<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/browse-by-country/id/46/SUDAN> SUDAN -
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/5809/The_world_according_to_K
hartoum> The world according to Khartoum
The smuggling out of what appear to be top secret state documents points to
a major security breach in the government
10th October 2014
The Khartoum government is yet to react to the circulation of what purport
to be detailed minutes of a meeting on 31 August of top security and
military officers in which they discuss arming Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon's
rebels in South Sudan, supporting armed jihadists in Africa and the Middle
East, and destroying crops in South Kordofan to starve out rebel supporters.
The officers present also show a fairly uniform contempt towards the
governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Western states and African officials
trying to mediate Sudan's internal conflicts.
The first question is whether the minutes are authentic (see
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/5807/Khartoum_in_fact_and_fic
tion> Khartoum in fact and fiction). Most of the Sudanese politicians, and
serving and former officials that Africa Confidential has spoken to reckon
they are and that there have been serious security breaches in Khartoum. The
second question is how much they may change events on the ground. They may
inform the opposition's negotiating tactics and encourage mediators,
regional and otherwise, to take a more realistic view of the regime's
position. If Khartoum's support for Riek Machar's forces is further
confirmed, that will complicate the tortuous peace negotiations with the
Juba government and invite censure from the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development, which is mediating in the civil war (AC Vol 55 No 18,
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/5777/A_deadline_for_the_deadl
ine> A deadline for the deadline).
Entitled 'Management of Military Activities', the document dated 1 September
is set out as an account of a meeting at the National Defence College on the
previous day. Through a circuitous route, the documents were passed from a
dissident within the security structure to oppositionists, we were told.
They were posted on the internet after the Arabic originals and loose
English translations had been passed to Professor Eric Reeves, a veteran
United States-based human rights campaigner on Sudan and South Sudan. The
documents refer to a meeting of the military-security chiefs; they are
addressed to Lieutenant General Osman Taj el Sir, Managing Director of the
National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Central Security
Authority.
The Military Activities meeting was about achieving consensus, not making
policy. 'In that kind of dictatorial apparatus, you have to keep the
political base of the regime stable and give the impression that each centre
of power has had its say', commented one Sudanese academic. 'It gives you a
window on the ideological consensus at the heart of the regime's top
policy-making apparatus'.
Security inner circle
Of the 14 men listed as attending the security meeting, half are generals
and only two are civilian politicians: Investment Minister Mustafa Osman
Ismail and Presidential Assistant Ibrahim Ahmed Ghandour. Former dentist and
ex-Foreign Minister Mustafa was founding Secretary of the Popular Arab
Islamic Congress (PAIC) in the early 1990s (AC Vol 52 No 7,
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/3908/Mr.-Smile-and-the-militi
as> Mr Smile and the militias). 'I never believed he was not a part of the
most inner circle', a Western security source told AC.
Prof. Ibrahim was leader of the putatively independent Sudanese Workers'
Trades Union Federation, in which guise he has led a campaign against the
International Criminal Court's indictment for genocide, war crimes and
crimes against humanity of Field Marshal Omer (AC Vol 51 No 15,
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/3615/Khartoum%27s_most_wanted
> Khartoum's most wanted). He is the ruling National Congress Party's Deputy
Chairman for Party Affairs and head of negotiations with the opposition
Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), due to restart in Ethiopia on 12 October
but now postponed until 25 October because the NCP is too busy preparing for
its party conference.
Announcing the postponement on 5 October, Ibrahim Ghandour told the official
Sudan Radio that the government had 'a clear vision of the solutions in the
Two Areas', i.e. Blue Nile and South Kordofan. The Defence College meeting
covers the regime's main policy areas, not only directly military ones. It
reflects the increased power of the military-security cabal at the expense
of the civilians, who used to run the regime through the security, rather
than the other way around.
