Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 18:45:53 +0200
Assessing Mombasa's Credentials as a Battleground in Kenya's War on Terror
by <http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/herman-butime> Herman Butime
Journal Article | July 30, 2014 - 11:38pm
Abstract
The sequential, mysterious assassinations of high profile Muslim clerics in
Mombasa over a period of two years (2012-2014) has elevated that coastal
city's status as a critical battleground in Kenya's war on terror. These
unresolved murders have occurred against the backdrop of Mombasa grabbing
the spotlight as the scene of the 2002 Al Qaeda attacks on Israeli interests
in the region and the emergence of allegations by Kenyan authorities, the
United States and the United Nations linking some of the area's leading
Islamist ideologues to insurgent activity in the Horn of Africa. However,
the challenge in understanding the roots of the city's restiveness is that
its alleged role in fomenting transnational insurgent activity sits
side-by-side with its secessionist tendencies. To that effect, it is
difficult to determine which of the two factors contributes more to
instability in the area. In this article, the author attributes Mombasa's
restiveness to its status as a link between religious/secessionist tensions
in the coastal region of Kenya and contradictions fuelling Jihadist
campaigns in the Horn of Africa and beyond. The implication of this finding
is that the key to stabilizing Mombasa lies in resolving both the domestic
and regional/international contradictions fuelling its state of restiveness.
Introduction
In the post-Cold War era, Kenya has emerged as one of East Africa's hotspots
for terrorist attacks mounted by radical Islamist groups. Since 1998,
terrorist operatives have conducted high profile attacks that have elevated
the country's profile as a critical theatre in the Global War On Terror
(GWOT). Among others, in 1998, suspected operatives of Al Qaeda, a global
Islamist terrorist franchise, bombed the United States (US) embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania;
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn1> [1] four years
later, the same organization masterminded the bombing of Paradise Hotel and
attempted to shoot down an Arkia Airlines aeroplane in the Kenyan coastal
city of Mombasa.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn2> [2] More
recently, in 2013, operatives of Al Shabaab, an affiliate of Al Qaeda,
mounted a brazen attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn3> [3] In the East
African region, Kenya as a target of Islamist militant groups is only
rivalled by Uganda which has had to contend with the Allied Democratic Front
(ADF) insurgency in the western part of the country and attacks mounted by
Al Shabaab.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn4> [4]
Although attacks in Kenya have occurred in Nairobi and the north eastern
part of the country, Mombasa has grabbed the spotlight as the country's
terrorism and counterterrorism focal area.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn5> [5] The city's
apparent credentials primarily derive from its being the scene of the 2002
Al Qaeda attacks and a suspected springboard for operatives who were
involved in the Westgate attack and some of those participating in the Al
Shabaab insurgency in Somalia.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn6> [6] The Al Qaeda
attacks would seem to link Mombasa's state of instability to contradictions
fuelling the global Jihadist campaign. However, this notion is unsettled by
the area's secessionist tendencies. Mombasa is part of the wider coastal
region that seeks to break away from Kenya due to the alleged economic
neglect of the area and the marginalization of Muslims who are a minority in
the country.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn7> [7] In this
regard, domestic politics contributes to the area's restiveness as much as
external political contradictions.
Against this background, this article examines the credentials of Mombasa as
a battleground in Kenya's war on terror. The central argument is that the
city occupies that space that links Kenya's religious and secessionist
tensions with the political contradictions fuelling the global Jihadist
campaign. Due to the historical, political, socio-economic and geographical
factors shaping this space, Mombasa has evolved into a hub for the
propagation of militant Islamist activity in East Africa and the Horn of
Africa. Whereas the state denies responsibility, the recent mysterious,
targeted assassination of prominent Muslim clerics in the city has created a
perception among the Muslim community that the state has adopted a
religiously-motivated extrajudicial approach to countering terrorism in the
area.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn8> [8] Thus, the
attacks in Mombasa, militant Islamist activity in the area and the perceived
state response to this phenomenon constitute a start-up benchmark for
designating Mombasa as a battleground in Kenya's war on terror.
This article is organized as follows: The next section examines the
historical, geo-political and socio-economic factors that have shaped the
evolution of Mombasa. This analysis is followed by an assessment of the
city's status as a leadership, recruitment, indoctrinational, logistical and
operational centre for militant Islamist activity in East Africa and the
Horn of Africa. The author then assesses the Kenyan state's counterterrorism
strategy in Mombasa before briefly discussing this case's implications for
the stability of Kenya.
