Sudan, Iran, the Obama Administration, and Khartoum’s political vision"
_____
More about what we learn from the leaked minutes of the August 31 meeting
bringing together Khartoum’s most senior military and security officials
By Eric Reeves
October 18, 2014 - The document containing minutes of the 31 August 2014
meeting of the most senior military and security officials of the National
Islamic Front/National Congress Party (NCP) ("Minutes of the Military and
Security Committee Meeting held in the National Defense College" [Khartoum])
has been assessed at considerable length over the past three weeks. The
overwhelming consensus is that the document is authentic and reveals in
powerful detail how determined these ruthless men are to hold onto power in
Sudan at all costs. I have seen to date no credible account of how such a
document could have been fabricated and passed through the channels it has
without being detected as a hoax. As one astute and longtime student of
Sudan observed to me, "It is hard to believe such a record was made…but even
harder to imagine anyone forging it."
Africa Confidential began its recent brief overview of the issue by
observing:
Most of the Sudanese activists and officials (serving or former) that we
have contacted believe the leaked reports of the National Intelligence and
Security Service (NISS) meeting on 31 August are an authentic account.
Indeed, one former official has confirmed the NISS meeting took place and a
serving official said the documents were genuine.
And in a different section of the issue:
The first question is whether the minutes are authentic (see Khartoum in
fact and fiction). Most of the Sudanese politicians, and serving and former
officials that Africa Confidential has spoken to reckon they are and that
there have been serious security breaches in Khartoum. (10 October 2014, Vol
55 No 20)
For a more extensive survey of opinion about the authenticity of the
document, see this compendium. Absent compelling evidence that the document
was forged, there is simply too much within it that demands recognition as
the actual thinking and decision-making of the men who now constitute what
is essentially a junta in Khartoum, with merely the trappings of civilian
rule.
A "Strategic Relationship" with Iran
Moreover, subsequent events have in some cases unfolded as if scripted by
the decisions and recommendations recorded at this meeting. For example,
President Omar al-Bashir’s trip to Saudi Arabia had less to do with the hajj
than with the need to reassure Saudi leaders about the nature of Khartoum’s
relationship with Tehran. In an interview with Asharq al-Awsat (11 October
2014) al-Bashir declares that, despite recent tensions in the relationship
between Khartoum and Riyadh, this has had nothing to do with Khartoum’s
relationship with Tehran, the great regional menace in Saudi eyes:
"There are no strategic ties between [Sudan] and Iran. Our ties with Iran
are very normal."
Desperate for Saudi economic and financial assistance (noted frequently in
the leaked document), and given also the repeated references in the leaked
document to deceiving the Saudis about the nature of the relationship with
Tehran, al-Bashir had no choice but to publicly disavow any strategic
relationship with Iran, however unpersuasively.
In fact, however, in a dozen places in the minutes these most senior
security, political, and military officials declare just the opposite:
"In the open let us maintain good relations with the Gulf States, but
strategically with Iran and to be managed secretly by the Military
Intelligence and the security organs."
"In my personal view our relation with Iran is a strategic one in the areas
of defense and security."
"…we can improve our relations with the Gulf States [and Saudi Arabia]
without affecting our strategic alliance with Iran. (Mustafa Osman Ismail,
Political Secretary of the National Congress Party)
[Because a much-improved translation into English of the Arabic will soon be
available, I have been more liberal in editorial clarification of the
available English translation where there are clearly problems with word
choices, idiom, syntax, punctuation, and other grammatical matters. In two
places, because of the opacity of the formulation, I have attempted a
reconstruction of what seems to be intended; they are not of central
importance—ER]
"My comment is on our relation with Saudi Arabia and the Emirates on one
side and Iran on the other side…. Our relation with Iran is strategic."
