Civil society situation analysis on the socio-political turmoil in South
Sudan
Peter Lasu Ladu
2014-10-10, Issue <
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/issue/697> 697
Global attention to the crisis that broke out in South Sudan nearly a year
ago has almost entirely disappeared. But difficult negotiations are ongoing,
despite periodic outbreaks of fighting. To find lasting solutions, the
stakeholders need to appreciate the complex realities leading up to the
crisis
Civil society situation analysis on the socio-political turmoil in South
Sudan
INTRODUCTION
Following the latest eruption of violence in the South Sudanese capital of
Juba on 15 December 2013, civil society activists there held a series of
consultations in an effort to identify the causes and triggers of the
current conflict. This was done with an intention to generate an objective
analysis of the situation and develop a roadmap for restoring peace and
stability in the country. On 4 January, South Sudanese civil society actors
in Nairobi, Kampala and Juba held a meeting in three different locations to
analyze the current socio-political turmoil spreading across the nation. The
meetings analyzed the context in which the conflict is taking place, the
possible underlying root causes and the role and influence of various
stakeholders in the process. This document is a summary of the analysis. It
discusses the following:
1. The historical context of the situation in South Sudan, including
unresolved issues that were not addressed during the 2005 Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) negotiations and the militarization of the polity
during the CPA period and immediately thereafter
2. The security architecture that was adopted in South Sudan right after the
2005 CPA which developed over time until December 2013
3. The 2010 Sudan General Elections and the emergence of armed political
rebellion
4. The immediate pre-independency period and the development of legal
frameworks in the immediate post-independency period
5. Resource management in the young nation
6. The buildup to the conflict
1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF 2005 CPA NEGOTIATIONS
The 2005 CPA brought to an end the more than two-decade civil war in Greater
Sudan. However, it is instructive to note that while the issues were broader
and included several areas internal to the South, the negotiations that led
to the CPA put great emphasis on ending the protracted conflict between
North and South Sudan. It therefore focused primarily on securing agreements
between the then major warring parties-Sudan's People Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the National Congress Party (NCP) of Sudan.
Fault line ONE
The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), while lauded for its
achievement in ending the conflict between the North and South, was
principally an arrangement designed to bring the civil war in Sudan to an
end. It fell short of defining concrete reform processes and clear
implementation modalities for many of the principles agreed upon, most of
which were internal to South Sudanese society. As such, issues relating to
peace building and state building were not adequately addressed, nor was a
clear timetable drawn for these issues to be resolved.
The CPA primarily achieved the following:
1. Permanent cessation of hostilities between the SPLM/A and NCP
2. Creation of opportunities for Southern Sudan to operate as a
semi-autonomous state and participate in the national government for a
period of six years
3. Accord the citizens of Southern Sudan the opportunity for
self-determination
But the CPA also had some major flaws, most of which have led to the current
political stalemate.
First, the CPA did not take into consideration internal political
settlements with other political parties in South or North Sudan. Although
it provided for the right to self-determination for the people of South
Sudan, the CPA was not clear on how post-CPA issues such border demarcation
between the two countries would be done after the independency of South
Sudan. Therefore, even today South Sudan and Sudan have boarder tensions and
porous boarders that contribute to further instability in the country.
However, this did not have a clear neutral political implementation
strategy. As a result, even the solution to the three contested areas of
Southern Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and Abyei remains unresolved, and the
fate of these three contested areas is still unclear.
Second, in the opinion of many actors the 2005 CPA was a cease-fire
agreement and a framework or roadmap for eventual peace (Ashworth 2009). It
was not a governance blueprint, nor was it structured to be a bridge through
which a new political, economic and social dispensation was to be nurtured
as many expected. Most importantly, it moved the conflict from a military
and rebel conflict to the political sphere, while failing to address the
root issues concerning the separation of the military and political issues.
Third, the CPA did not have any strategy to ensure civilian oversight of the
highly militarized security architecture in South Sudan. Consequently, the
CPA implementation process consolidated the political influence of the SPLA
and legitimized its hold on political power.