Roots of Instability in Mombasa
The geo-political factors that shaped the early historical development of
Mombasa reinforce the dynamics underpinning the uneasy relations between the
Kenyan central government and the coastal region as well as those that
triggered off the global Jihadist campaign in the post-Cold War era. Between
the 15th and 17th centuries, the control of Mombasa was contested by
Portuguese and Omani Arabs.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn9> [9] During that
era, the Suez Canal that connected Europe to Asia by sea had not yet been
constructed.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn10> [10] Thus, for
European merchant ships that had to sail around Africa enroute to India,
Mombasa was a highly strategic transit point given its location along the
East African coast. In order for European mercantile interests to have
controlled the Indian Ocean trade routes, they had to displace the Arabs
from Oman who had already settled along the East African coast, intermarried
with the indigenous people, introduced Islam and controlled Mombasa.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn11> [11] For 200
years, starting in the late 15th century, the Portuguese were able to
establish a presence in Mombasa where they built Fort Jesus to defend the
port against attacks by the Arabs. The Portuguese were later to be defeated
by the Arabs who re-occupied Mombasa and during the colonial era, ceded its
control to the British.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn12> [12]
>From the above exposition, it can be deduced that Mombasa was founded
against the backdrop of a competition for global power and influence between
the Euro-Christian and Arab-Muslim civilizations. Significantly, its early
contact with the outside world laid the foundation for religious and
secessionist tensions in Kenya which reinforced the clash of civilizations
which had shaped its founding.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn13> [13] Since its
early contact with the Arabs, the coastal region of Kenya has evolved into a
distinct area with a cultural heritage underpinned by Islamic, Arab and
indigenous African traditions.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn14> [14] This
contrasts sharply with the hinterland that is populated by indigenous
Africans mainly belonging to Christian denominations. In terms of how this
religious factor has unfolded demographically, Kenya is predominantly
Christian, with Muslims accounting for 11% of the population, mainly
inhabiting the area along the country's border with Somalia and the coastal
region of which Mombasa is a part.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn15> [15]
Whereas the above factor in itself would not have been sufficient to trigger
off religious tensions in Mombasa, the area is restive because sections of
its population believe that the central government is economically
marginalizing it. Apart from being a favourite destination for foreign
tourists, Mombasa serves as a port for some of the countries of East Africa.
Yet, despite its significant contribution to the national coffers, a section
of the coastal population believes that the area is getting a raw deal. The
Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) seeks the region's secession from Kenya in
light of the argument that the government has economically neglected the
area; its population wallows in poverty; unemployment levels are high; and
the resources of Mombasa are controlled by non-natives.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn16> [16]
On another score, Mombasa is restive because her secessionist demands
collide with allegations by Kenyan officials linking the MRC leadership to
Al Shabaab.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn17> [17] Given this
development, it becomes difficult to ignore the area's religious identity as
a critical factor underpinning the uneasy relations between the central
government and the coastal region. If it is true that Mombasa is a sanctuary
for Al Shabaab, then its Islamic heritage and Al Shabaab's radical Islamist
agenda would presumably be the elements linking the two. However, this
notion would be contested on grounds that an Islamic heritage is not always
synonymous with a militant Islamist agenda. For example, MRC, an
organization based in a predominantly Muslim area has dissociated itself
from Al Shabaab, a militant Islamist group.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn18> [18] If the MRC
position is true and the government knows it, then the state is using a
'terrorism scare' to shoot down the region's demand for equitable control of
its resources. And if sections of Mombasa's population attribute the area's
woes to state-instigated religious marginalization, then Islam would most
likely be the doctrine around which it would rally to contest the authority
of the state. In this sense, an evolving Islamist insurrection would be
directed against a state largely dominated by Christians. That development
would consolidate Mombasa's history as an area shaped by a Muslim-Christian
divide.
Like the case of Mombasa's restiveness, the clash of civilizations has also
partly been at the heart of the onset of the post-Cold War confrontation
between the West and radical Islamist groups.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn19> [19] Although
during the Cold War, the two sides were unified in their opposition to
communism, when the Berlin wall fell, inherent ideological differences in
their alliance precipitated a clash between them.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn20> [20] Whereas
the West espoused the principles of a free market economy and liberal
democratic values, radical Islamist groups were intent on installing
governments based on a strict interpretation of Islamic law. A critical
flashpoint in relations between the two sides manifested during Iraq's
occupation of Kuwait. Saudi Arabia, home to some of Islam's holiest shrines,
accepted the deployment of US forces on its soil to stave off a probable
Iraqi invasion. This development precipitated a deterioration in relations
between the Saudi monarchy and Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda, who
saw the presence of American soldiers as a desecration of the Islamic holy
lands. The fall-out between bin Laden and the House of Saud was a critical
starting point in Al Qaeda launching a war against the West.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn21> [21]
Also relations between the erstwhile anti-communist allies were not helped
by the West's apparent double-standards in cooperating with regimes in
predominantly Muslim countries which were not embracing democracy. For
example, France (a western country) was not emphatic in its condemnation of
the Algerian government after it prematurely terminated the elections of
1992 that were on the verge of ushering in a government run by the Islamic
Salvation Front (FIS).
