The Rising Terrorist Threat in Tanzania: Domestic Islamist Militancy and
Regional Threats
How should the US respond to a growing number of Islamist attacks in
Tanzania? Andres LeSage thinks Washington should 1) pay attention to the
problem, particularly at the policy level, and 2) commit the intelligence,
law enforcement, and strategic communications assets that are needed to help
curb the violence.
By Andre LeSage for Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS)
20 October 2014
Despite its reputation for peace and stability in a troubled region, the
East African country of Tanzania is experiencing a rising number of militant
Islamist attacks that have targeted local Christian leaders and foreign
tourists, as well as popular bars and restaurants. These attacks, which
began in 2012, rarely make the headlines of international media. However,
they should serve as a wake-up call for U.S. policymakers to increase
short-term engagement with Tanzanian officials and support for Tanzanian
security agencies to preempt the emergence of a more significant threat to
U.S. and international interests in East Africa.
Thus far, the attacks in Tanzania have been relatively unsophisticated. They
have involved crude homemade explosives, handguns, and buckets of acid; they
have been focused on poorly protected targets of opportunity; and they have
not resulted in mass casualties. However, as events over the past few years
in neighboring Kenya have demonstrated, today's seemingly minor and
manageable threats can evolve quickly into something far more lethal and
intractable. In Kenya, similarly unsophisticated attacks only a few years
ago have grown quickly, resulting in the Westgate Mall attack in September
2013, when 4 shooters killed 67 people and wounded 175 more; the discovery
in March 2014 of a massive car bomb in Mombasa that could have killed scores
more; and the massacre of more than 60 villagers in Lamu County in June
2014. Events such as these have thrown Kenya into a cycle of violence
pitting national security forces against clandestine militant cells.
This paper provides an overview of the current threat posed by Islamist
militants in Tanzania by tracing their evolution in the Tanzanian political
context, identifying the major Islamist movements active in the country
today, and assessing the spillover of al Shabab- and al Qaeda-associated
threats from Somalia and Kenya. The paper concludes with recommendations
that the United States pay closer attention to the situation in Tanzania,
build Tanzanian capabilities to address current threat streams, and work
closely with the governments in both mainland Tanzania and the Zanzibar
islands to counter further radicalization.
The Tanzanian Context
Globally, Tanzania is known for its rich cultural his - tory, political
stability, and increasingly vibrant economy. Politically, the country earned
respect from international observers as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement
and a key regional force in the struggle against South African apartheid.
Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's first president who served from 1964 to 1985,
promoted national unity of the country's 120 ethnic groups and emerged as
one of Africa's leading statesmen. The economy is primarily based on
agriculture, infrastructure remains poor, and corruption is a significant
problem. However, foreign direct investment is booming in the mining and oil
exploration sectors. In addition, tourism opportunities abound-including
safaris in the Serengeti, climbing on Mount Kilimanjaro, and the luxury
beach resorts of Zanzibar.
Officially known as the United Republic of Tanzania, the country was formed
through the union of main - land Tanganyika and the Zanzibar islands (Unguja
and Pemba), which lie approximately 20 miles off the coast. Tanzania has a
population of approximately 48 million, divided roughly evenly between
Christians and Muslims at 35 to 45 percent each, with a large segment of
traditional animists making up the difference. Tanzania is not dominated by
a single ethnic group. The largest tribe-the Sukuma, located around Lake
Victoria-constitutes less than 20 percent of the population. Other tribes,
including the Nyamwezi, Haya, Gogo, Ha, and Masaai, individually comprise
less than 10 percent of the population.
Muslims-primarily from the Shafi'i school of Sunni Islam-are scattered
across the country and interspersed with non-Muslims in all major Tanzanian
cities. That said, the largest concentrations of Muslims can be found in
Zanzibar-where Muslims make up 95 percent of the population of 750,000
people-and the mainland Tanzanian coastline. Islam arrived in Tanzania from
Arabia, resulting in dynastic settlements along the coast by the 13th
century, and then spread inland along pre-colonial trade routes.
Zanzibar-including the more populous island of Unguja and the smaller,
poorer island of Pemba-was critical to this process as it became the seat
for an Omani sultanate by the mid- 1800s and a main base for the slave trade
deep into the mainland. European colonization-the British on Zanzibar and
the Germans on the mainland-did little to disrupt the spread of Islam. In
fact, "the diffusion of Islam in East Africa generally followed the
establishment of railroads, and was facilitated by the fact that the Germans
initially employed Muslims as officials, police, soldiers and teachers."
<file:///C:\Users\vivianb\Desktop\Russia%20Demonstrates%20Its%20Strength.doc
x#_edn1> [i]
Control of mainland Tanganyika shifted from Germany to Britain during World
War II. The territory then gained independence in December 1961 under the
leadership of Julius Nyerere and his Tanganyika African National Union
(TANU). Zanzibar did not achieve in - dependence until December 1963. Its
first government, a constitutional monarchy led by the Sultan of Zanzibar,
was overthrown in an extremely violent coup by the Afro- Shirazi Party
(ASP), which quickly merged Zanzibar with Tanganyika in 1964 to form the
modern Tanzanian state. This was followed by the merger of the TANU and ASP
parties to create Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, or the Party of the Revolution).
Tanzania was established by Nyerere along the lines of state corporatism,
which was originally considered a mid-point between capitalism and Marxism.
In the corporatist state, all interest groups-trade unions, women's
organizations, ethnic organizations, youth organizations, and even religious
groups-are directly controlled by the government. The ideas behind state
corporatism were that interest groups would still be represented, but a
strong government able to guide economic and political development would be
firmly in control.
