Date: Sun, 22 Sep 2013 20:20:58 +0200
The Future of Intrastate Conflict in Africa - More Violence or Greater
Peace?
A South African National Defence Force machine waits to begin his advance
during a joint US-South African simulated assault, 2011.
Will Africa in general – and East Africa in particular – still be synonymous
with intrastate conflict in 2050? Not according to Jakkie Cilliers and Julia
Schünemann. They argue that while instability and violence are likely to
persist, large-scale unrest will have waned by then.
By Julia Schünemann and Jakkie Cilliers for Institute for Security Studies
(ISS)
22 September 2013
_____
Introduction
Many African countries experienced violent transitions after independence,
which included civil wars and mass killings. This is not surprising
considering the divisiveness of the original boundary-making processes, the
coercive nature of colonial rule and the messy process of independence.
Created in haste, postcolonial states often exhibited the same
characteristics as their colonial antecedents. In some instances, these
problems were compounded by non-inclusive political settlements, governance
failures and natural catastrophe.
Generally, the newly independent African nations had to find their way in a
bipolar world order that provided limited alternative policy choices beyond
those linked to the West or members of the opposing Warsaw Pact. A number of
African countries experienced initial rapid economic growth after
independence and then underwent a period of general decline and decay, as
living standards dropped and poverty levels increased. Although average
annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates remained slightly positive
(see Figure 1), they fell far short of the 6–7 per cent generally required
to reduce poverty in a rapidly increasing population. The GDP growth rates
fell to historical low levels during the late 1970s, only recovering two
decades later.
Following this period of stagnation, excitement about Africa’s economic
growth prospects has reached fever pitch early in the 21st century. Today
many African countries present an optimistic economic outlook that contrasts
strongly with the previous characterisation of Africa as a region beset by
chronic instability, poverty and marginal importance to the global economy.
Recent publications by the African Futures Project, using the International
Futures (IFs) forecasting system, have explored the gains in human
development that are becoming possible and the potential for positive
changes to the development trajectory of Africa.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn1> [1] These
include benefits from investments in education, water and provision of
sanitation; the potential for a green revolution in Africa; and gains to be
realised from the eradication of malaria. Collectively, these changes
present the potential for greater life expectancy, better education and
higher income in most countries. A number of factors provide the basis for
continued positive change in Africa in the 21st century. Examples are the
growth of South–South trade, particularly with China; improvements in the
capacity of African governments and progress with the conflict-management
capabilities of regional organisations, such as the African Union (AU); and
the steady increase in the number of democracies.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn2> [2]
In addition to these positive developments, the number of violent
conflict-related deaths has been declining steadily over several decades.
This decline has preceded and perhaps allowed for the more recent upturns in
Africa’s development prospects. A reduction in a country’s incidence of
armed violence corresponds with improved development outcomes.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn3> [3] This
trend started shortly after the end of the Cold War, although there has been
an uptick in global instability in the last two to three years.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn4> [4]
Rapid economic growth and improvements in most human development indices are
expected to continue and go hand in hand with further declining levels of
armed conflict in Africa.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn5> [5]
However, as argued below, it is also expected that instability and violence
will persist and even increase in some instances – reflecting the changing
nature of armed conflict in Africa and new dynamics that appear to supersede
those of the Cold War period.
This paper describes emerging trends and patterns of conflict and
instability in Africa since the end of the Cold War. It also discusses seven
key correlations associated with intrastate violence on the continent and
presents a number of reasons for the changing outlook regarding conflict.
These reasons include increased international engagement in peacekeeping,
improved regional capacity for conflict management, and Africa’s continued
growth and positive prospects for development.
Africa has always been deeply affected by external influences, from the days
of slavery to the present-day scramble for the continent’s resources and
even its consumer market. Therefore, this paper also explores how emerging
multipolarity may impact on stability. In conclusion, the IFs model is used
to forecast trends of intrastate conflict.
Armed violence in Africa: trends and patterns
Civil or internal wars remain the dominant form of conflict in Africa.
