Opinion: The end of a unified Yemen?
Written by : <
http://www.aawsat.net/author/abdul-rahman-al-rashed>
Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
on : Saturday, 18 Oct, 2014
Popular, political and military activity calling for the secession of
southern Yemen intensified this week in Aden and Hadramout. The possibility
of southern Yemen becoming its own independent state is now closer than at
any time before. While unity and division are two issues that concern
everyone in the region, this is of particular concern to Yemen's northern
neighbor, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
The unification of Yemen was backed by people from both the North and South,
but this was not the product of popular demands or activity. Rather, this
was the result of a struggle over governance in the South among communist
powers. Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh seized the chance to expand his
authority when the South's political leader Ali Salem Al-Beidh-who was on
the verge of losing his grip on power-called for unification. Saleh and
Beidh signed the unification agreement in 1989 but instead of achieving
unity and power-sharing, Saleh dominated the scene. The promises of
unification were not fulfilled and this ultimately became a burden on
northern Yemen, leading to the neglect and appropriation of southern Yemen.
Saleh was thus the sole winner, securing his own personal rule across the
country.
Prior to unification, I met with late Saudi Interior Minister Prince Naif
Bin Abdulaziz who also represented Riyadh on the joint Saudi-Yemeni
committee. I asked him about Ali Abdullah Saleh's allegations that Saudi
Arabia had objected to unity and viewed it as a threat. He summarized the
nature of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Yemen and its historical
roots which date back to the the 1950s.
Prince Naif said that a united Yemen is ideal for Saudi Arabia as it would
be difficult to deal with two governments-one in Sana'a and the other in
Aden-because satisfying one would mean angering the other. This is something
that would be even more pronounced when there are tensions between the two
governments. Ultimately, this would result in one of these governments
allying with Saudi Arabia's rivals. This is something that happened during
the Cold War when rebels in the North allied with the Nasserites while the
South later allied with the Soviet Union. It's easier for Saudi Arabia to
manage relations with a unified country that has one government while
maintaining good relationships with the different domestic powers who have
historical ties with the Kingdom.
Truth be told, Saudi Arabia also suffered politically during the period when
Yemen was united; however this suffering was the result of mere disputes.
Former President Saleh, whose time in office overlapped with the reign of
three successive Saudi monarchs, was well-known for his attempts to promote
and glorify himself, even if this came at the expense of Yemen and its
people. When former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, Saleh sided
with Baghdad against Saudi Arabia. Saleh then allied with the Qataris during
the most recent disagreement with Saudi Arabia. He also allowed former
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to fund Yemeni tribes against Saudi Arabia.
Last but not least, Saleh is responsible for the emergence of the Houthis.
It was under his rule that this simple tribal group turned into the
dangerous political and sectarian movement that it is today.
The latest developments now raise an important question, not just for Saudi
Arabia but also for the people of Yemen-whether in the North or South: Is
division really the solution?
I think that the secession of the South will only serve to exacerbate
problems for everybody on both sides; there is no domestic power that is
strong enough to put an end to this rivalry and secure a conclusive end to
the fighting. In addition to this, Yemenis do not have a genuine democratic
electoral system which they can rely on. Therefore, division will only
foment chaos across the country, whether in the North or South.
Despite all this, secession remains an increasingly possible scenario as a
result of the rapid collapse of the ruling institution in northern Yemen and
the popular frustration at the failure of the unification agreement. Yemenis
are now aware that the unification agreement was merely part of the personal
agenda of ousted President Saleh. Northern Yemenis have truly tried to
compensate the South for Saleh's sins towards the people there, displaying a
lot of flexibility and concern regarding Yemeni national unity. This can be
seen in the fact that the posts of president and prime minister are now
occupied by southerners even though the northerners constitute the sweeping
majority of the population. Despite this, southern political powers continue
to compete with one another and call for secession as they are aware that
this is a demand that will win them popular backing. Unity has become a
hated idea in the South due to Saleh's policies which marginalized the
region and entrenched poverty.
Due to the weakness of the central government, Yemen's North is currently
facing a political vacuum as the three major powers continue to fight each
other. The three parties involved in this confrontation are Saleh's own
party, the Houthis and the state. Saleh's political party and backers are
actively seeking to sabotages the political process by inciting strife and
buying loyalties as part of plans to return them to power. While the
Houthis, who have ties to Iran, continue to advance, and its militias have
seized major state institutes. As for the state and government, it is
failing and faltering and has only one card up its sleeve, namely its
regional and international legitimacy based on the recognition of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) and UN Security Council respectively.
In the event that the Yemeni government is pronounced dead, or if it
collapses within the next few months but no such announcement is made, we
will no doubt witness the South announcing its own independent state and the
inevitable end of a unified Yemen. Yemen would thus begin a new chapter in
its history. However, this history will almost certainly be just as rife
with domestic disputes and foreign interference, while the biggest victims
will be the Yemeni people who have yet to express an opinion over this
putative division.
*******************************************
Opinion: Iran's Dangerous Game in Yemen
Written by : <
http://www.aawsat.net/author/amir-taheri> Amir Taheri
on : Friday, 17 Oct, 2014
"Yemen is simple," says a European diplomat working on a report for NATO on
the war-torn nation. "The Saudis feed the Yemenis and the Iranians arm them.
So, what is left for Yemenis to do, except chew qat and fight each other?"
