Despite Instability, Djibouti's Position Limits Government Actions
By Stratfor
01/09/2014
A member of the Presidential Guard for Djiboutian President Ismail Omar
Guelleh opened fire in Djibouti's international airport on Aug. 25, just
minutes after the president's departure. In the attack he wounded two other
guards and the president's physician in what may have been an assassination
attempt against Guelleh. The attack follows a July 17 incident in which the
government arrested several members of the military amid rumors of a coup
and a heavy security presence in the streets of the capital.
The airport assault highlights the continued potential for internal
opposition to Guelleh's rule, as he now serves his third term since 1999 and
could be aiming for a fourth in 2016. These internal rumblings, however,
have their limitations. The regime has proven itself able to weather
opposition in the past and, more important, occupies a critical position in
the international system, ensuring policy continuity in spite of
instability.
Guelleh's regime has already demonstrated resilience in the face of
opposition. In January 2011, protests influenced by the Arab Spring broke
out after Guelleh amended the constitution to allow himself to run for a
third term. The government launched a broad crackdown, engaged in mass
arrests and denied international observers access to the country,
successfully ending the demonstrations by March.
Djibouti, however, occupies a position on the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a key
choke point for goods and energy resources moving between the Mediterranean
Sea and the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal and Red Sea. This makes it
an important partner for powers in East Africa and outside the region. The
Port of Djibouti's critical trade and military role, as well as the bases
directly leased to U.S. and French forces, mean that the interests of more
powerful international players dominate the nation's trajectory far more
than internal power politics do. Despite opposition attempts to oust
Guelleh's ruling People's Rally for Progress party -- and regardless of any
personalities or party affiliations -- Djibouti's leaders remain highly
constrained by international allegiances.
Ethiopia is the main regional power with an interest in Djibouti's politics.
The Port of Djibouti functions as landlocked Ethiopia's main outlet to the
sea -- a role Djibouti has occupied since Ethiopia's 1991 loss of Eritrea
and the Red Sea coast. Ethiopia's infrastructure investments indicate that
it intends to continue this focus on Djibouti. The 784-kilometer (487-mile)
railway between Addis Ababa and Djibouti is now in disrepair (some sections
were even removed illegally for their steel), and the China Civil
Engineering Construction Corp. is now building a new line along the same
route. Barring project overruns, this line is to be completed within two
years. The new line will increase the railway's capacity from its current
240,000 tons to as much as 1.5 million tons per year. The project is one
part of a major railway infrastructure expansion initiative in Ethiopia and
is supposed to extend into South Sudan, which has needed reliable import and
export routes since its independence from Sudan.
In addition to its contracts to build railways from the interior, China is
directly involved in the Port of Djibouti through the state-owned China
Merchants Group, which has purchased part of the port terminal operator.
China's interest in Djibouti transcends the benefits of being involved in
East African regional trade -- roughly one-half of the port's container
traffic is in transshipment due to Djibouti's position as the only reliable
port with significant infrastructure along the main shipping lanes between
Europe and the Gulf, Asia and the eastern coast of Africa.
Djibouti also serves a significant military function. It regularly hosts
vessels from the United States, Europe, Russia, China, Japan, Iran and other
nations, providing fresh supplies and maintenance. This activity has
expanded dramatically since 2009, when anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of
Aden ramped up regional deployments of naval vessels from many countries,
increasing military port calls in Djibouti from less than 200 to
approximately 400 per year.
The United States and France stand out among the nations with military
interests in Djibouti because both lease onshore military installations. The
United States uses Camp Lemonnier as its main forward-basing facility to
support operations on the African continent and in other nearby regions.
These range from ongoing anti-terrorism operations in Somalia and Yemen to
the recent evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in South Sudan. The United States
also operates an unmanned aerial vehicle base outside of Camp Lemonnier that
provides significant regional surveillance and strike capability. France,
Djibouti's former colonial ruler, still has about 1,900 troops stationed in
the country -- the largest concentration of forward deployed French forces
in Africa.
Because of the country's importance to a multitude of important
international players, any potential ruler in Djibouti is automatically tied
to making sure Djibouti continues to fulfill its role. Were the country to
undergo radical changes in behavior as a result of internal instability or
regime change, it is even possible that stronger players with a defined
interest in Djibouti such as Ethiopia, the United States or France would
intervene in the country's internal politics to defend those critical
interests.