Kenya's outlaw police
<
https://www.opendemocracy.net/author/jehanne-henry> Jehanne Henry
16 September 2014
Developments in Kenya show what happens when "counter-terrorist" police and
other security forces are not subject to public accountability.
Seated on a folding chair in a health centre near the mosque where she
prays, Salima, a soft-spoken hijab-clad mother of four, told me how
unidentified gunmen shot her husband one morning in November 2013 as he
returned from prayers with a friend. She is convinced that Kenya's
anti-terrorism police killed her husband and she is not alone. During
research in Mombasa and Nairobi earlier this year, we found evidence that
the anti-terrorism unit, or ATPU, had been involved not just in the death of
Salima's husband but at least nine other extra-judicial killings and ten
enforced disappearances since 2011.
Shaban Makotse was eating fruit salad on a bench in Mombasa when three men
gunned him down in April 2013. Weeks later, in a raid on a Nairobi apartment
block, security forces including ATPU members shot dead Hassan Omondi. One
evening in June 2013, a lone gunman killed Ibrahim Mwasi (Ruta) in a public
toilet. The men were all Muslims in their mid-20s and known terrorism
suspects, accused of involvement in deadly grenade and bomb blasts. But
instead of being investigated and tried under the law they were harassed or
tailed by police for months-then turned up dead. In all these cases there is
compelling evidence that the ATPU was responsible, in one way or another.
They add to the already-ample evidence that Kenya's anti-terrorism police
trade on fear and brutality, rather than legal criminal-justice procedures.
They also reflect wider, systemic abuses in the country's security
operations. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and others have for years documented
patterns of serious violations by security forces, often in
"counter-terrorism" or other large-scale operations-including killings,
<
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/05/04/criminal-reprisals> torture,
<
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/06/28/bring-gun-or-you-ll-die>
disappearances and unlawful
<
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/09/30/why-am-i-still-here-0> renditions to
Somalia and Uganda.
The toll from <
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/03/16/ballots-bullets>
Kenya's post-election violence in 2007-08 included hundreds of deaths at the
hands of the <
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/12/09/turning-pebbles-0>
police who used excessive force against protesters. In
<
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/07/27/all-men-have-gone-0> Mount Elgon,
hundreds of men were tortured and killed by soldiers and police during a
counter-insurgency operation in 2008; over
<
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/10/27/hold-your-heart> 300 were
"disappeared". None of these crimes by Kenyan police, the ATPU or other
security forces has resulted in the accountability that is desperately
needed. This enduring problem, coupled with widespread corruption,
undermines Kenya's ability to tackle its security threats.
Targeted for round-ups
Earlier this year the
<
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/12/kenya-end-abusive-round-ups> "Usalama
Watch" operation targeted communities of Somali nationals, Somali Kenyans,
and other non-Kenyans, including refugees, for round-ups, harassment,
extortion, unlawful detention and summary deportation. Triggered by grenade
and gun attacks in Mombasa and Nairobi in late March, the operation began
when thousands of armed security forces descended on Nairobi's Eastleigh
neighborhood. They raided buildings and homes; extorted money, cell phones
and other goods; confiscated or ignored valid refugee documents; and
arrested and detained thousands, holding them in appalling conditions for
much longer than the 24 hours allowed by Kenyan law. Individuals with
refugee documents were ordered to move into camps in northern Kenya (Kakuma
or Dadaab, the world's largest) or be taken there by force.
In June, I visited one block of flats in Nairobi where residents, visibly
rattled after a raid, said police had entered the building at night, banging
on windows and doors. One young mother, standing in a room full of partially
packed suitcases, said she was too scared to remain after multiple visits
from police, who forced her to pay 5,000 KES (US$56) and ordered her to move
to a refugee camp.
Such <
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/05/29/you-are-all-terrorists> abusive
treatment targeting ethnic Somalis is not new in Kenya. HRW and others have
documented widespread human-rights violations against members of that
community <
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/06/17/welcome-kenya-0> since the
1990s. But Usalama Watch cast a wider net across the country, eliding
"counter-terrorism" with immigration enforcement: authorities were
especially intent on driving refugees out of the urban areas, in violation
of domestic and international law.