2. TIMELINE AND TIMING OF THE SOUTH SUDAN POST-CPA SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Many people do not know that the security architecture for South Sudan is
expired. The CPA broadly provided for assimilation of militia groups into
the SPLM/A. However, the agreement was not clear on the Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration (DRR) mechanism, more specifically on
mechanisms for integrating all the personnel from multiple militia groups
into the regular forces and demobilizing those who needed to be demobilized,
including a comprehensive demobilization programme. Consequently, one of the
challenges of implementing the CPA document has been the integration and
professionalization of the SPLA and other security sector reforms. This
process has seen forces loyal to various commanders co-opted into the
national army with no clarity of roles of hierarchy of command.
In some instances, this lack of clarity has led to proliferation of military
factions seeking to be integrated into the army. For the most part of the
past seven years, military faction leaders have been incorporated into top
governmental leadership positions mainly based on the number of militia at
their command and their military strength. Over the years, this has provided
a fertile ground for the proliferation of different militia groups in the
young nation.
Fault line TWO
Lack of a clear Security Sector Reform Strategy has led to a militarized
government and an army that still has multiple allegiances and interests.
This situation has intensified the militarization of the politic to the
extent that ascension to political power has, for the most part, been based
not on political capacity and capability, but on military prowess. There is
still no distinction between the military and political leadership.
Within society, the SPLM/A has enjoyed a cordial relationship with and an
upper hand in the political spheres of the country. From a very early stage,
the SPLA has presented itself not as a national army but rather the military
wing of the ruling party, SPLM. While this has given the party political
power in the eyes of society, the lack of distinction between SPLA the army
and SPLM the party has caused considerable confusion on who exactly is
ruling the country-the military or the party. This was not made any better
by the fact that the leadership of both the army and the party is a product
of presidential decree. The president is also the chair of the party.
It is under these conditions in which South Sudan will go into the general
elections in 2015.
It is instructive to note that while these issues were known to the
international community, there was a clear conspiracy of silence, with a
focus being placed on the referendum and later the elections.
After the elections, there was no attempt at all, not even under the ongoing
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, to go back to the
unresolved issues of the post-CPA agreements and the securitization of the
government and ruling party.
The result was that South Sudan continued to face several challenges as it
moved toward independence, and long after. The consolidation of peace and
the guarantee of security in the militarized political environment remains
unfulfilled, facing the challenges of a high proliferation of small arms and
light weapons brought on by a gun culture that continues to be exploited by
the political elite from various factions.
Previous to independence, the then semi-autonomous region was highly
dependent on article 39 (3) of the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan,
which states that 'the security and welfare of the people of Southern Sudan
shall be the primary duty of all levels of government in Southern Sudan'.
Indeed, some progress was made, reflected in the few DDR efforts seen in the
region before independency in 2011. Other efforts were also made towards the
provisioning of security. These include the following:
. Re-organization of the SPLA forces
. Reorganization of the police
. Professionalization of the police
However, several challenges have yet to be addressed after attaining
independency. There is an over-emphasis on internal cessation of conflict
with no effort made to develop a strategic engagement on a state building
agenda. On the other hand, there has been little effort in strengthening the
relations between the state and various sections of society.
At the governmental state building level, not much attention has been given
to policy formulation, legislation, constitution making and national
reconciliation, meaning that all that which was achieved in the security
sector reform process and other peace building efforts were not legally
underpinned.
Although there have been processes of disarmament, they have suffered from
perception problems, with sections of society seeing it as selective and
targeted towards communities thought to be enemies of those in power. This
has led to sporadic acts of violence, leading to the death of hundreds of
civilians and members of government forces. Further, even though the
government has made considerable progress in putting in place mechanisms to
control misuse of guns by its organized forces, cases of terror by the army
and police are still reported on a regular basis.
3. THE POST-ELECTION PERIOD AND THE GENESIS OF CURRENT CRISES
The 2010 Sudan General Elections were successful in many ways, including as:
. an achievement of one of the key milestones in the implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
. an opportunity for many South Sudanese to elect their leaders.
