from August 2014. In this context, the
PSC could use the 17 September meeting to determine the dates on which it
would undertake this long-awaited visit.
http://www.issafrica.org/pscreport/images/img_nodes/SouthSudan_300.jpg
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