

South Sudan: Jonglei – “We Have Always Been at War”

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Executive Summary

Jonglei state's combustible mix of armed political opposition, violent ethnic militias and dysfunctional political system were part of the tinder that led to the eruption of the civil war in South Sudan in late December 2013. Despite eleven months of peace talks, mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the war threatens to reintensify in the coming weeks. The negotiations do not reflect the diversity of armed groups and interests in South Sudan and the region, most of which are nominally allied with either President Salva Kiir's government or former Vice President Riek Machar's Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO). The constellation of regional and South Sudanese armed groups in Jonglei is emblematic of the regional, national and local challenges to peace and the pattern of a war that cannot be resolved by engaging only two of the nearly two-dozen armed groups in the country and ignoring those that have not yet engaged in the fight.

These armed groups' *casus belli* are often different from those of Kiir and Machar, and many do not support the peace process, creating a chaotic environment on the ground. Most of these groups are not fighting for control of the government in Juba and some of their conflicts are best resolved at the state or local level. Yet if they are ignored the main protagonists will use these groups to continue the fight and derail national peace efforts.

This round of fighting in Jonglei represents more continuity than change with past decades, and its deep roots are similar to those across the country. Much of the state is now under the control of the SPLM/A-IO and the Murle South Sudan Democratic Army-Cobra Faction (SSDA-CF), which has made a peace deal with the government but the majority of whose fighters are not integrated into the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA), while the SPLA and the Ugandan army, the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF), secure the government's control over the rest.

No one's territory is stable, civilians are displaced and starving and a return to fighting is all but guaranteed. The trajectory of the war in Jonglei demonstrates the dangers of limiting IGAD's peace process to only the government and SPLM/A-IO. The uneasy status quo in Jonglei is unlikely to last; the peace deal between the government and SSDA-CF is in danger while the local peace deal between the Murle and the opposition-affiliated Lou Nuer grows stronger. Jonglei illustrates the nationwide trend of fragmentation of armed groups, alliance formation at the local level and the potential for the war to get much worse during the upcoming fighting season.

Crisis Group's prior recommendations about the need for more inclusive talks focused on 1) Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) reform (now supported by Tanzania's ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party); 2) a reactivated Political Parties Forum; 3) engaging with armed groups beyond the SPLA and SPLA-IO; and 4) more attention to intercommunal all remain relevant to ending the war. By looking at the war in Jonglei, this report explains the importance of the third and fourth recommendations. IGAD's emphasis on brokering a deal between Kiir and Machar neglects the diversity of armed interests and may lead to a peace deal that enjoys little support on the ground. While the government has the upper hand militarily, increasing repression in Juba, interminable rebellion in the bush and cities of Greater Upper Nile and continuing regional interference point to a turbulent future.

In addition to the peace talks in Ethiopia, political work is needed on the ground not only to end the war, but to create a sustainable peace. To improve the prospects of an agreement that leads to peace on the ground, IGAD could consider a number of factors:

- ❑ The vast majority of the political work toward a sustainable peace will need to be done inside South Sudan. IGAD could reinforce its political presence there in addition to its monitoring and verification teams.
- ❑ Monitoring and verification teams could become more responsive to ongoing violations and increase monitoring in areas not yet in conflict but that remain at risk.
- ❑ Building upon the political consultations undertaken by the government and SPLM/A-IO, encouraging dialogue in strategic areas within and between key communities will better link the talks with the evolving political situation on the ground.
- ❑ Sustainable peace at the local level is distinct from the alliances of convenience that constitute much of the government and SPLM/A-IO coalitions. Unpacking different groups’ motivations will enable a more coherent approach toward which matters should be included in the IGAD talks, which require local-level processes, and how best to link the two so they are mutually reinforcing rather than mutually undermining.
- ❑ The multiplicity of armed groups and their independent nature suggests that far more effort should be dedicated to discussions about transitional security arrangements that go beyond the government and SPL/A-IO.
- ❑ The 2010 elections in South Sudan took place in a restrictive political climate and led to conflict. Elections should be part of a long-term national political process, not an outcome or objective on their own.
- ❑ Outsiders have had little success in mediating south-south conflict over decades and the most transformative southern peace agreements have been led by South Sudanese. Religious and traditional leaders are influential, relatively independent of military leaders and important barometers of communities’ willingness and ability to implement agreements.
- ❑ Abuses against civilians in South Sudan lead to rebellion and communal obligations to revenge. IGAD could carefully consider how transitional justice and accountability can reinforce the peace process and encourage the parties to halt abusive practices to prevent further escalation.

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South Sudan: Jonglei – “We Have Always Been at War”

I. Introduction

In the years before South Sudan’s civil war, violent deaths from often overlapping armed rebellions and intra and intercommunal violence in Jonglei were already at “wartime levels”.¹ Lacking effective civilian governance, service delivery and security, Jonglei was a hotbed of violent state- and national-level power struggles. Intercommunal conflict increased in 2009 and reached its pre-war apex in 2011. The 2010 elections and 2012 disarmament campaign sparked armed rebellions, but the state’s conflicts have always been intertwined and driven by a complex set of political, communal and personal motivations. Force has long been the preferred governance tool, with the largest armed group, the SPLA, widely believed to be in the service of the Greater Bor Dinka, while the large and militarily strong Lou Nuer and Murle have felt marginalised in Jonglei state.² The Greater Bor Dinka occupy Bor South, Twic East and Duk counties; Lou Nuer are in Nyrol, Uror and Akobo; Dinka Padang in Pigi; Gawaar Nuer in Ayod; Anuyak in Pochalla; and Murle (and smaller Jiye and Kachipo) occupy the sizeable Pibor county.

The trajectory of the civil war in Jonglei reflects the bifurcated nature of the pre-war political landscape in South Sudan. This includes the multiplicity of armed opposition groups and related ethnic militias, many of which were already embroiled in conflicts when the national war broke out. Decades of competition between the Greater Bor Dinka and Greater Bahr el Ghazal Dinka (President Kiir’s home area) for prominence within the SPLM/A again came to the fore as the SPLM unravelled in late December 2013.³ The steady transfer of power away from Greater Bor Dinka and toward Bahr el Ghazal Dinka has accelerated since the onset of war as many view the former’s loyalties divided between the government and the SPLM Detainees.⁴ Vast areas of Jonglei are under the control of armed groups: the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) and the South Sudan Demo-

¹ “South Sudan: Murder Rates at Wartime Levels in Jonglei”, South Sudan Law Society, 21 September 2013.

² The Twic, Nyaraweng, Ghol and Bor Dinka ethnic communities are part of “Greater Bor” – which comprises the counties of Bor South, Twic East and Duk. Simon Harragin, “Background paper for Bor, Twic, Ghol and Nyaraweng Dinka”, Jonglei State – Strengthening Conflict Mitigation & Peacebuilding Conference, Nairobi, 19-21 March 2012, p. 1. Bor is the capital of Jonglei state.

³ For more about the SPLM’s unravelling, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°217, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, 10 April 2014, p. 1-5.

⁴ The SPLM Detainees include the suspended SPLM secretary general, Pagan Amum Okech, and several former ministers, Oyay Deng Ajak (investment and regional cooperation as well as former SPLA chief of general staff); Gier Choung Aloung (internal affairs); Majak D’Agoot (deputy defence); John Luk Jok (justice); Cirino Hiteng (culture); Deng Alor Koul (foreign affairs); Madut Biar (telecommunications); and Kosti Manibe (finance); as well as the former ambassador to the U.S., Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth, and Lakes state Governor Chol Tong Mayay.

cratic Movement/Army-Cobra Faction (SSDM/A-CF), which entered into a peace deal with the government.

Formal and informal peace deals, secured since the war’s outset, and deployments by the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) have reduced fighting in Jonglei in recent months. Yet, challenges facing the peace agreement between the government and SSDM-CF and the end of the rainy season lull in fighting threaten to return Jonglei to full-scale conflict.

II. Jonglei’s Conflicts Before the Civil War

The era of peace in Sudan ushered in by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) never truly reached Jonglei, where a series of political and communal conflicts, aided and abetted by external actors, continued after independence.⁵ These conflicts, frequently misunderstood, were part of the violent political contestation for control of the new nation. This violence contributed to the outbreak of civil war and understanding its nature will be critical to more effective efforts at securing a peaceful resolution of this conflict.

A. *Perpetual Armed Rebellion*

The 2010 national elections destabilised the state, long dominated by armed actors.⁶ In Jonglei, Lieutenant General George Athor, a Dinka from Pigi county,⁷ sought and failed to receive the SPLM gubernatorial nomination and contested as an independent. Amid voter intimidation and irregularities, he lost and launched a rebellion. Similarly, David Yau Yau, a Murle, sought to run as an SPLM candidate for a Jonglei state parliamentary seat but did not receive the nomination. Upon losing as an independent he took up arms in Pibor county.⁸

Athor, a long-serving, respected and senior SPLA officer formed the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) and was able to, at least nominally, lead a coalition of armed groups across the country that included disaffected Lou Nuer youth, establishing a tenuous multi-ethnic coalition.⁹ There was sporadic fighting and the SSDM/A captured areas of New Fangak and Pigi. Following this many Lou Nuer returned home, weakening the SSDM/A, and turned their newly acquired weapons against the Murle. In response, the SPLA launched “Operation Buffalo”,¹⁰ and, as fighting shifted to Ayod county, it sought to deny Athor’s men and his home community in Pigi county access to food, water and humanitarian aid, including by instituting “no-fly zones”.¹¹

⁵ Crisis Group Report N°217, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, op. cit., p. 3.

⁶ The 2010 elections were held under the auspices of the CPA and were national elections in Sudan and for the regional Government of Southern Sudan.

⁷ Pigi is alternatively called Canal and Khorflus. The name of the county has produced local conflict for years.

⁸ Many believe he was supported by Sultan Ishmael Konyi, a senior Murle leader and former Jonglei governor. Crisis Group Africa Report N°172, *Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan*, 4 April 2011, p. 3.

⁹ “Athor reputedly issued his soldiers with two guns apiece, one for personal use and one to be sent to their family, because he knew that protection of the family and cattle was the primary reason they had joined his army”. John Young, *The Fate of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process* (London, 2012), p. 310.

¹⁰ There are also reports the SPLA ambushed Athor in the presence of church mediators. Ibid, p. 311; “Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile”, Small Arms Survey, Sudan Issue Brief no. 18, November 2011.

¹¹ While UNMISS complied with the “no-fly zones”, after a period humanitarians began to operate in the area again despite UNMISS’ objections. The government and Athor signed a ceasefire agreement in early 2011 to ensure the referendum on independence could take place but conflict resumed soon after. Ceasefire Framework Agreement between the SPLA and Lieutenant General George Athor’s Forces, Malakal, Upper Nile State, Southern Sudan, 5 January 2011 (hard copy on file with Crisis Group); “Arms and Ammunition Seized from George Athor’s Forces”, Small Arms Survey, Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), November 2011; “Fighting for Spoils”, op. cit.

Throughout the fighting there were allegations of atrocities against civilians, including targeted rape.¹² Athor was killed on 19 December 2011.¹³ On Christmas Eve 2011, SPLA soldiers killed worshipers from a community associated with Athor inside a church. Violence against civilians in places of worship is a persistent feature of the ongoing civil war.¹⁴ Following his death, Athor’s rebellion quickly petered out, but its legacy can be seen in his community’s response to the current war (see Section III.B).

Yau Yau’s rebellion was of far less concern to national-level officials; it only impacted Murle areas and did not receive widespread support. Following months of low-intensity conflict, he accepted amnesty in June 2011 and he and his forces began an unsuccessful integration into the SPLA.¹⁵

B. *The Politics of Intercommunal Conflict*

1. The communal is political

Intercommunal conflict is widely, but erroneously, believed to be separate from political conflict in Jonglei. For nearly two centuries, Jonglei’s three largest groups – the Dinka, Nuer and Murle – have raided cattle, women and children from one another as well as been involved in political conflict.¹⁶ The 1991 split in the SPLM/A between SPLM/A Chairman Dr John Garang and a group led by Dr Riek Machar led to a dramatic rise in political and communal violence, corresponding with an increase in

¹² “Report of the Secretary General on Conflict Related Sexual Violence”, S/2012/33, 13 January 2012, para. 46-7, 49; John Young, *The Fate of Sudan* op. cit., p. 311.

¹³ The SPLA said he was killed in an ambush in Central Equatoria while his men and family asserted that he was killed in Uganda with Kampala’s complicity and his body brought back to South Sudan. South Sudan television showed Athor with a bullet wound in the forehead. Concerns about the security of opposition leaders’ families, as well as Nuer civilians in Uganda, continue to be raised in the wake of the alleged Nuer disappearances in 2014. Crisis Group analyst observations in another capacity, Juba, December 2011, January 2012; Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Juba, April 2014; South Sudanese refugees, Uganda, March-June 2014; John Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, op. cit., pp. 318-320.

¹⁴ This came after heightened tensions surrounding Athor’s burial, including reported violence against his family for visibly mourning his death. The SPLA says the attack was sparked by the killing of a soldier. It promised an investigation, but the culprits have never been identified. The SPLA says four civilians were killed but witnesses and local leaders say the number is much higher. SPLA spokesman Phillip Aguer told news agencies the incident was “unfortunate”. Crisis Group analyst interviews in another capacity, SPLA officers involved in “Operation Buffalo” and witnesses, Juba, December 2011, March 2012. “SPLA kill church goers in Jonglei, Pibor attacked”, Sudan Tribune (www.sudantribune.com), 26 December 2011; “S. Sudan army ‘accidentally shot’ Christmas worshippers”, Agence France-Presse, 27 December 2011.

¹⁵ Even many Murle who did not support SPLM candidate Judi Jonglei Bioris, thought Yau Yau was too young and too “impatient” to have a senior position. “David Yau Yau’s Rebellion”, Small Arms Survey, HSBA for Sudan and South Sudan, 17 December 2012.

¹⁶ The Nuer expansion into what is now Jonglei began in earnest in the early nineteenth century, and displaced other ethnic communities. A similar Murle migration west toward the Nile was also ongoing. See Douglas H. Johnson, *Nuer Prophets: A History of Prophecy from the Upper Nile in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Oxford, 1994); Gabriel Giet Jal, *History of South Sudan’s Jikany Nuer Ethnic Group 1500-1920* (Nairobi, 2013); Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars* (Oxford, 2003); and Jon Arensen and Richard Lyth, *Chasing the Rain: An African’s Quest for God* (Kijabe, 2011).

modern weapons.¹⁷ Cattle raiding and violence against civilians stem from unresolved grievances and the need to “revenge”, lack of services and political representation, concentration of cattle in the hands of the politically connected elite, lack of civilian governance structures and suspicion of government.¹⁸ Raiding is intimately tied into social norms, masculine ideals and the need to accumulate cattle to marry.¹⁹ Local intercommunal conflict is often part and parcel of national political contestation and supported by politicians.²⁰

Fighting can be accompanied by devastating violence against civilians, specifically murder, sexual violence and abduction of women and children.²¹ In the past decade, thousands of women and children were abducted; yet, despite nine years of UN human rights presence, there has been little international monitoring.²² The practice of raiding and counter-raiding for women and children creates a widely accepted need to “replace” women and children killed or abducted.²³ Women often encourage this through support for raids, singing songs of praise for the warriors and preparing

¹⁷ Crisis Group Report, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, op. cit., p. 5. Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, *Nuer Dilemmas: Coping With Money, War and the State* (Berkeley, 1996); Jok Madut Jok and Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, “Sudan’s Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities”, *African Studies Review*, vol. 42, no. 2 (September 1999).