The agenda lists: 'The Paris Declaration [between El Sadig el Mahdi and the
SRF] and the impact of the SRF statement [presumably the memorandum of
understanding signed with Ghazi Salah el Din el Atabani and Ahmed Saad Omer
(AC Vol 55 No 18,
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/5768/Opposition_beams%2c_Khar
toum_glowers> Opposition beams, Khartoum glowers)]; Radical and moderate
trends in regards to Shiite belief activities in Sudan; President Mbeki's
role and Sudanese issues; Elections, National Dialogue and peace
negotiations - The Priority; New Sudan project and its impact on the
national security and economic activity'.
The participants do not proceed in an orderly fashion down the agenda. 'In
this meeting it is not necessary that we agree on every point we discuss',
says First Vice-President Bakri Hassan Salih, though they mostly do.
'Everyone is to express his point of view and I will inform the President
with all the details and the majority and minority opinion regarding each
topic'. This is where the decisions will actually be made, 'in the Palace'.
Key areas discussed are as follows:
South Sudan
Assistance to Riek's rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition
will increase and include tanks, artillery, intelligence and logistical
training, as requested, said the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen.
Hashim Abdullah Mohamed, by Riek, Taban Deng Gai and Dhieu Mathok Diing on a
visit to Khartoum. The NCP's explicit aim is a federal state of Greater
Upper Nile - a bid to regain the oilfields and to block the SPLM-North's
route southwards.
Evidence of NCP support for Riek is skimpy, though Western sources believe
light weaponry is involved and question the utility of tanks. An
investigation by the Small Arms Survey and Conflict Armament Research after
this year's fighting in Bentiu found cartridge cases made this year in
Khartoum.
Sudanese opposition
'All the plans for dividing the SRF and the SPLM are in place with the aim
to get rid of the New Sudan Project' says NISS boss Mohamed Atta el Moula
Abass. The Director of People's Security, Gen. El Rasheed el Fagiri,
describes sending people abroad to claim asylum. 'After that we contact them
to get regular reports about the SPLM-N chapters' activities in the
Diaspora. We managed to send many such collaborators to most countries'.
This fits with what Sudanese in exile know but Britain's Home Office
steadfastly denies: the community is infiltrated by regime spies and
security officers. The non-governmental organisation Waging Peace detailed
such methods in a September report, The Long Arm of the Sudanese Regime: How
the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Service monitors and
threatens Sudanese nationals who leave Sudan. People's Security is the organ
directing the 'People's Committees', local groups that spy on the
neighbourhood.
Gen. El Rasheed reports that he has infiltrated all political parties and as
for the rebels, 'We are following all their movements, chats, private
affairs with women, the type of alcohol preferred or taken by each one, the
imaginary talks when they get drunk. We have ladies who are always in
contact with them. The ladies managed to send to us their emails, telephone
numbers, Skypes, WhatsApps and all their means of communications... In our
activities abroad, we are now concentrating on the SPLM-N. Because we
believe that, if we managed to destroy the SPLM-N, the threat to our rule
will vanish,' says El Rasheed.
The securocrats are furious with El Sadig el Mahdi. In August, he signed the
Paris Declaration with the SRF, the first serious attempt to bring the
vacillating Umma Party leader into a broad-based opposition. 'On top we must
put pressure on El Sadig's family through his children to see him return to
Sudan and we pardon him, provided that, he disowns the Paris Declaration and
severs any relation with the SRF', declares El Rasheed. Since El Sadig's
daughter Mariam el Sadig el Mahdi was held in solitary confinement to force
her father home, this is bad news for the family. El Sadig is so 'insulted'
that this looked unlikely, said one Mahdi family source.
The military-security meeting reiterated the regime's refusal to postpone
next year's general and presidential polls. 'Holding the elections
constitutes a psychological war against the armed movements and may
frustrate them and lead to the end of the New Sudan Project' announced Lt.
Gen. Salah el Din el Tayeb, an NISS Deputy Director and head of Disarmament,
Demobilisation and Reintegration, a post he took over from Sulaf el Din
Salih Mohamed Tahir, who previously led the organisation Muessessa Muwafag
el Kheiriya ('Blessed Relief').
