Sudan - Colliding interest
_____
Too many volatile alliances bring little hope to Sudan's problems
By Mohamed Elshabik
September 18, 2014 - Sudan seems to be unconcerned by the current political
crisis in the region. Amid a prognosis of full-scale war in South Sudan,
unrest in Egypt, chaos in Libya, Iraq and Syria, a shaky truce in Gaza, Boko
Haram insurgency in Nigeria, and tumultuous conditions in Mali, Somalia and
CAR, Sudan presents an apparently halcyon scene. The reality though is very
different as political discontent is simmering beneath the surface.
A group photo of <
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot812> Sudan
Revolutionary Front (SRF) leaders (a coalition of the armed rebel groups in
Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile) flanking the veteran Sudanese
National Umma Party (NUP) leader and former prime minister al-Sadig
al-Mahdi, provokes the new Sudanese political scene. This time the new
coalition is between the staunchest advocate of change by peaceful means,
and the armed rebellion forces. Odd as it may seem, this brought together
opposing elements with shared tactical objectives in what is known as the
<
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article52049> Paris Declaration.
The Paris Declaration's joint statement of 8 August calling for peace and
democratic reform stressed the need for the unification of the forces for
change in order to end the war and establish a democratic state based on
equal citizenship. Al-Mahdi described the statement as a
<
https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/79014> historic breakthrough. He further
described as 'clinically dead' the
<
http://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/-Bashir-calls-for-national-dialogue--/-/195
0946/2163892/-/format/xhtml/-/y1xupp/-/index.html> national dialogue,
adopted by the ruling National Congress Party (NCP).
At best, the Sudanese political scene has become more like a Sudanese
<
http://www.lessonpaths.com/learn/i/zar-in-northern-sudan-2/zar-spirit-posse
ssion-in-the-sudan-patachu-30> Zarceremony, a traditional trance dance
associated with women believed to cure mental illness through contact with
the possessing spirits and orchestrated by al-Shaikha, the female Zar
leader.
Different motivations
To al-Mahdi the new alliance is more than revenge for his recent
<
http://elshabik.blogspot.com/2014/06/sudan-dialogue-enough-playing-pollyann
a.html> arrest. The paramount leader in Sudan published a recent
<
http://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/2013/articles_opeds/5148/> articleas a
complaint to God and a historical testimony, in a desperate and a sad tone.
Al-Mahdi listed all he has done with the NCP in his continuous efforts to
avert a calamity in Sudan, but to no avail. He has finally realized that the
NCP was never keen on genuine dialogue and that dialogue was merely an NCP
tactic to strengthen its legitimacy and prolong its grasp on power. By
endorsing the Paris Declaration Al-Mahdi is tacitly saying to his old
National Front friends that he is not to be taken for granted.
On the other hand, the SRF which had recently been sidelined from influence
by the NCP, is in no better condition. Militarily they are losing ground,
thanks to the <
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51083> Rapid
Support Forces (RSF), and politically they managed to upset the
<
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot505> African Union High Level
Implementation Panel (AUHIP) on Sudan, after the last
<
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50986> failed round of
negotiation with the government. SRF also understands that the protracted
civil war in South Sudan has changed the regional profile made Khartoum be
seen internationally as a force of stability in this volatile area. As such,
international stakeholders focusing on South Sudan are less keen to provide
any support that might disrupt Khartoum.
In consequence SRF Head Malik Agar and General Secretary Yassir Arman
visited South Africa in July to meet AUHIP head Thabo Mbeki to perk up the
negotiations. The relatively peaceable language of the declaration should
not be attributed solely to al-Mahdi's influence; it also highlights a shift
in the SRF approach from armed resistance towards more political
accommodation.
July's visit has paid dividends as Mbeki has vigorously reengaged himself in
Sudan's business. His efforts have yielded thus far in linking the new
alliance of the Paris Declaration with the government's national dialogue
committee known as <
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51643> 7+7.
His efforts were also crowned by a meeting with the president who apparently
has given these efforts his <
http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article52357>
blessing.
Reaction in Khartoum
Back in Khartoum, the Paris Declaration has triggered diverse reactions. The
Popular Congress Party (PCP), an NCP defected faction led by Islamist leader
al-Turabi, had aggressively rejected and criticized the agreement probably
motivated by jealousy and competition, but more importantly by a desperate
desire to return to power.