¹⁸ Crisis Group analyst interviews in another capacity, politicians, traditional leaders, youth warriors and women leaders, Akobo, Bor, Pibor, August 2012. Ingrid Marie Breidlid and Michael J. Arensen, “Anyone Who Can Carry a Gun Can Go’: The Role of the White Army in the Current Conflict in South Sudan”, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2014; “Challenges of Accountability: An Assessment of Dispute Resolution Processes in Rural South Sudan”, Pact and South Sudan Law Society, March 2013.

¹⁹ Crisis Group interviews, White Army members from Urur, Bor, November 2013; Ingrid Marie Breidlid and Michael J. Arensen, op. cit., p. 4.

²⁰ “Kiir says politicians ignited South Sudan inter-tribal clashes”, Sudan Tribune, 13 April 2009; “Kiir condemns South Sudan politicians and Khartoum for Jonglei violence”, Sudan Tribune, 5 January 2012; Crisis Group interviews, members of parliament, Juba, November 2013.

²¹ “South Sudan’s Hidden Crisis: How Violence Against Civilians is Devastating Communities and Preventing Access to Life-Saving Healthcare in Jonglei”, Médecins sans frontières, November 2012, pp. 8-11, 13-14.

²² For example, Jonglei state officials stated that 208 children were abducted in Pieri payam in August 2011, 1,293 in Pibor county from December 2011 to January 2012, and six in Twic East county in October 2013. Some organisations operate family tracing and reunification projects but this requires women and children to be permitted to return. Threats against women for seeking to return are great and they are unlikely to request it unless international organisations are able to provide them security. “Lou-Nuer armed youth enter Pibor town”, Sudan Tribune, 31 December 2011; “Accounts emerge in South Sudan of 3,000 deaths in ethnic violence”, *The New York Times*, 5 January 2012; “Over 40 people killed in Twic East”, Gurtong (www.gurtong.net), 21 October 2013.

²³ With a few notable exceptions this is also due to the failure of the government to secure the return of abducted women and girls. The most concerted effort followed the 2012 All Jonglei Peace Conference, but even then the numbers returned fell far short of those abducted and the perception of bias led many, with the complicity of traditional authorities, to hide women and children from officials. At one point, ten children who had been taken by the government from their abductors (without ensuring they were indeed kidnapped) were left in a Bor transit site as it was not clear who their families were (many were taken at such a young age they did not remember). “South Sudan: Jonglei militia ‘kills dozens’”, BBC, 21 October 2013; “South Sudan 2013 Human Rights Report”, U.S. Department of State, 2013; “Bishops of Bor and Twic dioceses issue statement on Maar and Paliu tragedy”, press release, New Sudan Vision (www.newsudanvision.com), 3 November 2013. Crisis Group interviews, former County Commissioner Brigadier General Joshua Konyi, traditional authorities, women, and age-set leaders, Juba, Pibor, November 2013; White Army members, Bor, November 2013.

special foods for participants, as well as by shaming and “humiliating” men who do not join.²⁴ Children often participate in large raids, sometimes as combatants and to herd cattle back to their home areas while the battles continue.²⁵ Some of these practices date back a century or more and have evolved and escalated over time; halting them requires recognising the many social structures supporting them and that they are not a new phenomenon.²⁶

All parties have received weapons and ammunition from local police and SPLA members, and some officers and troops participated in attacks (at times deserting their posts to do so and other times with the full support of their superiors).²⁷ Many Lou Nuer youth joined Athor’s rebellion in 2010 and 2011, returning home with weapons and ammunition they used when they joined White Army formations for attacks in Pibor in December 2011.²⁸ In other cases, such as the Lou Nuer attack on the Murle in July 2013, the SPLA in Juba and Jonglei provided highly organised support against Murle community defenders and the SSDA-CF.²⁹ A Murle revenge

²⁴ Crisis Group interviews, White Army fighters, Bor, November 2013; Ingrid Marie Breidlid and Michael J. Arensen, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

²⁵ Crisis Group interviews, White Army fighters, Bor, November 2013; northern Jonglei, April 2014.

²⁶ Negotiations toward the most famous South-South peace agreement, the 1999 Wunlit agreement, almost broke down over disagreements on how to resolve the abduction of women and children. “Wunlit Dinka Nuer Covenant”, Dinka-Nuer West Bank Peace and Reconciliation Conference, Wunlit, Bahr el Ghazal, Sudan, 27 February – 8 March 1999, Resolutions I; John Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, *op. cit.*, pp. 321, 371; Wal Duany, *Neither Palaces Nor Prisons: Constitutions of Order Among the Nuer* (U.S., 2005), pp. 125-126; Sharon E. Hutchinson, *Nuer Dilemmas*, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-160, 255.

²⁷ For example, in December 2011, Lou Nuer within the Pibor SPLA garrison directed the White Army into Pibor town and many deserted to join the attack. The Nuer SPLA commander said that despite arriving to convince the White Army to turn around, Riek Machar only advocated that it avoid the town and failed to give the garrison direct orders to defend the town before he left. On 31 December, Kiir gave direct orders to the garrison to defend the town. Many Nuer defied the order and the Murle and Bahr el Ghazal Dinka troops comprised the bulk of the forces who defended the town. “Disarmament Déjà-Vu”, Danish Demining Group, Pact and Saferworld, January 2012; “Incidents of Inter-communal Violence in Jonglei State”, UNMISS, June 2012; “My Neighbor, My Enemy: Inter-Tribal Violence in Jonglei”, Small Arms Survey, HSBA, Sudan Issue Brief no. 21, October 2012, p. 7.

²⁸ For more on the White Army, see Section III.A.2. “White Arms Army and Ammunition”, Small Arms Survey, HSBA Tracing Desk report, March 2012. It was during this attack that the Nuer prophet Dak Kueth came to prominence. He is a relatively young man from Uror county in Jonglei. White Army fighters say he was noted for bravery in fighting and hunting prior to becoming a prophet. Crisis Group interviews, White Army fighters, Jonglei, November 2013, April 2014; Prophet Dak Kueth, Jonglei, April 2014.

²⁹ Following months of limitations on humanitarian access and targeting of medical facilities serving Murle civilians, the government granted immediate access to the UN and other agencies to airlift wounded attackers from Pibor alongside SPLA airlifts (which many report also brought new combatants to the frontlines as they returned the wounded). Several hundred were evacuated, but none were Murle civilians. Crisis Group interviews, SPLA officers, White Army, civilians, medical humanitarians, Juba, Jonglei, November 2013; “South Sudan’s army faces accusations of civilian abuse”, *The New York Times*, 28 September 2013; “South Sudan: MSF hospital targeted and purposefully damaged to render it inoperative”, press release, Médecins sans frontières, 17 May 2013; “South Sudan: Violence intensified in Jonglei, wounded left without access to medical care”, press release, Médecins sans frontières, 17 July 2013; “MSF condemns the killing and wounding of its team members near Juba, South Sudan”, press release, Médecins sans frontières, 9 August 2013; “Jonglei: 160 airlifted to Bor for treatment as UN gains access to Pibor clashes”, Sudan Tribune, 14 July 2013; “Jonglei’s Bor hospital treats 279 wounded in local clashes”, Sudan Tribune, 20 July 2013.

raid, undertaken with weapons received from the SSDA-CF, on Maar, the hometown of former Deputy Defence Minister Majak D’Agoot, and Palieu villages in Twic East county killed at least 50.³⁰ The links between armed rebellion and communal violence continue into the present civil war.

2. Mixed messages: Government response to intercommunal violence

Intercommunal fighting escalated in 2011, with thousands killed, including in attacks during independence ceremonies.³¹ Under international pressure, the government launched a three-pronged approach to addressing the violence: a human rights committee of inquiry (including into politicians instigating the violence), a peace committee and forced civilian disarmament (removal of weapons in the hands of civilians by the SPLA).³² The committee of inquiry was staffed and funded but political interference ensured it was never sworn in.³³ The peace committee launched an All-Jonglei Peace Conference in May 2012, a four-day affair in Bor that purported to discuss and resolve all of Jonglei’s issues – except the political ones.³⁴ In the midst of an uneven, coercive disarmament campaign and increasingly tense national political situation, these efforts did not bring peace to vast swathes of the state and there is much IGAD can learn from this failure in top-down peacemaking.³⁵

³⁰ Fifty deaths were confirmed but the figure is likely higher. Crisis Group interviews, victims and military hospital administrators, Juba, October 2013; victims and displaced persons from Twic East, Bor, November 2013. The attackers insist the raid was carried out by youth, independently of the SSDA-CF but admitted to using weapons the SSDA-CF gave them to fight the SPLA. Senior Murle leaders and government officials hold senior officials from the ministry of defence and SPLA responsible for the campaign of forced displacement and violence. The Murle leaders and officials presented their concerns, including what they believed to be the military chain of command, to the UN in early 2013. UNMISS sent its first human rights monitors to areas under SSDA-CF control only in July-August 2013, by which time the Murle civilian population had been forcibly displaced from five of six urban areas under government control, meaning that, for the first year of the conflict, UNMISS was unable to conduct credible human rights investigations as it operated only in locations from which most of the victims had fled. Crisis Group interviews, Murle officials, UN officials, Juba, November, 2013; “GPC support mission to South Sudan”, Global Protection Cluster (www.globalprotectioncluster.org), 18 June 2013; “Inter-Sectoral Working Group Statement on Jonglei”, Inter-Sectoral Working Group, 20 June 2013.

³¹ “South Sudan’s Hidden Crisis”, op. cit., p. 5; John Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, op. cit., p. 318.

³² Committee for Community Peace, Reconciliation and Tolerance, Presidential Order No.10/2012, 24 February 2012; Investigation Committee on Jonglei Crisis, Presidential Order No.10/2012, 5 March 2012; “Incidents of Inter-Communal Violence in Jonglei State”, op. cit.

³³ The government, in the midst of a fiscal crisis, said it lacked money to swear in the committee. Donors then provided substantial funds and offered technical assistance. To date the committee has not been sworn in. Crisis Group interview, donor representatives, May 2014.

³⁴ “Conference Resolutions and Recommendations”, Presidential Committee for Community Peace, Reconciliation and Tolerance in Jonglei State, Jonglei State Communities Conference for Peace, Reconciliation and Tolerance, held in Bor, 1-5 May 2012, Problem Statement, p. 3. “While not within the mandate of this Conference ... various issues relating to government and administration have been identified by the communities and are noted here for the responsible authorities to consider”. The conference issued a set of resolutions and “peace” was declared.

³⁵ An international NGO found that although most civilians were aware of the conference, (1) many delegates failed to inform their communities about the process upon their return; (2) there were no national, state or local mechanisms to create conditions for peace on the ground; (3) “political issues” were not discussed; (4) the Murle believed they were subject to a deliberate and deadly attack en route to the conference and discriminated against in early drafts of resolutions; (5) the leadership of Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul, a Twic Dinka, led many to believe the process was manipulat-

3. Ethnically targeted civilian disarmament

The SPLA has attempted to disarm civilians across the country repeatedly since 2006, arguing it is necessary to stop violent raiding and limit intercommunal conflict.³⁶ Government officials argue it is needed to reduce the number of weapons in the hands of civilians, stop violent raiding and limit intercommunal conflict. This masks murkier political realities; disarmament has been a violent state-building tool, often targeting communities with difficult relationships with the SPLA. It has never been neutral or equally applied, has only rarely succeeded and has in some cases increased violence.³⁷

The 2012 campaign, forced in some locations from the start, was no different.³⁸ Lieutenant General Kuol Diem Kuol, a Lou Nuer with a long history in the SPLA, was given overall command and Major General Peter Gatdet Yak, a Bul Nuer, was charged with collecting weapons in the Lou Nuer areas of northern Jonglei.³⁹ Some senior SPLA officers reportedly hoped that Gatdet would either fail to disarm the Lou youth or trigger open conflict – creating divisions between Nuer communities. They could then use this to deny him senior positions and undermine anti-Kiir Nuer collaboration.⁴⁰ To the surprise of many, Gatdet partially succeeded, by providing protection to some farmers and saying he would not force disarmament but rather would allow it to happen naturally over several years once people felt safe.⁴¹

The prophet Dak Kueth, a powerful and influential Lou Nuer spiritual leader with close ties to the Lou Nuer White Army, and a small group of followers declared war on the government. Their campaign was relatively small save a deadly attack on an

ed in the interests of the Dinka; and (6) the peace process was dramatically overshadowed by disarmament. There were short, follow-on outreach efforts over the next few months but they bore little relation to conflict on the ground. Confidential report on file with Crisis Group. Supporters of the peace process blamed its failure on international partners for not funding “peace dividends” or providing greater support. Crisis Group interview, international expert, Nairobi, January 2014. But given its lukewarm reception in many conflict-affected communities, the failure of participants to inform their own communities and the substantial government resources spent on disarmament that could have been allocated to “peace dividends”, this argument places far too much importance on the international community as opposed to the South Sudanese leaders who were the driving forces behind both peace and conflict in Jonglei in 2011 and 2012. For further discussion, see Ferdinand von Habsburg-Lothringen, “South Sudan, many pasts, no solutions? Is the international community helping or hindering?”, Africa Express (www.africa-express.info), 13 April 2014.

³⁶ Crisis Group analyst interviews in another capacity, SPLA officers and enlisted men, senior politicians, traditional authorities, and women’s leaders, Akobo, Bor, Pibor, Malakal, Nasir, Bentiu, Juba, 2012. Crisis Group Africa Report N°154, *Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan*, 23 December 2009, p. 11. See also Cecile Brewer, “Disarmament in South Sudan”, Center for Complex Operations, 2010, p. 3.

³⁷ Within a year of the founding of the Government of Southern Sudan in 2005, the SPLA targeted the Lou Nuer – who had been opposed to the SPLA since 1991 – for disarmament. It quickly escalated into full-scale conflict between the White Army and SPLA leaving perhaps 1,200 Lou and 400 soldiers dead and widespread destruction. Crisis Group Report, *Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts*, op. cit., p. 3.

³⁸ “President Kiir opens disarmament in troubled Jonglei”, Sudan Tribune, 13 March 2012.

³⁹ John Young, “Jonglei 2010: Another Round of Disarmament”, Institute for Security Studies, 4 May 2010, pp. 2-3; “Anatomy of Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State”, Small Arms Survey, HSBA issue brief no. 3, February 2007, p. 3; Adam O’Brien, “Shots in the Dark: The 2008 South Sudan Civilian Disarmament Campaign”, Small Arms Survey, HSBA working paper, 16 January 2009.

⁴⁰ Gatdet is deeply unpopular among many in the SPLM/A for his wartime success on the side of Khartoum. Crisis Group Africa Report N°179, *South Sudan: Compounding Instability in Unity State*, 17 October 2011, pp. 7, 9, 11-13; Crisis Group interview, international analyst, December 2014.

⁴¹ Ibid.

SPLA boat traveling down the Sobat in August 2012.⁴² All of Jonglei’s communities were partially disarmed and, for a period, stopped openly carrying weapons in towns.

