Analysis: Understanding organized crime in Africa
By Philippa Garson
........."The work of traffickers . is facilitated by a wide range of
people, which can include business executives, politicians, members of the
security forces and the judiciary, clergymen, traditional leaders and youth"
.......
HIGHLIGHTS
* New tools needed to analyse organized crime
* Criminal financing of state structures
* Weak states open door to crime
* Development-oriented solutions needed
NEW YORK, 3 July 2014 (IRIN) - Growing concern about the extent to which
organized crime is undermining stability and prosperity on the African
continent is galvanizing a search for analytical tools and a clamour for
more research to understand the contextual forces at play and how best to
undermine them.
Whereas debates on organized crime primarily centered on the developed
world, and then on Latin America and Central Asia, the focus has shifted to
Africa. "Where analysts once questioned the relevance of organized crime as
an issue in Africa, it is now increasingly being perceived as a
quintessentially African concern," reads a
<
http://www.globalinitiative.net/unholy-alliances-organized-crime-in-souther
n-africa/> report, Unholy Alliances: Organized Crime in Southern Africa, put
out by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime and Rosa
Luxemburg Stiftung, based on discussions by a panel of experts earlier this
year. The report notes that of the growing number of mentions and
resolutions made by the UN Security Council over the past eight years, 80
percent related to Africa.
Experts at the panel noted that there should be no "finger pointing" at the
continent or its states and that "the most developed states in the world
have roots in corruption and organized crime". Furthermore, when trying to
find solutions, "the role of Western countries and companies as exploiters
and consumers in Africa must sit in the foreground."
The focus on Africa has largely coincided with the accompanying
<
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?hl=en&shva=1#search/tuesday.reitano%40glo
balinitiative.net/146d3e6ec0ab8015?projector=1> realization over the last
decade that not only does organized crime threaten development but that
development-orientated solutions are necessary to combat it.
Organized crime on the continent is part of the "narrative of independence
and statehood" reads the report. The end of the Cold War and reductions in
development aid opened the space for criminal financing of state structures.
Furthermore, "multi-party democracy and the need to finance electoral
processes have presented a particularly vulnerable point for networks to
gain influence and legitimacy."
Growing demand in Asia and the Middle East for both licit and illicit goods
has fuelled trade in Africa. "The burgeoning market for recreational drugs
and wildlife products has caused criminal networks in Africa to grow and
become increasingly professional and militarized. At the same time, demand
for recreational drugs in the Gulf, coupled with instability across North
Africa, has pulled trafficking flows eastwards," reads the report. The rise
in amphetamine use in emerging markets in the Gulf and Asia means that drug
production is no longer confined to specific geographical areas. In southern
Africa, weapons smuggling routes from the liberation wars are now being used
to traffic wildlife products and other illicit goods.
Director of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime Mark
Shaw says beyond a few examples such as the gangs of the Western Cape in
South Africa, or patterns of organized crime in Nigeria, classic definitions
of organized crime do not in his view apply to Africa. "It's not something
you can confine to a box that occurs separately from the state and
commercial institutions. On the continent, organized crime is much more
clearly linked to these institutions."
"Protection economy"
Shaw invokes the notion of a "protection economy" to illustrate how the
various players intersect in countries where the state's capacity is weak.
He identifies three key components that comprise a protection economy:
firstly, provision of violence or "the people with guns" to secure the
movement of contraband, which can vary from elements in the security forces
themselves to militia, to gangs, to private security companies; secondly,
corruption - involving payment to key government officials; thirdly,
criminal investment in the communities themselves to ensure legitimacy and
smooth operation, such as payment to political parties, or financing of
local facilities.
"This is a better way to understand organized crime in a particular context
where the state is weak or unable to offer protection. It allows you to look
at the whole range of state, business, criminal and community actors and
understand how they are interrelated," adds Shaw, who believes that every
major criminal network operating on the continent contains these three
elements in varying degrees. Where the state is particularly weak "the
protection economy is most pronounced," he says.
While the protection economy phenomenon is hardly unique to Africa it is in
evidence in many of its countries. The extent to which the state is involved
varies across the spectrum. Guinea Bissau has seen full state involvement in
the protection economy, while in Mali local players in organized crime have
had links to the state. In Libya, where there are large swathes of
ungoverned territory "protection is sold by private brokers, often with ties
to certain militia."