On the other hand Al-Tayeb Mustafa, Sudan's Just Peace Forum chairman and
also the President's uncle and no friend of the SRF, has surprisingly
welcomed the Paris Declaration which he hails as a
<
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article52012> major achievement . In a
media conference, Mustafa astonished participants when he described the
agreement as an accomplishment he could not fault. Mustafa's new stance,
cheered by Yassir Arman, depicts the zenith of ecstasy in the Zar ritual
when everybody in the room starts dancing hysterically.
The NCP, representing the sorceress Al-Sheikha in our Zar analogy,
immediately <
https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/78876> rejected the Paris
Declaration on the basis that it was hatched on foreign ground. The NCP
reiterated its rejection of the agreement when his political secretary,
Mustafa Osman Ismail, <
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article52094>
repeated their concern that the Paris Declaration is based on external
solutions, stressing that 'foreign capitals will not bring solutions to the
issues of the country'. Paradoxically foreign capitals have been incubating
every peace deal that was signed during the NCP tenure; Abuja, Doha, Addis
Ababa and Cairo (to name a few).
However the NCP decided to withdraw the initiative from al-Mahdi and to
revive its own national dialogue when they gave the green light to the (7+7)
committee representatives to sign the
<
http://www.thabombekifoundation.org.za/Pages/Landmark-Agreement-on-a-Nation
al-Dialogue-for-Sudan.aspx> eight-point text with the opposition under the
auspices of the AUHIP.
By doing so, the NCP has managed in a convoluted way to withdraw the
initiative from the Paris axis, and bring the process back under its own
jurisdiction. This is the same dialogue that al-Mahdi declared clinically
dead and from which he has withdrawn and which the SRF rejected at the
outset. This has been reinforced by President Bashir's
<
http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article52357> acceptance of an all-party
<
http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article52338> meeting in Addis Ababa next
month.
But regardless, the NCP still seems less apprehensive about the Paris
alliance and more concerned about the looming economic crisis in the
country. The NCP understands where the real threat comes from. Al-Mahdi's
ability to represent a threat was tested during his recent arrest, when the
party that won the majority in the last democratic election in Sudan in 1986
was not able to mobilize more than few hundred protesters. The SRF military
threat is contained by geo-political factors mentioned earlier.
The recent <
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article52254> move to shut
down the Iranian cultural center and expel its diplomatic mission is likely
not because it represents ideological or sectarian concerns as declared, but
rather economic motivation. Such a move will appease rich Saudi Arabia and
UAE axis, which may help to ease the economic and banking embargo.
To the NCP, September brings with it bitter memories of last year's
large-scale
<
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/sudan-security-forces-fatally-shoot-dozens-p
rotesters-demonstrations-grow-2013-09-26> uprisingsthat represent the most
significant threat the NCP has had in its 25 years of rule.
Sudan is witnessing an unprecedented emigration in its history; the majority
of Sudanese are living in despair because of deteriorating social and
economic conditions and thus the Paris Declaration and Mbeki's efforts to
revitalize NCP's national dialogue, was received with very little
enthusiasm.
To the Sudanese, al-Mahdi lost credibility when he failed to live up to the
people's expectations and to support their resistance. The man who is
unfortunately well-known for his indecision and changeability in midstream
is unreliable. The alliance with the SRF is based more on tactical and
situational interest from both sides than on strategic objectives.
Signatories to the Paris Declaration call for a roadmap for the post NCP
transition, more equitable distribution of power and resources, ending the
war, and starting a transition toward democracy; legitimate demands that
represent the basic aspirations of all Sudanese people. Nonetheless, as long
as the current balance of power between NCP and its opposition rivals is
retained, and these disparate opposition elements are not able to enforce
change on the ground by mobilizing their constituency, consequently
represent a real threat to the NCP's power, such agreements are merely a
storm in a tea cup that will join the too many dishonoured agreements, to
quote <
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abel_Alier> Abel Alier.
At the end of a traditional Sudanese Zar ritual, blood has to be spilled.
Usually a sheep or a male goat is sacrificed, and this blood is believed to
chase away the satanic soul. The spilled blood is gathered in a bowl that is
passed around the room for the audience to dip their fingers in and smear on
their faces with joy and relief. In this extended metaphor the sheep
represent the Sudan, the blood belongs to the Sudanese citizens, the
audience represents the politicians, and the sorceress Al-Sheikha is the
NCP, ruthlessly manipulating the scene.
It became very clear that individual, piecemeal, flawed alliances,
undeliverable promises and palliative economic measures won't bring any
change or hope. As September whirls in, Sudanese people will have to have
the final say.
Mohamed Elshabik is a Sudanese blogger, and international
development/humanitarian practitioner, he can be reached via Twitter at
_at_ElshabikM
Received on Thu Sep 18 2014 - 12:17:16 EDT