. a first step towards the democratization process in South Sudan.
As an achievement of one of the key milestones in the implementation of 2005
CPA
The 2010 Sudan General Elections were provided for in the 2005 CPA as one of
the milestones to be achieved upon implementation of the agreement. The 2010
Sudan General Election was also a test of the possibility for peaceful
coexistence amongst South and North Sudanese. It also gave an opportunity
for South Sudan to field candidates for the presidency of the country.
As an opportunity for many South Sudanese to elect their leaders
The 2010 Sudan General Elections saw the participation of the people in
electing their leaders. This came after a long period of war in the country,
and many people have never participated in a national election. This brought
a feeling of belonging and was intended to bring citizens close to their
government.
As a first step towards the democratization process in South Sudan
The 2010 elections were perceived to be a step towards democratization in
the country. Since the country had been in war with itself due to
marginalization and oppression, this was a perfect opportunity to launch the
process of democratization in South Sudan and prepare the country for
participation in the referendum process. Indeed, it gave citizens and the
government an experience that was useful for the successful carrying out of
the Referendum on Southern Sudan Self-Determination.
But the elections were also a reflection of the tendency by the
international community to address electoral democracy, placing focus on
elections and electoral processes instead of a democratic agenda that is
based on equity, competitive politics that takes into consideration the
dynamics and composition of the society, and a strong state-society
engagement governance agenda.
In the case of South Sudan, it was clear that the SPLM/A commanded a strong
political dominance in the country based on their role as the liberation
movement. But this did not mean that they should have been allowed to
monopolize the political process leading up to and after the elections. Yet
this is exactly what happened.
Many smaller and emerging political parties could not compete with SPLM, as
they were either less known by the electorate or manipulatively branded by
the dominant party as collaborators with the Khartoum government. An example
of such manipulation is the Sudan People's Liberation Movement for
Democratic Change Party (SPLM-DC) of Lam Akol, which was branded an
instrument of Khartoum aiming to cause confusion during the elections. As a
result, they had a presence in only few states. Yet at the moment they are
the only official opposition in the parliament, with four representatives
out of the over 300 members of parliament's two houses, the National
Legislative Assembly and the Council of States.
Vast swaths of the electorate supported the SPLM party because it was
considered to be the liberating agency and the institution expected to
deliver the referendum. But it is important to note that while the SPLM is
seen and known as a political party, it has never been organized this way.
There is still little distinction between the SPLM party and the SPLA, which
is supposed to be the national army. The party has never had a general
assembly of members since the elections in 2010 and most of its major
decisions are made through presidential orders, further weakening internal
party structures and reducing democratic space within the party.
KEY CHALLENGES POST-ELECTION
Because this was the first time the people of South Sudan participated in
electing their leaders, the elections saw all kinds of people elected not
because they can represent the electorate, but rather because they were SPLM
candidates and most of the electorate new nothing apart from SPLM being the
only party. This gave rise to the current weakness of the National
Legislative Assembly.
The 2010 Sudan General Elections were also the first time for SPLM internal
disputes to be brought to light in front of the public. Due to
dissatisfaction of some SPLM members with internal party processes, this saw
some SPLM members contest as independent candidates and others to claim the
elections as fraudulent.
Security and security systems
After the 2010 Sudan general elections, the security situation in South
Sudan remained delicate. One key concern was how to deal with the organized
armed militia groups that were either a remnant of the civil war or
initiated by disgruntled military elites who claimed that they were rigged
out of political leadership in the polls. Both David Yau Yau and the late
George Athor were are among the actors who continued to wage war against the
government from the forests of Jonglei State, protesting what they saw as a
lack of political space to engage in the election and the subsequent
government. Many armed militia have since sprang up, fighting battles with
government forces and resulting in continued loss of lives and the
destruction of property in Jonglei State and elsewhere.
Challenges of competing development and political interests
While the government has made considerable progress in several areas, the
key challenge has been in balancing political power building and state
building. Certainly one would be too ambitious to expect the leadership of a
party such as the SPLM to govern through consensus and dialogue or a
democratic process.