Like all caricatures, this verbal caricature puts the aggrandizing lens on
just one aspect of a complex situation, exaggerating its importance.
Today, Yemen is a tangled web of conflicts that, though they must be
examined one by one, can't be fully understood without reference to their
collective context.
Since 2010, Yemen has been on a slippery slope towards becoming an
ungoverned or semi-governed territory, an experience shared by many others
at different times in their history. Right now, a number of countries,
notably the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic,
South Sudan, and, of course, Somalia, are passing through the same
experience in different degrees.
No nation is immune from suffering that fate. If the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) is not crushed it could turn four of Iraq's 18 provinces
into "ungoverned" zones. The phenomenon could spread from Syria and Iraq to
their neighbors, notably Lebanon and Turkey. Some analysts include the
so-called "badlands" of northwest Pakistan in the list of ungoverned zones.
Parts of the disputed Kashmir and both the Pakistan and Iranian provinces of
Baluchistan are also in danger of moving in this direction.
The disease, if one may call it such, is not confined to newly created
states in the Third World. Vast areas of the United States became ungoverned
territory during its Civil War. Spain had a similar experience during the
Spanish Civil War. For much of the 1990s, Afghanistan was a vast ungoverned
zone. More recently, ungoverned territories emerged in parts of the former
Yugoslavia for almost a decade. Parts of Myanmar (Burma) are in that
situation today.
Looking at the Yemeni crisis as an issue of regional-and to some extent even
international-security, is therefore perfectly legitimate. Yemen's crisis
poses a threat to both Saudi Arabia and Oman, if only because it could
produce a humanitarian catastrophe with vast numbers of refugees trying to
cross the borders. The effective disintegration of governmental authority
could also threaten the security of sea-lanes in the Gulf of Aden and the
Red Sea, especially Bab El-Mandeb, one of the most sensitive chokepoints in
global maritime traffic.
Throughout the Cold War, the United States feared that the Yemeni island of
Socotra would provide the Soviet Union with a platform to project power
across the Indian Ocean. Anarchy in Yemen today could mean the capture of
Socotra and smaller islands in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea by terrorist
groups like ISIS. We have already seen what piracy is doing in Somalia.
What is astonishing is that this growing danger is either ignored by the
major powers or exploited for petty tactical advantage by regional rivals.
In the latter context, Iran is pursuing a dangerous opportunistic gambit.
Tehran official media wax triumphant because a few Houthi demonstrators in
Sana'a carried portraits of the late Ayatollah Khomeini and his successor
Ali Khamenei. The daily Kayhan, published under Khamenei's control,
headlined a report on the entry of Houthis in Sana'a as "the victory of our
Islamic Revolution."
The paper's editorialist couldn't contain his excitement in narrating what
he thought was the adoption by Yemenis of Khomeini's version of Islam.
He ignored the fact that the Houthis' army of around 10,000 gunmen can
hardly control Sana'a, a city of some 2 million inhabitants, not counting
the mass of recently arrived refugees. Those who know Sana'a's countless
labyrinthine twists and turns know that talk of any enforced control is
nonsense, especially when the supposed controllers are not natives of the
sprawling city.
Another thing the editorialist didn't know is that the Houthis are reluctant
to assume governmental responsibility, something for which they lack the
most elemental preparation. Like almost all Yemenis, Houthis know how to use
their guns. But they have no political program or administrative experience
to offer.
In fact, no one can really control Yemen, or ever has. In Yemen, the
question is one of the management of chaos rather than governance in the
classical sense of the term. More importantly, Kayhan's editorialist did not
know that Yemenis with guns could always be hired but are never bought.
Iran is not alone in ignoring that fact. The United States, too, has been
spending vast sums trying to buy various Yemeni factions, chasing the
will-o'-the-wisp of an ever-elusive alliance. Though among the 10 poorest
nations in the world, Yemenis still walk in the middle of the street as
proud as Gary Cooper in High Noon.
Yemenis certainly don't want, or need, either a Hezbollah or an Iranian-syle
Supreme Leader, as Khamenei seems to believe. But nor do they want liberal
democracy as some in Washington claim. This may shock some people, but
Yemen, even under Imam Ahmad, presented as a medieval monster by many in the
Western media, seemed to be happy. The reason was that the so-called Imam
lacked the coercive instruments to frighten them, and did not have the
resources to bribe them. He just left them alone.
The civil war of the 1960s was the result of outside intervention, notably
by Gamal Abdel Nasser pursuing his dream of an Arab Empire. Khamenei's dream
of a Khomeinist empire is equally doomed.
Today, Yemen is on the edge of humanitarian tragedy. It is effectively
divided into at least four segments: the north where Houthis form the
biggest armed group; Aden and part of the south, where the secessionists of
the Al-Hirak movement have most of the guns; the Hadhramaut, where jihadists
linked to Al-Qaeda are on the rampage; and finally, a few isolated pockets
where tribal chiefs still exercise some authority. The nation is dependent
on foreign aid for 90 percent of its food and almost all of its medical
needs. Almost all of foreign aid has now been diverted to emergency
operations and, yet, the prospect of mass famine looms larger. What is
needed are urgent efforts to create breathing room to prevent the tragedy of
total systemic collapse. The United Nations should take the lead by calling
on all concerned to at least stop pouring more oil on the fire.
Yemen can't be anybody's poodle but, if turned into a hungry wolf, it could
bite many.
Received on Sat Oct 18 2014 - 07:16:59 EDT