Date: Fri, 1 Aug 2014 21:23:21 +0200
The Shabab Distortion: Somalia's Real Challenges Lie Elsewhere
* By Dominik Balthasar
<http://www.fairobserver.com/author/Dominik%20Balthasar>
* August 01, 2014
Given that fighting al-Shabab does little to advance Somalia's
state-building, other approaches need pursuing.
<http://www.fairobserver.com/?s=al+shabab> Al-Shabab's attack on the
presidential palace in <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-28219681>
Mogadishu on July 8 is the latest in a string of violent assaults that have
afflicted <http://www.fairobserver.com/?s=somalia> Somalia and neighboring
countries. The militant <http://www.fairobserver.com/?s=islamist> Islamist
group's ability to penetrate the heavily fortified presidential complex is a
testimony to the movement's potency to disrupt reconstruction efforts of the
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).
This is particularly striking against the backdrop of enhanced security
precautions the FGS had recently taken, and the military offensive the
<http://www.fairobserver.com/?s=african+union> African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) had launched on March 5. As
with the assault on Nairobi's Westgate shopping mall in September 2013,
there is a risk that al-Shabab's " <http://www.fairobserver.com/?s=ramadan>
Ramadan offensive" will trigger a predominantly military response by the FGS
and its international allies.
Distortion at Play
However, as argued in a
<http://www.life-peace.org/wp-content/uploads/The-ACTS-Report.pdf> study by
the Life and Peace Institute, dividing Somali political actors into a binary
dichotomy of extremists and moderates has produced a distorted understanding
of the conflict. Partly rooted in the prevailing counterterrorism narrative,
this distortion goes in tandem with a one-sided perception of al-Shabab. Yet
as rightly pointed out by the International Crisis Group's
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/b099-so
malia-al-shabaab-it-will-be-a-long-war.aspx> latest policy briefing on
Somalia, the group is multifaceted and constitutes much more than an armed
insurgency. Unfortunately, simplistic portrayals of both the Somali conflict
and its most prominent fomenter have significantly hampered the country's
prospects for conflict resolution and state-building.
Simultaneously, there is another distortion at play when it comes to
al-Shabab, namely the ubiquitous proposition that the Islamist movement
constitutes the greatest challenge to peace and stability in Somalia.
However, this is questionable for two reasons.
First, at the grassroots, al-Shabab offers practical solutions and benefits
for numerous communities, including the mediating of clan disputes,
establishing local governance arrangements and providing basic services.
Second, despite popular claims to the contrary, defeating al-Shabab is not a
precondition for advancing Somalia's state-building project. For one, a
victory over the extremist movement is likely to catalyze local clan
disputes. For another, the historic track record of state-building shows
that the creation of governance structures has, for better or for worse,
generally been accompanied by violent contestation, particularly during
early phases.
Somalia's obstacles toward peace, stability and prosperity lie beyond the
challenge posed by al-Shabab. Just as has been acknowledged in the case of
pirates, the Islamist movement constitutes more of a symptom of underlying
discrepancies rather than an insurmountable core problem in and of itself.
Consequently, the FGS and its international backers should not exhaust
themselves and their scarce resources in hopeless military operations
against al-Shabab which, if anything, have encouraged it. President Hassan
Sheikh Mohamud and the international community should consider devoting more
attention toward tackling Somalia's more fundamental problems, which would
allow them to kill two birds with one stone: rebuilding a functioning state
and, thereby, draining al-Shabab of its fertile soil.
Somalia's Real Challenges
There are four key challenges facing Somalia. First, the fragmentation of
clans not only challenges prospects for peace and stability in the country,
but also provides fertile soil for al-Shabab. That this dynamic has seen a
revival with the rolling out of a federal agenda is evidenced by the
increasing tribal tensions in southern Somalia. Rather than curbing such
fragmentation, the military advances against al-Shabab appear to have
furthered it by establishing a
<http://www.irinnews.org/report/100196/clans-clash-in-somalia-s-lower-shabel
le> power vacuum. While al-Shabab has frequently exploited resulting clan
competition to its own benefit, such fragmentation is poisonous for
Somalia's state-building endeavor. Hence, the FGS needs to successfully
forge social cohesion on a national scale, if it wants to establish peace
and stability.