Disarmament in Pibor county was violent and accompanied by allegations of torture, rape (including of children and the elderly) and hostage-taking.⁴³ Murle officials and civilians warned that if the abuses did not stop they would rebel.⁴⁴ The government and UNMISS dismissed the warnings and were unprepared when 24 soldiers were killed in an August 2012 ambush in Lekongole, marking the beginning of the war between the government and David Yau Yau’s SSDA-CF.⁴⁵

C. *Region over Ethnicity? Shifting Alliances between the Bahr el Ghazal Dinka, Greater Bor Dinka and Nuer*

While conflict in South Sudan is typically viewed as a matter of Dinka versus Nuer, contestation between Dinka from Greater Bor, the home of founding SPLM/A Chairman John Garang, and Dinka from Greater Bahr el Ghazal, home of President Kiir, for primacy in the SPLM/A has been in the open for more than a decade. In 2004, then SPLM/A leader Garang and Kiir clashed over Garang’s authoritarian style, circumvention of institutional decision-making structures and Kiir’s belief he was going to be replaced as the SPLA’s second in command.⁴⁶ Riek Machar played a critical role, alongside other senior SPLM/A leaders, doing “shuttle diplomacy” to resolve the potentially devastating break.⁴⁷ In retribution, Garang retired Kiir from the army but left him as the vice president of the then Southern Sudan regional government and in position to take charge following Garang’s 2005 death.⁴⁸ Kiir’s early appoint-

⁴² SPLA officers said that Dak’s supporters within the army alerted him and enabled his men to lay an ambush. They made off with food and arms. Crisis Group interview, UN official, December 2014.

⁴³ In March 2012, the UN insisted disarmament would be voluntary and UNMISS would provide support. Despite reports of abuses at its outset – including UNMISS evacuating Murle chief Baba Majong after the SPLA shot him – it was not until September 2012 that the UN acknowledged the exercise was forced and accompanied by widespread human rights violations. “South Sudan: Lethal Disarmament: Abuses linked to civilian disarmament in Pibor County, Jonglei State”, Amnesty International, 3 October 2012; “Letter to South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir on the Violence in Jonglei State”, Human Rights Watch, 23 August 2012; “They are Killing Us”, Human Rights Watch, September 2013; “Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan”, S/2012/486, 26 June 2012. The SPLA denied the allegations. “South Sudan denies abuses cited by HRW in Jonglei report”.

⁴⁴ “Perpetuating Cycles of Violence”, Community Empowerment for Progress, Pact, Standard Action Liaison Focus, Serving and Learning Together, and the South Sudan Law Society, March 2012.

⁴⁵ “Yauyau forewarned of Jonglei attack and making advance rebel claims”, Sudan Tribune, 28 August 2012; “UNMISS increasing concerns over violence in Jonglei State”, press statement, UNMISS, 31 August 2012; “Ongoing violence in Jonglei State, South Sudan”, press statement, U.S. State Department, 12 July 2013.

⁴⁶ Kiir’s response was to gather troops loyal to him in Yei town and refuse to meet Garang. Crisis Group Africa Report N°96, *The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace*, 25 July 2005, p. 15.

⁴⁷ The standoff took place during the last days of the CPA negotiations, giving its resolution particular urgency, and was solved with an agreement to meet face-to-face in Rumbek town. During the tense meeting, Kiir’s critiques were echoed by many others. Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°30, *Garang’s Death: Implications for Peace in Sudan*, 9 August 2005, p. 4; John Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, op. cit., pp. 76-7.

⁴⁸ John Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, op. cit., p. 77.

ments indicated a trend of reliance on figures from Bahr el Ghazal and those who had backed him against Garang.⁴⁹

Since taking power, Kiir has contended with plots, real and perceived, to remove him from power, either by force or politically and, over time, came to rely on a small group of loyalists.⁵⁰ In doing this, he alienated the Greater Bor Dinka as well as the “Garangists” who formed the SPLM/A’s core. Believing the army’s loyalties divided, Kiir focused on building a loyal National Security Service and presidential guard, supported by the U.S., UK and Israel. There are allegations these forces were used against his critics, including long-time SPLM/A members, such as Isaiah Abraham, a Bor Dinka journalist who wrote articles critical of Kiir and was assassinated in 2012.⁵¹

At the same time, relations between the Greater Bor Dinka and Nuer were shifting with the integration of most Nuer forces into the SPLA and began to improve despite Machar’s attempt to replace Kiir as SPLM/A chairman in 2008.⁵² As the centre of political power shifted to Greater Bahr el Ghazal, the Greater Bor Dinka and Nuer began a tentative process of alliance formation. Following independence, Machar apologised for the 1991 Bor Massacre, widely viewed as a critical step toward Bor’s acceptance of any form of alliance.⁵³ Dinka and Nuer youth also came together for a series of attacks between December 2011 and July 2013 on the Murle.⁵⁴ In September 2012, it was widely believed a coup had been attempted and Lou Nuer Generals Bol Kong and Simon Gatwech Dual were arrested for their involvement.⁵⁵ Although fingers rightly pointed at Jonglei, it is widely believed Kong and Gatwech were not the masterminds and were scapegoated.⁵⁶

⁴⁹ Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, *Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead*, 31 March 2006, pp. 6, 21.

⁵⁰ Some of those implicated were investigated and removed from their positions. Telar Deng and Aleu Ayieny Aleu were stripped of their membership in the SPLM in 2008, but have since been reinstated and Aleu is among Kiir’s trusted advisers. Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°50, *Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis*, 13 March 2008, p. 3.

⁵¹ Following his death, Greater Dinka Bor civil society and youth leaders in Juba hid in fear. Crisis Group interviews, senior SPLA officers and international security experts, Juba, November 2013; Addis Ababa, Nairobi, January 2014; “UN peacekeeping mission deplores killing of journalist, urges investigation”, press release, UNMISS, 7 December 2012; “Timeline of Recent Intra-Southern Conflict”, HSBA for Sudan and South Sudan, Small Arms Survey, 27 June 2014.

⁵² “Sudan’s Kiir faces two contenders for the SPLM chairmanship”, Sudan Tribune, 14 May 2008.

⁵³ Machar’s public apology, in August 2011, took place at the home of Rebecca Garang, John Garang’s widow (from Twic East), which symbolised the leadership’s acceptance but many in Bor South county felt it should have been made in Bor town and remained deeply suspicious of Machar’s loyalties and intentions. For more on the 1991 Bor Massacre, see “Sudan: A Continuing Human Rights Crisis”, Amnesty International, 14 April 1992, p. 17.

⁵⁴ John Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, op. cit., p. 320.

⁵⁵ Kiir went to his compound in Luri outside of Juba and deployed the presidential guard and other loyalists throughout Juba. Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, October 2014.

⁵⁶ Gatwech was officially arrested for his association with Dak Kueth’s and David Yau Yau’s rebellions. Some Dinka SPLA officers said he was deliberately set-up and noted that given the hostility between Kueth and Yau Yau it was unlikely he – or anyone – was in league with both. Other officers reported that he was arrested for making accusations of significant levels of corruption within the defence ministry. The Lou Nuer community vehemently protested but he was only released upon the outbreak of war in December 2013. Gatwech says, following his release, he remained loyal until an assassination attempt on his life in January 2014 led him to flee Juba and join the opposition. Crisis Group interviews, members of the security services, UN officials, and General Simon Gatwech Dual, Jonglei and Juba, January – March 2014.

The arrests were followed by an attempt to assassinate Gatdet in Eastern Equatoria state in March 2013 and a tense standoff between him and SPLA headquarters in northern Jonglei in October.⁵⁷ By the end of 2013, lines were being drawn and Jonglei’s Dinka and Nuer were increasingly on one side and the Greater Bahr el Ghazal Dinka on the other. This fragile alliance born of political expediency has been challenged since the outbreak of the war. Despite Machar’s demanding the release of the Detainees, hoping they would join his movement, making the SPLM/A-IO a broader political coalition, upon their release the Greater Bor Dinka SPLM Detainees did not join him. It also did not hold in Bor in January 2014 when the SPLA-IO and White Army retook the city and targeted Dinka civilians. As a Bor Dinka official said, “Machar betrayed us. We forgave him and we had a plan to bring the leadership back to Greater Upper Nile and instead he killed our people”.⁵⁸ Yet both groups continue to call for Kiir to step down and a rebuilding of this alliance remains possible as many of the circumstances that brought them together remain.

⁵⁷ The March 2013 assassination attempt, which led to a battle between Gatdet and SPLA commandos, was only stopped by senior Greater Bor Dinka and Equatorian intervention.

⁵⁸ Crisis Group interview, Jonglei state official, Juba, March 2014.

III. South Sudan’s Civil War in Jonglei

Within 48 hours of the outbreak of conflict in Juba in December 2013, Gatdet defected, on his own initiative, with much of the Bor-based 8th Division, whose unity had already been under strain in the preceding months. When he defected, Machar was still in flight from Juba and the SPLM/A-IO did not exist.⁵⁹ Following Gatdet’s defection, units across the state split, sometimes violently. With the loss of Bor, the road to Juba was open and there was heavy fighting along the Juba road between, on the one hand, the SPLA and UPDF and, on the other, the SPLA-IO and White Army. Bor changed hands four times before the government regained firm control in early February 2014.

The government, seeking to focus on the SPLA-IO and avoid fighting on two fronts in Jonglei, signed a peace agreement with the Murle SSDA-CF operating in south-eastern Jonglei in January. At present, the government controls Bor South, Twic East, Duk (except areas around Pajut) and Pochalla counties; Ayod town (but the SPLA-IO controls the countryside); and shares control of Pibor county with the SSDA-CF. The SPLA-IO controls Nyrol, Uror and Akobo counties. As of December 2014, fighting was ongoing in Fangak and Pigi counties although the SPLA-IO appears in control of most of Fangak and the government in control of much of Pigi. However, in many areas community defence forces have greater control than the official armed groups.

A. *Armed Factions in Jonglei*

The civil war has seen a set of shifting alliances between and among armed groups including the SPLA, SPLA-IO, SSDA-CF, UPDF, Lou and Gawaar Nuer White Armies, Greater Bor youth and other community-based armed groups. All parties to the war, except the UPDF, have used child soldiers.⁶⁰ Neither Kiir nor Machar have full command and control over all of the forces fighting in Jonglei – the SSDA-CF operate in nearly a third of the state – and the need to build and maintain alliances among the forces amid difficult fighting, heavy casualties and unfavourable political conditions is an ongoing challenge for both sides. Likewise, many of these groups and their interests are not represented in either Kiir’s or Machar’s delegations to the negotiations in Addis Ababa – or the more inclusive mechanisms established by IGAD.

1. Pro-government forces: SPLA, UPDF and Greater Bor Dinka Youth

The SPLA in Jonglei remains multi-ethnic, but most of its members are Dinka, and following a series of desertions of Bahr el Ghazal Dinka early in the war, the majority is Greater Bor Dinka.⁶¹ The SPLA struggled to maintain its forward-most deploy-

⁵⁹ Crisis Group Report, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, op. cit., p. 8.

⁶⁰ UNICEF estimated that approximately 9,000 children have been recruited during the current war. “With conflict raging in South Sudan, recruitment of children into armed groups is on the rise”, UNICEF, 5 May 2014. One organisation estimates that more than 900 children have been abducted since the start of the war. “The situation of children in South Sudan”, press statement, African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC), 3-9 August 2014. Child recruitment is not straightforward. There are reports of forced recruitment by the SPLA and SPLA-IO, while other children, idealising older warriors, want to join the various armed groups. Ingrid Marie Breidlid and Michael J. Arensen, “Anyone Who Can Carry a Gun Can Go”, op. cit.

⁶¹ Other groups, such as Equatorians, were also part of the fighting forces. “Halting South Sudan’s Spreading Civil War”, Crisis Group Conflict Alert, 7 July 2014; “South Sudan’s Jonglei swears in three

ments during the rains; troops deserted from bases in Ayod and Gadiang towns in June 2014.⁶² The SPLA’s most significant challenges are desertions due to lack of pay and food, soldiers’ fears of staying in “garrisons” surrounded by hostile forces and civilians, as well as lack of motivation among some to fight to protect Kiir’s presidency.

The UPDF was in South Sudan prior to the war as part of a regional counter-Lord’s Resistance Army task force, but questions surround its activities at the end of 2013.⁶³ It has supported SPLA offensives with MiG-29s and SU27 fighter bombers, helicopter gunships and both the elite Special Forces and Zulu units.⁶⁴ The UPDF has been accused of using banned cluster bombs and of indiscriminately bombing civilian areas during the war, an allegation it has denied.⁶⁵ Currently, the UPDF maintains a base near Bor town and withdrew from Gadiang.⁶⁶ There are reports of UPDF support to the SPLA further north as well as more recently into South Sudan in advance of the upcoming dry season offensives. Much like the involvement of the Justice and Equality Movement in Unity state, the UPDF’s involvement is a lightning rod for both the opposition and some government supporters.

Greater Bor youth were not a coherent fighting force at the outset of the conflict and the SPLA and UPDF fought with limited involvement from them. Bor South county is home to the Defence and Veterans Affairs Minister Kuol Manyang Juuk and Deputy Chief of General Staff for Administration and Director of Operations General Malual Ayom Dor; a promotion of SPLA officers from Bor South in 2013 also contributed to Bor’s loyalty.⁶⁷ It is largely government-aligned, though with a significant contingent of political dissenters.

Twic East county is home to former Deputy Defence Minister Majak d’Agoot, one of the former SPLM Detainees, and John Garang’s widow, Rebecca Garang, and its leaders made an early non-aggression pact with the White Army.⁶⁸ North of Twic East, Duk county, which borders the Lou and Gawaar Nuer areas, has also sought to avoid conflict with the SPLA-IO/White Army, and the opposition controls territory in eastern Duk.⁶⁹ In late December 2013, the Lou Nuer White Army largely bypassed Duk

new county commissioners”, Sudan Tribune, 18 March 2013; “Defecting generals from W. Bahr el Ghazal’s Wau town speak out”, Sudan Tribune, 18 April 2014; “Who’s who of the SPLM-Juba faction: Kuol Manyang Juuk”, Radio Tamazuj, 22 August 2014; “Sudan: Over 300 armed youth in N. Bahr El Ghazal join rebels”, Sudan Tribune, 17 July 2014.

⁶² Crisis Group interview, senior SPLA officer, Nairobi, July 2014.

⁶³ UNMISS reported UPDF units missing from Nzara in Western Equatoria county at the end of 2013. Some South Sudanese and Ugandan officials report that the first UPDF deployments reached the border nearly two days before the war began. Crisis Group interviews, UNMISS officials, Nairobi, Juba, January 2014; South Sudanese and Ugandan officials, July, September 2014. On the counter-LRA force, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°182, *The Lord’s Resistance Army: End Game?*, 17 November 2011.

⁶⁴ The UPDF also sent in other units, some including veterans of Uganda’s liberation struggle, the “Zulu” units. “The Conflict in Jonglei State”, Small Arms Survey, 2 May 2014.

⁶⁵ “South Sudan: Investigate New Cluster Bomb Use”, Human Rights Watch, 15 February 2014; United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Report, 12 February 2014.