However, the number of wars has halved since the 1990s and the nature of the
conflicts has changed significantly with the lines between criminal and
political violence becoming increasingly blurred. As the World Development
Report 2011 states, ‘the remaining forms of conflict and violence do not fit
neatly either into “war” or “peace”, or into “criminal violence” or
“political violence”’.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn6> [6] The
2011 Global Burden of Armed Violence, therefore, challenges
compartmentalised approaches to armed violence. It provides a global
overview of different forms of violence, tries to understand how violence
manifests in various contexts and how forms of violence interact with one
another. <http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn7>
[7] Scott Straus provides the following crisp summary on the changing nature
of conflict: ‘Today’s wars are typically fought on the peripheries of
states, and insurgents tend to be militarily weak and factionalised.’
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn8> [8]
The latter part of the Cold War was a particularly violent period
characterised by protracted proxy wars fought by protagonists in Southern
Africa, the Horn of Africa and South-East Asia over several decades.
According to both the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn9> [9] and
the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer,
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn10> [10]
there were steady increases in the number of armed-conflict incidents,
casualties and civilians affected during this period.
After the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, some previously frozen
conflicts in Africa reignited violently, including those in Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). After this pent-up
conflict pressure was released, a steady decline ensued. In a number of
instances, insurgencies that had been externally funded before, and
therefore had benefitted financially from the Cold War, turned inward for
resources. They used diamonds (UNITA and the RUF in Angola), coltan (various
factions in the eastern DRC), coffee and cacao (in Côte d’Ivoire), and even
charcoal (in Somalia) as alternative sources of revenue. Generally, these
‘resource-based insurgencies’
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn11> [11]
were unable to grow into large-scale fighting forces and lacked the strength
to challenge the dominant party in the capital. However, there have been
exceptions in recent months, such as the extreme cases of Mali and the
Central African Republic (CAR), where the weakening of the armed forces was
significant.
Figure 2 graphs the number of internal wars by region (as defined by the
World Bank), using data from the Political Instability Task Force.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn12> [12]
Taking into consideration the increase in the number of countries – from 55
in 1946 to 179 in 1992 (the year the wars peaked) – the probability of a
country being in conflict is now similar to that at the end of the 1950s and
(after substantial peaks) lower than during the Cold War.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn13> [13]
Today conflict in Africa appears to be increasingly fragmented and the
number of actors, particularly non-state factions, involved in conflicts is
rising. <http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn14>
[14] This is evident in regions such as Darfur, in Sudan, where the peace
process that was finalised at the All Darfur Stakeholders’ Conference in May
2011 (in Doha, Qatar) was significantly complicated by divisions among
various rebel factions. More recently, the Séléka coalition in the CAR
(whose advance on the capital, Bangui, was temporarily halted by the
intervention of other African countries) eventually consisted of five
separate groupings. Three of these signed a peace agreement with President
François Bozizé on 13 January 2013. Bozizé was eventually ousted when the
coalition resumed their advance a few months later.
In the armed conflict in northern Mali, previous allies, Tuareg and Islamist
rebels, fought each other in the latter stages of Operation Serval in
January 2013 when French forces recaptured Mali’s north. Also, in the
eastern provinces of the DRC, the M23 rebel movement has recently split into
different factions ahead of the decision to deploy a neutral intervention
force as part of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in
the DRC.
Therefore, scholars recognise ‘the reality of a messy empirical record in
which non-state groups are frequently racked by internal differences and
struggles’,
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn15> [15]
which complicates the picture of state versus non-state actors.
In addition, several of today’s insurgent groups have strong transnational
characteristics and move relatively easily across borders and between
states. However, few present a significant military threat to governments or
are in a position to seize and hold large strips of territory. Some fight on
the periphery of fairly well-consolidated states, as in Senegal, Mali and
Uganda, whereas others exploit the weak central authority of countries such
as the DRC and Sudan.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn16> [16]
Another well-known example is al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which
originally fought to overthrow the Algerian government while consolidating
its activities across the Sahel region, particularly in northern Mali.