Where such overlaps between crime, state and politics occur, traditional law
and order responses - such as seizure of contraband and locking up culprits
(usually those at the lower levels) - won't solve the problems, comments
Stephen Ellis, researcher at the <
http://www.ascleiden.nl/> African Studies
Center in Leiden, the Netherlands.
Blurring of frontiers between legitimate and illegitimate enterprise
He cites failed efforts to combat the drug trade in West Africa, as an
example. There is a widespread sense among law and order contingents, he
says, that they cannot adequately address organized crime because "they
don't have the right tools. The nature of the problem has changed but in
ways that are not easy to understand," he adds, noting a blurring of the
frontiers between legitimate and illegitimate enterprise, particularly in
so-called failed or failing states. "The notion of a 'failed state' is not a
term I like," adds Ellis, "because it does not necessarily correspond to
what is happening on the ground." However, it is a useful tool to identify
those countries where the state does not have a monopoly on violence, he
says. According to Foreign Policy's
<
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/2013_failed_states_interac
tive_map> index of 50 failed states, 32 are located in Africa.
"Many people involved in activities that are illegal may have a high level
of legitimacy locally," says Ellis. "They may be people who have played a
formal role in politics, particularly in an era of one-party states."
A recent <
http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/report/> report by the West
African Commission on Drugs notes that "the work of traffickers in the
region is facilitated by a wide range of people, which can include business
executives, politicians, members of the security forces and the judiciary,
clergymen, traditional leaders and youth." Because elections are privately
funded in most parts of this region, they are easily co-opted by drug money.
Examples of the involvement of the state and political actors in organized
crime across the continent abound - from elephant poaching and ivory trade
that implicates <
http://www.bornfreeusa.org/press.php?p=4223&more=1> many
countries, including Zimbabwe, Sudan, DRC, Tanzania, Mozambique; to diamond
mining in Zimbabwe; to the arms deal in South Africa; to rhino horn
trafficking (South Africa and Mozambique); to smuggling, arms and drugs
trafficking in Libya and the Sahel; to trafficking of drugs and logging in
Guinea Bissau; to trafficking of ivory, gold and diamonds in the Central
African Republic. The list goes on.
Shaw believes that the "protection economy" tool allows one to "cost
protection economies and to measure progress against them". According to the
Global Initiative report, "consideration of the protection economy and how
it operates is an analytical tool that prompts the consideration of a
broader spectrum of issues and actors, and thus arguably can increase the
likelihood of improved interventions." One can increase the protection costs
of engaging in organized crime by making the risk of exposure greater
through dogged media investigation, for example, says Shaw, or by helping
communities become more resilient to penetration by crime groups through
successful development initiatives.
A dangerous area for journalists
Investigating organized crime is easier said than done. Research by the
<
http://cpj.org/reports/2012/04/organized-crime-and-corruption.php>
Committee to Protect Journalists shows that 35 percent of all journalists
killed since 1992 were covering organized crime and corruption, often more
dangerous beats for journalists than covering conflict. Furthermore, when
the "the lines between political and criminal groups are blurred in many
nations" the risk for reporters goes up.
According to the CPJ, "criminal groups are operating increasingly like armed
political forces, and armed political groups are operating increasingly as
for-profit, criminal bands. Journalists have been attacked while reporting
on collusion between crime figures and government officials, and they have
been targeted while pursuing crime or corruption stories during times of
both peace and war."
Increasingly, development actors are being forced to engage with the
phenomenon of organized crime as they recognize the extent to which it is
enmeshed in all levels of society and feeds off poor communities, subverting
development agendas. In the Sahel, for example, communities rely on the
proceeds of organized crime, in the same way as those in Somalia came to
depend on the proceeds of piracy, or the villagers in Mozambique on the
money from rhino horn poaching. Without alternatives, poor communities will
continue to be the foot soldiers of organized crime.
A recent Safer World
<
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/812-identifying-approa
ches-and-measuring-impacts-of-programmes-focused-on-transnational-organised-
crime> report, Identifying approaches and measuring impacts of programs
focused on Transnational Organized Crime describes transnational organized
crime (TOC) as fast becoming a key development issue and notes an increase
in developmental approaches to tackling it. "TOC is largely driven by the
demand for illicit goods in rich, developed nations. However, the impacts
are felt most keenly by communities in poorer countries with weak
institutions." According to the report, the "existence of linkages between
the various levels of the system within which TOC operates also suggest that
holistic strategies which draw on different approaches are likely to have a
higher impact."
Received on Thu Jul 03 2014 - 17:50:03 EDT