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn22> [22] As a
result, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) insurgency, one of three rebellions
that resulted from the botched up elections, not only targeted the Algerian
establishment but also France.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn23> [23] In this
vein, ideological contradictions in the defunct anti-communist alliance and
inconsistency in the West's promotion of its ideals abroad partly
constituted a basis for radical Islamist groups launching a world wide Jihad
against so called moderate Muslim regimes and the countries of the West.
>From the foregoing, it is evident that the founding of Mombasa, its shaky
relations with the Kenyan central government and the international Jihadist
campaign have all been shaped by a global competition for power and
influence pitting the Euro-Christian countries of the West and state and
non-state actors propagating Islamist ideals. Mombasa is unstable because it
seats at the intersection between the domestic and international
manifestations of this confrontation. In this context, rebellions abroad
that are spurred by radical Islamist ideals favourably fit in with the
religious tensions that define Mombasa's uneasy relations with the Kenyan
central government.
Mombasa's Credentials as a Terrorism/Counterterrorism Hotspot
Having examined how certain historical, political and socio-economic factors
have shaped Mombasa's restiveness, this section assesses its credentials as
a battleground in Kenya's war on terror. Given the religious tensions
underpinning Mombasa's relations with the Kenyan central government and some
parallels in the contradictions fuelling the conflict in Somalia (a country
neighbouring Kenya), Mombasa has evolved into a critical leadership,
recruitment, indoctrinational, logistical and operational centre for
militant Islamist activity in East Africa and the Horn of Africa.
Whereas there may be other parts of Kenya that are home to fiery Islamist
preachers, in recent times, Mombasa has emerged as the defacto seat of the
radical Islamist movement in the country. The city hosts the Masjid Musa
mosque which was the base for three fiery Muslim clerics: Aboud Rogo
Muhammad, Ibrahim 'Rogo' Omar and Abubaker Shariff Ahmed also known as
Makaburi. Prior to being killed, all three preachers were linked to Al
Shabaab.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn24> [24] In June
2012, the US imposed sanctions on Aboud Rogo for allegedly supporting the
Somali insurgent group. Pursuing almost similar measures, the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) instituted a travel ban on Rogo and froze his
assets;
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn25> [25] Makaburi
was targeted likewise: the UNSC imposed sanctions on him for being "a
leading facilitator and recruiter for young Kenyan Muslims for violent
activity in Somalia."
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn26> [26]
In a way, the three clerics were targeted because the US and UN saw them as
leaders around whom the radical Islamist community in Kenya was engaging in
transnational insurgent activity. However, in order to authenticate the US
and UN conclusions, it would have to be proven that these preachers held
radical views and were committed to directing the transnational propagation
of these ideals. Confirming his own commitment to a strict interpretation of
Islam, Makaburi notes that "There is no such a thing as a moderate Muslim.
The prophets did not teach us moderation in Islam-Islam is Islam..Being a
moderate Muslim is accepting what your enemies want you to be."
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn27> [27] Whereas
Makaburi held such a conservative world view, in itself, this would not have
been sufficient to prove that he was using it to shape the political
landscape in Somalia. It would have to be proven that he aided Al Shabaab in
some way. In showing the active role Mombasa clerics play in the Somali
conflict, the BBC's Peter Taylor reveals that ".would-be Jihadis, whatever
their national origin, do not chance upon the route for themselves, but are
actively guided along it by radical preachers like Makaburi."
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn28> [28]
Whereas the case of Makaburi shows that there are individuals in Mombasa who
are openly committed to coordinating Islamist insurgent activities in East
Africa, Mombasa's credentials as a leadership centre for this movement have
largely been validated by the mysterious, sequential assassination of Rogo,
Omar and Makaburi. Although the Kenyan government denies responsibility for
these murders, the Muslim population in Mombasa blames it.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn29> [29]
Supposedly, from its perspective, the state would have had an interest in
eliminating the three preachers given their open support for Al Shabaab, an
insurgent group that had conducted attacks in Kenya in retaliation for the
East African country sending troops to Somalia to shore up the government
there. Also, in light of the religious dimension to the tensions between the
central government and the coastal region, the state would presumably have
been weary of the clerics' teachings further fuelling Mombasa's secessionist
tendencies. Whether or not the state had a hand in the assassinations, the
significance in the demise of the three clerics is that it raises the
profile of Mombasa as both a breeding and liquidation ground for leading
radical Islamist ideologues.