A number of recent publications by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
indicate the tendency towards convergence and connection between networks of
organised crime as well as their illicit activities, including money
laundering, kidnapping, drug trafficking, terrorism, etc.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn17> [17]
Violence directly associated with elections has increased in line with the
rise in political contestation
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn18> [18]
before, during and after polls. This is particularly common in settings
where democracy has not been entrenched, such as during the elections in
Zimbabwe in 2005, or where the government has been actively factional in
benefitting one ethnic group above others. In Kenya, in December 2007, this
culminated in post-election violence – a fate avoided during the more recent
elections in 2013. In Zimbabwe’s 2008 presidential elections, more than 200
people died, at least 10 000 were injured and tens of thousands were
internally displaced due to election-related violence. Other elections that
were accompanied by varying levels of violence include those in Nigeria
(2011) and Côte d’Ivoire (2011). In general, the push for multi-party
elections in the 1990s led to an increase of associated violence across much
of Africa – a pattern that has been sustained over time.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn19> [19]
To some extent, the era of democracy and elections has seen violent
competition move from armed opposition in marginal rural areas to violence
around the election process itself. In this regard, Straus points out:
The onset of multi-party elections meant that, from a would-be insurgent’s
point of view, governments were at least nominally vulnerable outside the
context of armed resistance. Moreover, the weight of international funding
flowed toward sponsoring elections and civil society organizations. For
talented opposition figures, the opening of the political arena – combined
with the change in international funding streams – created a strong pull
away from the battlefield toward the domestic political arena.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn20> [20]
As democracy continues to deepen and spread in Africa, in the aftermath of
the so-called Arab Spring, election processes can turn violent in contexts
characterised by latent conflict and tensions surrounding political
competition and power-sharing arrangements. In post-conflict situations,
elections are crucial for deciding who will control state institutions, and
may either affirm existing patterns of power or bring in new elites, thereby
transforming state–society relations.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn21> [21] On
this subject, Bekoe illuminates the fact that electoral violence seems to be
related to more widespread systemic grievances and tensions, including land
rights, employment and ethnic marginalisation.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn22> [22]
More systematic research is needed to explore these issues as well as the
role of external stakeholders in electoral processes and their potential
contribution to building resilient and legitimate states. Sisk asserts that
the way in which elections are conducted is critical. He argues that
sequencing, design and the extent of international monitoring of elections
are the key variables that determine whether electoral processes contribute
to capable, responsive states or reinforce captured, fragmented and weak
states. <http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn23>
[23]
Localised violence over access to livelihood resources, such as land and
water, is also on the increase and this includes farmer–herder conflicts.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn24> [24]
There is evidence that resource competition at community level is relatively
prone to violence.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn25> [25] In
2010 and 2011, conflicts over resources accounted for approximately 35 per
cent of all conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa and 50 per cent of conflicts in
the Americas. On the other hand, only 10 per cent of all conflicts in
Europe, the Middle East and Maghreb, and Asia and Oceania featured resources
as a conflict item.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn26> [26] In
cases of resource conflict, the possession of natural resources and/or raw
materials, and the profits derived from them were determining factors in the
conflicts. Globally, in this period, almost half of the resource conflicts
were violent. In contrast, only 14 per cent of the conflicts over territory
or international power
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn27> [27]
turned violent. The conflict item most prone to violence was secession – 73
per cent of the cases – while demands for (greater) autonomy were
articulated violently in only a third of the cases recorded by the
Heidelberg Conflict Barometer.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn28> [28]
Looking ahead, climate change will inevitably affect competition over
livelihood resources, and will act as an accelerator and, in extreme events,
a direct cause of violence and instability. Climate changes influence both
crop and livestock farming, and can be crucial to food production. According
to the World Development Report 2011 the occurrence of a civil conflict in
sub-Saharan Africa is more likely after years of poor rainfall, reflecting
the impact of one type of income shock on stability.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn29> [29] The
rate of change in climate extremes is now increasing significantly faster
than in previous generations, with the result that extreme events, such as
drought and flooding, are more common than in the past.