⁶⁶ Crisis Group interviews, South Sudanese officials, Nairobi, July 2014; Ugandan officials, Kampala, September 2014.

⁶⁷ “Defence and Veterans Affairs”, Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2014; “Who’s who of the SPLM-Juba faction: Kuol Manyang Juuk”, Radio Tamazuj, 22 August 2014.

⁶⁸ “Timeline of Recent Intra-Southern Conflict”, op. cit.; Crisis Group Report, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, op. cit.

⁶⁹ Connections between Dinka and Nuer in eastern Duk are some of the strongest anywhere in the country with frequent intermarriage and common bilingualism.

and Twic East en route to Bor; its attacks against Dinka civilians in Jonglei have mainly focused on Bor with more limited violence in Duk led by the Gawaar Nuer White Army.⁷⁰ The mobilisation of the Greater Bor Dinka by the SPLA is limited in comparison to Upper Nile state, where Dinka and other youth have been recruited and armed by the government into the Oil Protection Force, Mabaan Defence Forces, Baliet Defence Forces and other militia groups.⁷¹

Facing questions about their loyalty in Juba, government-aligned politicians from both counties sought to set their communities against the opposition and skirmishes followed violence in the SPLA barracks in Juba in March 2014.⁷² In April, youth from Bor also mobilised a revenge attack on Nuer IDPs in the Bor UNMISS base.⁷³ Greater Bor communities remain internally divided; the limited unity that exists derives from shared opposition to the SPLM/A-IO – largely due to its association with ethnic violence – and dissatisfaction with President Kiir. While officially aligned with the government, their primary motivation is to protect their areas and many favour the SPLM Detainees.

2. Anti-government forces associated with the SPLM-IO: SPLA-IO and the Lou and Gawaar Nuer White Armies

The SPLA-IO in Jonglei comprises former 8th Division SPLA soldiers and smaller numbers from other units.⁷⁴ Most of the division defected in late December 2013 with much smaller groups intermittently defecting since then; some joined the White Army rather than the SPLA-IO.⁷⁵ When he defected, Gatdet was joined by Gabriel Lam, the appointed civilian governor of Jonglei, who began to establish the SPLA-IO in Greater Fangak (Ayod, Fangak and Pigi counties). They were joined several months later by General Gabriel Tanginye, whose forces operate in north-west Jonglei and have concentrated on Malakal, the capital of oil-rich Upper Nile state.⁷⁶ While Gatdet presided over early military successes against the SPLA and UPDF (Section III.B), he also alienated much of the large and powerful Lou Nuer White Army.⁷⁷

⁷⁰ Crisis Group Report, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, op. cit.

⁷¹ Crisis Group interviews, Baliet, Bor and Twic East youth, Juba, February 2014; international analyst, August 2014.

⁷² This includes senior figures such as former Jonglei state Governor Philip Thon Leek and SPLM National Liberation Council Member Deng Dau.

⁷³ While there was some official support for the attack, it was not universal. Crisis Group interview, Defence Minister Kuol Manyang Juuk, Juba, April 2014.

⁷⁴ General Gatdet said he defected due to the killings in Juba and had not spoken to Machar, underlining that there was neither a coup attempt nor a military chain of command under Machar's leadership at the outset. Machar confirmed this account. Crisis Group interviews, SPLA-IO officials, January 2014; “South Sudan's people are forced to fight this war – Riek Machar”, *The Africa Report*, 11 August 2014.

⁷⁵ “The Conflict in Jonglei State”, op. cit.

⁷⁶ After defecting, General Tanginye fought around Juba and, along with other senior opposition figures, such as General Alfred Ladu Gore, began moving north as opposition forces lost territory in early 2014. Crisis Group Report, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, op. cit.

⁷⁷ Other SPLA-IO commanders have struggled with the same issues. Then Unity state military Governor James Koang Chuol sought to “persuade” Nuer youth to undergo training in Unity as White Army members could, and often do, simply walk away if they do not like the orders. Koang says that some “saw the benefit” of the training in improving fighting capabilities, which convinced them to stay. Crisis Group interview, Brigadier General James Koang Chuol, Nairobi, May 2014.

The White Army, built upon traditional Nuer community structures, emerged as a major fighting force during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005).⁷⁸ As a White Army leader said, “the community has needed us since before my time because we have always been at war”.⁷⁹ The Lou Nuer White Army, the largest in Jonglei, is highly organised by clan, section, payam and county, up to the overall leadership.⁸⁰ Leaders are selected democratically based on criteria such as “bravery” and battlefield success, fighting “skill”, ability to “solve disputes” among warriors, and “fairness” in allocation of loot. They can be removed at any time and change is not uncommon. Warriors rarely deny or hide their involvement in atrocities, which are invariably described as “revenge”.⁸¹

The Lou Nuer White Army was decimated in 2006 but has regrouped since 2009.⁸² The return to semi-permanent mobilisation was aided by easy access to weapons, including from both the Sudanese and South Sudanese governments.⁸³ Like the SPLA-IO, the White Army mobilised after it received reports of the massacre of Nuer in Juba.⁸⁴ Their primary motivations to fight are to revenge their kinsmen’s deaths, remove Kiir from power and “rescue” Nuer sheltering in UN bases, rather than securing Machar’s political future.⁸⁵

The Lou Nuer White Army leadership has remained largely unchanged since the July 2013 attack into Murle land, including the prominent role of the prophet Dak Kueth. However, the December mobilisation was much larger than prior ones, particularly among the Lou, and included the very young and old.⁸⁶ Their numerical superiority is undermined by limited tactical skills and ability and desire to maintain defensive positions.⁸⁷ For example, in a failed attempt to retake Gadiang town involving thousands of White Army members, they planned to have one group attack while two others remained outside to ambush fleeing soldiers. The outside groups realised that

⁷⁸ Crisis Group Report, *Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts*, op. cit., p. 3; John Young, “The White Army: An Introduction and Overview”, Small Arms Survey, June 2007, p. 19; Section III.A.2.

⁷⁹ Crisis Group interview, Akobo, March 2014.

⁸⁰ Ingrid Marie Breidlid and Michael J. Arensen, op. cit., p. 5.

⁸¹ Crisis Group interviews, White Army members, Bor, November 2013; Akobo, March 2014.

⁸² The Lou Nuer White Army suffered a serious defeat during the 2006 disarmament campaign where perhaps 1,000 were killed and did not engage in major fighting again until 2009, after another disarmament campaign in 2008. Crisis Group Report, *Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts*, op. cit., p. 3; “Civilian Disarmament in South Sudan: A Legacy of Struggle”, Saferworld, February 2012; “Anatomy of Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei State”, op. cit.; John Young, “The White Army: An Introduction and Overview”, op. cit.; “Sudan: Fragile disarmament in the south”, IRIN, 3 August 2006; “Armed youth voluntarily disarm in Sudan’s Jonglei”, Sudan Tribune, 23 August 2006.

⁸³ “Reaching for the Gun: Arms Flows and Holdings in South Sudan”, Small Arms Survey, HSBA, Sudan Issue Brief no. 19, April 2012.

⁸⁴ Some Ethiopian Nuer also joined the White Army in response to reports of atrocities in Juba.

⁸⁵ This differed from post-2009 White Army activity in which cattle raiding was a key objective. Crisis Group interviews, Dak Kueth, White Army leaders, Akobo, March 2014.

⁸⁶ There is general consensus that very young children should not fight, but upon receiving the *gaar* (facial scarification and initiation into manhood) in the mid-teens, and increasingly earlier, it is appropriate to join the White Army. White Army members have described the challenges of preventing children from joining the fighting. Sometimes children secretly follow the warriors into battle, only emerging from the bush after several days walking. Children’s lack of weapons, inability to use them effectively and propensity to tire easily make them a liability; kinship obligations require elder family members to ensure wounded or tired children are returned to a medical facility or safe location, taking them out of the battle as well. Crisis Group interviews, White Army members, Bor, November 2013, Akobo, March 2014.

⁸⁷ This is a major reason the SPLA-IO was unable to hold Malakal.

those who went in would have the best access to weapons and other goods left behind and so abandoned their positions to join the attack. Many were inadvertently killed when they came into their comrades' line of fire and the attack was a dismal failure.⁸⁸

The prophet Dak Kueth provides guidance on auspicious times to fight, where to attack and what to expect, but the White Army leadership takes the ultimate decisions; all are in constant communication via satellite phone. This approach differed from General Gatdet's tactical military planning and, for this and other reasons, the Lou White Army resisted his efforts to place it firmly under his command in the SPLA-IO.⁸⁹ Tensions between the Lou White Army and Gatdet soon reached a boiling point, including over his efforts to protect civilians, and he was replaced by Gatwech, following Gatwech's escape from an assassination attempt in Juba in early January 2014. Although Gatwech is popular, the Lou White Army leaders and Dak Kueth insist they are not under SPLA-IO command but fight alongside them.⁹⁰

There are often internal conflicts between Lou, Jikany and/or Gawaar Nuer, and among Lou clans. The careful balance between different White Army units, SPLA-IO commanders and Nuer political leaders could easily fall apart, with northern Jonglei opposition groups fighting one another. Some in the government would like to see that happen and in June 2014 sought to bring Dak Kueth back to government in an ill-fated effort that saw Gatwech arrest a Kenyan pilot on suspicion of having been involved with Dak Kueth in an assassination attempt in June. This potentially explosive break between the two was resolved but similar risks remain.⁹¹

3. Murle and Anuyak anti-government forces: SSDA-CF and Murle Youth

The SSDA-CF has a generally good relationship with the Murle community and has often fought alongside Murle youth.⁹² The SSDA-CF's original rallying cry, to halt the SPLA's abusive disarmament campaign, was popular and its defence of Murleland at the Nanaam river during the July 2013 Lou Nuer attack increased its approval.⁹³ Criticism that SSDA-CF leader Yau Yau was too young to lead were addressed by his reliance on elder, seasoned commanders: James Arzen Kong Kong, Adoch Agul and Peter Buretti, as well as powerful “red chiefs” (leaders from lineages with spiritual abilities), such as Baba Majong (whom the SPLA had shot at the outset of the 2012

⁸⁸ Crisis Group interviews, White Army, SPLA-IO leaders, August 2014.

⁸⁹ The Lou also resisted being commanded by a Bul Nuer.

⁹⁰ This has not stopped Gatwech from seeking to influence the selection of White Army leaders. Gatwech was released from prison on 15 December 2013 in an attempt by the government to try and stem the tide of Nuer defections to the opposition. He remained in Juba until the assassination attempt. Gatdet left Lou Nuer territory in late March 2014 and crossed into Unity state in April.

⁹¹ Crisis Group interviews, SPLA-IO officials, Nuer civilians, June–July 2014. Kenyan Deputy President William Ruto led the efforts to secure the pilot's release. It seems the pilot was unaware of his passengers' objectives. Crisis Group interviews, SPLA-IO spokesman, Lual Ruai Koang, Nairobi, May 2014.

⁹² This is also indicated by the relatively few human rights abuses associated with the SSDA-CF. SPLA-IO appears in control of most of Fangak and the government in control of much of Pigi.

⁹³ During previous attacks, neither the SPLA nor Murle youth directly engaged the Lou Nuer to prevent their advance. More commonly, Murle scouts would follow the Lou Nuer columns, numbering in the thousands, and wait for smaller groups to branch off and then ambush them. In July 2013, the SSDA-CF and Murle youth prepared defensive positions along the Nanaam and took heavy casualties defending Murleland. Casualties were also high among the attackers, many of whom were children. “Pendulum Swings: The Rise and Fall of Insurgent Militias in South Sudan”, Small Arms Survey, HSBA, Issue Brief no. 22, November 2013, p. 4.

disarmament campaign).⁹⁴ Unlike the Nuer who mobilise along clan lines the Murle do so by age-set; the major fighting age-sets among the Murle are the Botonya and the younger Lango group (Yau Yau is a Botonya).⁹⁵

Age-set competition has, at times, led to divisions within the SSDA-CF, and commanders struggle to prevent Lango youth from raiding neighbouring communities. The SSDM-CF's peace deal with the government (see Section IV/B below) created the Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA) and has brought new challenges to SSDM-CF and Murle unity. There are divisions within the group and its supporters about the deal itself and its implementation. External opponents include senior and influential Murle SPLA officers, such as Brigadier General Joshua Konyi (a former Pibor commissioner), Kennedy Gayien and Steven Marshall, whose positions within the community are threatened by an SSDM-CF-led administration in Pibor. When Joshua Konyi attempted to undermine the peace deal, Kiir dismissed him as county commissioner.⁹⁶ The predominantly highland Murle around Boma town are concerned given SSDM-CF leaders are largely lowland Murle and fear the intentions of SPLA commandos that continue to maintain a presence in Boma town and Maruwa Hills.⁹⁷

B. *Battles for Bor*

Jonglei's first round of conflict was characterised by the opposition's relatively easy capture of the state capital, Bor; the defection of most Nuer areas and soldiers to the opposition; the Murle and SSDA-CF's decision to remain neutral; and divisions within the Greater Bor Dinka. Having lost Juba but with units still surrounding parts of the city and Bor captured, the SPLA-IO, joined by thousands of White Army fighters, began to push toward Juba. Early SPLA efforts to stem the advance failed and, amid heavy casualties, government soldiers began deserting the frontlines.⁹⁸

The UPDF provided air support, using Mi-24 helicopter gunships and MiG-29 fighter bombers, targeting the White Army before they reached Bor, and sent in ground troops and heavy weapons to bolster the faltering SPLA frontline. The UPDF's intervention and placing Jonglei Dinka officers in charge of the operation (following desertions of Bahr el Ghazal troops from the frontline) was critical in preventing a full-scale attack on, and the likely fall of, Juba. The advance was only halted by weeks of heavy and bloody fighting, with the help of thousands of UPDF troops, on the Juba-

⁹⁴ Most of these commanders were part of Sultan Ismail Konyi's wartime Pibor Defence Forces. Crisis Group interviews, SSDA-CF commanders, Murle leaders, November 2013.

⁹⁵ Murle of different ages might be in greater alliance with their age mates who live several days walk away than members of their own village of different ages. All boys become members of an age-sets or *bull* in their teens. Those of the same age-set have instant rapport and cooperation. Age-set mates also form an important part of dispute resolution within Murle communities. For example, women who have a grievance with their husband are more likely to take their case to their husband's age-mates than chiefs or government authorities. The decisions of the age mates are binding on members and failure to abide by them is often met with violence. Jon Arensen, “Murle Political Systems and Age-Sets”, Jonglei State – Strengthening Conflict Mitigation & Peace-building Conference, Nairobi, 19-21 March 2012.

⁹⁶ While Pibor county now falls under the GPAA, Kiir's announcement, on South Sudan Television, of a county commissioner's removal is a strong indication he continues to back the peace agreement. “President Kiir dismisses Pibor county commissioner”, Radio Tamazuj, 13 August 2014.

⁹⁷ Crisis Group interviews, Murle civilians, August-September 2014.

⁹⁸ Crisis Group Report, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, op. cit., p. 11; “South Sudan rebels take Bor town after ‘coup attempt’”, BBC, 19 December 2013.

Bor road, particularly around Mangalla, Gemeza, Pariak and Malek.⁹⁹ What became known as the “Battles for Bor” served as a proxy for the likelihood of an opposition takeover of Juba during the first month of the war.