If we accept the proposition that Mombasa is a leadership centre for the
radical Islamist movement in Kenya, then this status should have a knock-on
effect of making the area a hub for the recruitment and indoctrination of
Islamist insurgents. According to the United Nations (UN), more than 500
Kenyan youths have been recruited to participate in the Al Shabaab
insurgency.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn30> [30] Given the
connection between the slain clerics' fiery sermons and allegations linking
them to Al Shabaab, it is plausible to assert that Mombasa, the city where
they were based, has made a significant contribution to the enlistment
figures cited by the world body. While insurgents may not necessarily be
recruited from their areas of origin, it is intriguing to note that there
are multiple cases of Kenyan insurgent-suspects hailing from Mombasa:
In June, 2013, Kenyan authorities reported that Fuad Abubaker Manswab, a key
terror suspect hailing from Majengo in Mombasa had joined Al Shabaab. Two
years earlier, he had been arrested together with Jermaine Grant, a British
national, for planning terrorist attacks in Mombasa;
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn31> [31] in
September 2013, five Kenyan youths from Kisauni and Majengo were apprehended
and sentenced to six months in jail for being in Somalia illegally. A
relative of one of the suspects revealed that he had been recruited into Al
Shabaab;
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn32> [32] the
following month, a 19 year old resident of Kisauni, Mombasa was interrogated
by Kenya's Anti-Terrorism Police on suspicions of having communicated with
the Westgate Mall attackers.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn33> [33]
The above examples point to the Kisauni and Majengo areas of Mombasa as
probable recruiting grounds for Al Shabaab. Incidentally, the Masjid Musa
mosque is located in this predominantly Muslim neighbourhood of Mombasa.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn34> [34] If we
adopt the proposition that the blacklisted clerics' sermons have had a
profound indoctrinational impact in the city, then this has mainly been felt
in areas that are not only proximate to the mosque but also those
predominantly with a religious identity at the heart of uneasy relations
between the coastal region and the central government. And as earlier
argued, some similarities between the contradictions fuelling restiveness in
Mombasa and some conflicts abroad reinforce the area's state of instability.
When Sheikh Rogo was murdered, Al Shabaab attempted to draw parallels
between its struggle and what it saw as the plight of Muslims in Kenya. The
group linked the cleric's death to a religiously motivated plan by the
Kenyan government to marginalize Muslims.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn35> [35] Al
Shabaab's calculation was that its ideology (based on a plan to establish an
Islamist theocracy in Somalia) would resonate well with the ostensibly
marginalized Muslim population of Mombasa and Kenya at large. Apparently,
this would in turn accord the Somali group much needed external support for
its insurgent campaign.
With the emergence of an ideological bridge connecting insurrectional
tendencies in Kenya and the conflict in Somalia, the centrality of Mombasa
to this nexus has allowed the area to evolve into a sanctuary, logistical
and operational hub for Islamist insurgent activity in East Africa and the
Horn of Africa. As a sanctuary, Mombasa has not only hosted indigenous but
also foreign Jihadists. For example, Manswab was arrested and charged
alongside, Jermaine Grant, a British national.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn36> [36] Also,
according to Kenyan intelligence sources, Samantha Lethwaite, another
British national and wife to one of the operatives responsible for the
London suicide attacks of 2005, lived in an exclusive villa in Mombasa while
plotting terrorist attacks.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn37> [37] The
reported activities of these foreign fighters showcase Mombasa's
significance as a battleground in the wider Jihadist campaign. The city's
credentials as a sanctuary for radical Islamists are further evidenced by
its hosting an Al Shabaab terror cell, of which Lethwaite is a
'logistician.' Coordinated by Abdulkadir Muhammed Abdulkadir also known as
Ikrima, this cell also includes Fahmi Jamal Salim who is believed to be
married to Lethwaite.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn38> [38] If it is
true that Lethwaite is an Al Shabaab 'logistician' and she once lived in
Mombasa, then it is plausible to deduce that the area's restiveness has
created an environment conducive for organizing and supporting Islamist
insurgent activity in Kenya and beyond.
Having assessed Mombasa's role in the organization of Islamist insurgent
activity in the region, it is also important to examine why some attacks
have particularly been conducted in this area. Given Mombasa's status as a
strategic port along the East African coast and its tourist attractions,
attacks on it would have serious economic ramifications in Kenya and beyond.
