http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm
Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview
BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM
Country Reports on Terrorism 2013
Report
April 30, 2014
ERITREA
Overview: Eritrea did not experience any major acts of international
terrorism in 2013. The Government of Eritrea claimed that it sought to be a
partner in the war on terrorism. Eritrean officials in Asmara, at the UN,
and at the AU issued statements and told U.S officials that they wanted to
move out of a long period of regional isolation and animosity. Eritrean
officials engaged with some neighboring states, as well as nations in
sub-Saharan Africa and the Arabian Peninsula to discuss regional stability,
counterterrorism cooperation, and regional initiatives to counter
transnational challenges. The Eritrean Foreign Minister expressed public
dismay at al-Shabaab's September 2013 attack on the Westgate Mall in
Nairobi. However, Ethiopia and other nations in East Africa continued to
accuse Eritrea of sponsoring armed groups destabilizing the region. The
Eritrean government, for its part, continued to deny the accusations and,
in return, levied charges that Ethiopia-supported groups continued to
pursue the violent overthrow of the Eritrean regime. Eritrea's lack of
commitment to regional stability reduced opportunities for counterterrorism
cooperation or dialogue.
In May, the United States re-certified Eritrea as "not cooperating fully"
with U.S. counterterrorism efforts under Section 40A of the Arms Export and
Control Act, as amended. In considering this annual determination, the
Department of State reviewed Eritrea's overall level of cooperation with
U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, taking into account U.S. counterterrorism
objectives and a realistic assessment of Eritrean capabilities.
The Government of Eritrea has been under UN Security Council (UNSC)
sanctions since December 2009. UNSCR 1907 (2009) imposed an arms embargo on
Eritrea and a travel ban and asset freeze on some military and political
leaders, calling on the nation to "cease arming, training and equipping
armed groups and their members, including al-Shabaab, that aim to
destabilize the region."
In July, the UNSC called on Eritrea to begin cooperating with the Somalia
and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG), so that the body could determine the
veracity of regional claims about Eritrean assistance to regional
destabilizers. Refusal of the Government of Eritrea to hold substantive
discussions with the SEMG, on grounds that the sanctions regime aimed
simply to "humiliate" Eritrea and that the international community had
turned a blind eye to Ethiopian misdeeds, prevented international
investigations of charges against Eritrea. In December, Eritrean officials
met with the SEMG in Paris in what the latter termed a productive meeting;
subsequent confidence-building sessions have been scheduled for 2014.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Articles 259-264,
269-270, and 282 of the Eritrean Penal Code, grandfathered into present-day
law from 1957, criminalize terrorist methods; measures of intimidation or
terror; acts of conspiracy carried out by organized armed bands; use of
arms, means, or support from foreign organizations; the use of bombs,
dynamite, explosives or other terrorist methods constituting a public
danger; genocide; and war crimes against the civilian population. Other
sections of Eritrean law could also be used to prosecute terrorism,
including acts related to: offenses against public safety, property, the
state, national interests, and international interests; attacks on the
independence of the state; impairment of the defensive power of the state;
high treason; economic treason; collaboration; and provocation and
preparation.
Entities including the Eritrean Defense Forces, National Security Agency,
Police, Immigration and Customs authorities all potentially have
counterterrorism responsibilities. Chain of command may work effectively
within some security and law enforcement elements, but there are rivalries
between and overlaps of responsibility among the various forces. Many
soldiers, police officers, and immigration and customs agents are young
national service recruits or assignees, who are performing their jobs
without adequate training.
Eritrea closely monitors passenger manifests for any flights coming into
Asmara, and scrutinizes travel documents of visitors, but does not collect
biometric data. Government officials lack training and technology to
recognize fraudulent documents. The Government of Eritrea does not share
information gathered at ports of entry with the United States. Eritrea's
borders with Ethiopia and Djibouti are tightly controlled, whereas the
border with Sudan is porous in some places, resulting in a considerable
amount of unrecorded movement across by persons across the border.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Eritrea is not a member of a
Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. This gap prevents any
overall assessment of the risks the country faces in regards to terrorist
financing. Eritrea's general lack of transparency on banking, financial,
and economic matters made the gathering of definitive information
difficult. The United States is unaware of passage and/or implementation of
counterterrorist finance-related legislation in 2013. Article 263 of the
Penal Code criminalizes economic treason.
The United States is unaware of whether the government routinely
distributes UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities to
financial institutions. The Government of Eritrea's longstanding policy of
self-reliance and self-imposed isolation predispose it to reject
non-indigenous regulatory arrangements and it is reluctant to cooperate
with sanctions regimes. In addition, it lacks laws, resources, financial
checks and balances, and an independent, properly-trained judiciary.
For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the
2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2,
Money Laundering and Financial Crimes:
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.
Regional and International Cooperation: Eritrea is a member of the AU, and
would like to reactivate its membership in the Intergovernmental Authority
on Development (IGAD); however, Eritrea's return to IGAD is opposed by
Ethiopia and by Djibouti, both of whom have had military conflicts with
Eritrea in recent years.
Received on Thu May 01 2014 - 06:58:20 EDT