<file:///C:\Users\vivianb\Desktop\Russia%20Demonstrates%20Its%20Strength.doc
x#_edn2> [ii]
Tanzania remained a single-party state under the CCM until multiparty
elections were allowed in 1992, but the CCM's rule continued unbroken until
today. Since the CCM remains deeply intertwined with state institutions and
retains its organized system of party representation from the village level
up to the national level, it has been difficult for Tanzanian opposition
parties to challenge the party's dominance. However, in the run-up to
national elections in 2015, cracks in CCM's control are beginning to show,
and political competition is becoming fiercer and occasionally violent.
Although several political parties exist,
<file:///C:\Users\vivianb\Desktop\Russia%20Demonstrates%20Its%20Strength.doc
x#_edn3> [iii] the primary challenges to CCM rule come from two parties:
Chama Cha Wananchi (CUF, or the Civic United Front) and Chama Cha Demokrasia
na Maendeleo (CHADE - MA, or the Party for Democracy and Progress). While
the CCM is able to draw support from all parts of the country, the CUF
emerged in Zanzibar-particularly the poorer and more religiously
conservative island of Pemba-and Muslims remain its primary supporters.
Although the CUF is working to build stronger support on the mainland,
Zanzibar remains its base. After losing closely contested elections in
Zanzibar to the CCM in 1995, 2000, and 2005, violent demonstrations occurred
after CUF supporters decried vote-rigging by CCM politicians. In an attempt
to avoid future conflict, a Government of National Unity was created for
Zanzibar following a referendum in July 2010, effectively to share power
between CCM and CUF leaders on the islands. As a result, following the 2010
elections, the CCM retained power in Zanzibar under President Ali Mohamed
Shein, with long-time CUF leader Seif Sharif Hamad as his first vice
president.
<file:///C:\Users\vivianb\Desktop\Russia%20Demonstrates%20Its%20Strength.doc
x#_edn4> [iv]
The other main opposition party, CHADEMA, is building its constituencies on
the mainland among young people and other disenchanted voters, and it won 26
percent of the national vote in 2010. CHADEMA, as well as the CUF, is hoping
for a much stronger showing in the 2015 elections. Several CCM leaders are
positioning themselves to succeed the current president, Jakaya Kikwete, who
has served his maxi - mum two terms in office. In addition, public
frustration with CCM leaders is elevated following a series of high-profile
(and high-value) corruption scandals and the sacking of four ministers in
2013 for human rights abuses committed by Tanzanian security forces involved
in anti-poaching operations.
<file:///C:\Users\vivianb\Desktop\Russia%20Demonstrates%20Its%20Strength.doc
x#_edn5> [v] Efforts by the CCM to undermine its challengers have led to
accusations of state-sponsored repression of opposition politicians, civic
leaders, and journalists, the banning of opposition demonstrations, and a
dangerous rise in political violence. The abduction and torture of party
leaders have been reported, and a handrenade thrown into a CHADEMA rally in
Arusha in 2013 killed four people.
<file:///C:\Users\vivianb\Desktop\Russia%20Demonstrates%20Its%20Strength.doc
x#_edn6> [vi]
Despite the formation of the Government of National Unity before the 2010
elections, the question of Zanzibar also remains a critical issue. Following
2 years of work, a Constitutional Review Commission, chaired by Joseph
Warioba, has recommended changing the structure of the republic to a
federation or "three government system." According to this propos - al,
Tanzania's new structure would include one overall national government and
two state governments-one for the mainland and one for Zanzibar. The
proposal, however, remains highly controversial. Failure to find a
significant degree of national consensus on the issue could further divide
Tanzanians on political, regional, and religious lines.
_____
<file:///C:\Users\vivianb\Desktop\Russia%20Demonstrates%20Its%20Strength.doc
x#_ednref1> [i] Jodi Vittori, Kristin Bremer, and Pasquale Vittori, "Islam
in Tanzania and Kenya: Ally or Threat in the War on Terror?" Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 12 (December 2009), 1077.
<file:///C:\Users\vivianb\Desktop\Russia%20Demonstrates%20Its%20Strength.doc
x#_ednref3> [iii] These include the Civic United Front, Party for Democracy
and Progress, Tanzania Labour Party, United Democratic Party, and National
Convention for Construction and Reform.
<file:///C:\Users\vivianb\Desktop\Russia%20Demonstrates%20Its%20Strength.doc
x#_ednref4> [iv] For details on the Government of National Unity, see
Mohammed Bakari and Alexander Makulilo, "Beyond Polarity in Zanzibar? The
'Silent' Referendum and the Government of National Unity," Journal of
Contemporary African Studies 30, no. 2 (April 2012), 195-218; and Archie
Matheson, "Maridhiano: Zanzibar's Remarkable Reconciliation and Government
of National Unity," Journal of Eastern African Studies 6, no. 4 (November
2012), 591-612.
<file:///C:\Users\vivianb\Desktop\Russia%20Demonstrates%20Its%20Strength.doc
x#_ednref5> [v] Hanno Brankamp, "CCM's Identity Crisis: Comebacks,
Constitution and Corruption in Tanzania," Think Africa Press, February 21,
2014.
<file:///C:\Users\vivianb\Desktop\Russia%20Demonstrates%20Its%20Strength.doc
x#_ednref6> [vi] See Nicholas Kulish, "Violent Episodes Grow in Tanzania, an
African Haven," The New York Times, June 30, 2013; and The Citizen, "Chaos
Threat Looms Ahead of 2015 General Election," May 7, 2014.
_____
Dr. Andre LeSage is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic
Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense
University.