http://thinkafricapress.com/egypt/generals-turn-old-rival-fight-against-ansar-bayt-al-maqdes-sudan-sinai
Egypt's
Generals turn to an Old Rival in the Fight against Islamist Militancy in
Sinai With violent attacks by Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis showing no signs of
abating, Cairo is looking to Khartoum for a helping hand.
ARTICLE | 26 FEBRUARY 2014 - 1:49PM |
BY TOM STEVENSON
For over two years, the Islamist militant group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM)
has been launching violent attacks against the Egyptian state in North
Sinai. These fighters have been responsible for killing dozens of Egyptians
in coordinated bombings, carrying out a handful of assassination attempts,
and earlier this month demonstrated a possible change in
tactics<
http://thinkafricapress.com/egypt/targeting-tourists-militant-islamists-shift-their-focus>
when
suicide attackers blew up a bus killing three South Korean tourists and the
Egyptian driver.
Despite regular claims to have killed or captured key militants, the
Egyptian government's attempts to quell the violence from this group have
so far proven ineffective. There have been over 300 reported
attacks<
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/02/ansar_jerusalem_releases_video_1.php>
since
last July, and the run of attacks shows no sign of abating.
With insecurity in the Sinai peninsula deteriorating and Cairo looking
short of options, it is little wonder that it has turned to others for help
in tackling the Islamist militancy. However its latest choice of partner
may raise some eyebrows.
When Cairo met Khartoum
At the start of February, according to Al-Sayyid Al-Badawi, head of the
al-Wafd party, an Egyptian delegation returned from a visit to Sudan.
There, the officials had agreed a deal with Khartoum over the deployment of
joint<
http://en.starafrica.com/news/sudan-egypt-agree-joint-border-patrols.html>
military
patrols along the Egyptian-Sudanese border.
Shortly after that meeting, another higher-level
engagement<
http://allafrica.com/stories/201402051394.html> was
arranged with the Sudanese Defence Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein who
flew to Cairo for talks with Field Marshall Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, his
counterpart/Egypt's de facto ruler, and General Sedqi Sobhi,
second-in-command of the Egyptian armed forces.
Such meetings are hardly typical of Cairo's current relationship with
Khartoum. Relations<
http://www.voanews.com/content/egypt-wants-to-fortify-ties-with-sudan/1635618.html>
had
been warm during the presidency of the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi,
with the country's newfound friendship reaching its apogee in September
2012 when Morsi gave a speech to the United Nations
expressing<
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aW7Uq13vimw> support
for President Omar al-Bashir.
But Morsi was toppled in July in a military-led movement. And Egypt's
military establishment has never been particularly genial towards al-Bashir
and has always maintained that the Sudanese president, who has been
indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity,
should stand trial. Egypt's relations with Sudan therefore cooled once more
when Morsi was deposed. The new military-led government soon went about
clamping down on the Brotherhood and eventually designated the group a
terrorist organisation, leading many senior Brotherhood members to try to
flee<
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/12/25/Egypt-former-Prime-Minister-Qandil-arrested.html>
to
Sudan.
Sisi's campaign
In September, a couple of months after Morsi was deposed and Sisi became
Egypt's de facto ruler, the military announced that it was
expanding<
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/7372-egyptian-army-expands-operations-in-sinai>
its
campaign in Sinai in response to ABM's
attempted<
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23971239>assassination
of the Interior Minister Mohammed Ibrahim.
This fit in with Sisi's general approach to Sinai since being appointed
head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in August 2012.
Sisi's predecessor, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, is known to have been against
trying to control Sinai militarily, arguing instead for an informal
arrangement whereby the state gave militant groups leeway in return for
them confining themselves to specific areas and limiting activity. By
contrast, Sisi since taking office has put his own stamp on the
government's policy in Sinai, favouring a much more
aggressive<
http://www.mei.edu/content/aziz-sinai>
approach.