Spate of violence
Meanwhile, the ATPU and other security forces carry out further abusive
operations, largely out of sight, in response to a spate of violence which
has yet to be clearly understood. On 14 June, gunmen opened fire on the
sleepy coastal town of Mpeketoni, in Lamu county, killing at least 50
people. Similar bloody attacks on nearby villages over the following ten
days killed 15 and attacks in early July in both Lamu and Tana River
counties killed dozens more.
Although the Somalia-based al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for two of the
attacks, Kenyan authorities rushed to diagnose the violence not as terrorism
but as homegrown politically-motivated violence. President Uhuru Kenyatta
initially told the media: "The attack in Lamu was well planned, orchestrated
and politically motivated ethnic violence against a Kenyan community with
the intention of profiling and evicting them for political reasons. This
therefore was not an al-Shabaab terror attack." But as details emerged,
many, including government and security officials, concluded that al-Shabaab
was responsible after all and that it appeared to have capitalised on
pre-existing local grievances, working with Kenyan affiliates.
The ease with which this could be done makes the threat of terrorist
violence all the more pernicious and points to the urgent need for Kenyan
authorities to deal with the underlying tensions. In addition to land
grievances against ethnic Kikuyu "settlers," there are intercommunal
fault-lines in Tana River ripe for manipulation.
Heavy-handed
The government's response to the violence has been heavy-handed and at times
brutal. Large contingents of security forces, including military and
anti-terrorism police, were deployed to Lamu and Tana River counties in the
weeks following the attacks. Targeting the communities in both counties in
continuing operations, these forces have rounded up, beaten and arrested
dozens, including the Lamu governor (later released), and charged at least
three people with offences relating to the violence.
Some have blamed Kenya's weak criminal-justice institutions for the routine
use of excessive force, particularly in "counter-terrorism" operations. As
one anonymous member of the anti-terrorism police unit put it to the BBC
last December, "The justice system in Kenya is not favorable to the work of
the police. So we opt to eliminate them [suspects]. We identify you, we gun
you down in front of your family and we begin with the leaders." HRW heard
the same observation from others in enforcement, including lawyers.
To be sure, Kenya is facing serious threats and it has proved difficult for
the Kenyan authorities to prosecute terrorism cases. But the challenges of
investigation and compiling evidence for prosecution cannot justify abuses
and ethnic profiling, on the premise that this will improve security.
In September 2013, gunmen believed to be affiliated with al-Shabaab attacked
the affluent Westgate Mall in Nairobi, killing 67 people and injuring
hundreds in a bloody stand-off. A year after the horrific incident, which
also drew international attention to the botched security response and
extensive looting by Kenya's military, there has been no official
investigation or report. And Westgate was not unique: there have been at
least 70 grenade and gun attacks in Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa since 2011,
according to the US embassy, with at least 30 in 2012 alone. The situation
does not seem to be improving.
Alienating
By engaging in thuggish tactics and targeting entire communities, the
authorities risk alienating more people. No one knows how many young people
in Kenya may have turned to al-Shabaab for opportunistic or idealistic
reasons but the abuses certainly don't help. It was no surprise that the
Institute for Security Studies, which promotes stability across Africa,
found that members of al-Shabaab and the separatist
<
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mombasa_Republican_Council> Mombasa Republican
Council said they had joined because of Kenya's abusive "counter-terrorism"
practices.
Instead of investigating the abuses by ATPU and other security forces,
Kenyan authorities have looked the other way. Western donors, in particular
the US and the UK, have also ignored the abuses, while continuing to channel
resources to the anti-terrorism unit. That is not just short-sighted but
appears to condone the crimes. US law prohibits support to abusive foreign
forces.
The obvious way for donors to help is by pressing the Kenyan government to
respect the rule of law, ensure that abuses are investigated and prosecuted,
and push through much-needed police reforms, which have stalled. Support
could also include beefing up investigative capacities, prosecutors and the
judicial system, as well as funding programmes that provide at-risk
populations with new opportunities for education and development.
Above all, there needs to be real accountability-not just rhetoric and
promises-from the government in Nairobi.
Received on Tue Sep 16 2014 - 15:58:29 EDT