This outcome would be welcomed by Islamist insurgents in Kenya and abroad
seeking spotlight for their agenda. The city also presents radical Islamist
groups with some symbolic targets. Mombasa is a popular tourist destination
for Israeli nationals. In relation to the 2002 attacks in the city,
operatives targeted an Arkia Airlines aeroplane with Israelis on board and
Paradise Hotel that, according to James Bennet, had a kosher restaurant, a
synagogue and torah scrolls.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn39> [39] From
Bennet's report, it is apparent that the facilities at Paradise Hotel were
mainly tailored to host Israeli tourists. A senior official of Israel's Shin
Bet security agency observed that had the two attacks fully succeeded, 300
to 400 Israelis would have lost their lives.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn40> [40]
The primacy of Israeli interests in Kenya as a target of radical Islamist
groups stems from the following premises: First, the Palestinians' struggle
for statehood has cast Israel and the Western countries that support the
Jewish state (mainly the US) as the principle stumbling block to the
aspirations of the Palestinians. As a result, predominantly Arab and Muslim
state and non-state actors that share an ethno-religious identity with the
Palestinians and empathize with their struggle for self-determination have,
over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries, variously rallied in
opposition to Israel and her allies. Although not swayed by ethno-religious
considerations, during the Cold War, some radical leftist groups originating
from Germany and Japan also worked closely with Palestinian terrorist
organizations in targeting what they saw as Western imperialism and its
ostensible support for the Jewish state.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn41> [41] In this
connection, the endurance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the
post-Cold War era; the heightening of religious tensions as one of the
drivers for both the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the uneasy relations
between the Kenyan central government and the coastal region; and the
existence of Israeli interests in Mombasa have all combined to constitute
the city into an attractive target for radical Islamist groups.
Second, the existence of Israeli interests in Kenya presents radical
Islamist groups with the opportunity to hurt Kenya not only for her
ostensible marginalization of Muslims but also her enduring cordial
relations with Israel. With the author having already looked at religious
tensions in the country, the focus in this paragraph shifts to the relevance
of Israel-Kenya relations to this debate. Historically, the two countries
have had cordial relations to the extent that when terrorist operatives of
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
and the German leftist group Baader-Meinhoff hijacked an aeroplane mainly
carrying Israeli nationals and diverted it to Uganda in 1976, the squadron
of Israeli military planes involved in Operation Thunderbolt (the rescue
mission) refuelled in Kenya.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn42> [42] Kenya's
role in Operation Thunderbolt positioned her as an ally of the Jewish state
and by extension, an adversary of all those opposed to its existence.
This explains why in the aftermath of Operation Thunderbolt, an Arab group
masterminded the bombing of Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi apparently to punish
Kenya for her role in the 1976 hostage rescue mission.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn43> [43] Also,
although Al Qaeda is widely suspected to have organized and executed the
2002 attacks in Mombasa, in Lebanon, a group known as the Army of Palestine
claimed responsibility for the attacks.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn44> [44] The
significance of this claim is the connection between the name of the group
and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on one hand and the targeting of
Israeli interests in Kenya on the other. If that group's claim was true,
then at that time, Mombasa emerged as one of the theatres within which the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict was playing out. It is then plausible to deduce
that the location (and by some respects, the concentration) of Israeli
interests in Mombasa (an area at the intersection of the domestic and
international manifestations of the global conflict between the West and
radical Islamist groups) has constituted the Kenyan coastal city into an
attractive spot for terrorist attacks.
Responding to the spectre of terrorism, the Kenyan state has reinforced
Mombasa's status as a bridge between secessionist tensions in the coastal
region and Jihadist campaigns abroad. In this direction, Kenyan officials
have linked MRC to Al Shabaab.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn45> [45] This
strategy has served to de-legitimize and criminalize the grievances of
sections of the population in Mombasa thereby presenting the state with a
basis for going after those individuals it has designated as security
threats. The state's overt response to terrorism in Mombasa has mainly
involved the arrest and indictment of terror suspects: In December, 2011,
Manswab, Grant, Warder Breikh Islam (Grant's wife) and Frank Ngala were
arrested and charged for among others, possessing explosives and preparing
to commit felony;
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn46> [46] nearly two
years later, a Mombasa court charged Swaleh Abdalla for planning to conduct
terror attacks in Kenya. Since 2004, Kenya's Anti-Terrorism Police had been
monitoring his movements after he had allegedly joined Al Shabaab.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn47> [47]
In some cases where suspects have been deemed to be prepared to resist
arrest, the state security apparatus has not hesitated to use lethal force.
In May 2013, Kenyan police killed Khalid Ahmed in an exchange of gunfire at
his mother's house in Mombasa. Ahmed was a Somali national who had undergone
paramilitary training in Somalia before sneaking into Kenya.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn48> [48] Whereas
the state can officially point to the above examples as representative of
its 'rule-of-law' response to terrorism in Mombasa, the sequential
assassination of high profile Muslim clerics against the backdrop of the
attempted criminalization of MRC activities has led sections of the Muslim
population to believe that the state is simultaneously running a covert
counterterrorism programme that entails the targeted liquidation of terror
suspects.
