Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 17:07:08 +0100
Somali military has more problems than lack of guns
- By Mohamed Mubarak
Posted on
<http://africanarguments.org/2014/02/26/somali-military-has-more-problems-th
an-lack-of-guns-by-mohamed-mubarak/> February 26, 2014
Last week, a leaked UN report detailed a "systematic" proliferation of arms
by the Somali government. However, the UN Security Council is expected to
extend the easing of arms sanctions on the government.
This means the government of Somalia will be allowed to import light weapons
to assist it with improving security across areas under its control. While
this is not a bad thing in principle, it becomes more problematic once you
have considered the bigger picture.
Somalia has no real military
Somalia's current military was first reformed by the Transitional National
Government (TNG) in the year 2000, and again from 2004 by the Transitional
Federal Government. In the first instance, the TNG recruited freelance
gunmen and members of Siyad Barre's military. However, few of those went on
to join the TFG military formed in Jowhar in 2004.
The first TFG military brigades were made up of the old Siyad Barre
military, Puntland militias and clan militias from the Jowhar area; when the
TFG moved to Baidoa in 2005, some clan militias from the Bay region joined
the TFG military. In late 2006, Ethiopian troops took Mogadishu, and behind
them came the TFG military.
>From 2007, the ruthless militias that were led by Mogadishu's warlords
joined the TFG military and police. Some clan militias also joined, so as to
protect their interests - this is a common practice of such militias across
Somalia.
However, clans from central Somalia were largely unrepresented in the TFG
military during the Ethiopian occupation because they had vested interests
in the insurgency fighting the occupation. This changed when the Ethiopians
withdrew in January 2009.
>From January 2009, clan-based militias in the insurgency joined the TFG
military, including a huge contingent led by a former Jubba Valley Alliance
leader, Goobaale. These JVA fighters were from Galgadud in central Somalia,
but had been stationed in Kismayo during the JVA days, and had fought in
Mogadishu against other warlord militias in 2006; they later joined the
reformed Islamic Courts Union in mid-2006. You have probably heard of the
Somali army's 3rd Brigade led by General Gobale: these are almost
exclusively from Galgadud region and from one sub-clan in that region.
This meant that now the TFG military had a large representation of almost
all major clans in southern Somalia. But that is exactly the problem:
minority and large clans that were not well armed were less represented in
the TFG military (in the beginning you had to bring your own gun to join the
force, meaning that unarmed people remained exactly that). This void was
filled by Al-Shabab, which took to arming and empowering clans that were
ignored by the then-TFG.
Clan tensions started almost immediately after the TFG regained most of the
Lower Shabelle region by the end of 2012. By mid-2013, there was an almost
full blown war in Lower Shabelle region between the locals and the Somali
army: the 3rd Brigade faced off with local clan fighters in and out of the
Somali army, leading to the eventual
<http://africanarguments.org/2014/02/26/somali-military-has-more-problems-th
an-lack-of-guns-by-mohamed-mubarak/>
withdrawalhttp://cdncache1-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png of
said brigade from many parts of the region.
Middle Shabelle is no different: the Somali army there has been involved in
battles against local Bantu gunmen from early 2013. Reports from that region
detailed horrific atrocities committed by the army, although these cannot
currently be confirmed. However, what can is that for most of 2013,
travellers who didn't want to get raped or robbed avoided the Somali army in
Middle Shabelle.
In today's Somali army, clan loyalties trump national identity; without this
being rectified by rehabilitating and decommissioning clan militias,
continuing to arm the Somali army is akin to fuelling clan wars.
Military ranks given out for political reasons
Since the TNG days, the transitional governments of Somalia have given
military honours to clan and warlord militia commanders simply to appease
said groups. This has resulted in an army of semi-literate officers at every
level: from the veteran warlord Indha Adde promoted to General from nothing
by Sheikh Sharif in 2010, to former ICU foot soldiers promoted to Captains
and Majors from 2009.
These untrained officers are "leading" Somalia's military to defeat after
defeat - it is still a fact that the Somali army cannot plan and
successfully attack the remaining Al-Shabaab by itself. AMISOM has to lead
and clear the way.
Moreover, these officers oversee perhaps one of the largest self-sabotage
operations any military has done to itself in the recent past: the selling
of weapons to arms traders who resell them to customers that include
Al-Shabaab.
Government arms sold
The sad fact is that the Somali government is too weak and disorganised to
manage and account for the weapons it already possesses, let alone future
shipments of weapons.
Officially, the Somali government does not allow the buying and selling of
weapons, but there is a sprawling black market for arms in Mogadishu. One
can buy anything from pistols to machine guns and hand grenades in
Mogadishu's arms market. You can even have your newly acquired weapon tested
- by none other than uniformed government police or army personnel; because
they are the only ones allowed to carry arms and shoot in Mogadishu.
According to knowledgeable sources, heavy calibre guns such as the ZU-series
anti-aircraft gun - provided by clan militias that have been armed by the
government - are also available for buyers who can afford to pay up to a
hundred thousand dollars.
Ironically, the government will register your weapon for you and allow you
to maintain a small army - but as explained above, not allow you to legally
purchase it. This fact only encourages the continuation of the arms black
market.
Without stopping the continuation of arms sales by uniformed government
troops, the Somali government should not be allowed to continue importing
arms.
Most of all, there needs to be
<http://africanarguments.org/2014/02/26/somali-military-has-more-problems-th
an-lack-of-guns-by-mohamed-mubarak/>
investmenthttp://cdncache1-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png in
the quality of the Somali army before continuing to pile arms into it. With
an army that can barely fight on its own without heavy assistance from
friendly foreign troops, the Somali government has more to worry about than
where to buy cheap guns.
Mohamed Mubarak, a political and security analyst, is the founder of
anti-corruption NGO Marqaati (Marqaati.org), based in Mogadishu
_at_somalianalyst
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