Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2014 18:17:38 +0200
Al-Shabaab Strikes in Djibouti
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross <http://warontherocks.com/author/daveedgr/> and
Henry Appel <http://warontherocks.com/author/henry-appel/>
June 5, 2014 · in Analysis <http://warontherocks.com/category/analysis/>
On Saturday evening, May 24, a Somali man and his female companion took
their seats in La Chaumière, a restaurant in Djibouti’s capital popular with
tourists and Western military personnel. Before even checking the menu, the
pair
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/05/al-shabab-claims-deadly-djibou
ti-blasts-2014527154632977410.html> detonated suicide vests hidden under
their clothes, killing a Turkish national and wounding eleven international
soldiers. Three days later, the al-Qaeda affiliated Somali militant group
al-Shabaab
<http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Shabaab-claim-Djibouti-attack-against-cru
saders-20140528> claimed credit for the attack, explaining that it “targeted
a restaurant frequented predominantly by French Crusaders and their NATO
allies from the U.S., Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands.”
This attack is significant for several reasons. First, it is the first
suicide bombing in Djibouti’s history, shattering the country’s long stretch
of insulation from the many terrorist attacks that have struck its
neighbors. Second, Djibouti is an important base of operations for Western
forces in the region, including the U.S. Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of
Africa. The bombing should be understood in the context of a recent spate
of attacks by al-Shabaab, both in Somalia and outside.
Djibouti’s Military Significance
There are two major reasons al-Shabaab wanted to strike inside Djibouti. The
first, highlighted in al-Shabaab’s statement, is the Western military
presence in the country. The only U.S. military base in the Horn of Africa,
Camp Lemonnier, is in Djibouti. Camp Lemmonier is
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06%20/world/africa/us-signs-new-lease-to-kee
p-strategic-military-installation-in-the-horn-of-africa.html?_r=0> used as
“a staging ground for counterterrorism operations in Yemen and Somalia,” and
has even been
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-us-base-at-cor
e-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story
.html> employed as the staging point for drone strikes in Yemen. Lemonnier
also serves as a base for training of regional forces, some bound for
Somalia as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) mission.
The Western military presence is not limited to American forces.
France—which was mentioned first in al-Shabaab’s claim of
responsibility—also maintains a military base in Djibouti, which is the
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10173740/Where-are-the-world
s-major-military-bases.html> largest of its three installations in Africa.
France’s Djiboutian base helps to support its multiple missions on the
continent.
The second reason al-Shabaab has a vendetta against Djibouti is the
country’s contribution of troops to the AMISOM force, which is designed to
protect and stabilize al-Shabaab’s mortal enemy, the Federal Government of
Somalia. As Djibouti prepared to send 960 of its troops to join the AMISOM
mission in December of 2011, al-Shabaab spokesman Ali Mohamed Rage
<http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2332/Al-Shabaab_Warns_Djibouti>
warned the Djiboutian people that “if you do not keep them from attacking
us, you will see the bodies of your children scattered on Mogadishu
streets.”
Al-Shabaab’s Offensive
The suicide attack in Djibouti comes in the midst of an al-Shabaab
offensive. A database of al-Shabaab attacks that we maintain for the
Foundation for Defense of Democracies shows that there were nine attacks
credited to al-Shabaab outside Somalia’s borders in May. In contrast, in the
first four months of 2014, al-Shabaab was only suspected of involvement in
eight total attacks outside of Somalia—seven in Kenya and one in Ethiopia
(both of whom have been contributors to the fight against al-Shabaab inside
of Somalia).
Al-Shabaab may be seeking to intimidate countries that have committed troops
to Somalia, attempting to make them rethink their commitment to the mission.
Indeed, the group has loudly explained that its escalation inside Kenya is a
sign of things to come. On May 22, senior al-Shabaab commander Fuad Mohamed
Khalaf
<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/22/uk-somalia-kenya-attacks-idUKKBN0E
21OL20140522> said that “we have transferred the war to inside Nairobi,” and
after a series of early May bombings in Kenya that killed more than 35
people, he threatened more suicide attacks. On the same day, senior
al-Shabaab commander Fuad Shongole
<http://www.deseretnews.com/article/765653799/Somali-extremist-threatens-US-
Kenya-with-attacks.html> promised that the group would carry its jihad to
Kenya, Uganda, “and afterward, with God’s will, to America.”
Al-Shabaab’s strategic modus operandi has recently been to carry out attacks
against Somali citizens, the Somali military, and AMISOM forces. In the case
of this last target set, the group’s objective is, in part, to send the
message that occupying Somalia to support the government is not worth the
cost. Attacks in neighboring states further drive home the point, and there
is a growing voice in Kenya’s political class in favor of abandoning its
Somalia mission. Earlier this month, for example, Kenya’s senate minority
leader Moses Wetangula <http://allafrica.com/stories/201405150361.html>
argued that “in our attempt to help a neighbor we have suffered a lot—costs
ranging from human loss and monetary loss.” He argued that it was time to
“end our presence in Somalia and save the country from further conflicts.”
And Ronald Tonui, a member of Kenya’s national assembly, further argued that
“it does not make any sense that our forces are trying to keep peace in
Somalia at the expense of Kenyans’ safety,” referring specifically to the
threat of terrorist attacks. There is, of course, also the risk that attacks
like that at the Westgate Mall will increase rather than erode Kenyan
resolve. But these public statements from elected officials are significant,
and will likely bolster al-Shabaab’s belief that it can reduce the pressure
it faces within Somalia’s borders by perpetrating attacks beyond them.
The recent attack in Djibouti serves a similar purpose, but with an eye
toward the West.
Conclusion
Since October 2012, the vast majority of al-Shabaab’s attacks have struck at
Somali or Kenyan targets (84% Somali, 15% Kenyan, <1% Ethiopian). But the
group’s frequent bellicose threats and warnings, combined with its status as
an official affiliate of al-Qaeda, have kept the question of whether it will
strike outside the immediate region prominent. Though this attack represents
an escalation on al-Shabaab’s part, the militant group has not shown the
ability to carry out a sustained campaign outside of Somalia and Kenya. Its
operations are likely to continue to be heavily concentrated in those two
countries.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies and an adjunct assistant professor in Georgetown University’s
security studies program. He is the author or volume editor of fourteen
books and monographs, including
<http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1118094948/ref=as_li_qf_sp_asin_il_tl?ie=U
TF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=1118094948&linkCode=as2&tag=httpwar
onthec-20&linkId=OP6QJD42R2LUQGBT> Bin Laden’s Legacy (Wiley, 2011). Henry
Appel is a research intern at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies,
working with Dr. Gartenstein-Ross. Appel is currently studying government
and international relations at Claremont McKenna College in Southern
California.
<http://warontherocks.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Attacks-Outide-Somalia.
png> Attacks Outide Somalia
(image/png attachment: image001.png)