Conclusion
In this article, the author set out to assess the status of Mombasa as a
battleground in Kenya's war on terror. To that effect, the historical,
geo-political and socio-economic factors shaping the area's evolution have
been reviewed. In addition, the author has examined Mombasa's credentials as
a leadership, recruitment, indoctrinational, logistical and operational
centre for Islamist insurgent activity in East Africa and the Horn of Africa
as well as the state's response to the city's emergence as a terrorism focal
area.
Mombasa is restive because it seats at the intersection between
religious/secessionist tensions in the coastal region of Kenya and
contradictions fuelling the global Jihadist campaign. Due to this status,
the area has evolved into a hub for the propagation of radical Islamist
ideals which in some cases, has translated into attacks on targets deemed to
be at variance with these beliefs. In responding to the upsurge in terrorist
attacks in Mombasa, the connection between the domestic and transnational
roots of instability in the city has accorded the Kenyan state the leverage
to partially criminalize and de-legitimize the area's demands for self
determination. With this development, it has since been difficult for the
state to shake off allegations that it is running a covert counterterrorism
programme involving the extra-judicial killing of prominent Muslim clerics
some of whose pronouncements are not only aimed at shaping the political
landscape in neighbouring countries but also inadvertently challenge the
authority of the Kenyan government.
Against this backdrop, the key to stabilizing Mombasa then lies not only in
resolving the contradictions at the heart of uneasy relations between the
coastal region and the Kenyan central government but also ending the global
Jihadist campaign. While it is plausible for the government to address the
former issue, the latter is almost beyond its reach. With regard to the
former, the government could water down Mombasa's secessionist tendencies by
instituting programmes that promote country wide political and
socio-economic inclusiveness. Resolving the contradictions fuelling the
global Jihadist campaign is almost an insurmountable task. For example,
Kenya would have to work with among others, the governments of Somalia,
Mali, Nigeria, Algeria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan to end the conflicts
in those countries.
In relation to the global Jihadist campaign, Kenya has adopted a more
realistic approach of trying to stabilize the political situation of one her
neighbours-Somalia. In 2011, Kenya sent 4,000 troops to Somalia to shore up
the government there.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn49> [49] Although
this move dismantled some of Al Shabaab's insurgent infrastructure, it
backfired by motivating the Somali group to conduct terrorist attacks inside
Kenya to punish the East African country for its regional interventionist
policy.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_edn50> [50] In seeking
to stabilize Mombasa then, Kenya is caught between a rock and a hard place.
If it only chooses to address the domestic dimension to the city's
restiveness, the regional/global one will still serve as a source of
instability in the area. If it opts to address both dimensions (as it is
currently doing), it risks a backlash (as is currently the case).
End Notes
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref1> [1] The
Federal Bureau of Investigation 2003, The War on Terrorism: Remembering the
Losses of KENBOM/TANBOM, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, August.
Available at: <http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2003/august/kenbom_080603>
http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2003/august/kenbom_080603. Accessed on
31/03/2014
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref2> [2] BBC 2002,
'Kenya Terror Strikes Target Israelis,' BBC News, 28th November, 2002.
Available at:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2522207.stm%20%20Accessed%20on%2018/11/20
13> http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2522207.stm Accessed on 18/11/2013
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref3> [3] Brady
Dennis 2014, Interview: On the Ground in Kenya. Part 2: Terror at the
Westgate Mall, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, 10th January. Available
at:
<http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/january/a-conversation-with-our-legal-
attache-in-nairobi-part-2.%20Accessed%20on%2003/02/2014>
http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/january/a-conversation-with-our-legal-a
ttache-in-nairobi-part-2. Accessed on 03/02/2014
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref4> [4] Delany
Max and Straziuso Jason 2010, 'Uganda Bomb Attacks Kill World Cup Fans: Al
Shabaab Suspected In Kampala Explosions,' Huffington Post, 12th July.
Available at:
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/11/uganda-bomb-world-cup_n_642336.htm
l.%20Accessed%20on%2019/01/2012>
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/11/uganda-bomb-world-cup_n_642336.html
. Accessed on 19/01/2012; on the ADF insurgency, see: Terrorism Research and
Analysis Consortium, Uganda's Rising Threat: The Allied Democratic Forces
(ADF), Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium. Available at:
<http://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/ugandas-rising-threat-allied-democ
ratic-forces-adf>
http://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/ugandas-rising-threat-allied-democr
atic-forces-adf. Accessed on 16/05/2014
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref5> [5] The
Westgate Mall attack occurred in Nairobi. See: BBC 2013, 'Nairobi siege: How
the attack happened,' BBC News Africa, 18th October. Available at:
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24189116.%20Accessed%20on%2004/02/20
14> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24189116. Accessed on 04/02/2014;
on terrorist attacks in north eastern Kenya, see: Ombati Cyrus 2011, 'Al
Shabaab launch fresh bomb attack in Mandera,' Standard Digital, 16th March.