(Lt.-General Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint General Staff)
"Our relation with Iran is strategic." (Lt.-General Yahya Mohammed Kher,
State Minister of Defense)
"Our relation with Iran is beneficial to us, because Iran is our biggest
ally in the region, in terms of the cooperation in the areas of intelligence
and military industrial production. This is due to our web-like relations
with all the Islamic Movements world-wide. The importance of this relation
comes from the fact that we constitute [a connection?] for Iran to all the
Islamic groups." (Lt.-General Siddiig Aamir, Director of Military
Intelligence and Security) (I will return in a subsequent analysis to the
claim that Khartoum has "… web-like relations with all the Islamic Movements
world-wide."—ER]
"So let us separate between the two issues, the strategic relation [with
Iran] and the Shite Cultural Centers." [Recently shut down as the regime
faced various domestic pressures; the idea of a "separation" of the
religious and the strategic is a sentiment shared by several officials at
the meeting; Iran is overwhelmingly Shiite and Sudan is overwhelmingly
Sunni—ER] (First Lt.-General Mohammed Atta, Director General of the National
Intelligence and Security Services)
"Whatever the case, our relation with Iran is a red line: without the
support of Iran, the Ingaz ["National Salvation Revolution," the name given
to the coup of June 1989] would have been defeated." (First Lt.-General
Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint General Staff)
Most emphatic is Defense Minister First Lt.-General Abdel Rahim Mohamed
Hussein:"
I start with our relation with Iran and say it is strategic and everlasting.
We cannot compromise or lose it. All the advancement in our military
industry is from Iran. They opened the doors of their stores of weapons for
us, at a time the Arabs stood against us. The Iranian support came at a time
we were fighting a rebellion that spread in all the directions including the
National Democratic Alliance. The Iranians provided us with experts and they
trained our Military Intelligence and security cadres. Also they trained us
in weapons production and transferred to us modern technology in military
production."
Finally, and most consequentially, First Lt.-General and Vice President
Bakri Hassan Saleh declared decisively:
"Our relation with Iran is strategic one and unchangeable. [They] who want
to assist us can do that without conditions. Once in Saudi Arabia
Abdal-Hafiz Ibrahim [Khartoum’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia—ER] [came to me
and said] that the Kingdom’s foreign minister wanted to support [us], [but]
the problem is our relation with Iran. That [the Saudi] leadership will not
accept…. I realized that [Abdal-Hafiz Ibrahim] [had been] infiltrated [by
Saudi security agents]. I told Mohammed Atta to put him under surveillance."
Al-Bashir’s claim that Khartoum does not have a strategic relationship with
Iran is a feeble effort at damage control following the leaking of a
document that reveals all too clearly that the relationship is indeed
"strategic." Ironically, al-Bashir indirectly confirms the leak with his
belabored insistence:
"Relations would not have reached this stage were it not for false
information being leaked about the situation in Sudan and the country’s
foreign ties, particularly with Iran. This information was exaggerated,”
Bashir said. “All of the information that reached the Saudi leadership
within this context was false, fabricated, and exaggerated." (Asharq
al-Awsat [Medina, Saudi Arabia], 11 October 2014)
No reading of the minutes as a whole can lead to any conclusion but that
Iran is critical to Khartoum’s view of itself in the region and to the
continuing militarization of the Sudanese economy. Tehran’s role in
supporting international Islamist movements and terrorist organizations is
intimated or discussed explicitly at several junctures in the minutes; this
should be seen in the context of the well-established use of Sudan by Iran
to funnel weapons to Hamas in Gaza. "Wiki-leaked" State Department cables
show clearly that the U.S. has long been aware of this partnership.
At the same time, the need to convince Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States that
the relationship is something else comes up again and again in the minutes:
these countries must be deceived about the depth of the strategic
relationship (something made a good deal more difficult my virtue of these
leaked minutes) in order to preserve Sudan’s standing in the Sunni world and
to gain access to Saudi wealth:
"We need to strike a balance in the relation between Gulf States and Iran.
Our diplomacy must work here. In the open let us maintain good relations
with the Gulf States, but strategically with Iran and to be managed secretly
by the Military Intelligence and security organs."