According to the World Meteorological Organization, the decade from 2001 to
2010 was the warmest since records were first kept in 1850. Global land- and
sea-surface temperatures were estimated at 0,46°C above the long-term
average (1961–1990) of 14°C.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn30> [30] The
results of a new study supported by the world’s largest climate modelling
system show that global temperatures may warm by 3°C by 2050, taking into
consideration the current rates of global greenhouse gas emissions.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn31> [31]
Many plant species, animals and even large human settlements will struggle
to adapt to the current speed of climate change. This may lead to widespread
displacement of people, increased conflict and suffering, particularly in
countries and regions with limited adaptive capacity and resources. In 2009
various papers presented at an Oxford University conference, ‘4 Degrees and
Beyond’, forecast a collapse of the agricultural system in sub-Saharan
Africa in such a scenario.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn32> [32]
In addition, there is an ongoing debate on the potential of competition over
scarce natural resources (particularly food, water, energy and rare earth
metals <http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn33>
[33]) to become a major source of future interstate, regional and even
international conflict. Defence industry researchers have been particularly
vocal about the ‘resource wars of the future’, as have respected think tanks
such as the Royal Institute for International Affairs.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn34> [34] As
populations grow, competition for food, water and energy inevitably
increases. However, the projected transition from conflict over livelihoods
to major interstate war over control of scarce resources remains untested.
The most recent global trends report published by the National Intelligence
Council of the US, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, argues that in 20
years scarcity could be national or regional in nature, but not global,
although the trade-offs between food, water and energy may impact upon one
other. The report argues that fragile states in Africa and the Middle East
are most at risk for food and water shortages, but China and India are also
vulnerable.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn35> [35]
The Global Trends 2030 report goes on to state that, by 2030, the world will
require 35 per cent more food, 40 per cent more water and 50 per cent more
energy to cater for a global population of around 8,3 billion people
(approximately 1,2 billion more than the present population).
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn36> [36] By
that point, the process of global warming will already have had a measurable
and durable impact on livelihoods across many communities, most affecting
those with the least ability to adapt. Extreme heat, especially if
accompanied by drought, may reduce or destroy agricultural yields. This is
particularly relevant in Africa, with its rapid population growth and
violent local clashes over grazing land, water, minerals and other scarce
commodities and resources. Therefore, the longer-term prognosis (beyond
2030) of human-induced climate change is uncertain.
In summary, the ongoing violent intrastate conflicts in Africa tend to be on
a smaller scale than in previous decades, feature factionalised and divided
armed insurgents, and occur on the periphery of states. These conflicts are
difficult to end because of the mobile, factionalised nature of the various
armed groups; the strong cross-border dimensions; and the ability of
insurgents to draw funding from (transnational) illicit trade, exploitation
of local resources, banditry, and/or international terrorist networks rather
than principally from external states.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn37> [37]
There are numerous examples for this in sub-Saharan Africa, including those
in Uganda, Chad, the CAR, Ethiopia, Sudan, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Angola,
Nigeria and the DRC. To some extent, it appears as though these conflicts
represent a form of ‘resistance to the global liberal economy’.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn38> [38]
According to this view, conflict serves to protect the interests of those
who would otherwise be dispossessed by globalisation, and to preserve the
increasing influence of finance in determining the allocation of global
power and resources.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftn39> [39]
This matter will be discussed further in the section about future trends.
Read the
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=164234&lng=e
n> full report .
_____
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref1> [1]
The African Futures Project is a collaboration between the Pardee Center for
International Futures at the University of Denver, Colorado, and the
Institute for Security Studies, with its head office in South Africa
(www.issafrica.org/futures). The International Futures (IFs) is a software
forecasting system that represents relationships and interactions within and
across key global systems for 183 countries from 2010 to 2100. IFs is an
integrated assessment model, which means that it is characterised by
dynamically interacting subsystems, rather than straight-line forecasts or
extrapolations. These subsystems include modules on population, economics,
health, education, infrastructure, agriculture, energy, environment,
governance and international politics. The model has been developed and
maintained by the Pardee Centre for International Futures (www.ifs.du.edu)
by Prof Barry B Hughes. In this paper, version 6.69 has been used for all
data, analysis and forecasts where the source is not indicated otherwise.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref2> [2]
Many of these developments have recently been captured in the 2013 Human
Development Report. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human
Development Report 2013: The rise of the South: human progress in a diverse
world, 2013, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2013_EN_complete.pdf (accessed
12 April 2013).
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref3> [3]
Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Global burden of armed violence 2011: lethal
encounters, executive summary, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011,
10.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref4> [4]
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), Heidelberg
Conflict Barometer 2011,
http://www.hiik.de/de/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2011.pdf
(accessed 10 March 2012); and HIIK, Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2012,
http://www.hiik.de/de/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2012.pdf
(accessed 12 April 2013).