Abuses grew as the fighting raged. During the first period of opposition control (17-25 December 2013), the SPLA-IO outnumbered the White Army.¹⁰⁰ Gatdet protected some Dinka civilians as they fled across the Nile to escape the conflict and sent SPLA-IO soldiers to protect UN installations, including the World Food Program (WFP) warehouse. Despite this, there was violence against civilians.¹⁰¹

The UPDF and SPLA retook Bor on 25 December, and there was violence against Nuer civilians as well as looting and destruction. The SPLA-IO and White Army recaptured Bor on 31 December with minimal fighting, but there was more sustained violence against Dinka civilians, particularly in outlying areas of Bor South. The government retook Bor on 17 January and it has remained under its control since.

Each time Bor changed hands those seeking protection within UNMISS changed – the internally displaced population (IDP) is now largely Nuer. Regardless of who was in control, UNMISS base’s perimeter was repeatedly violated and civilians were extracted from the base and murdered.¹⁰²

Since re-taking Bor, the SPLA and UPDF have systematically pushed north. They moved first to Gadiang, and into Twic East and Duk counties by April 2014.¹⁰³ In late April, they made their most serious inroad into opposition-held territory and captured Ayod town, the Gawaar Nuer opposition stronghold, burning parts and displacing both the opposition’s civilian Jonglei government, led by Gabriel Duop Lam, and the civilian population.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Reported death tolls run into the thousands, including hundreds of UPDF casualties. Crisis Group interviews, international analysts, members of armed groups, December 2013, January-February, August-September 2014.

¹⁰⁰ Following his flight from Juba, Machar travelled to Bor and then through Jonglei, staying in Akobo county prior to his move to Nasir, in Upper Nile state. He encouraged the SPLA-IO and White Army not to kill their neighbouring Dinka who were also opposed to the president (and whom Machar was trying to convince to join his rebellion). Crisis Group interviews, SPLA-IO commanders, White Army leaders, Jonglei, Nairobi, March-May 2014. Despite this, many continued to view the war as a Nuer response to an attempt by the Dinka to “finish us”. Crisis Group interviews, White Army leaders, Jonglei, April 2014.

¹⁰¹ Crisis Group interviews, UN officials, Juba, January 2014. During this period, there was an unprecedented regional effort to evacuate some of their tens of thousands of citizens from South Sudan. On 21 December, the SPLA-IO fired on three U.S. CV-22 Osprey aircraft, injuring four servicemen, sent to evacuate U.S. citizens. Gatdet insist that he was not properly informed and, because of the U.S. military’s relationship with the UPDF, believed the aircraft were hostile. Crisis Group interviews, SPLA-IO officials, Addis Ababa, January 2014; “U.S. aircraft fired upon in South Sudan”, U.S. Africa Command, 21 December 2013. An official described it as a “bloody nose we should learn a lesson from” and discounted further deployments in South Sudan. Crisis Group interview, U.S. military official, May 2014.

¹⁰² Crisis Group interviews, UN officials, international observers and civilians, Bor, January 2014; Juba, March 2014.

¹⁰³ Gadiang is a forward base in between Dinka, Lou Nuer and Murle territory. “The Conflict in Jonglei State”, op. cit.

¹⁰⁴ “Timeline of Recent Intra-Southern Conflict”, op. cit.; “IRNA Report (Gorwai, Ayod County, Jonglei State)”, Inter-Agency Rapid Needs Assessment, 28 June 2014.

IV. The Civil War and Jonglei State’s Administration

A. *Jonglei State Government*

Jonglei has not had an effective state-level administration in over a year. Governor Kuol Manyang Juuk, appointed defence minister in July 2013, was not replaced until former Defence Minister John Kong Nyuon, a Gawaar Nuer, was appointed caretaker governor in November.¹⁰⁵ Although controversial, Manyang left no doubt that he was in charge. Governor Kong, of an older and quieter temperament, arrived in Bor just prior to the outbreak of the civil war. Within weeks, he and his deputy, Hussein Maar, also a Nuer, were forced to flee; Maar says they fled to UNMISS claiming government forces tried to assassinate them.¹⁰⁶

Following attacks by Nuer fighters on Dinka civilians, armed Dinka youth from Bor South prevented Kong’s return and demanded that he step down as his Gawaar Nuer kinsmen had joined the opposition.¹⁰⁷ Kong eventually returned to Bor, although the true power centre is in the hands of Greater Bor Dinka government officials, SPLA officers and the UPDF, which guarantees their security. They govern a rump Jonglei state, essentially Greater Bor, with the south east falling under the Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA, see Section IV.B) and most of the north under opposition control or an active theatre of combat.¹⁰⁸

Only in May 2014 did Kong appoint a new administration, replacing officials who defected six months previously.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, Greater Bor Dinka argue that his new deputy, Baba Medan, a Murle, should step aside as Murle are now represented through the GPAA; and similar suggestions are made about Anuyak, Jiye and Kachipo who retain state government positions and are eligible for GPAA posts.¹¹⁰ With most of

¹⁰⁵ Jonglei is one of three states (out of ten) with a caretaker governor despite the constitutional provision requiring an election within 60 days of a governor’s removal, no such elections have been held. The others are Lakes state where Governor Chuol Tong Mayay was replaced by Matur Chul Dut in January 2013 and Unity state where Taban Deng Gai was replaced by Joseph Nguen Monytuil in July 2013. Many believe Chuol Tong and Taban Deng were dismissed because they participated in the political mobilisation against President Kiir throughout 2013. Government of South Sudan, Republican Decree No 56/2013 (31 July 2013); “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan”, UNSC S/2013/140, 8 March 2013; “Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan”, UNSC S/2013/651, 8 November 2013.

¹⁰⁶ Governor Kong was not in Bor when the war broke out on 15 December but returned as the 8th Division became increasingly unstable. During the first 48 hours, Maar and other state officials sought to contain the escalating tensions but when General Gatdet defected, it was beyond civilian officials’ abilities to influence. Maar says the attack against them took place in the governor’s compound upon Kong’s return to Bor and that one of his bodyguards was killed as they escaped. Crisis Group interview, Hussein Maar, former Jonglei deputy governor, now chairman of the Humanitarian Committee of the SPLM-IO, Nairobi, December 2013; UN officials, Juba, January 2014.

¹⁰⁷ These are some of the same youth responsible for the April 2014 attack on the UNMISS Bor base. They later said he could return, but without Nuer bodyguards as they would not accept armed Nuer in Bor. Lengthy negotiations secured his return with appropriate bodyguards.

¹⁰⁸ The SPLA also has garrisons in Boma town, Maruwa Hills, Pibor town, Gumruk, Manyabol and Ayod but does not control the surrounding territory.

¹⁰⁹ “Jonglei governor reshuffles state ministers”, Radio Tamazuj, 4 May 2014. A second set of officials were replaced in September 2014.

¹¹⁰ They have also suggested Information and Communication Minister Jody Jonglei Boyoris, a Murle, be removed. Baba Medan, formerly youth, sports and heritage minister, was appointed deputy governor in March 2014 after Hussein Maar was removed for joining the SPLM-IO. Previously,

Jonglei controlled by armed groups opposed to the leadership of Greater Bor, intra-state conflicts are unlikely to be resolved through negotiations with either the SSDM/A-CF or the SPLM/A-IO independently.

B. *The Greater Pibor Administrative Area*

The GPAA, established in May, encompasses the former Pibor administrative area and is administratively independent of the state administration in Bor. It includes the Murle, Anuyak, Jiye and Kachipo communities in what used to be termed “Greater Pibor”. Contentious from the outset, the GPAA is off to a rocky start. If it fails, the SSDM/A-CF may once again take up arms but may not formally join the SPLM/A-IO, leaving the government to fight on two fronts in Jonglei. There have been months of contentious negotiations over the GPAA’s budget, tensions over control of customs and other revenue and allegations of mismanagement of the limited finances provided by the government to top SSDM/A-CF officials.¹¹¹

Some Bor Dinka, Murle and Jiye leaders are attempting to undermine the peace agreement.¹¹² SPLA commando units based in Boma town originally refused to acknowledge the new dispensation but have since accepted it.¹¹³ Senior Bor Dinka remain hostile – one said, “this is not even an agreement, how can Warrap [Kiir’s home area] make an agreement with the Murle without the Dinka Bor or Nuer?”¹¹⁴ The government reportedly handed new weapons and vehicles to Jiye civilians in Kassingor in early 2014 and some of their leaders are vocally opposed to the GPAA.¹¹⁵

Even some Murle commanders, armed youth and community members believe the SSDA-CF wrongly “settled” for an administrative area rather than a state, and would consider a return to rebellion, particularly in light of the limited benefits the GPAA has provided and the government’s desire to attack the SPLA-IO stronghold of northern Jonglei through their territory.¹¹⁶ Jonglei is awash with new weapons and some Murle are trading cattle with the Lou Nuer for guns they captured from the government and UPDF in case the GPAA fails to deliver.¹¹⁷

The fate of Anuyak, Jiye and Kachipo minorities in a Murle-dominant administration also is uncertain. Marginalisation is what led to the Murle’s revolt and the GPAA’s creation. Discrimination, conflict and loss of land – experienced throughout the country – are reasons many support calls for greater federalism; they believe greater

he was the only Murle minister in Governor Manyang’s cabinet. Crisis Group interviews, Jonglei state officials, Bor Dinka civilians, Juba, April 2014.

¹¹¹ Crisis Group interview, international expert, December 2014; “Yau Yau speaks about new Pibor administration”, Radio Tamazuj, 11 August 2014. See also Crisis Group Report, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

¹¹² Crisis Group interviews, UN official, Murle civilians, SSDM-CF representatives, Nairobi, June-July 2014.

¹¹³ They continue to occupy the homes of Murle civilians they displaced in May 2013. The commandos also reportedly told the SSDA-CF/SPLA ceasefire monitoring and verification mission teams they had no instructions from Juba on engagement with them, hence did not need to be cooperative. Crisis Group interview, international analyst, Pibor, August 2014.

¹¹⁴ Crisis Group interview, senior SPLA officer, Kampala, September 2014.

¹¹⁵ Crisis Group interview, senior SPLA officer, Nairobi, June 2014.

¹¹⁶ Crisis Group interviews, Murle intellectuals, Kampala, September 2014; international analyst, December 2014.

¹¹⁷ Crisis Group interviews, Lou Nuer and Murle intellectuals, Kampala, September 2014.

local control would reverse this trend.¹¹⁸ The SSDM-CF is now presented with similar challenges faced by the national and state government in establishing an inclusive administration in a multi-ethnic territory and its success or failure will be one demonstration of the efficacy of federalism in South Sudan. IGAD should watch this development closely.

1. Murle

The Murle and SPLA have had a tumultuous history. The SPLA’s oldest military base is in the Murle-dominated Boma highlands along the Ethiopian border, while for much of the second civil war the SPLA also fought Ismail Konyi’s Pibor Defence Forces, supported by Khartoum.¹¹⁹ Ismail Konyi, a Murle red chief, was the Khartoum appointed Jonglei state governor when the CPA was signed but soon after the SPLM took over the regional government, he was replaced by Philip Thon Leek, a Twic East Dinka from Garang’s home area.¹²⁰ By the end of the CPA period, Murle state government representation was reduced to the youth, sports and heritage minister. Murle believed they were denied political representation and services, in part to punish them for their wartime alliances.¹²¹ Growing intercommunal conflict led to further feelings of victimisation and marginalisation that increased when, in 2012, the SPLA and auxiliary police focused their violent disarmament efforts on the Murle.¹²²

When the SSDA-CF emerged in 2012, part of the SPLA’s counter-insurgency campaign led to the forcible depopulation of five of the six Murle urban areas.¹²³ Even in Juba, the government sought to shut down churches that hosted Murle IDPs.¹²⁴ In

¹¹⁸ Crisis Group Report, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, op. cit., pp. 9-10. The SSDA-CF first called for federalism in March 2013. “The Jebel Boma declaration: Federalism for South Sudan”, South Sudan Nation (www.southsudannation.com), 28 March 2013; “The speech of Central Equatoria State Governor Clement Wani Konga”, video, YouTube, 3 July 2014, <http://bit.ly/1xa5sTJ>; “Eastern Equatoria governor joins calls for federalism”, Sudan Tribune, 15 June 2014; “South Sudanese rebels hail growing calls for federalism within ruling SPLM”, Sudan Tribune, 19 July 2014; “Church leader, women’s groups back federalism in South Sudan”, Sudan Tribune, 30 June 2014.

¹¹⁹ Many Murle take pride in their role in founding the SPLM/A both in terms of being part of the original uprising of the 105th Battalion in Pibor and in hosting a major base. Murle pulled away from the movement when senior members were killed in Garang’s purges in the early years, perceptions of Dinka-dominance grew and civilians were mistreated. Crisis Group interviews, Murle elders, Murle SPLA officers, and women leaders, Pibor, November 2013.

¹²⁰ Thon Leek was followed by Kuol Manyang in December 2007. “Newly appointed Jonglei Governor sworn in”, Sudan Tribune, 17 December 2007. Ismail Konyi remained an important, if controversial, figure and subsequently held a number of South Sudan government positions.

¹²¹ This also extended to UN and NGO service provision. Anne Laudati, “Victims of Discourse: Mobilizing Narratives of Fear and Insecurity in Post Conflict South Sudan – The Case of Jonglei State”, *African Geographical Review*, vol. 30 (2001), pp. 15-32.

¹²² A security analyst described the auxiliary police as a “paramilitary group” and they were frequently noted for their violence against civilians during the 2012 disarmament campaign. They even disarmed the regular police in Bor at the outset of the campaign. They were eventually pulled back from Pibor but on their way out of Lekongole they reportedly killed several civilians and kidnapped women. They set up camp just outside of Bor town with the kidnapped women. UNMISS never were said to have publicly reported on this incident. Crisis Group analyst interviews in another capacity, Bor, May-November 2013

¹²³ “Inter-Sectoral Working Group Statement on Jonglei”, Inter-Sectoral Working Group, 17 May 2013; “Inter-Sectoral Working Group Statement on Jonglei”, op. cit., 20 June 2013.

¹²⁴ Hundreds of IDPs that fled to Bor ended up sheltering in state Deputy Governor Baba Medan’s compound, too fearful to live openly in the state capital. Those who tried to reach Juba were often

an attempt to secure the Boma plateau after Boma town, in eastern Pibor county, was captured from the SPLA in May 2013 (for the first time since 1984) and undermine the SSDA-CF, the Jonglei state government defined lowland and highland Murle as separate ethnic groups, officially calling those from the highlands “Ngalam”, a term previously used to describe the highland sub-set of the Murle. They also created a new administrative unit, the “sub-county”, for the Boma plateau.¹²⁵ For several reasons, including political ambition and survival, many Murle administrators and some civilians in Boma adopted the new official designation.¹²⁶ Many highland Murle civilians, displaced from Boma town and surrounding villages, whose homes had been burnt and whose resources were being exploited by others, suggested calling themselves “Ngalam” was a protective measure in the wartime context and saw it as a part of the government’s divide-and-conquer strategy.¹²⁷

Pibor is perhaps the most resource-rich area in Jonglei. The Boma highlands have gold and other minerals, a large national park host to the world’s second largest wild-life migration and the lowlands are a fertile grazing area. Who controls these resources is a source of friction. Many Murle and some SPLA claim that the SPLA controls gold and customs export revenues.¹²⁸ Questions also have been raised about a concession granted in 2008 to Al-Ain, a United Arab Emirates-based company.¹²⁹ The most recent round of violence in Murleland coincided with the government’s decision to break up Total’s “Block B” oil concession, which sits atop Pibor county, into smaller parcels.¹³⁰ Exxon and Kufpec (Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Excavation Company) were

beaten, robbed and raped along the road by the SPLA and police. Crisis Group interviews, Murle civilians, Bor, Juba, November 2013.

