The Root of South Sudan's Crisis is Constitutional not Ethnic
Any lasting peace deal must bear in mind the political underpinnings of the
ongoing violence and dismantle South Sudan's centralised, high-stakes,
zero-sum political system.
By <
http://www.thinkafricapress.com/author/hilary-matfess> Hilary Matfess
Article | 13 May 2014 - 1:54pm |
Last Friday, President Salva Kiir and former Vice-President Riek Machar
signed a peace deal in Addis Ababa, renewing tepid hopes that the crisis in
South Sudan will soon draw to a close. The breaking of the ceasefire in the
days since the agreement, however, suggests there is still some way to go.
On the one hand, part of this difficulty no doubt arises from ongoing
animosity between the country's two largest ethnic groups, the Dinka and the
Nuer. The violence, which began last
<
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/05/08/atrocities_mount_as_south_suda
n_foes_launch_talks.html> December, has largely occurred along these ethnic
lines and has led to the deaths of over 10,000 people and the displacement
of over 1 million.
However, on the other hand, it is crucial not to underestimate the political
and constitutional underpinnings of the crisis. The power structures in
South Sudan, codified in the transitional constitution of 2011, centralises
an inordinate amount of power in the office of the President. This
ultimately undermines a system of checks and balances and establishes a
system of 'winner-takes-all' politics. Understanding how this political
structure contributed to widespread violence will be necessary if the
current fighting is to be halted and prevented from repeating.
Crisis in the constitution
In understanding how the violence began, it is important to note the
political situation in South Sudan prior to the crisis. The tensions between
Kiir and Machar did not burst forth unannounced, but rather can be traced to
the changes to the transitional constitution of South Sudan made in 2011.
Though billed as '
<
http://jurist.org/forum/2014/02/kevin-cope-south-sudan.php> technical'
changes to the 2005 transitional constitution, the revisions were sweeping.
The 2005 constitution, developed in light of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, granted significant authority to districts and laid the
foundation for a system of federalism following the scheduled referendum.
The 2011 changes "rolled back federalism," according to
<
http://jurist.org/forum/2014/02/kevin-cope-south-sudan.php> Kevin L. Cope,
a visiting professor at Georgetown Law, and concentrated power in the
national government. The reforms, says Cope, gave the president power to
"dissolve state councils and dismiss state governors" and to implement
emergency provisions under which individual rights can be suspended and the
president is able to take "any such measures as deemed necessary."
Under this centralised system, there is little incentive to compete for
state-level government seats. The office of the president, officially vested
with the authority to appoint certain members of the legislature and dismiss
state-level officials, is the only position worth competing for since
control of the executive amounts to control of the entire political system.
In addition to vast political power, there are also significant financial
opportunities that come with the presidency. South Sudan is an oil rich
country and the revenues from production are highly
<
http://www.crisisgroup.org/%7E/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/172%
20-%20Politics%20and%20Transition%20in%20the%20New%20South%20Sudan.pdf>
concentrated at the federal level. 98% of the government's revenue comes
from oil and the federal government is responsible for distributing revenues
to the sub-national states. Furthermore, given that that some oil fields are
believed to be past peak production and that oil production is expected to
decline in coming decades, control is also time-sensitive, increasing the
current stakes even more.
A lasting peace
Prior to the outbreak of violence, peaceful attempts at reforming the new
2011 constitution had been made. Machar circulated one such reform agenda
<
http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/652467-south-sudan-no-power-sharing-without
-reform.html> calling for term limits for the presidency and for the removal
of the clause in the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement's (SPLM) own
constitution that gives its chairperson the power to nominate 5% of members
at all levels of the party. This proposal was voted down and Machar was
accused of "parallelism" by President Kiir, foreshadowing their impending
fallout.
Tensions rose over the next two years as Kiir exercised his right to dismiss
politically insubordinate governors, including the Lakes State governor,
Chol Tong Mayay, in January 2013. Then, in
<
http://www.aljazeera.com/video/africa/2013/07/20137287019670555.html> July
of that year, Kiir dismissed his entire cabinet, including Machar. In
response, Machar and his allies accused President Kiir of acting
extra-judicially and creating a
<file:///\\localhost\-%09http\::www.newvision.co.ug:
news:652467-south-sudan-
no-power-sharing-without-reform.html> constitutional crisis.
These tensions finally burst forth in December 2013, when clashes between
elements of the army erupted into wider instances of violence. Kiir accused
Machar of attempting to stage a coup. Machar denied this but amassed a rebel
group and clashes spread across many areas of the country. A ceasefire was
signed in January, but it was repeatedly violated. Thousands have been
killed, the humanitarian crisis has deepened, and because the violence
<
http://www.oxfam.org/en/emergencies/southsudan> disrupted the planting
season the country is now poised to suffer a disastrous famine.
While the international community has been eager to institute a transitional
agreement between the two sides of the conflict, it is clear that past deals
have done little to establish a sustainable ceasefire. After all, long-term
peace in South Sudan will require, amongst other things, an agreement that
will alter the environment created by the 2011 constitutional changes. The
political underpinnings of the crisis need to be addressed and for an
agreement to be sustainable, power will have to decentralised once more,
diffusing some of the political competition to the sub-national level. A
lasting peace deal must bear in mind the constitutional roots of the ongoing
violence and dismantle the current high-stakes, zero-sum political system.
Received on Tue May 13 2014 - 13:39:16 EDT