"Let us win the hearts and minds of the Gulf States and work closely with
them also in order to read their minds and plans. We can find out whether
they are intending to support us or just conspiring to spoil our relation
with Iran and expose our back to the enemy."
"But Iran may object to the idea that we improve our relation with the Gulf
States, meanwhile our economy relies very much on the Saudi Kingdom in terms
of investments and expatriates money transfers. Saudis are scared from the
Iranian military presence in Sudan and may not allow their banks to resume
transactions with Sudan banks in terms of letters of credits for
export/import traders plus expatriate transfers to their relatives. (Mustafa
Osman Ismail, Political Secretary of the National Congress Party) [This is
one of the very few realistic comments about the state of the Sudanese
economy; for the realities ignored, see my 17 September 2014 overview—ER]
" … you know that our relation with Iran is part and parcel of our relation
with the Muslim Brotherhood International Islamic Organization. Accordingly,
we must consult with Iran and our Islamist group before taking any step in
this regard [re-positioning Khartoum diplomatically vis-à-vis Saudi
Arabic—ER]. This is, because the Kingdom [Saudi Arabia] cannot be trusted,
despite their knowledge that we are in a position to threaten their rule."
(Lt.-General Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen, National Service Coordinator)
"My comment is on our relation with Saudi Arabia and the Emirates on one
side and Iran on the other side. We are capable and also know how to mislead
the Gulf States by taking open, declared steps and procedures towards
improving diplomatic relations with them, while knowing that they are backed
by the Americans and Israel." (Lt.-General Siddiig Aamir, Director of
Military Intelligence and Security)
"I agree with what brother Mustafa said, that our military and security
relations with Iran should not contradict our brotherly and diplomatic
relation with Saudi and Emirates countries, especially at this moment, when
axis policies, polarization and alliances has surfaced at the level of the
region. Currently, there are three million Sudanese employees working in the
Gulf States and especially in the Saudi Kingdom. (Lt.-General Salah
Al-Tayib, Commissioner of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration)
"The secret of the strength of the Ingaz (NCP) government lies in the smooth
management of the alliance with Shite’ Iran on one side and the alliance
with the Sunni Islamic groups on the other side. Any negligence or failure
to maintain this fragile relation between the Sunni and Shite’, will be
disastrous and we shall be the biggest losers." (Lt.-General Siddiig Aamir,
Director of Military Intelligence and Security)
"We must explain to Iranian Military Intelligence the threats we expect and
they should understand, so that we keep the relation with both parties [Iran
on the one hand, Saudi Arabia and he Gulf States on the other—ER]. At the
same time we tell the Saudis that we are taking your side." (Lt.-General
Siddiig Aamir, Director of Military Intelligence and Security)
The Obama Administration’s Dissimulation
Unlike al-Bashir, some come to dissimulate by habit or by virtue of position
in office. My October 9 inquiry about the authenticity of the document at
issue, sent to the Director of the Office of the U.S. Special Envoy for
Sudan and South Sudan, Lucy Tamlyn, yielded only an ambiguous grammatical
solecism in response: "The U.S. government would not speculate on the
authenticity of the document." This artful or instinctual misuse of the
auxiliary modal verb "would" leaves a reader unsure what is meant: that "The
U.S. government will not speculate on the authenticity of the document"? or
that "The U.S. government does not speculate on the authenticity of
[documents like this one]"? or that "The U.S. government would not be
speculat[ing] on the authenticity of the document [in some indeterminate
future]"?
But of course all such parsings yield only nonsense: the U.S. government,
whatever it chooses to say or not say publicly, has certainly made an
intensive, thorough and comprehensive investigation of the document, and has
just as certainly reached a "non-speculative" conclusion about its
authenticity. The issues addressed in the document are far too important for
the Obama administration to tolerate any sort of agnosticism. And given the
consensus that I have watched build since initial publication of substantial
elements of the document (24 September 2014), it is exceedingly difficult to
believe that the U.S has concluded that the document has been fabricated. We
will be told publicly of this decision, however, only if the administration
finds if useful to do so.