The postponement of the resumption of National Dialogue talks in Addis Ababa
looks like a bid to ensure the NCP Conference that precedes it endorses Omer
as candidate, notwithstanding the constitutional block on a third term. 'The
elections will give us another five years of legitimacy', urges Mustafa
Osman.
Foreign policy
Apart from expressing contempt for Western governments and African
mediators, the officers seem to believe they can continue to get cash from
Arab governments while expanding relations with Iran and with the
International Muslim Brotherhood's multifarious offspring. 'In the open let
us maintain good relations with the Gulf States but strategically with Iran
and to be managed secretly by the Military Intelligence and security
organs,' advises former Foreign Minister Mustafa.
The State (junior) Defence Minister, Gen. Yahya Mohamed Kheir, is blunter:
'The Gulf states have only very weak information about the terrorist groups
that are based in Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, North African Arab Countries and
Afghanistan, because they have bad relations with these radical groups. They
want us to cooperate with them in the war against terrorism because the
radical groups constitute a direct threat to them. Their relation with
Da'ish [Islamic State in Iraq and Shams, ISIS], Nusra Front, Muslim Brothers
and the Palestine Islamic Movement is even weaker. We will not sacrifice our
relations with the Islamists and Iran for a relation with the Saudis and the
Gulf states'.
Saudi Arabia and the dissidents
The National Service General Coordinator, Abdel Gadir Mohamed Zein asks:
'Are you sure Saudi Arabia can change its mind after it has classified the
Muslim Brothers as terrorists?' Distrust of Saudi Arabia runs deep. Lt. Gen.
Sideeg Amir Ali Hassan, Director of Military Intelligence and Security,
says: 'We should confront them [Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates]
and tell them openly that we got evidence (audio tapes, names etc) that you
Saudis and Emiratis are the ones who financed the September 2013 uprising
and demonstrations in Khartoum... 'They contacted two of our officers with
the ranks of brigadier general and sat with them in Khartoum... after five
meetings with the Saudis, the two officers disclosed to us that [the Saudis]
want a coup to be carried out by Islamist officers who are pro-Saudi
Arabia.'
In an attempt to stem Sudanese support for IS, Riyadh threatened to block
Sudan's lucrative export of millions of sheep to be slaughtered for the Eid
al Adha festival on 4 October, an opposition source tells us. This followed
reports of Saudi officials being killed when IS fighters went into Saudi
Arabia but is part of a broader policy to deal with Iraqi-Syrian 'blow-back'
(AC Vol 55 No 8,
<
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/5585/Saudi_Arabia_targets_Kha
rtoum> Saudi Arabia targets Khartoum). The officers believe they have the
capital well covered: 'All the embassies and chanceries in Khartoum are
infiltrated and our elements report to us who visited the embassy and who
went out from the embassy staff and to where,' boasts El Rasheed.
On Egypt, Chief of Joint Operations, Gen. Emad el Din Mustafa Adawi,
suggests pressuring Cairo to block El Sadig in return for Sudan preventing
the political activities of Muslim Brothers who arrived after the fall of
Mohamed Mursi. Then he changes tone: 'The northern border is totally
secured, especially after the victory of our [Islamist] allies in Tripoli.
We managed to get to them the weapons and military equipment donated by
Qatar and Turkey and we formed a joint operations room under a colonel for
coordination purposes with them on how to administer military operations.
Turkey and Qatar provided us with information in favour of the
revolutionaries on top of the information collected by our own agents that
will help them to win the war and control the whole country'.
'Intelligence cooperation' with the United States may amount to less than
Western officials often make out. 'America has fallen into the trap of the
ISIS and the other jihadist movements that are newly formed and can move
freely outside the traditional surveillance networks', comments Defence
Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein. 'Currently, there are 20,000 jihadists
and 15 newly formed jihadist movements which are scattered all over, from
Morocco to Egypt, Sinai, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, all Gulf States, a wide
presence in Africa and Europe and nobody else owns a data-base on that as
the one we have. We release only limited information to the Americans
according to the request and the price is the armed movements file'.
Received on Fri Oct 10 2014 - 11:22:23 EDT