East Africa: The roots of radicalism should inform government's response to
terror
* ANNELI BOTHA
* Africa <
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/section/africa/>
* 21 Oct 2014 10:48 (South Africa)
The Kenyan government's response to terrorism may have made the problem
worse, says a senior researcher from the Institute for Security Studies
(ISS), ANNELI BOTHA.
There has until now been very little research into why young Kenyan and
Somali men join al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). This
has led to limited understanding among government and Kenyan society of the
roots of radicalisation and terrorism.
But to deal with terrorism you have to understand where it comes from. I
recently concluded independent academic research, in two different studies
in Kenya and Uganda, followed by a third study in Somalia in partnership
with Finn Church Aid, which I hope will contribute to that understanding.
In the Kenyan research, with the assistance of the Kenyan Muslim Youth
Alliance, we interviewed 95 people associated with al-Shabaab, 45 associated
with the MRC, and relatives of people associated with the organisations.
We found that many Muslim youths joined extremist groups as a reaction to
the Kenyan government's collective punishment or assassination of their
religious leaders. It is clear, therefore, that government anti-terror
strategies based on mass arrests and racial profiling are counterproductive
and may drive individuals to extremism. Unless government changes its
approach, there is a real risk it will inspire a new cycle of radicalisation
and violence.
The MRC is often mistakenly associated with al-Shabaab, but our research
showed very clear differences in the type and motivation of people who join
the two organisations. The MRC is driven by ethnic and economic factors,
while al-Shabaab's core is radical Islam. The two have a common enemy in the
Kenyan government, but it would be a mistake to place extremists from both
groups under one banner.
Violent extremism in Kenya has since the 1990s lost its exclusively foreign
character, and national and regional extremism has expanded. While
al-Shabaab's roots are in Somalia, growing acceptance of al-Qaeda and
al-Shabaab's philosophy in traditional African communities has allowed it to
spread through the broader region, including Kenya.
The most dramatic manifestation of Al-Shabaab's abilities to strike beyond
Somalia came when it successfully executed suicide attacks in Kampala,
Uganda, on 11 July 2010, and the attack on the Westgate shopping mall on 21
September 2013 in Nairobi. Al-Shabaab was also implicated in smaller attacks
where Kenyans were the targets of improvised explosive devices and hand
grenade attacks.
In addition to being the victims, Kenyans and Ugandans were directly
involved in recruiting their fellow nationals to join al-Shabaab, some of
whom were used to execute attacks in their own countries.
"These radicalised individuals are identifying with something other than
being Kenyan. It shows that radicalisation will increase as long as Kenyan
citizens identify with an ethnic or religious identity that is perceived to
be under threat.
The assassination of Muslim leaders or scholars has radicalised and
recruited dozens, if not hundreds, of people into extremist organisations.
It is not only government and its security forces that treat people on the
fringes of society as the 'enemy', but also broader Kenyan society, which
perceives al-Shabaab as consisting only of Somali nationals or those who are
visibly Muslim.
Unfortunately, Kenyan government officials have to date mostly denied that
domestic circumstances contribute to the radicalisation of Kenyan nationals.
Some consider Kenya to be an innocent victim of conflict between the United
States and Islamic extremists, or think that Somalia is the beginning and
end of all its security problems. Only a few accept that Kenya is
experiencing internal problems.
Security in Kenya is also increasingly politicised, which affects the way
the government responds to terrorism. For example, following the killing of
at least 15 people in the village of Poromoko near Mpeketoni on the Kenyan
coast on 15 June 2014, President Uhuru Kenyatta blamed official political
opponents, even though al-Shabaab accepted responsibility.
Instead of attempting to bring people together, politicians are harnessing
political divisions for their own ends, which further threatens national
unity. As a result, the Kenyan leadership has not stepped in to address
growing radicalisation when firm action could still have prevented the
increase in attacks in Kenya.
Instead, local conditions have enabled growing frustrations to become worse,
enabling al-Shabaab to strengthen its foothold in the country.
During our study, most al-Shabaab and MRC respondents said what pushed them
to finally join radical organisations were injustices at the hands of Kenyan
security forces. People interviewed specifically referred to a perception of
'collective punishment'.
The single most important factor that drove respondents to join al-Shabaab,
according to 65% of respondents, was government's counter-terrorism
strategy. The worst example of a campaign of mass arrests came in April
2014, when Kenyan authorities arrested 4,005 Somali-looking individuals.
But lashing out against the collective is ineffective and counterproductive,
because a real danger exists that affected communities might see the need to
defend themselves, thus driving individuals to extremism.
Our research also looked at the role of religious identity in
radicalisation. Despite Kenya being a secular country, Muslims feel
discriminated against and are not well represented in key government
positions and institutions.
Revealingly, 73% of al-Shabaab respondents said they 'hated' other
religions. Asked to define the intensity of the conflict between Islam and
its enemies, 74% of respondents classified it as 'ongoing' and 26% as an
'all-out war'.
Nearly half of al-Shabaab respondents (49%) identified the government as the
source of the threat to their religion, followed by other religions (24%),
an external enemy (18%) and a combination of the government and others (9%).
The role of religion was again confirmed when respondents were asked why
they joined al-Shabaab - 87% of respondents cited religion. The role of a
religious figure in the recruitment process was also important, with 34% of
al-Shabaab respondents saying they were approached by a religious figure.
None of the MRC and only 1% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that they
trusted politicians, yet 22% of MRC respondents still believed that
elections could bring about change. Only 4% of al-Shabaab respondents had
the same trust in the political process.
It is clear that politicians and government face a serious legitimacy crisis
among individuals who ended up joining al-Shabaab and the MRC. Government
needs to create the necessary political space to permit the expression of
political frustrations and interests other than through the use of violence.
The research found no direct link between poverty and the reason why
respondents joined al-Shabaab and the MRC. However, uneven development and
subsequent relative deprivation played a prominent role among MRC
respondents.
Education or a lack thereof was identified as a crucial contributing factor
to relative deprivation. Overall, al-Shabaab respondents were better
educated than MRC respondents. The number of years a person spent at school
is therefore not the most important factor in preventing later
radicalisation - it is also the quality of education that determines its
value in preparing a person for a career.
More than half of respondents joined al-Shabaab and the MRC between the ages
of 10 and 24. Nearly all al-Shabaab (96%) and MRC (87%) respondents said
they had high levels of frustration when they joined the organisations,
illustrating the role emotions play in the radicalisation process.
Most al-Shabaab respondents (87%) referred to religion or the need to
respond to a threat to their religious identity as their motive for joining.
Only 4% of al-Shabaab respondents referred exclusively to economic reasons.
MRC respondents were motivated by a combination of ethnic, political and
economic reasons.
By contrast, economics were a much larger factor in recruitment to
al-Shabaab in Somalia, where researchers interviewed 88 former fighters in
Mogadishu in April 2014, in a separate study by the ISS and Finn Church Aid
that used the same methodology as the Kenya research. DM
Anneli Botha has been a senior researcher on terrorism at the Institute for
Security Studies in Pretoria since 2003. Her specific areas of interest are
counter-terrorism strategies and the underlying causes of terrorism and
radicalisation. A summary of her academic research findings has been
published by the ISS in a paper titled 'Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment
to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council'.
The ISS is an African organisation that aims to enhance human security on
the continent. It does independent and authoritative research, provides
expert policy analysis and advice, and delivers practical training and
technical assistance. The research in Kenya referred to here was
independently funded by the author as part of her academic research.
Received on Tue Oct 21 2014 - 13:07:52 EDT