"The Sinai campaign as it is today is very much Sisi's campaign," says
Issandr el-Amrani, the Cairo-based North Africa Project Director for the
International Crisis Group. "Sisi pushed in January 2013 for a more active
campaign, where Egypt now takes advantage of its full military deployment
quota in Sinai and goes directly after the militant groups."
Unfortunately for Sisi, however, the results have thus far have not been
impressive. Although accurate data is difficult to come by, the number of
security forces personnel that have been killed may well be higher than the
number of militants.
Indeed, in response to the September announcement that the military would
step up its campaign in the region, ABM increased its violent activity. On
11 September, suicide bombers
attacked<
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/11/sinai-car-bombing_n_3904806.html>
the
military intelligence building in Rafah and an armoured personnel carrier
at any army checkpoint killing nine soldiers. Next, the group
bombed<
http://article.wn.com/view/2013/12/23/Militant_group_in_Egypts_Sinai_warns_military_k/>
the
el-Tor Security Directorate, attacked the military intelligence facility in
Ismailia, and in November
claimed<
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/11/ansar_jerusalem_clai_3.php>
the
assassination of intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Mabrouk.
By December militants had also killed 16 in an attack on a security
directorate in Mansoura, bombed the Cairo security directorate in Abdeen,
andassassinated<
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/28/egypt-interior-minister-aide-shot-dead>
senior
Interior Ministry official Mohamed Said. On 25 January, the Islamist
militants used a SA-18 surface-to-air missile to take down an army
helicopter<
http://world.time.com/2014/01/27/missile-attack-in-sinai-spell-trouble-for-israeli-airliners/>,
killing five. And now it seems that it may have adopted a new tactic of
also targeting tourists.
My enemy's enemy
It is in the face of this inability to stem to violence that Cairo has
called on Khartoum for help. Part of the problem with a military campaign
against Sinai militancy is that the groups involved often don't have
traditional hierarchical command structures and are highly adept at
concealing their plans and communications. ABM, for example, doesn't have a
clearly defined organisational structure, and intelligence is not even
confident on basic facts about the group - estimates as to its size vary
from 500 to 5,000 members. Meanwhile the insurgency is not confined to just
one group - ABM appears to be the most active, but the likes of al-Salafiya
al-Jihadiya, the Mujahideen Shura Council, al-Tawhid Wal Jihad, Ansar al
Jihad, and the Egypt Free Army also operate in Sinai.
However, amidst all the uncertainty, one thing about the militants in Sinai
is relatively well-accepted, which is that the militants get at least some
of their arms from local Bedouin smuggling gangs. These groups are believed
to run weapons from Sudan through routes running along the Red Sea, before
passing through the Suez towns or across the Gulf of Suez in small boats.
Egyptian intelligence has been particularly concerned by this flow of
weapons since the downing of one of its helicopter with a surface-to-air
missile.
Military or military border guards are meant to control the roads along
these routes, but shipments still appear to be slipping through. One
explanation is that the smugglers are highly skilled at avoiding main roads
and border guards; another is that the security forces - those supplied by
the state as well as by private oil and gas companies in the region - are
drawn from local Bedouin communities and have ties with the smugglers.
These gangs are also known to engage in the trafficking of humans,
particularly of Eritrean refugees who they torture and hold for ransom. But
so far, pressure from international human rights organisations on Egypt and
Sudan to coordinate and crackdown on traffickers has largely been
unsuccessful, partly perhaps because of the two country's ongoing
disagreements over issues such as the Renaissance Dam project and the
Hala'ib Triangle border.
However, with insecurity in Sinai growing, this reluctance to combine
forces now seems to be waning. Whether increased co-operation in tackling
arms smugglers will lead to closer diplomatic ties between Egypt and Sudan
remains to be seen, but with attack after attack undermining Sisi's control
of the Egyptian state, he is hoping he can find a friend in an old rival.
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Received on Sat Mar 01 2014 - 13:13:38 EST