After Godane - Al-Shabaab's New Leadership Fights Internal Reform
By Hassan M. Abukar
2 October 2014
A month has passed since the US Government killed Ahmed Abdi Godane, former
emir of Al-Shabaab, with a targeted air strike. Godane's replacement, Ahmed
Diriye 'Abu Ubaidah', has yet to issue a statement about his intentions and
vision for the militant group. His jihadi credentials, however, were
recently enhanced when the United Nations placed him on its list of
international terrorists subject to sanctions. Not to be outdone, the Somali
government put a $2M bounty on his head.
Al-Shabaab vowed to retaliate for Godane's killing and the group bombed
Mogadishu two days after the new emir's coronation - an incident that led to
the deaths of 16 civilians. It is however, likely that planning for the
attack was underway long before Godane was killed.
It is a challenging time for the new emir to come into power. Operation
Indian Ocean; a joint military venture by the Somali National Army and the
forces of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), has slowly been pushing
Al-Shabaab from territories previously under its control. The next major
target is the strategic port city of Barawe, which was formerly the
headquarters of the group and remains the locus of the highly profitable
charcoal trade.
The loss of Baraawe would deprive Al-Shabaab of access to the sea, proximity
to Mogadishu and tax proceeds. It will also force the group to relocate
further inland and organize its headquarters either in Jilib or Jamaame, the
latter of which is 363 km away from Mogadishu but only 53 km south of
Kismayo, the third largest city in Somalia (currently controlled by Kenyan
forces.)
Recently, Al-Shabaab has been losing fighters (Somalis and foreigners) to
ISIS in Iraq and Syria with jihadists eager to relocate to the Middle East
rather than Somalia.
Moreover, Al-Shabaab has slowly been suffering desertions due to a 45-day
amnesty the Somali government has extended to its members. Although the
defection is slow, the amnesty program has diminished the likelihood that
the government will punish many of the youngsters who had joined the group -
willingly and unwillingly - becoming its foot soldiers.
After Godane's death, the leaders of Al-Shabaab met for days in Baraawe to
discuss the challenges faced by the group and to reorganize its power
structure. Mahad Karate has been appointed deputy emir and Bashir Mohamed
Mohamoud 'Qoorgaab' as the head of military operations. Karate was widely
rumored to be taking on the top job after Godane, but the leadership opted
for a conservative and smoother transition of power when it elected Ahmed
Diriye, Godane's deputy.
The new emir and his deputy, Ali Dheere (the official spokesman), form the
nucleus of a faction in Al-Shabaab that adheres closely to Godane's
philosophy of governance. This faction was known for its brutality, selected
assassinations of rivals and a general mistrust of foreign jihadists.
Another wing however, represented by Foud Mohamed Khalaf 'Shangole, is
calling for a change of direction. Shangole, on whom Washington had placed a
$5M bounty, has started a campaign for internal reform. Immediately after
Godane's death, Shangole proposed changes that would make the group's late
leader turn in his grave. He called for the following:
Curbs to the powers of the 'Amniyaat' - a powerful branch of Al-Shabaab
responsible for intelligence and assassinations which reported directly to
Godane. Shangole proposed that the Amniyaat be brought under tighter control
and that the number of the assassinations be limited. He also proposed that
attempts should be made to limit civilian casualties during bombings.
Make the Qur'an and the Sunnah (tradition) the ultimate arbiter in conflict
resolution instead of the emir being the judge and jury.
Close all secret detentions operated by Godane.
Initiate reconciliation talks with those estranged leaders of the group,
such as Mukhtar Robow, and others who are currently in hiding.
Al-Shabaab's new leaders are likely to spend the next few months
consolidating power rather than rushing to make drastic changes (such as
those proposed by Shangole.) The loss of territories, while sizable, is
unlikely to change the economic power of the group which relies, among other
things, on extortion even in the areas controlled by the government. Many
Somali merchants still pay monies to Al-Shabaab, euphemistically called
zakat or 'alms', for fear of assassination.
The late Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden once characterized his Sudanese
host, the National Islamic Front, in the 1990s, as a "mixture of religion
and organized crime." Jihadi groups like Al-Shabaab are no different and see
extortion as a means of survival.
Neither the Somali army nor AMISOM have an appetite for a long and sustained
war with the group. Government forces are small, undisciplined, and
haphazard, and the African forces prefer a slow and plodding approach to
defeating Al-Shabaab - a campaign that is coupled with political and
economic programs for liberated areas. Unfortunately, these liberated areas
are more likely to return to the hands of Al-Shabaab because no effective
administrative and economic programs have been put in place.
It seems unlikely that Al-Shabaab will disappear from the political scene of
Somalia any time soon as it remains a force that stands against the
legitimacy of the central government, the presence of foreign troops in the
country and the absence of sharia. These are all powerful motivating factors
for many Somalis.
Hassan M. Abukar is a political analyst and can be reached at
abukar60_at_yahoo.com.