Further, it would have been prudent for the government to balance its
commitment to political leadership with a state building agenda focused on
strengthening the institutions of the state and the government, including
the judiciary, the legislative arm and the executive branch.
Legal Reforms
The unanimous vote for the secession of Southern Sudan in the landmark 2011
Referendum on Southern Sudan Self-Determination and the consequent
declaration of independence was expected to mark the beginning of a new
constitutional order. This was seen in the drafting of a Transitional
Constitution of South Sudan. Yet little progress has been made in this area.
The shift brought on by the vote and the resulting constitution did not
change the security or political architecture in the country. Hence, there
is still no civilian/citizen oversight of the security sector or a political
framework to enable civilian decision making on governance issues. The
country has not had a consistent law reform process; as a result, both good
and progressive laws as well as retrogressive laws still are in operation in
South Sudan, two and a half years after independence.
A case in point is the powers of the presidency, found in Article 101 of the
Transitional Constitution. Of particular interest is sub article (h), which
has been the most contentious piece of legislation. It states that the
President can 'remove a state governor and/or dissolve a state Legislative
Assembly in the event of a crisis in the state that threatens national
security and territorial integrity'. But it did not define the limits of
this dissolution in the manner that countries such as Kenya have done.
The same section gives the president powers to give unilateral decrees and
make absolute national decisions.
While this is the case in many countries emerging out of conflict, what were
needed were checks that ensured these powers were not excessively applied,
especially to democratically elected legislative representatives who
represent the voice of society.
The same article 101, sub article (g) provides that the President shall
'convene, summon, adjourn or prorogue the National Legislature in
consultation with the Speaker'.
But there are some positive aspects, such as Transitional Constitution of
South Sudan Article 24 (1), which provides for freedom of expression and
media, stating that 'every citizen shall have the right to freedom of
expression, reception and dissemination of information, publication, and
access to the press without prejudice to public order, safety or morals as
prescribed by law'.
The lack of adequate constitutional provisions on elections is also
noteworthy. Due to what many consider to be deliberate delays in the
constitution-making process, it is very likely that the forthcoming general
elections will be held under the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan,
which unfortunately does not have an express provision on elections. This
means that the only legal provision under which the elections is to be
conducted is the Electoral Act. The concern in this case is that the
Transitional Constitution neither provides for an effective processes nor
for institutions to prevent, manage or resolve security-related electoral
issues that have certainly presented themselves in the present conflict as
part of the early election fervor.
Resource Management and Distribution
South Sudan is endowed with various natural resources, among which oil the
most exploited. It contributes to about 98% of the total national revenue.
The South Sudan oil industry is dependent on the infrastructure developed by
Sudan, and transfers its outgoing resources through Sudan to the high seas.
For this reason, the two countries both have interest in the oil revenues.
This creates a challenge in managing these transactions in a transparent
manner, where citizens have knowledge and a say regarding the use of
revenues.
Politicization of ethnicity
South Sudan faces challenges in how to cultivate unity in diversity. The
country has over 65 ethnic communities living in the country, and in most
cases this has been politicized and sometimes seen as source of or fuel for
conflict. It has been evident that in a competitive election environment,
politicians are likely to portray communities to be against one another's
potential access to power and resources. But these ethnic communities
themselves are able to come together and peacefully coexist, as witnessed
during the Referendum on Self-Determination of Southern Sudan.
Corruption and basic service delivery
With the existence of weak institutions and lack of proper systems,
corruption is likely to creep in, and will certainly lead to inadequate
service delivery and the slowing of development projects. There has been a
perception that oil revenues came as free money that did not require
accountability. As a result, those who were entrusted with these funds took
the opportunity to enrich themselves, while those who had limited or no
access to the proceeds were disadvantaged, creating dissatisfaction among
South Sudanese citizens.