¹²⁵ Internationals, including UN officials, shepherded this dangerous process along, with the support of researchers who divided the Murle into two groups and allocated “responsibility” for cattle raiding and abductions to the lowland Murle. See Diana Felix Da Costa, “‘We Are One but We Are Different’: Murle Identity and Local Peacebuilding in Jonglei State, South Sudan”, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 13 June 2013. This view was refuted by senior anthropologists. See Jon Arensen, “Highland Murle”, September 2013 (hardcopy on file with Crisis Group). There were also several cases in which highland Murle had abducted Jiye children. Crisis Group interviews, civilians, Boma town, Upper Boma and Nawayapuru, November 2013.

¹²⁶ Some may have believed this but Crisis Group was unable to locate any civilians whose reasons for ethnically differentiating themselves from the lowland Murle were anything other than related to the issues the lowland Murle had with the Jonglei government. Crisis Group interviews, Juba, June-July 2013; Boma town and Upper Boma, November 2013.

¹²⁷ Crisis Group interviews, Juba, Boma town, Upper Boma November 2013.

¹²⁸ As discussed above, control over customs revenues is one of the sticking points in discussions over the GPAA. Murle, Jiye, Kachipo, other South Sudanese groups and some Ethiopians work in the mines. Crisis Group interviews, SPLA officers, Jonglei state officials, Murle civilians, international analysts, Boma, Pibor, Bor and Juba, November 2013-September 2014. Douglas Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 165; “YauYau speaks about new Pibor administration”, Radio Tamazuj. Prior to 2011, all gold exported from Boma would have been considered Sudanese. “City of gold: Why Dubai’s first conflict gold audit never saw the light of day”, Global Witness, February 2014.

¹²⁹ Al-Ain is based in Maruwa Hills, outside of Boma town in Pibor county. “An odd deal over land”, *The Economist*, 9 July 2009; “Review of South Sudan investment deals and contracts”, Sudan Tribune, 27 February 2011; “State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2012 - South Sudan”, Minority Rights Group International, 28 June 2012; “More cases of land grabs in South Sudan”, South Sudan News Agency, 26 March 2013; “Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa - Country Report: South Sudan”, Oakland Institute, 6 December 2011.

¹³⁰ Total has held Block B since the 1980s. Exploration has been limited given continuing insecurity and local community concerns. Crisis Group Report, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, *op. cit.*, fn. 120.

brought in, but by August 2014, Exxon had pulled out.¹³¹ At the same time, delays in starting oil production meant that oil from Block B could not be used to fund a new pipeline (that did not pass through Sudan), a key objective of Khartoum’s policy toward South Sudan.¹³²

Many Murle do not oppose mining, tourism or oil exploration but credible environmental impact assessments and public contract details are needed to ensure their informed consent.¹³³ Most believe their resources are being taken for the benefit of the Bor Dinka and link the 2012-2013 state-sponsored violence to an attempt to undermine their ability to assert a stake in economic and political activities. Some have demonstrated their willingness to take up arms in response.

2. Jiye

The Jiye, a small community, reside in Pibor’s eastern Boma plateau, primarily in Kassingor payam. They experience multiple levels of marginalisation – not only by the national and state governments, but also within Pibor by the Murle.¹³⁴ Unlike the Anuyak (Section IV.B.3), they continue to fight the government and their neighbours to secure their rights.

The Jiye have defended themselves against raiding by the larger Murle community for cattle and children, while the Murle claim they are also responsible for raiding.¹³⁵ At the same time, the Jiye have had a difficult relationship with the largely Dinka SPLA units that have occupied Boma since 1984. Conflict with the SPLA has been related to cattle raiding in which the SPLA destroyed Jiye villages.¹³⁶

As conflict between the government and the SSDA-CF spread east toward Boma in early 2013, the government sought to exploit historic Murle-Jiye tensions. Senior SPLA officers visited Kassingor to mobilise and arm the Jiye.¹³⁷ Two of the major Jiye clans joined the SPLA in devastating attacks on Murle cattle camps.¹³⁸ Hundreds were killed in a single reported attack on Lazach in early 2013 and tens of thousands of cattle stolen.¹³⁹ Later in 2013, the Jiye clan closest to Lazach approached Baba Majong, the senior Murle leader affiliated to the SSDA-CF, and requested peace.¹⁴⁰

The agreement between the government and Murle has now put the other Jiye in a precarious position. If it holds, it is anticipated the Murle will turn their attention

¹³¹ “Exxon ends oil search with Total in South Sudan as war rages”, Bloomberg, 14 August 2014.

¹³² *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, op. cit., p. 10

¹³³ “The Land Act”, Laws of Southern Sudan, 2009; “Chapter II: Land Ownership, Tenure and Natural Resources”, The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011.

¹³⁴ The Jiye have almost no representation in the state or national government. Crisis Group Report, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, op. cit., p. 10. Also residing in Boma plateau are the Kachipo.

¹³⁵ One such instance occurred in March 2011 when the SPLA destroyed the major Jiye village of Nayapuru following a dispute between the Jiye and Toposa of Eastern Equatoria state. Civilians reported the use of RPGs and other heavy weaponry against the village while civilians were present. Crisis Group interviews, Jiye, Murle leaders, Boma, November 2014; Crisis Group interview, UN official, November 2014.

¹³⁶ “Climate Change and Inter-Community Conflict over Natural Resources in Jonglei State, South Sudan”, Minority Rights Group International, 5 January 2012.

¹³⁷ Crisis Group interviews, Boma, November 2013.

¹³⁸ Crisis Group interviews, Jiye and Murle officials, Boma, November 2013.

¹³⁹ Crisis Group interviews, international experts, Murle civilians, Juba, Boma, November 2013.

¹⁴⁰ This peace continues to hold despite the tensions between the Murle and the other Jiye clans. Crisis Group interview, Jiye official and UN official, Juba, November 2013.

to the Jiye. Many do not wish to be part of the GPAA, want their own county and they and some Murle have suggested that they should return to their “home” area of Lopet in Eastern Equatoria state.¹⁴¹ At the same time, elements within the government continue to instrumentalise the Jiye to destabilise the GPAA. How the Jiye respond to ongoing efforts from some SPLA elements to pit them against the Murle and how the Murle incorporate the Jiye into the GPAA will determine their relationship with the state and national governments.

3. Anuyak

The Anuyak live in Pochalla and Akobo counties in eastern Jonglei and, like the Nuer, there is a substantial population across the border in Ethiopia.¹⁴² Relations between Anuyak and Nuer in Ethiopia and Sudan are deeply intertwined.¹⁴³ Anuyak involvement in South Sudan’s armed movements began with their support for Anyanya I and Pochalla became one of the SPLA’s first bases.¹⁴⁴ The Sudanese government retook Pochalla in 1992 with the support of some Ethiopian Anuyak and it fell again to the SPLA in 1996.¹⁴⁵ The Anuyak suffered at the hands of both the SPLA and Khartoum and experienced repeated displacements, including from all but one payam of Akobo, an historic Anuyak homeland.

¹⁴¹ “Jie community distance themselves from govt – YauYau peace deal”, South Sudan Tribune, 30 May 2014; “Greater Pibor head calls for patience among Jie community”, Sudan Tribune, 23 August 2014.

¹⁴² The Anuyak, Anuak, Anyuak or Anywaa are a Luo Nilotic group that lives on the border of Ethiopia and South Sudan. Following a period of migration from the south west, the Anuyak occupied the western areas of the Sobat river beginning in the sixteenth century. By the eighteenth century they were pushed east by groups of Abialang, Ager, Dongjol, and Nyiel Dinka. The Anuyak migrated toward the middle and eastern parts of the Sobat and then further toward the Pibor river, Adura island and the plains along the current South Sudanese/Ethiopian border. They rely to a greater extent on agriculture than their Nuer neighbours and encroachments have threatened a complex system of environment protection to ensure grasslands and forests remain a source of livelihood. Gabriel Giet Jal, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-130.

¹⁴³ Gunther Schlee and Elizabeth E. Watson (eds.), *Changing Identifications and Alliances in Northeast Africa* (New York, 2009); Douglas Johnson, *op. cit.*; “Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia”, Human Rights Watch, September 1991, pp. 285-286. Pressure on land and the influx of other peoples led the Anuyak to feel they are a minority in local governance structures where they should be a majority. Nuer encroachment was exacerbated by the Sudanese civil wars and Ethiopian conflicts. During the Addis Ababa period (1972-1983), Lou Nuer were able to draw boundaries to increase their representation, begin to take over governance of Akobo and, amid allegations of Sudanese government complicity, repeatedly attack Anuyak civilians. Following the Derg takeover in Ethiopia, Anuyak formed the Gambella People’s Liberation Movement (GPLM) to fight the Derg, resist the displacement of Anuyak caused by the forced resettlement of non-Anuyak and displacement and abuses associated with the opening of SPLA bases and camps hosting more than 150,000 Sudanese in Gambella. In response, the Derg promoted Nuer interests in Gambella. Following the Derg’s fall in 1991, the GPLM took power in Gambella and fought with remaining elements of the Derg and SPLA to secure their withdrawal. Within a few years, amid conflict with the Nuer and a tense relationship with the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the GPLM fell out of favour in Addis. Some former GPLM and others, such as the Gambella People’s Liberation Front, have engaged in armed rebellion against Ethiopia from Anuyak areas in Sudan.

¹⁴⁴ Soldiers in the 105th garrison based in Pochalla crossed into Ethiopia and met with defectors from the 105th garrisons in Bor and Pibor, Anyanya II forces and others in Bilpham where they formed the core of the SPLA and operated until they were forced to leave Ethiopia in 1991 after the Derg’s fall. Robert O. Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan* (Cambridge, 2008), p. 139.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

While the CPA brought relative peace to the Anuyak, many feel marginalised at all levels of governance, and land appropriation by Lou Nuer in Akobo remains unaddressed. Jonglei’s Dinka governors appointed Pochalla’s local government officials and the SPLA garrison was largely non-Anuyak.¹⁴⁶ During the 2012 All-Jonglei Peace Conference, Anuyak unsuccessfully sought to table the land issue, and citizens launched several complaints against appointed officials and the behaviour of the SPLA Pochalla garrison.¹⁴⁷ Given these grievances, the SSDA-CF was able to successfully recruit small numbers of Anuyak.¹⁴⁸ Amid months of heavy fighting with the SSDA-CF and rising tensions, in July 2013 the SPLA shot at a convoy carrying the Anuyak king.¹⁴⁹ The Akobo land issue also reached a boiling point in October 2013 when Lou Nuer youth killed the Anuyak paramount chief prompting thousands to flee to Ethiopia.¹⁵⁰

The Anuyak of Pochalla are now part of the GPAA, although their level of representation in GPAA structures remains to be seen. Smaller numbers of Anuyak joined the SPLA-IO while the SPLA maintains a garrison there.¹⁵¹ The land issue remains unresolved but, in the midst of the larger civil war, the Anuyak, Lou Nuer and Murle have agreed to keep all quiet on Jonglei’s eastern front. Similar land issues, such as with the Shilluk in Upper Nile, have already led to violent conflict while others remain boiling beneath the surface. The failure to engage those with serious grievances but not yet fighting leaves a major source of future conflict unaddressed.

C. UNMISS under Fire

Following the outbreak of war in December 2013, UNMISS was attacked in Akobo county, when Nuer learned of the killings of their kinsmen in Juba.¹⁵² Dinka civilians, officials and National Security members took shelter inside the UNMISS base in Akobo.¹⁵³ A revenge attack was organised and civilians, including a UN interna-

¹⁴⁶ Non-Anuyak National Security officials and SPLA officers in Pochalla confirmed the unpopularity of the local government. Crisis Group analyst observations in another capacity, Pochalla, September 2013.

¹⁴⁷ Following the 2012 peace process, the Anuyak representatives from Akobo were among the few participants who returned and fully briefed their community. They began to organise themselves and establish representative structures to address unresolved issues with land and representation in local government. Confidential report on file with Crisis Group.

¹⁴⁸ Crisis Group interviews, SSDA-CF peace delegates, Joseph Lilimoy and Khalid Butros, Addis Ababa, January 2013.

¹⁴⁹ The Anuyak stated it was an assassination attempt while the SPLA said it was an accidental shooting by drunk soldiers traumatised by the heavy fighting with the SSDA-CF. Following the incident the SPLA commander forbade soldiers from carrying their weapons outside the barracks. The king fled to North America. “Anuak king survives assassination attempt in South Sudan”, press release, South Sudan News Agency, 27 June 2013; Crisis Group analyst interviews in another capacity, SPLA commander and national security officials, Pochalla, September 2013.

¹⁵⁰ “Report on Communal Violence between Anuak – Nuer (Chieng – Yoang Clan), Akobo County”, National Assembly of the Republic of South Sudan, October 2013; “Jonglei: Anuak paramount chief killed in Akobo fighting”, *Sudan Tribune*, 6 October 2013.

¹⁵¹ “125 soldiers defect from SPLA in Pochalla”, Radio Tamazuj, 25 March 2014.

¹⁵² Crisis Group interviews, SPLM-IO County Commissioner Koang Rambang, civilians, participants in the attack, Akobo, March 2014; “UNMISS issues preliminary account of Akobo base attack”, press release, UNMISS, 20 December 2013; “Security Council statement on UNMISS ambush,” op. cit.

¹⁵³ The predominantly Nuer community viewed the officials as “imposed” on them by the Dinka-led state government, had previously requested their removal and saw them as symbols of their subjugation. Exacerbating the matter at the time, the Nuer county commissioner was not in Akobo and the appointed leadership of the Nuer and Anuyak area was Dinka.

tional staff who was not inside the mission’s compound, were indiscriminately killed.¹⁵⁴ UNMISS quickly withdrew from both Akobo and Yuai (following a shooting at a UNMISS helicopter there), leaving its vehicles (later used by the White Army in Akobo) and forcing UN humanitarians to negotiate their permanent return without the mission.¹⁵⁵

Throughout March and April 2014, Jonglei officials demanded the largely Nuer IDPs sheltering in UNMISS Bor base be moved.¹⁵⁶ Tensions grew when some celebrated the SPLA-IO capture of Bentiu, capital of Unity state, on 15 April. On 17 April, in a pre-planned attack, armed “protesters”, including uniformed officials and youth, breached the base perimeter in two locations.¹⁵⁷ Inside, men, women and children were attacked with machetes, axes, handguns, and semi-automatic weapons, in full sight of peacekeepers. Some UNMISS troops and a police unit fled further into the base. During the attack, Non-Violent Peaceforce, an NGO providing unarmed civilian protection, protected women and children against multiple groups of armed attackers while peacekeepers were nowhere to be seen.¹⁵⁸ Reportedly it took nearly 25 minutes for UN troops to return fire – when they did, some of the attackers were killed and the rest fled.¹⁵⁹

Due to the gravity of the attack and the perception that UNMISS was unable to protect itself, the UPDF then deployed in the areas of UNMISS’ perimeter. The deployment of Ethiopian troops to the UNMISS Bor base and their forward-leaning posture

¹⁵⁴ Attackers said they warned non-Nuer not to go to UNMISS but to go to the NGO compounds to avoid being targeted. Civilians, including Dinka, sheltering in areas other than the UNMISS base were not killed. Many Nuer expressed sympathy for the UNMISS soldiers saying they were killed because they did not understand they were protecting “bad people” otherwise they would have seen that it was wrong and that they should have known that taking these officials was taking sides in the war. This rhetoric of “political” civilians or armed actors, including former soldiers who are *hors de combat* under international law, taking shelter inside UNMISS, is common on all sides of the conflict. Crisis Group interviews, participants in the attack, civilians, Akobo, March 2014.