But if this is so, there are any number of moments in the minutes that must
be thoroughly discomfiting to U.S. policy-makers, including statements
revealing very strong opposition to Special Envoy Donald Booth’s making a
trip to Khartoum anytime soon. Moreover, given the views revealed in the
minutes, even if such a trip were to occur, its meaning would lie only in
the fact that it occurred, generating useful "optics" for the regime as it
pushes hard towards its overarching political goal: holding national
elections in April 2015 so as to give—in the words of Mustafa Osman Ismail,
Political Secretary of the NCP—this ruthless and tyrannical regime "another
five years of legitimacy." But again, there is not a shred of evidence in
the documented minutes that those who now wield real power in Khartoum are
inclined to see a visit by the American special envoy occur. First
Lt.-General Bakri Hassan Saleh, Vice President and the man most likely to
have greatest power in a regime following the death, medical incapacitation,
or political sidelining of al-Bashir (there are many who oppose his
re-nomination for President at the NCP convention later this month),
declares:
"The greatest security and social threat is coming from South Sudan ([and
the foreign presence of] Uganda, America, France and Israel), the Armed
Movements, South Sudanese, and the two areas [South Kordofan and Blue Nile]
where people have been displaced and [become] refugees due to war (diseases,
social crimes, children missing education, and some converted to
Christianity)." [This passage has been poorly translated and I have with the
bracketed phrasing attempted to make sense of what appears to be the
intended meaning; in general I have only made minor editorial
clarifications, mechanical emendations, and idiomatic renderings of the
English translation of the Arabic text; I have no reading Arabic skills—ER]
America is viewed as part of the "greatest security and social threat [to
Khartoum]." Thus it is hardly surprising that Bakri goes on to declare:
"America deceived us in regards to the separation of the South. They did not
lift our name from the list of the States sponsoring terrorism or relieve
our debts. So the Envoy should not come."
Ironically, Bakri had just declared that "nobody is paying us and we are
indebted to nobody." In fact, Sudan has massive external debt now exceeding
US$46 billion—and while the U.S. is not a major creditor, it is the most
powerful member of the Paris Club that would have to reach consensus on debt
relief for Sudan, something extremely unlikely even with U.S. support. But
the feeling of having been deceived by the U.S. is evidently real and
clearly has a bearing on whether Special Envoy Booth will make a trip to
Khartoum anytime soon.
First Lt.-General Abdel-Rahim Mohammed Hussein, Minister of Defense, was
also adamant about such a visit:
"Look at the statement [Paris Declaration] of the [Sudan Revolutionary
Front] rebels which they want to execute with the help of France and the
American Envoy. [The Paris Declaration of principles was also signed by
Sadiq el-Mahdi, representing the National Umma Party; the minutes reveal
this to be a particular political concern of the participants—ER]
"This is meddling in our internal affairs. Accordingly the American envoy
should not be permitted to enter Sudan."
Publicly these sentiments emerge with a rather different tone, even
suggesting the possibility of a meeting that senior officials have
explicitly ruled out in private:
Sudanese foreign ministry undersecretary, Abdallah Azrak, told al-Youm
Altali newspaper that Khartoum and Washington needed to repair the broken
trust, stressing that his government no longer believes what American
officials say. "We had received multiple pledges on many occasions, but the
USA has not fulfilled its promises," he said. He went further to welcome
[sic] Booth’s visit to Sudan, stressing, "We need assurances of the
sincerity of American statements, especially they did not fulfill previous
promises." (Sudan Tribune, 11 October 2011)
The irony of Khartoum complaining about "unfulfilled promises" is of course
simply grotesque: for the complaint comes from a regime that has never
abided by any promise or agreement signed with any Sudanese party during its
25 years in power—not one, not ever. Implicit in Abdallah Azrak’s statement
is a claim that Khartoum abided by the terms of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (2005), the primary demand of the U.S. under both the Bush and
Obama administrations. But whether we look to the military seizure of Abyei
(May 2011) that replaced the self-determination referendum guaranteed in the
Abyei Protocol of the CPA; or to the military assaults on the people of
South Kordofan and Blue Nile that took the place of the "popular
consultations" guaranteed by the CPA; or to the refusal to negotiate a final
delineation of the North/South border as stipulated by the CPA; or to the
ground and aerial military assaults on sovereign South Sudanese territory,
Khartoum is far, far from having kept the "promise" implicit in the signing
of the CPA.