Available at:
<http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000031273/al-shabaab-launc
h-fresh-bomb-attack-in-mandera>
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000031273/al-shabaab-launch
-fresh-bomb-attack-in-mandera. Accessed on 16/05/2014
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref6> [6] BBC 2002,
op cit; Correspondent 2013, 'Suspect charged in Mombasa over terror links,'
Capital News, 11th October. Available at:
<http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/10/suspect-charged-in-mombasa-over-ter
ror-links/>
http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/10/suspect-charged-in-mombasa-over-terr
or-links/. Accessed on 16/11/2013; Onsarigo, Calvins 2013, 'Four Terror
Suspects Under Police Radar in Mombasa,' The Star, 26th September. Available
at:
<http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-137377/four-terror-suspects-under-po
lice-radar-mombasa>
http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-137377/four-terror-suspects-under-pol
ice-radar-mombasa. Accessed 16/11/2013
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref7>
[7]Chonghaile, Clar Ni 2012, 'Kenya Coast Secessionists Play on Fear of
Outsiders-The Wabara,' The Guardian, 6th September. Available at:
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/06/kenya-ocean-coast-secessionist
-party.%20Accessed%20on%2018/11/2013>
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/06/kenya-ocean-coast-secessionist-
party. Accessed on 18/11/2013; Nzwili, Frederick 2012, 'Mombasa Riots Deepen
Concern About Religious Tensions in Kenya,' The Christian Science Monitor,
28th August. Available at:
<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2012/0828/Mombasa-riots-deepen-concer
n-about-religious-tensions-in-Kenya.%20Accessed%2016/11/2013>
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2012/0828/Mombasa-riots-deepen-concern
-about-religious-tensions-in-Kenya. Accessed 16/11/2013; Chitwood, Ken 2013,
'Long An Oasis of Christian-Muslim Calm, Kenya May See More Strife,'
Religious News Service, 8th October. Available at:
<http://www.religionnews.com/2013/10/08/long-oasis-christian-muslim-calm-ken
ya-may-see-strife/>
http://www.religionnews.com/2013/10/08/long-oasis-christian-muslim-calm-keny
a-may-see-strife/. Accessed on 16/11/2013
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref8> [8] Nzwili,
Frederick 2012, op cit.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref9> [9]
Chonghaile, Clar Ni 2012, op cit.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref10> [10] Suez
Canal Authority, Canal History. Available at:
<http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/sc.aspx?show=8>
http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/sc.aspx?show=8. Accessed on 28/11/2013
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref11> [11]
Chonghaile, Clar Ni 2012, op cit; Quarshie, Hugh, The Story of Africa: The
Swahili, BBC World Service. Available at:
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/storyofafrica/index_secti
on5.shtml>
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/storyofafrica/index_sectio
n5.shtml. Accessed on 28/11/2013
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref12> [12]
Chonghaile, Clar Ni 2012, op cit; UNESCO, Fort Jesus, Mombasa, World
Heritage List. Available at:
<http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1295.%20Accessed%20on%2014/04/2014>
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1295. Accessed on 14/04/2014
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref13> [13] On the
clash of civilizations, see: Brooks David 2011, 'Huntington's Clash of
Civilizations Revisited,' The New York Times, 3rd March. Available at:
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/opinion/04brooks.html?_r=0>
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/opinion/04brooks.html?_r=0. Accessed on
16/05/2014
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref14>
[14]Quarshie, Hugh, op cit
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref15> [15]
Chitwood, Ken 2013, op cit
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref16>
[16]Chonghaile, Clar Ni 2012, op cit
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref17> [17] Ibid
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref18> [18] Ibid
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref19> [19] On the
clash of civilizations, see: Brooks David 2011, op cit
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref20> [20] On US
support for radical Islamist groups, see: Global Research, Sleeping with the
Devil: How US and Saudi Backing of Al Qaeda Led to 9/11, Global Research,
Center for Research on Globalization. Available at:
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/sleeping-with-the-devil-how-u-s-and-saudi-back
ing-of-al-qaeda-led-to-911/5303313>
http://www.globalresearch.ca/sleeping-with-the-devil-how-u-s-and-saudi-backi
ng-of-al-qaeda-led-to-911/5303313. Accessed on 03/04/2014
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref21> [21] Muskus
Jeff 2011, Osama bin Laden Dead: The Rise, Fall and Legacy of America's Most
Wanted Terrorist, The World Post, 2nd May. Available at:
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-killed-legacy_n_85
6138.html>
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-killed-legacy_n_856
138.html. Accessed on 03/04/2014
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref22> [22] On the
botched up 1992 elections, see: BBC 2014, Algeria Profile, BBC News, March.
Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14118856>
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14118856. Accessed on 31/03/2014; on
the French government's lukewarm response to the 1992 elections, see: Ahmed
Nafeez, Algeria and the Paradox of Democracy: The 1992 Coup, its
Consequences and the Contemporary Crisis, Algeria-Watch. Available at:
<http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/articles/1997_2000/paradox_democracy.htm>
http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/articles/1997_2000/paradox_democracy.htm.
Accessed on 16/05/2014
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref23> [23] On the
GIA insurgency, see: Vriens Lauren 2009, Armed Islamic Group (Algeria,
Islamists), Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, 27th May. Available
at:
<http://www.cfr.org/algeria/armed-islamic-group-algeria-islamists/p9154.%20A
ccessed%20on%2031/03/2014>
http://www.cfr.org/algeria/armed-islamic-group-algeria-islamists/p9154.
Accessed on 31/03/2014
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref24> [24] BBC
2013, 'Mombasa Riots After Kenyan Cleric Ibrahim Omar Killed,' BBC News, 4th
October. Available at:
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24398548.%20Accessed%20on%2016/11/20
13> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24398548. Accessed on 16/11/2013;
Nzwili, Frederick 2012, op cit; Aljazeera 2014, 'Kenyan Muslim cleric shot
dead,' Aljazeera. Available at:
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/04/kenyan-muslim-cleric-shot-dead
-20144117408714193.html.%20Accessed%20on%2009/04/2014>
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/04/kenyan-muslim-cleric-shot-dead-
20144117408714193.html. Accessed on 09/04/2014
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref25> [25] Nzwili,
Frederick 2012, op cit
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref26> [26] BBC
2013, 'Mombasa Riots After Kenyan Cleric Ibrahim Omar Killed,' op cit
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref27> [27] Taylor,
Peter 2013, 'On the Trail of Al Shabaab's Kenyan Recruitment 'Pipeline,' BBC
News, 28th September. Available at:
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-24263357>
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-24263357. Accessed on 16/11/2013.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref28> [28] Ibid
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref29> [29]BBC
2013, 'Mombasa Riots After Kenyan Cleric Ibrahim Omar Killed,' op cit;
Nzwili, Frederick 2012, op cit; Aljazeera 2014, op cit
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref30> [30] Yusuf
Muhammad 2013, 'Former Al Shabaab member to testify against alleged
recruiter,' Voice of America, 31st October. Available at:
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ainst-alleged-recruiter/1780971.html.%20Accessed%2016/11/2013>
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<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
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<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
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s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref34> [34] BBC
2013, 'Mombasa Riots After Kenyan Cleric Ibrahim Omar Killed,' op cit
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref35> [35] Nzwili,
Frederick 2012, op cit.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref36> [36] The
Herald 2013, op cit
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
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News 2013, 'Journal Connects ''White Widow' to Al Shabaab Terror Group,' Fox
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<http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/10/13/journal-connects-britain-white-wido
w-to-al-shabaab-terror-group/>
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-to-al-shabaab-terror-group/. Accessed on 16/11/2013.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref38> [38] Ibid
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref39> [39] Bennet,
James 2002, 'In Kenya, 3 Suicide bombers attack hotel owned by Israelis;
Missiles fired at passenger jet,' The New York Times, 28th November.
Available at:
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/28/international/middleeast/28CND-KENYA.html
.%20Accessed%2018/11/2002>
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/28/international/middleeast/28CND-KENYA.html.
Accessed 18/11/2002
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s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref40> [40] Ibid
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
s-as-a-battleground-in-kenya%E2%80%99s-war-on-terror#_ednref41> [41]
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Maryland. Available at:
<http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=59>
http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=59.
Accessed on 16/05/2014; BBC 2007, 'Who were the Baader-Meinhof Gang?' BBC
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> http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6314559.stm. Accessed on 16/05/2014;
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John 2010, 'Entebbe,' Air Force Magazine, Vol 93 No 12, December. Available
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<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-mombasa%E2%80%99s-credential
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_plan_sources_say.html. Accessed on 23/01/2014
About the Author
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/herman-butime>
http://smallwarsjournal.com/sites/default/files/imagecache/author_photo/imag
efield_default_images/no_photo_0.jpg
Herman Butime <http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/herman-butime>
Herman Butime holds a PhD in Terrorism Studies from the University of
Wollongong in Australia. His thesis examined the relevance of the theories
of guerrilla warfare in explaining the activities of the Lord's Resistance
Army, a Ugandan insurgent group operating in the tri-border region of
Central Africa. He holds an MA in International Relations from the
University of Nottingham in the United Kingdom and a BA in Social Sciences
(Political Science and Sociology) from Makerere University in Uganda.
(image/jpeg attachment: image001.jpg)