¹⁵⁵ According to local officials, UNMISS returned to Akobo only to “collect the bodies” and “lock the gate”. To maintain distinction from the peacekeeping mission, humanitarians only addressed the killing of humanitarian personnel with community leaders, and received a formal apology from community representatives, including the county commissioner (who had returned to Akobo) and chiefs. The commissioner promised security for humanitarian staff, leaving any eventual return of the mission to Akobo subject to a separate discussion. Crisis Group interviews, UN officials, SPLM-IO County Commissioner Koang Rambang, Akobo, March 2014.

¹⁵⁶ The officials said that they were “deserters”, “White Army”, responsible for the “killings and looting” in and around Bor, and that they had “2,000 or more weapons” in the base. Three days in a row in March, civilians were “disappeared” by uniformed officials outside of the Protection of Civilians site forcing the base gate to be temporarily closed. Two were returned, but a body, believed to be of the third, was found several months later. Crisis Group interview, civilian, Bor, July 2014; “South Sudan’s New War: Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces”, Human Rights Watch, 11 August 2014, p. 54.

¹⁵⁷ Crisis Group interview, civilian, Bor, July 2014. The attackers had been preparing for weeks, requesting weapons from senior government officials. The defence minister refused, saying “I told them if they want guns to join the army. Otherwise these weapons will only be turned on other civilians for revenge”. Crisis Group interview, defence minister, Kuol Manyang Juuk, March 2014.

¹⁵⁸ Crisis Group interviews, Nuer community leaders, Nairobi, May 2014; Non-Violent Peaceforce staff, April, August 2014. 46 people were confirmed killed in the attack, while some suggest the real figure is 100 or more. “South Sudan’s New War”, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

¹⁵⁹ At least one of these attackers was reportedly a government official. Many Bor civilians suggest that the killings of the Dinka attackers created greater hostility toward the UN and Nuer IDPs inside, making a future attack all the more likely. “Update from South Sudan- April 21, 2014”, Non-violent Peaceforce, 21 April 2014; Crisis Group interviews, Bor youth, April-July 2014.

has, for the moment, deterred another attack but the threat remains significant in Bentiu and Malakal.¹⁶⁰

Following the attack, IDPs in the UNMISS Bor base felt unsafe and took substantial risks to get out; they sought to travel first to Juba and then leave the country. Officials in Bor required these civilians to obtain a stamped travel permit – for a fee – and up to 500 “aspiring refugees” have undergone this process.¹⁶¹

Alarming, the attacks on UNMISS in Akobo and Bor were for sheltering IDPs who are seen to have political affiliations or ethnicities that make them legitimate targets. Senior politicians and military leaders continue to use rhetoric that signals that these bases are legitimate targets rather than protected sites. Further attacks on civilians under UNMISS protection remain likely.

D. *A Collapsed Economy and Constrained Humanitarian Response*

The civil war created a profound, man-made humanitarian crisis. The impact in Jonglei comes after five prior years of conflict that displaced hundreds of thousands, destroyed health facilities and left parts of the central Lou Nuer areas in a perpetual state of malnutrition.¹⁶² The war has devastated much of the state’s economy, impeded trade and left displaced people unable to plant. A famine is quite likely. Care of the war-affected population is largely left to the international community and humanitarian organisations.

Despite the amount of humanitarian assistance flowing to South Sudan, organisations have long struggled in Jonglei, and most agencies remain poorly staffed and unable to manage risk and operate effectively amid armed conflict. UN and NGO leaders have concentrated on “firefighting” at the expense of forward planning.¹⁶³ Aid agencies are focused on providing assistance at static locations, such as the UNMISS base in Bor and the IDP camp in Minkaman (where Dinka from Bor fled), and it took until March 2014 for a major UN operation to begin in opposition-held areas in northern Jonglei.¹⁶⁴ The government’s insistence that no famine declarations be made without “political endorsement” raises further concerns about humanitarians’ ability to operate in an extremely complex environment where they are subject to increasing restriction and attempts to utilise assistance for political objectives.¹⁶⁵

While all armed actors, including the White Army and Dak Kueth, have promised unfettered humanitarian access, the reality is more complicated.¹⁶⁶ The SPLA, SPLA-IO and White Army are all responsible for destroying humanitarian facilities and

¹⁶⁰ Crisis Group interviews, civilians in Bor, October 2014; UN officials, November 2014.

¹⁶¹ Many try to fly to Juba where they will take refuge in the UNMISS base, which is adjacent to the airport. The flights are prohibitively expensive and civilians often spend months accumulating the funds to make the journey. Crisis Group interviews, civilians, June, August 2014.

¹⁶² “South Sudan’s Hidden Crisis”, op. cit.; “South Sudan violence hits MSF aid near Pibor”, BBC, 30 September 2012; “South Sudan: Violence a ‘hidden crisis’ in Jonglei”, Médecins sans frontières, 27 November 2012.

¹⁶³ Crisis Group interviews, UN officials and NGO staff, Juba, February 2014; Akobo, March 2014; Nairobi, May-June 2014.

¹⁶⁴ Crisis Group interviews, WFP and UNICEF officials, Akobo, March 2014.

¹⁶⁵ “Statement to Food Security Stakeholders in the Republic of South Sudan”, Republic of South Sudan Food Security Council (RSSFSC), RSS/RSSFSC/SGO/A-14, 22 July 2014.

¹⁶⁶ Crisis Group interviews, senior SPLA leaders, Juba, January-February 2014; SPLA-IO, December 2013-January 2014; White Army leaders and Dak Kueth, Akobo, March 2014.

massive looting.¹⁶⁷ The government has impeded operations in opposition-held areas and sought to exploit assistance. When the SPLA captured Ayod town in May it demanded humanitarians deliver food. A UN mission assessed there were few remaining civilians and thus it was not a priority, particularly given the risk of diversion to armed actors. The government threatened to expel the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) from Jonglei. It took humanitarians more than a month to reach the IDPs from Ayod who had been displaced into rural areas and by that point there were thousands of malnourished children.¹⁶⁸ Traders also report being prohibited from bringing food into opposition-held areas of northern Jonglei.¹⁶⁹ As a mother of four struggling to feed her malnourished children said, “at the market there is nothing for us, there is only beer, milk and bullets for the soldiers”.¹⁷⁰

Ending the war is the first step to preventing famine but, in the absence of peace, humanitarians must become better at managing risk and more operationally astute, maintain neutrality, respond appropriately to the increasingly restrictive political environment and plan on the basis of realistic assessments of the conflict’s trajectory.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁷ The White Army is also responsible for the killing of an International Medical Corps and International Labor Organization staff in Akobo and a Pact, Inc., staff in Twic East in December 2013; neither were killed due to their status as aid workers. The SPLA was also responsible for some of the looting and destruction of humanitarian facilities that took place in Bor. “Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council on crisis in South Sudan”, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, 24 December 2014; Tweet by Pact, Inc., @PactSouthSudan, 10:40pm, 8 January 2014; Crisis Group interviews, UN officials, Pact staff, Nairobi, December 2013.

¹⁶⁸ “South Sudan Crisis”, Situation Report no. 35, UN OCHA, 9 May 2014. With millions in need of assistance, an entire distribution for 50 households is not an effective use of resources. Eventually, an NGO provided assistance to the 50 civilian households in Ayod, ending the standoff. Crisis Group interview, UN official, August 2014. “Jonglei government severs ties with UN agency”, Sudan Tribune, 4 July 2014.

¹⁶⁹ Crisis Group interviews, civilians, November–December 2014.

¹⁷⁰ Crisis Group interview, displaced woman, Jonglei, April 2014.

¹⁷¹ Situational awareness is critical to humanitarians’ ability to operate effectively in conflict zones and change the culture of risk-averseness. For example, humanitarians should have been able to operate with little disruption in the Mabaan refugee camps but agencies should have heeded warning signs, including from the UN, that Nuer national staff would not be safe there and relocated them before the violence that killed Nuer aid workers in August 2014.

V. Beyond the Ethnic Paradigm: Managing Local War and Peace in Jonglei

While the civil war’s ethnic dimensions are critically important, reducing it to an “ethnic war” is not consistent with the more complex realities of conflict, cooperation and peace between communities. Below are examples of different ethnic communities across frontlines that see it in their interest to avoid conflict with their neighbours and the challenges they face in maintaining peaceful relationships. Churches have played a critical role in spreading the message of these agreements and, alongside chiefs, are often critical interlocutors and guarantors of agreements. IGAD and international partners can learn from the success and challenges of these peace and alliance formation processes – all spearheaded by South Sudanese – as they broaden political dialogue with communities across the country.

These initiatives are best led by South Sudanese but should be far better connected to the overarching process in Ethiopia. Indeed, many grievances can only be addressed at the national level and a better understanding of the differences between local- and national-level questions would enable a more strategic, multi-layered response. At the same time, genuine peace processes are few and far between and groups continuously assess their alliances and make and break them frequently. Both Kiir and Machar have built their military coalitions based on these shifting sands and any deal between the two could fall apart if their constituent groups do not see an advantage for themselves – all the more reason for systematic engagement at the community level.

A. *Twic East, Duk and the Lou Nuer*

Twic East county is in the middle of the three Dinka counties of Greater Bor – the other two are Duk and Bor South – and is the home of the late SPLM/A leader John Garang and Majak D’Agoot, now one of the former SPLM Detainees, who form an important faction at the peace negotiations in Ethiopia. When war broke out, D’Agoot was arrested and the Garang family was under threat. The Twic East county community maintained a policy of non-aggression with the neighbouring Lou Nuer predicated on previous years of political alliance formation.¹⁷² Some in Twic East openly supported the SPLM/A-IO, including Garang’s son, Mabior Garang, who joined the group, while his widow, Rebecca Garang, has remained nominally independent though close to the former SPLM Detainees.

Many in Twic East saw the conflict as “brought by those of Bahr el Ghazal” and did not want to fight a war to preserve Kiir’s presidency when most favoured change.¹⁷³ The non-aggression policy survived the perhaps accidental UPDF aerial bombardment of a peace meeting between Twic East and Lou Nuer youth and the killings of Twic East civilians by the White Army in late December 2013. To date, Twic East has not suffered the scale of attacks, destruction and death that opposition, particularly

¹⁷² As a youth representative from Twic East stated, the arrest of Majak D’Agoot was like a “slap in the face” from Kiir to the community. Crisis Group interview, June 2014.

¹⁷³ Crisis Group interviews, Twic East youth representatives, January 2014; Crisis Group Report, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, op. cit., p. 11.

the Lou White Army, levelled on Bor South.¹⁷⁴ Duk also sought to remain neutral; areas in eastern Duk (Pajut) declared themselves aligned with the opposition but they did not take up arms against their Dinka neighbours.¹⁷⁵

Following further Dinka-Nuer conflict targeting Nuer in the SPLA in Juba in March 2014, Gawaar Nuer youth from Ayod, as well as other opposition elements, attacked Duk county. Some armed youth from Twic East joined Duk youth to defend their county against attacks that continued throughout April.¹⁷⁶ Senior political figures from the area said that the youth “had to fight” as the SPLA was not present to defend the community.¹⁷⁷ Government officials claim that opposition forces first attacked Twic East on 3 April, killing 30 in Wernyol – the first opposition attack on Twic East since the war began – but the SPLA-IO denies it was involved.¹⁷⁸ There have been no further incidents and both sides prefer not to fight one another, each viewing their interests elsewhere. Unlike the agreement between the Lou Nuer and Murle, based primarily on local interests, the relative quiet between the Nuer and Dinka around Twic East is more closely related to the national-level political position of each groups’ leaders, demonstrating the evolving nature of conflict between communities and their leadership.

B. *Pigi Dinka and Lou and Gawaar Nuer*

The Dinka Padang of Pigi county in northern Jonglei are a different group from the Greater Bor Dinka and are bordered by Gawaar Nuer on the west and Lou Nuer to the east. Pigi is divided into two areas, Khorflus, the home of the late George Athor, and Atar, the home of Gier Chang, one of the SPLM Detainees; the two communities have been at odds with one another for years and remain heavily armed and mobilised.¹⁷⁹ Being situated between two Nuer communities is an incentive to join the opposition or remain neutral. Pigi also has its own grievances stemming from the abusive counter-insurgency campaign against Athor (Section I.A) and Gier’s arrest in December 2013. Some Pigi Dinka have facial scarification similar to the Nuer and

¹⁷⁴ Crisis Group interviews, civilians from Duk, Twic East, and Bor, SPLA-IO officials, government officials, January-June 2014. Civilians from Duk described how opposition forces even destroyed large trees for which the county was famous.

¹⁷⁵ Crisis Group interview, Duk youth leaders, Nairobi, August 2014; international analyst, December 2014.

¹⁷⁶ “South Sudanese rebels advance on Jonglei’s Duk county”, Sudan Tribune, 26 March 2014. “Heavy fighting erupts in Juba military barracks: witnesses”, Sudan Tribune, 5 March 2014. Nuer residents took up arms against the closest Dinka community, which was in Duk. Lou reportedly joined the offensive later. “South Sudan: Over 30 civilians killed in Jonglei’s Duk County – Officials”, Sudan Tribune, 31 March 2014; “South Sudan: Rebels say on ‘rescue mission’ to Bor”, Sudan Tribune, 22 April 2014.

¹⁷⁷ Crisis Group interviews, Hon. Deng Dau, Juba, 2014. “Dozens wounded, scores dead in Duk clashes”, South Sudan Today, 1 April 2014.

¹⁷⁸ The SPLA-IO says the attack was a local conflict not an “official” SPLA-IO attack. Some Dinka from the area confirm that it was a more localised conflict between Duk and, on the other side, Ayod youth and the Gawaar White Army that spilled over into Twic East and later escalated to involve the Lou Nuer White Army and SPLA-IO forces. Crisis Group interviews, youth from Twic East, former officials from Pigi, and international experts, June 2014; “S. Sudanese rebels blame armed youth over Jonglei’s Twic East killings”, Sudan Tribune, 4 April 2014.