So while Special Envoy Donald Booth waits for a response to his recently
reiterated offer to visit Khartoum, he apparently fails to see that the
electoral strategy articulated on every page of the minutes of the August 31
meeting in Khartoum has no place for such a visit. The Sudan Tribune
provides the public explanation coming from Khartoum:
In reaction to [Washington’s efforts to secure humanitarian access to
affected civilians in war-affected areas in South Kordofan and Blue Nile]
Khartoum decided to not cooperate with the US special envoy who [has not
visited] the Sudanese capital since December 2013. During [this] visit he
was received only at the Parliament [i.e., not by any senior official—ER].
Azrak also rejected what Booth statements about the national dialogue
process considering it as interference in Sudan’s internal affairs. “The
government is not ready to receive lessons in this regard,” he said.
Booth welcomed the national dialogue process but urged the Sudanese
government to take the necessary measures to create a conducive environment
in the country and to reach a framework agreement with the opposition
parties. “But to date, realisation of the promised National Dialogue remains
uncertain. In the intervening months, details of the purported dialogue were
few, and actions taken by the government appeared to run contrary to its
stated intent,” he said. (Sudan Tribune, 11 October 2014)
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that the racist views of Defense
Minister Hussein are not his alone, and work to define the regime’s attitude
toward Western nations:
"Whatever the case, the White People will never give you enough support or
fight along with [you]. The greatest liars are the White People; they are
concerned about their own interest only."
That Hussein himself has a gargantuan capacity for mendacity, and has
shamelessly pursued self-enrichment, as have all the men whose views are
recorded, make of this statement an utterly perverse irony.
Khartoum’s Political Vision
Throughout the minutes, the "National Dialogue" (as it is called) is clearly
nothing more than a political ploy, a means of giving merely the impression
of pluralism and broad national involvement in discussing the governance of
Sudan. A series of comments make clear the factitious nature of the
"dialogue," which in fact is a monologue dominated by the threat of action
by the security and military forces in the event of true popular
demonstrations: "The national dialogue is to take place in Khartoum and
under the chairmanship of President Bashir. No dialogue to take place abroad
[with expatriate Sudanese]" (Mustafa Osman Ismail, Political Secretary of
the National Congress Party).
The events of September 2013, in which hundreds of unarmed and largely
peaceful demonstrators were killed by security forces operating under "shoot
to kill orders," are constantly invoked in the minutes:
" … this year we have already trained [teams] to protect the elections and
assist the police to suppress any such activities that may be carried out by
the rebellion or the supporters of the New Sudan Project." (Lt.-General
Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen, National Service Coordinator)
"Let us go and prepare a force to protect the elections. Secondly, if the
peace talks are necessary let them take place after the elections, and the
internal national dialogue can continue after we hold the elections. There
must be strict control over the freedom of the press, political statements
of the party leaders, and the national security should remain a red line….
Let us criminalize anybody who support the rebellion or criticize the
regular armed forces." (First Lt.-General Hashim Osman Hisen, Director
General of Police)
"First our preparation for the elections is going according to plan…. We
want our security organs to inform us about the opinion of all political
parties, loyal or detractors on the elections before time to enable us
influence things earlier." (Ibrahim Ghandur, Deputy Chairman of the NCP)
And the key recommendation of Vice President Bakri Hassan Saleh is
characteristically blunt:
"Preparation of the necessary force for the protection of the elections."
