Aid and its implications for governance
Khumbo Bonzoe Soko
2014-07-06, Issue <
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/issue/685> 685
Malawi marks 50 years of independence next Monday. But the country is hardly
independent in any meaningful sense. It heavily relies on donor support and
international NGOs. It is these foreigners, not the citizens, who are in
charge of the country's governance
Malawi is one of the most aid dependent countries in the world. In fact it
has been said that 'Malawi receives more aid per capita than the average
developing country in sub-Saharan Africa and other low income countries.'
Malawi is so reliant on official development assistance - as aid is called
in development practice - that up to 40% and 80% of its recurrent and
development budget is financed by donors. Of course most of this would fall
under what is known as bilateral or multilateral aid. When one considers the
work that is done by international NGOs, however, or by them through local
surrogates, it becomes obvious that there is no aspect of life in Malawi
that has escaped the 'benevolence' of the donors. As we approach July 6,
2014, however, 50 years to the day when Malawi became an independent state
it's important to accentuate the discussion on aid in Malawi. And if at all
we will ever want to have some serious debate on the implications of aid for
Malawi, no area will be as important as that of governance. I use the word
governance to mean 'the exercise of political power to manage a nation's
affairs.'
It is difficult, nay impossible, to talk of governance in Malawi without
mentioning or at the very least thinking about donors or development
partners as we euphemistically call them. It is fair to say that donors have
always had a say in how, as a country, we manage our affairs. Long before
Kamuzu Banda's strong grip on power loosened, Malawi had already accepted a
range of pro-market policy prescriptions in exchange for World Bank aid
under the Structural Adjustment Loans. Because of Malawi's geostrategic
significance in the Cold War, however, the politics of the time remained
untouched. Africa Watch, in its 1990 report, 'Where Silence Rules: The
Suppression of Dissent in Malawi', noted for instance that ignoring the
worsening tyranny of Banda, some donors in fact responded by increasing
their aid to Malawi.
Things were to dramatically change, however, after the end of the Cold War
and the resultant loss of Malawi's strategic lure meant that governance
issues in their broadest sense possible could no longer be ignored. In 1992,
all non-humanitarian aid to the country was frozen pending an improvement in
the country's human rights situation. And while there was a confluence of
factors that were ultimately responsible for ending Banda's autocracy, there
is no gainsaying that the aid leverage played a significant role. Thus was
to commence a period of the most- in medical speak-invasive engagement in
governance issues in by donors. This engagement started in earnest in the
management of the transition from the single-party regime to multi-party
politics. For instance, so invested were the donors in the constitutional
making process that Kevin Bampton, who worked as secretary to the Committee
drafting the Malawi Constitution, has remarked that there were times when it
appeared that it was in fact the donors who were in charge. The result,
naturally, was in the words of one scholar 'one of the world's most liberal
[democratic] constitutions.'
To their credit, the donors have not wavered in their commitment to the
Malawi liberal democracy project, the birth pangs of which they had been
privy to in the early 1990s. And so accordingly, not only have they
generously co-funded each and every one of our general elections since 1994
but they have also helped us build, reform and support those institutions
that are vital for the success of the liberal democracy project. The United
Kingdom, for instance poured millions of its taxpayers' money into the
reform of our Police Force, as it was then called and has been key in
sustaining the operations of the Anti-Corruption Bureau. The World Bank has
spent quite a lot in its attempts to help with the reform of the civil
service and it was also instrumental in the establishing the Commercial
Division of the High Court. Of course, as is the nature of aid, its
disbursement has been far from certain. 'Governance concerns', often times
quite legitimate it must be said, have often resulted in suspension of aid
or in the most extreme of cases a demand for repayment of abused donor
funds. This erraticism of aid has naturally had a crippling effect on the
operations of some of these institutions and their ability to effectively
plan their activities.
The occasion of the celebration of 50 years of our independence might be as
a good as an occasion as any to examine the rather unsettling implications
of this state of affairs. It appears to me the most undesirable of
situations to the leave the responsibility of a significant part of our
governance edifice in the hands of other nations. From a practical aspect,
the most obvious concern is one of sustenance. It does not appear
far-fetched in my view to surmise that if donors decided to pull their plug
on all governance-related financial support to Malawi, the liberal
democratic project and its weberian institutions would suffer a cataclysmic
collapse. Alternatively, its sustenance would come at a huge social and
political cost as it would mean diversion of resources from provision of
more basic social services to fund activities such as tripartite elections.
>From a more conceptual viewpoint, however, aid distorts the social contract
between the governors and the governed.
Because such a significant portion of public expenditure is financed by
donors, it has been shown that those who exercise political power in the
aided state will be more beholden to the donors than their own people. In
these states, citizen involvement in governance is often times limited to
general elections. After the winners have been declared and the losers
consoled, the voters will often times be relegated to the periphery while
donors will continue to be at the centre of how political power is used in
management of the affairs of the state. Those who have followed the
government's response to the Cashgate scandal may agree that the response
has mainly been designed with a view to winning back donor support and not
exactly in fulfilment of the government's constitutional obligation to
account to its people for how it exercises power. Accordingly, the lasting
legacy of governance related-aid may be that contrary to the avowed wishes
of its providers, it has had the effect of undermining popular participation
in governance.
As we celebrate the golden jubilee of our independence we will need to ask
ourselves some tough questions. We need to find ways of growing our economy
to such levels that we are able to govern ourselves without outside help. If
this is an impossible pursuit, though it need not be, then we need to ask
ourselves whether our current governance paradigm, with its associated
institutions, is fit for purpose in our circumstances. The alternative to
liberal democracy need not necessarily be a replication of the
authoritarianism of Banda. We can find something more autochthonous.
Something that meets the aspirations of our people without our being
perpetually beholden to donors. I know some will find this proposition
startling. But regardless of our ideological differences, we can at least
agree that organising elections and then asking someone else to fund them
may easily be mistaken for irresponsibility. A debate on whether there is
another way for us should accordingly not be stifled but fully embraced and
encouraged.
* Khumbo Bonzoe Soko is a Malawian lawyer currently studying for a
post-graduate degree at the University of Warwick, Coventry, UK, and is a
regular social and political commentator on Malawi.
Received on Sun Jul 06 2014 - 06:21:36 EDT