¹⁷⁹ Crisis Group interviews, former Pigi county official, June 2014.

were mistakenly killed during the Juba Massacre. As a youth leader from Khorflus put it, “Machar found us when we were already unhappy with Juba”.¹⁸⁰

Early in the war, a local agreement between the Pigi Dinka and both the Gawaar and Lou Nuer prevented the type of large-scale violence that took place in Bor and Baliet.¹⁸¹ The White Army asserted that despite the violence committed by Dinka against Nuer in other parts of South Sudan, the Pigi Dinka would not be attacked, hoping that this already aggrieved community would join the SPLM/A-IO.¹⁸² The community in Pigi provided food to opposition forces in the area as well as Nuer civilians fleeing the fighting in Malakal, Upper Nile state.¹⁸³ Within months of his return to Greater Fangak, northern Jonglei state, General Gabriel Tanginye asked them to “declare themselves” and many joined the SPLA-IO.¹⁸⁴ The defection of SPLA General Dau Deng, who fought under Athor to the SPLA-IO in August 2014, is further indication that the armed youth and Athor’s former fighters from Khorflus are more formally fighting alongside the opposition and perhaps in larger numbers.¹⁸⁵

A smaller number of Pigi citizens fled to Melut in Upper Nile state and have organised themselves into one of the many eastern Dinka pro-government militias.¹⁸⁶ Despite efforts on all sides, there has been sporadic violence between the Lou Nuer and Pigi Dinka, at the outset of the war and again in July 2014, which also targeted civilians.¹⁸⁷ Thereafter General Gabriel Duop Lam, the civilian governor, took action to quell reprisals and ensure Pigi did not defect back to the government.¹⁸⁸ Divisions within Pigi and the careful negotiations between the community and a largely Nuer opposition are constantly evolving and are part of a broader effort by the SPLA-IO to ensure the two allied Dinka groups (the other is in northern Bahr el Ghazal state) remain with the movement. Government offensives in late November into Pigi and neighbouring Fangak counties have split territorial control of Pigi between the SPLA-IO and government and it remains to be seen if the civilians and armed youth of Pigi will maintain this alliance following the outbreak of conflict in their area.

¹⁸⁰ Crisis Group interviews, Pigi youth leader, September 2014; civilians from Pigi, January, June 2014.

¹⁸¹ “Fighting not Talking”, Crisis Group’s blog, In Pursuit of Peace (blog.crisisgroup.org), 13 May 2014.

¹⁸² This was also confirmed by SPLA-IO officials. Crisis Group interviews, White Army leaders, Akobo, April 2014; SPLA-IO officials, Nairobi, May-June 2014.

¹⁸³ Crisis Group interview, SPLM-IO delegate to the peace talks, Nairobi, June 2014. Crisis Group Reports, *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name, Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan*, both op. cit.; “Gabriel Tang Gatwich Chan (“Tang-Ginye”)”, HSBA, Small Arms Survey, March 2011.

¹⁸⁴ There was hesitation to accept Tanginye due to his role in the violence against the Dinka Padang during the counter-insurgency campaign against Athor. Tanginye led forces in a violent campaign against Athor following Athor’s killing of members of his family at the outset of the conflict.

¹⁸⁵ “Senior South Sudan military official joins rebels”, Sudan Tribune, 10 August 2014; Tweet by Mabior Garang, @TaoOfGarang, chairperson, National Committee for Information and Public Relations, SPLM/SPLA-IO; 11:01am, 9 August 2014.

¹⁸⁶ These civilians describe atrocities committed by the White Army early in the fighting but these accounts have not been corroborated by government or opposition officials nor other civilians from the area. Crisis Group interviews, international analyst, UN officials, SPLA officials, SPLA-IO officials, civilians from Pigi, August-September 2014.

¹⁸⁷ Crisis Group interview, former Pigi county official, June 2014.

¹⁸⁸ Crisis Group interview, SPLA-IO official, September 2014.

C. *Murle and Lou Nuer*

In the last months of 2013, before the outbreak of war, Machar backed efforts to establish a peace between the Lou and Murle, and Murle SSDA-CF leader David Yau Yau responded positively, contributing to the local peace following the outbreak of war in December 2013.¹⁸⁹ Lou and Murle community leaders met in several locations along their border in early 2014 to secure this peace.¹⁹⁰ Trade by land and river re-started, giving civilians at risk of famine critical access to food. Despite differences between Murle age-sets, there is a widespread consensus that they have little to gain by taking sides while the “elephants are fighting” and the Lou are loath to fight on a second front, especially given their territorial losses since late January.¹⁹¹

A Nuer intellectual says the Murle believe that “the Dinka Bor were behind all of our [ie, Nuer] attacks, even the ones that we started. We let them think this, it makes peace easier”.¹⁹² Despite this, there have been small Murle raids into Lou areas. Following one in June, Lou Nuer came to Pibor and successfully obtained the return of the raided cattle, a sign of the agreement’s strength.¹⁹³

However, women, children and cattle have not been returned and there has been no reconciliation or compensation for the years of violence between the communities.¹⁹⁴ Without these, this peace is unlikely to hold, and leaders and churches on both sides, recognising this, are making nascent efforts to deepen the process.¹⁹⁵ Government attempts to use Murleland to launch attacks into Akobo, the SPLA-IO’s last semi-urban stronghold, during the upcoming dry season will likely force the Murle to make difficult choices among their alliances.

The border between the Murle and Greater Bor Dinka has been quieter in recent years.¹⁹⁶ However, following the outbreak of war, Murle reportedly raided into Bor South in January 2014 and Twic East in February and March 2014.¹⁹⁷ The peace between Murle and Lou Nuer is largely a result of an agreement to protect their mutual

¹⁸⁹ Donors supported these efforts but they contributed to some security officials’ suspicions about Machar’s intentions. Crisis Group interviews, security officials, Juba, January, April 2014.

¹⁹⁰ Crisis Group interviews, Jonglei, April 2014; Kampala, September 2014.

¹⁹¹ Crisis Group interviews, Murle elders and SSDM-CF representatives, Juba, Addis Ababa, January 2014.

¹⁹² Crisis Group interview, Nuer intellectual, Kampala, September 2014.

¹⁹³ Crisis Group interview, Nuer civilians, August 2014.

¹⁹⁴ Given the precarious national situation, many are hesitant to begin a process that would require admissions of guilt, opening the door to revenge attacks, and the return of women, children and cattle – valuable resources in a time of great scarcity. Crisis Group interviews, Murle, Lou Nuer and Dinka Bor community and women’s representatives, Pibor, January 2014; Akobo, March 2014; Nairobi, June 2014.

¹⁹⁵ Crisis Group interviews, Nuer and Murle community leaders, September 2014.

¹⁹⁶ Years of conflict have depopulated parts of eastern Bor South due to fear of Murle raids. Edward Thomas, *The Slow Liberation of South Sudan* (forthcoming, London, 2015), ch. 9.

¹⁹⁷ During the raid into Kolnyang in Bor several children were abducted, including some who were related to a U.S.-South Sudanese citizen. The family is pressuring the U.S. government to locate the children and secure their safe return, but this will be difficult in Jonglei’s vast and remote areas, where thousands of children and women have been abducted and few ever returned; locating the children and securing their release will be difficult. Crisis Group interviews, U.S. government official, journalists, and Bor and Twic community members, Nairobi, June-July 2014; “Another lost generation in Sudan”, *Boston Globe*, 14 February 2014; “Nearly 30 killed in Jonglei’s Kolnyang attack”, *Sudan Tribune*, 7 February 2014; “Jonglei’s Twic East hit by raids and abductions, many displaced”, *Sudan Tribune*, 27 February 2014; “Jonglei: Three killed and two injured in Twic East raid”; *Sudan Tribune*, 19 March 2014.

interests in the midst of the larger civil war while the absence of any such deal between the Murle and Greater Bor Dinka, and the belief that the latter are undermining the GPAA, means violence between the two communities is likely to continue.

D. Lakes State Dinka and Southern Unity State Nuer

Local peace deals between Dinka, Nuer and other groups are also made elsewhere. The appointed governor of predominantly-Dinka Lakes state made clear that he would not tolerate ethnic reprisals against Nuer. Lakes youth have repeatedly resisted forced SPLA recruitment and many are more focused on their grievances against the governor that have led to a low-level rebellion.¹⁹⁸ Not part of the SPLA-IO conflict with Kiir, it is related to the removal of former Governor Chuol Tong Mayay, who is affiliated with the former SPLM Detainees, but has its roots in political conflict between Lakes Dinka clans.

There are a series of border agreements between Nuer areas of southern Unity and Dinka areas of north-eastern Lakes, with mutually beneficial trade and movement between the two areas and, as a humanitarian said, “if famine is avoided in parts of southern Unity it will be as much to do with Nuer access to markets in Lakes as humanitarian aid”.¹⁹⁹ Despite minor incidents along the border, the rainy season provided a physical barrier between the two communities and, like the other local peace or non-aggression agreements in the politically fraught environment of South Sudan, this peace is highly fragile.

¹⁹⁸ “Halting South Sudan’s Spreading Civil War”, op. cit.; “Lakes state governor to use force to recruit youth to join army”, Sudan Tribune, 5 June 2014.

¹⁹⁹ Crisis Group interview, humanitarian official, Nairobi, August 2014.

VI. Conclusion: Moving Forward

Reframing the IGAD process to more substantively engage with the leaders of various armed groups and hardliners within both the government and SPLM/A-IO is a critical task facing the mediation team. This requires an expansion of IGAD’s strategy for resolving South Sudan’s multi-layered conflict. The mediation team should expand its political presence, with dedicated staff, in the country to more directly engage with the various armed groups – including non-South Sudanese groups – beyond monitoring cessation of hostilities violations.

Most armed groups are not fighting for control of the government in Juba. Local issues, such as land, representation in state government, cycles of revenge violence and a sense of ethnic exclusion drive much of this conflict. Given these realities, it is not necessary or appropriate for these groups to participate in the talks in Ethiopia; rather, IGAD should engage them – and the communities that support them – on the ground. This is critical to building support for a future peace agreement and to ensuring Kiir and Machar are not able to use these groups to undermine talks or an agreement by playing to ethnic enmities or promising political rewards. Engaging these groups also lays the groundwork for the national political processes that must be part of a sustainable peace and enables planning for transitional arrangements that take into account these complex realities.

The international community has failed dismally over the past 25 years in its efforts to support the resolution of south-south conflict and the major successes in south-south peacemaking have been led by South Sudanese, with Kiir and Machar taking bold steps.²⁰⁰ Both leaders need to recall how South Sudan has benefited from their role as peacemakers in the past and step back from the war that is likely to intensify once again. More broadly, South Sudanese need to reclaim their role in shaping their political future. This is particularly true of the churches, which have historically led the way amid the daunting challenges of bringing peace between southerners.

IGAD should better understand and engage with South Sudanese processes while it refines its approach to the multiplicity of armed actors. This requires flexibility toward areas where local peace agreements can be made and supported versus those where violence, mistrust and deliberate instigation make the conflicts unlikely to be resolved through local-level peacemaking. With regional, national and communal armed groups fighting alongside one another in South Sudan, IGAD should enhance its approach, which already includes regional and national engagement, with engagement with armed groups across South Sudan to move the process forward toward a sustainable peace.


Nairobi/Brussels, 22 December 2014

²⁰⁰ This includes: Kiir’s provision of security against those wishing to attack the 1999 Wunlit Peace Conference, which led to a substantial reduction of hostilities between Dinka and Nuer following the 1991 split in the SPLA; Machar playing a mediating role between Garang and Kiir during the 2004 split between the two, which could have derailed the CPA process; and Kiir’s “Juba Declaration”, which paved the way for a relatively peaceful integration of largely Nuer units of the SSDA into the SPLA.

Appendix A: Map of South Sudan



Appendix B: Map of Areas of Control by Armed Groups in Jonglei



* At the time of publication, fighting is ongoing but the SPLA-IO are in primary control.

** At the time of publication, fighting is ongoing .

** Shared control pending military integration as per peace agreement.

Appendix C: Table 1: Areas of Control by Armed Groups in Jonglei


| Maintains Full Control/ Shared Control | County | | Official Armed Group ²⁰¹ |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Full Control | Bor South | | Government |
| Full Control | Twic East | | Government |
| Shared Control | Duk | Western Duk | Government |
| | | Areas of eastern Duk | SPLA-IO |
| Full Control | Pochalla | | Government |
| Shared Control Pending Military Integration as per Peace Agreement | Pibor | | Government |
| | | | SSDA-CF |
| Shared Control | Ayod | Ayod town | Government |
| | | Ayod countryside | SPLA-IO |
| Conflict Ongoing | Fangak | | SPLA-IO in primary control ²⁰² |
| Conflict Ongoing | Pigi | | Government/SPLA-IO ²⁰³ |
| Full Control | Nyirol | | SPLA-IO |
| Full Control | Uror | | SPLA-IO |
| Full Control | Akobo | | SPLA-IO |

²⁰¹ In some areas community defence forces have as much or greater control than the official armed groups.

²⁰² Fighting is ongoing at the time of publication.

²⁰³ Fighting is ongoing at the time of publication.

Appendix D: Map of Areas of Armed Violence in Jonglei since
15 December 2013



Appendix E: Table 2: Predominant Ethnic Groups by County

Jonglei state counties and their predominant ethnic sub-group(s) but small members of different groups live in different counties and others seasonally migrate to different counties:

| Counties | Predominant Ethnic Sub-groups |
|-----------|-------------------------------|
| Twic East | Dinka (Twic JS) |
| Duk | Dinka (Hol) |
| | Dinka (Nyarweng) |
| Bor South | Dinka (Bor) |
| Akobo | Nuer (Lou) |
| | Anuyak |
| Nyiroi | Nuer (Lou) |
| Uror | Nuer (Lou) |
| Pibor | Murle |
| | Jiye |
| | Kachipo |
| Pochalla | Anuyak |
| Ayod | Nuer (Gawaar) |
| Fangak | Nuer (Gawaar) |
| Pigi | Dinka (Padeng) |

Appendix F: Glossary

| | |
|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ACERWC | African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child |
| CCM | Chama Cha Mapinduzi |
| CPA | Comprehensive Peace Agreement |
| EPRDF | Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front |
| GPAA | Greater Pibor Administrative Area |
| GPC | Global Protection Cluster |
| GPLM | Gambella People’s Liberation Movement |
| HSBA | Human Security Baseline Assessment |
| ICC | International Criminal Court |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| KUFPEC | Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Company |
| LRA | Lord’s Resistance Army |
| MSF | Médecins sans frontières |
| PNG | Persona Non Grata |
| RSSFSC | Republic of South Sudan Food Security Council |
| SPLA | Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army |
| SPLM/A-IO | Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition |
| SSDA-CF | South Sudan Democratic Army-Cobra Faction, |
| SSDM/A | South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army |
| UNICEF | United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund |
| UNMAS | United Nations Mine Action Service |
| UNMISS | United Nations Mission in South Sudan |
| UNOCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UNSRSG | United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| UPDF | Uganda People’s Defence Force |
| WFP | World Food Programme |

Appendix G: About the International Crisis Group

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 125 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board of Trustees – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by former UN Deputy Secretary-General and Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Lord Mark Malloch-Brown, and Dean of Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po), Ghassan Salamé.

Crisis Group's President & CEO, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, assumed his role on 1 September 2014. Mr. Guéhenno served as the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations from 2000-2008, and in 2012, as Deputy Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on Syria. He left his post as Deputy Joint Special Envoy to chair the commission that prepared the white paper on French defence and national security in 2013.

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