Second, the FGS needs to come to grips with the lack of a political vision.
As of today, the government has failed to put forth a tangible plan on how
to move forward in newly liberated areas or with regard to federalism.
Against the backdrop of remaining social fault lines involving clan
identity, the recommendation of "facilitating local clan dialogue and
reconciliation" is generally advanced. Yet its relevance is not only
questionable in an environment of constantly shifting alliances, but it is
also backward-looking and divisive in nature. What the FGS needs to come up
with is a common vision that paints a tangible and realistic picture of the
future. Such a vision could bridge clan divides, implement a political
agenda for action, and provide an ideological framework that allows the FGS
to mobilize popular support for state-building and, therefore, challenging
al-Shabab's hegemony in terms of vision.
Third, a fundamental obstacle lies in the void of local administrations. For
one, the absence of formal administrative structures has provided al-Shabab
with the possibility to fill this gap. This has not only allowed the
extremist movement to establish its presence in rural areas for the past
decade. It has also enabled al-Shabab to become part and parcel of political
governance at the grassroots level. For another, it has deprived the FGS of
the ability to control territory, provide basic services and gain traction
among local constituencies. The arrival of ill-disciplined SNA troops and
corrupt government officials in newly liberated areas soured rather than
watered the population's appetite for central government control. Therefore,
the challenge of setting up functioning administrative structures needs to
be embraced, in order to defeat al-Shabab and build a viable state.
Fourth, the FGS must tackle concerns combating poverty, reducing
vulnerability and providing livelihoods by creating employment
opportunities. While poverty remains endemic, warnings of famine are once
again on the rise. Yet creating loyal fellowship for its state-building
project will be hardly possible in the absence of tangible improvements to
popular livelihoods. Similarly, it seems next to impossible to create an
engaged citizenship, without a productive economy and the ability for
popular taxation.
If the Somali government and the international donor community continue to
remain largely unable to reduce the multitude of risks the Somali population
faces, the objective of building a viable state and defeating al-Shabab will
remain a distant dream.
Going Beyond Military Approaches
Clearly, insofar as al-Shabab is an insurgency movement, it needs to be
countered militarily. However, this should not lead the FGS and its
international partners to become "locked" in a military response. Not only
do continued military campaigns against al-Shabab provide it with nurturing
grounds, but they also divert attention from the underlying challenges for
peace and prosperity in Somalia. Frequently heeded calls for "political
inclusion" of the extremist movement are questionable. Not only do both
sides of the table contain elements who reject political dialogue, but such
a solution maintains the focus on al-Shabab as the primary hindrance to
stability and development in Somalia. Yet as this seems to be far from the
truth, al-Shabab should be given less rather than more attention.
Given that fighting al-Shabab militarily does little to advance the fate of
the Somali population and the FGS' state-building project, other approaches
need to be found. The most promising way forward appears to be a strategy
that hones in on building a functioning state apparatus which, by
consequence, renders organizations such as al-Shabab irrelevant to the local
populace. This is a long-term and difficult endeavor. Yet the FGS and the
international donor community should consider such a strategic shift before
President Mohamud's term is up, and his empty-handedness triggers the
international community's retreat from Somalia.
http://fo1.fairobserver.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/piereg_users_files
/7932/file_4160147565-120x120.jpg
Dominik Balthasar is a Researcher and Analyst with the Transatlantic
Postdoctoral Fellowship for International Relations and Security, in the
framework of which he has worked with Chatham House, the US Institute of
Peace, and the EU Institute for Security Studies. His work focuses on issues
pertaining to conflict and state fragility, as well as international efforts
toward state reconstruction and development, particularly in Somalia.
Balthasar has taught at the London School of Economics and Political Science
(LSE) and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of
London, and has consulted with a number of international development
organizations, including the United Nations and the World Bank in Somalia.
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