Immediately following the signing of the CPA in 2005 there have been high
levels of corruption in almost all sectors of the South Sudan Society,
specifically among government officials, generating much dissatisfaction
among the ordinary citizens. Due to pressure from citizens and the
international community, the president responded by carrying out several
drastic measures, starting with an abrupt retirement of several top army
commanders. This action was followed by his writing of a letter to the 75
suspected corrupt incumbent and former government ministers, the
controversial removal of former Vice President Dr. Riek Machar and the
dissolution of the entire cabinet in July 2013.
Many analysts perceive these three events as ill advised. The dissolution of
the cabinet saw many political parties embarked in political patronage, as
they considered the space created by the cabinet dissolution an opportunity
to join the government. Political parties thus sent names of their proposed
ministers to the president for consideration. Instead, the president only
considered people whom he felt were overtly loyal and would support him,
mostly from among his military comrades, depicting him as someone practicing
politics of exclusiveness, encouraging the militarization of the executive
arm of the government and demonstrating a lack of tolerance of differing
opinion.
Buildup to Conflict
The analysis by civil society indicates that the present turmoil is the
result of a combination of several factors that culminated into development
of election fervors, leading to tensions within the SPLM leadership. Some of
the key contributing factors to the socio-political turmoil in South Sudan
is summarized below, though it is not a comprehensive list.
Weak institutions of governance and structures of decision making
According to the perspective of the civil society team doing analysis of the
situation, particularly weak institutions of governance and structures of
decision making are two of the contributing factors to the current crisis in
South Sudan. This is coupled with a weak constitution, lack
constitutionalism and nonadherence to the rule of law. The weakness is seen
in all the three arms of the government and within ruling party.
Sweeping Presidential Powers
The political structures within South Sudan gave the president sweeping
powers, including the powers to dismiss elected officials, appoint key
officials of national institutions and dissolve executives, as inexplicably
seen July 2013. In a nut shell, the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan
has a number of loopholes that a dictatorial president can invoke,
potentially leading to bad decisions, entrenched corruption and unfair
competition for services and resources, leading to rivalries and leadership
struggles.
Leadership vacuum
After the signing of the CPA, the people of South Sudan had hope. This came
to them after a very long struggle and bloody civil war, and amid a
situation where people of South Sudan had to face the reality of losing a
leader who had been leading the struggle. The transition from being a
movement to a nation came with great challenge, including facing a
leadership vacuum. These struggles have resulted in lack of a national
identity and a lack of nationalism and patriotism-all of which adds up to an
increase in corruption, rent seeking and untruthfulness, culminating into
fears and anxieties that easily propelled rebellion. The SPLM party had been
stifled to the extent that dialogue was no longer possible. This also
created acrimony within the party, greatly limiting internal party democracy
and other democratic processes.
RECOMMENDATIONS
. Any resolutions to the conflict should consider more than just the
short-term issues that lead to the events of 1 December 2013 and after.
. The negotiations should not just depend on the agenda of the two parties,
but should ensure as much inclusivity as possible.
. Any reform agenda should not include a call for elections and
constitutional reform to take place in less than one and a half years.
. Any dialogue should include all parties and neutral international
partners.
We call for:
. Immediate demilitarization of government.
. Immediate demilitarization of the parties.
. A very clear state-building agenda, complete with a timeframe, to
strengthen institutions of the state and society.
. Specific constitutional amendments to provide equity and equal
representation in the government.
. Autonomy and independence for all three arms of the government.
. The delinking of security from the government.
. An immediate process for building state-society dialogue as part of the
reconciliation.
We ask for:
. A clear timetable as part of the negotiation for each of the above.
. A framework that will ensure immediate national reconciliation with a
clear timetable.
. A clear and complete programme for DDR, with a specific timeframe
indicating Who, How and When.
. Clear laws on key reform agendas pending electoral and constitutional
reform. Only then should the agenda be put on table for referendum-with a
clear timeframe.
. Equity in resource distribution.
. Immediate security sector reforms.
* Peter Lasu Ladu is Director of Erada, a South Sudanese NGO.
End note:
Ashworth, John (2009) CPA Alert: The state of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, Alert No. 1, Utrecht, IKV Pax Christi
Received on Fri Oct 10 2014 - 12:15:30 EDT