All this is by way ensuring the NCP’s primary goal: that an election occurs
without any delay in April 2015, a goal that is constantly reiterated:
"No way for postponement of the elections whatever the case." (Mustafa Osman
Ismail, Political Secretary of the National Congress Party)
"The elections must take place on time. Holding the elections constitutes a
psychological war against the armed movements and may frustrate them and
lead to the end of the project of the New Sudan Project." (Lt. General Salah
Al-Tayib, Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration Commissioner) [The
"New Sudan Project" is governance in Sudan guided by the principle, most
forcefully articulated by the late Southern leader John Garang, that neither
race nor ethnicity nor religion should be the basis for citizenship in a
truly multi-party, democratic Sudan. The terms is repeatedly invoked as the
great enemy of the regime’s political goals—ER]
"[We have teams ready] to protect the elections and assist the police to
suppress any such activities that may be carried out by the rebellion or the
supporters of the New Sudan Project." (Lt. General Abdal-Gadir Mohammed
Zeen, National Service Coordinator)
"… if the peace talks are necessary let them take place after the elections,
and the internal national dialogue can continue after we hold the
elections." (First Lt.-General Hashim Osman Hisen, Director General of
Police) ["… if the peace talks are necessary": this may seem an
extraordinary conditional statement, given the multiple wars ongoing in
Sudan, but in fact is entirely consistent with the regime’s determination to
avoid all peace forums if possible: the wish is to determine events
militarily, again a sentiment that echoes and re-echoes throughout the
minutes—ER)
A summary by security chief Mohammed Atta captures the broader strategic
sense of the regime;
"We said the national dialogue must be held inside the country, elections to
take place on time, the decisive summer [military] campaign must continue.
We should step-up the recruitment to increase the Rapid Response Forces"
[i.e., re-constituted Janjaweed militia—ER]. (First Lt.-General Mohammed
Atta, Director General of the National Intelligence and Security Services)
A more impressive and much more insightful summary, however, is offered by
Osman Mirghani (Asharq Al-Awsat, 4 October 2014):
That Sudan’s Islamist regime is using trickery and prevarication is not
strange for a group that has made deceit and pretense a key part of its
political culture. But a recently-leaked document highlighting what happened
during a meeting between military, political and security leaders in
Khartoum in late August reveals how far the regime is willing to go in order
to maintain its grip on power…
On the domestic level, the document [i.e., the minutes of the August 31
meeting of senior military and security officials] confirms what every wise
observer already knows—that the regime is manipulating the opposition and
employing talk about dialogue and reconciliation to gain time and fragment
its political opponents. In fact, the regime desires to use talk about
dialogue to legitimize the presidential and legislative elections scheduled
for next year.
Precisely.
What then would be the purpose of a visit to Khartoum by U.S. Special Envoy
Donald Booth? What could he expect to accomplish in pushing this now fully
revealed regime toward a true democratic election? Booth’s predecessor as
Special Envoy, Princeton Lyman, remains notorious for having declared of
U.S. Sudan policy:
"We do not want to see the ouster of the [Khartoum] regime, nor regime
change. We want to see the regime carrying out reform via constitutional
democratic measures.” (3 December 2011 interview with Asharq Al-Awsat)
Special Envoy Booth has done far too little to move the Obama administration
away from this utterly preposterous vision of political change in Sudan.
Indeed, I am not aware that he has distanced U.S. policy at all from the
truly bizarre notion that the current regime, as revealed by the men
speaking in the minutes of this recent meeting, might preside over
meaningful reform or commit in any way to "constitutional democratic
measures."
[The next analysis will be a detailed accounting of the various political
machinations, bribery efforts, deceptions, and security preparations
detailed by various participants at the 31 August 2014 meeting. With
elections upcoming in April 2015, these hardliners are determined that there
will be at most the semblance of a democratic election—desirable for
international "public relations"—even as they make fully clear that they
intend to ensure the NCP candidate for president will win easily. Because
their plans are so elaborate and well-developed, they are determined that
the election will not be delayed for any reason whatsoever, a point made
repeatedly and emphatically by all speaking about the elections.]