Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 19:54:01 +0100
South Sudan's Uncertain Future: first end Ugandan military support for Kiir
- By Atieno Oduor
Posted on
<http://africanarguments.org/2014/02/24/south-sudans-uncertain-future-first-
end-ugandan-military-support-for-kiir-by-atieno-oduor/> February 25, 2014
As the IGAD led mediation talks resume in Addis Ababa, South Sudan's
political future looks uncertain. Despite the signing of a ceasefire,
fighting continues in three of the most volatile and strategic states.
International Crisis Group and the UN estimates that the violence has
claimed at least 10,000 civilians and left more than 800,000 displaced since
mid-December.
Two months into the crisis, neither diplomatic pressure nor mediation talks
have had an impact in restraining the warring parties. Rather than strive
for a political solution, the government of South Sudan seems to have made
the calculation that a military advantage over the rebels and a political
purge of dissenters from within the party is the best solution for resolving
the conflict.
As a precondition for ending the fighting, rebels have demanded a
<http://africanarguments.org/2014/02/24/south-sudans-uncertain-future-first-
end-ugandan-military-support-for-kiir-by-atieno-oduor/>
withdrawalhttp://cdncache1-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png of
foreign military forces siding with the government and the release of four
remaining political detainees, amongst them, the SPLM's former Secretary
General. Meanwhile, South Sudan's President Salva Kiir has taken a defiant
stance against the opposition mediators, responding by affirming foreign
military presence, laying treason charges on senior SPLM officials he
accused of orchestrating an alleged coup and unilaterally terminating their
membership from the ruling party - this included publicly announcing their
positions as vacant.
As things stand, the mediation talks are a mere side show of political
posturing. Neither side has the urgency and will to commit to a genuine
mutual solution. The most likely scenario is of a protracted and sporadic
armed conflict, mass killings along ethnic lines and displacements as rebel
groups fight to exert control and recapture lost territory. It is
foreseeable that territorial control will change hands many times between
Government and rebel forces.
The unfortunate consequence of this will be that much time and resource will
have been spent trying to squash rebels at the expense of nation building
and reconciliation. While South Sudan's Government has relied on foreign
troops to quell rebel forces and protect strategic infrastructure, it has
been unable to protect and feed its own civilians.
That South Sudan's political landscape allows for no public criticism
implies the existence of discontented citizens lacking alternative platforms
to vent their frustrations - this is likely to lead to increased
mobilization, militarization and wider conflict. Even worse, the SPLA is
unable to control fractures within its military and police force. In short,
South Sudan has entered a dangerous phase of uncertainty and instability
that poses severe risk to its citizens and neighbours.
With the worsening humanitarian situation, it is imperative to speed up the
peace talks by providing leverage for political commitment to the resolution
of the conflict. The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement between Southern Sudan and
Sudan and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 are practical examples
of previous political commitment to the resolution of conflict in which
South Sudanese politicians participated.
Uncertainty about the objectivity of the IGAD mediation and its lack of a
cohesive voice is arguably the most serious obstacle hampering positive
mediation outcomes. One of the points blocking progress thus far has been
the demand for the withdrawal of Ugandan forces by the rebels, Ethiopia, and
the United States. Uganda, an influential member of the regional grouping,
intervened militarily by deploying its army to prop up Kiir's embattled
Government. Ethiopia, also an influential IGAD member currently hosting the
mediation talks in Addis Ababa, has publicly echoed calls by the rebel group
for Uganda to withdraw its forces. Meanwhile, Uganda maintains its troops
will remain in South Sudan for as long as they are needed by Kiir's
Government. With the regional body taking two opposing stances - it is
highly unlikely that a divided IGAD will be able to
<http://africanarguments.org/2014/02/24/south-sudans-uncertain-future-first-
end-ugandan-military-support-for-kiir-by-atieno-oduor/>
brokerhttp://cdncache1-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png a
promising negotiated settlement.
Given South Sudan's ongoing tensions with Sudan - which to a large extent
distracted attention from the country's internal leadership squabbles, and,
Khartoum and Uganda's history of proxy war, Uganda's over engagement in
South Sudan's domestic politics could be a precursor for renewed conflict
with Khartoum. Second, as long as Kiir enjoys military support from Uganda,
it is unlikely that he will engage meaningfully in the mediation talks.
