September 17, 2014: Britain recently revealed that in August they had to
deal with a mutiny among 300 Libyan soldiers being trained at a British
base. The Libyans were selected to receive combat and leadership training so
they could better train and command Libyan soldiers back in Libya. The
mutiny occurred when British officers in charge of the training put three of
the trainees under guard after police picked them up for being off base
without permission. Then twenty other trainees went and threatened the
British soldier guarding the three Libyan trainees. The British guard let
the three go free rather than risk violence. Senior officers were uncertain
about how to handle this insubordination given the nature of Arab military
trainees.
What happened with these Libyans was not uncommon when Westerners are
assigned to train Arabs to be military leaders. What these trainers run into
is a collection of problems that have long made it difficult for Arab, and
many other poor (and often Moslem) nations to establish democratic
governments or prosperous economies. A lot of the problem has to do with
culture, especially culture influenced by Islam. There are a number of
reasons for this and the most important problems are;
Most Arab countries are a patchwork of different tribes and groups, and Arab
leaders survive by playing one group off against another. Loyalty is to
one's group, not the nation. Most countries are dominated by a single group
that is usually a minority (Bedouins in Jordan, Alawites in Syria, Sunnis in
Iraq, Nejdis in Saudi Arabia). All of which means that officers are assigned
not by merit but by loyalty and tribal affiliation.
Islamic schools favor rote memorization, especially of scripture. Most
Islamic scholars are hostile to the concept of interpreting the Koran
(considered the word of God as given to His prophet Mohammed). This has
resulted in looking down on Western troops that will look something up that
they don't know. Arabs prefer to fake it, and pretend it's all in their
head. Despite that improvisation and innovation is generally discouraged.
Arab armies go by the book, Western armies rewrite the book as needed and
thus usually win.
There is no real use of NCOs (sergeants or petty officers). Officers and
enlisted troops are treated like two different social castes and there is no
effort to bridge the gap using career NCOs. Enlisted personnel are treated
harshly. Training accidents that would end the careers of US officers are
commonplace in Arab armies, and nobody cares. The troops do not appreciate
this and that dislike often manifests itself in unpleasant ways.
Officers tend to be despised by their troops, and this does not bother the
officers much it all. Many Arab officers simply cannot understand how
treating the troops decently will make them better soldiers. Westerners have
a hard time convincing a lot of Arab leaders on this point and those that do
understand and implement these ideas risk ridicule for not being authentic
(as an Arab).
Paranoia prevents adequate training. Arab tyrants insist that their military
units have little contact with each other, thus insuring that no general can
became powerful enough to overthrow them. Units are purposely kept from
working together or training on a large scale. Arab generals don't have as
broad a knowledge of their armed forces as do their Western counterparts.
Promotions are based more on political reliability than combat proficiency.
Arab leaders prefer to be feared, rather than respected, by their soldiers.
This approach leads to poorly trained armies and low morale. A few rousing
speeches about "Moslem brotherhood" before a war starts does little to
repair the damage.
Arab officers often do not trust each other. While an American infantry
officer can be reasonably confident that the artillery officers will conduct
their bombardment on time and on target, Arab infantry officers seriously
doubt that their artillery will do its job on time or on target. This is a
fatal attitude in combat.
Arab military leaders consider it acceptable to lie to subordinates and
allies in order to further their personal agenda. This had catastrophic
consequences during all of the Arab-Israeli wars and continues to make peace
difficult between Israelis and Palestinians. When called out on this
behavior, Arabs will assert that they were "misunderstood."
While Western officers and NCOs are only too happy to impart their wisdom
and skill to others (teaching is the ultimate expression of prestige), Arab
officers try to keep any technical information and manuals secret. To Arabs,
the value and prestige of an individual is based not on what he can teach,
but on what he knows that no one else knows.
While Western officers thrive on competition among themselves, Arab officers
avoid this as the loser would be humiliated. Better for everyone to fail
together than for competition to be allowed, even if it eventually benefits
everyone.
Westerners are taught leadership and technology; Arab officers are taught
only technology. Leadership is given little attention as officers are
assumed to know this by virtue of their social status as officers.
Initiative is considered a dangerous trait. So subordinates prefer to fail
rather than make an independent decision. Battles are micromanaged by senior
generals, who prefer to suffer defeat rather than lose control of their
subordinates. Even worse, an Arab officer will not tell a US ally why he
cannot make the decision (or even that he cannot make it), leaving Western
officers angry and frustrated because the Arabs won't make a decision. The
Arab officers simply will not admit that they do not have that authority.
Lack of initiative makes it difficult for Arab armies to maintain modern
weapons. Complex modern weapons require on the spot maintenance, and that
means delegating authority, information, and tools. Arab armies avoid doing
this and prefer to use easier to control central repair shops. This makes
the timely maintenance of weapons difficult.
Security is maniacal. Everything even vaguely military is top secret. While
Western promotion lists are routinely published, this rarely happens in Arab
armies. Officers are suddenly transferred without warning to keep them from
forging alliances or networks. Any team spirit among officers is
discouraged.
All these traits were reinforced, from the 1950s to the 1990s, by Soviet
advisors. To the Russians, anything military was secret, enlisted personnel
were scum, they had no use for NCOs and everyone was paranoid about everyone
else. These were not "communist" traits, but Russian customs that had
existed for centuries and were adopted by the communists to make their
dictatorship more secure from rebellion. Arab dictators avidly accepted this
kind of advice, but are still concerned about how rapidly the communist
dictatorships all came tumbling down between 1989 and 1991.
Such a system can produce fearsome looking armies, at least on paper. But
these troops cannot n survive an encounter with well trained and led
soldiers. Even fanatical Islamic terrorists are often too much to handle.
This is still happening throughout the Arab world as can be seen currently
in Libya and Iraq.