President Museveni's strong alliance with the current order jeopardizes a
long term political solution at the expense of short term illusive stability
that seeks to shore up an embattled leader in Salva Kiir. At the same time,
it is reinforcing regional rivalries and political rigidities that fomented
the conflict in the first place in a country where the culture of violence
is endemic.
As the international community weighs options for successful mediation in
South Sudan, there will be three key critical points to consider:
First, more pressure from all quarters should be brought to bear on Uganda
to limit its selective military engagement in South Sudan and to withdraw
its armed forces altogether. A number of countries - amongst them the
Troika (the US, UK and Norway) - all of which were instrumental in
negotiating the CPA, are increasingly voicing concerns over Uganda's
counter-productive intervention and have publicly urged for its troops
withdrawal. If there is a need for military reinforcement, then it should
be from a neutral force, and there is already the United Nations Mission for
South Sudan (UNMISS) that could act as a neutral
<http://africanarguments.org/2014/02/24/south-sudans-uncertain-future-first-
end-ugandan-military-support-for-kiir-by-atieno-oduor/>
brokerhttp://cdncache1-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png.
Second, IGAD will need to speak with one voice if there is to be an impact
in compelling the key disputants to commit to a long term political
solution. In particular, Ethiopia and Kenya should take the lead and play
complimentary roles since both have had a positive historical stake towards
South Sudan. Apart from hosting the current mediations, Ethiopia hosted the
1972 Addis Ababa talks which ended the first civil war between Sudan
government and Southern Sudan rebel movement through the signing of the
Addis Ababa Agreement.
Kenya, on the other hand, hosted and brokered the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement in 2005 which ended the second civil war and ushered in Southern
Sudan as a semi-autonomous self governing entity. By taking in 7 of the 11
political detainees from South Sudan and releasing them to attend
mediation talks in Addis, Kenya has shown it is a neutral, reliable and
impartial mediator, who can be trusted by both sides. In the long term
both Kenya and Ethiopia are well placed in ensuring the objectives of the
CPA and current mediation are fulfilled.
Third, although South Sudan is scheduled to have elections in 2015, pressure
should not be simply be around elections. While important, elections tend to
obscure the difficult task of state building which is less eventful and is
itself a painstaking process requiring long term commitment. Elections are
rarely the solution when national goals are not supported by (at a minimum)
functioning complimentary political and military structures. One major
reason Kenya flared up after its 2007 election was the opposition's lack of
confidence in the judiciary. While at least judicial institutions were
functioning in Kenya (albeit without independence), for South Sudan the
judiciary is a non-starter without even the capacity to try treason charges.
Furthermore, its prosecution model is centralized, yet the political system
is decentralized, meaning there are no prosecutors at the county level to
independently carry out prosecutions. Overall, the Judiciary in South Sudan
has little functional capacity to adjudicate political disputes.
South Sudan's military and police are also in urgent need of reform. If the
goal is to promote political stability and accountability, then beyond
elections, efforts should be directed at establishing a framework that
prioritizes; reconciliation, harmonization and restructuring of South
Sudan's state structures. Just like Kenya in 2008 where the Kofi Annan
mediation and international experts were instrumental in helping Kenya
restructure its state institutions, similarly, South Sudan will need
international expertise to engineer and balance its restructuring process.
This is a disguised form of trusteeship.
Since South Sudan's future hinges on transforming the existing political
order and diffusing current political tension, ideally the best option would
be for neither Salva Kiir nor Riek Machar to contest the next elections. A
prosperous and peaceful South Sudan is feasible, but this will not happen
organically, and with political will lacking, it is up to the international
community, South Sudanese, Friends of South Sudan, together with its civil
society, local faith groups and diaspora to up continuous pressure for this
to be realized.
Atieno Oduor worked in South Sudan implementing governance programs. She is
currently based in DC working as an Independent Governance Consultant.
<http://africanarguments.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/M7Kiir.jpg> M7Kiir
President Museveni's strong alliance with the current order jeopardizes a
long term political solution at the expense of short term illusive
stability.
(image/png attachment: image005.png)
(image/jpeg attachment: image006.jpg)