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref5> [5]
This paper defines armed conflict as a contested incompatibility between a
government and an organised opposition group causing at least 25
battle-related deaths during a calendar year (see Lotta Themnér and Peter
Wallensteen, Armed conflict, 1946–2010, Journal of Peace Research 48(4)
(2011), 525–536).
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref6> [6]
World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and
Development, 2011, 2.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref7> [7]
Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Global burden of armed violence 2011, 5f.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref8> [8]
Scott Straus, Wars do end! Changing patterns of political violence in
sub-Saharan Africa, African Affairs 111(443) (2012), 181.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref9> [9]
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), www.ucdp.uu.se/database (accessed 10
March 2012).
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref10> [10]
HIIK, Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2011.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref11> [11]
Jakkie Cilliers, Resource wars – a new type of insurgency, in Jakkie
Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (eds), Angola’s war economy, Peace, profit
or plunder? Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref12> [12]
See http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/political-instability-task-force-home/.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref13> [13]
Erik Melander, Magnus Öberg and Jonathan Hall, The ‘new wars’ debate
revisited: an empirical evaluation of the atrociousness of ‘new wars’,
Uppsala Peace Research Paper 9,
http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/18585_UPRP_No_9.pdf (accessed 22
February 2013). The authors quote the work of Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter
Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Håvard Strand, Armed
conflict 1946–2001: A new dataset, Journal of Peace Research 39(5) (2002),
621.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref14> [14]
The UCDP tabulates the number of actors involved in conflicts and refers to
dyads, defined as a pair of warring parties. In interstate conflicts, these
warring parties are governments of states, whereas in intrastate conflicts,
one is the government of a state and the other is a rebel group. See
http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/124/124259_conflicts_dyads_2011.pdf
(accessed 15 March 2013). For evidence on the increased fragmentation of
conflict, see also Themnér and Wallensteen, Armed conflict, 1946–2011, 566.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref15> [15]
W. Pearlman and K.G. Cunningham, Nonstate actors, fragmentation, and
conflict processes, Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(1), 4; Straus, Wars do
end!, 181.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref16> [16]
Straus, Wars do end!, 181–182; I. Salehan, Rebels without borders:
transnational insurgencies in world politics, New York: Cornell University
Press, 2009.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref17> [17]
Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw, Check your blind spot – confronting criminal
spoilers in the Sahel, Institute for Security Studies, Policy Brief, 2013;
Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, Mali in the aftermath of the French military
operation, Institute for Security Studies, Situation Report, 2013; Mark Shaw
and Tuesday Reitano, The evolution of organised crime in Africa: towards a
new response, Institute for Security Studies, Paper 244 (April 2013). All
available at www.issafrica.org.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref18> [18]
Straus, Wars do end!, 192–193.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref19> [19]
Ibid.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref20> [20]
Straus, Wars do end!, 197.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref21> [21]
Timothy Sisk, Pathways of the political, in Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk
(eds), The dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the contradictions of
postwar peace operations, New York: Routledge, 2008, 196–224.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref22> [22]
Dorina Bekoe, Trends in electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa, United
States Institute of Peace (USIP) Peace Brief, 2010, 13.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref23> [23]
Sisk, Pathways of the political, 2008.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref24> [24]
Straus, Wars do end!, 179, 193.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref25> [25]
HIIK, Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2011, 4.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref26> [26]
The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer defines conflict items as follows:
‘Conflict items are material or immaterial goods pursued by conflict actors
via conflict measures. Due to the character of conflict measures, conflict
items attain relevance for the society as a whole – either for coexistence
within a given state or between states.’ HIIK, Heidelberg Conflict Barometer
2011, 120.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref27> [27]
Defined as change in the power constellation in the international system or
a regional system therein, especially by changing military capabilities or
the political or economic influence of a state. HIIK, Heidelberg Conflict
Barometer 2011, 120.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref28> [28]
HIIK, Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2011, 5.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref29> [29]
World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 6.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref30> [30]
World Meteorological Organization, A summary of current climate change
findings and figures, 2013,
http://www.wmo.int/pages/mediacentre/factsheet/documents/ClimateChangeInfoSh
eet2013-03final.pdf (accessed 7 April 2013).
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref31> [31]
Ibid.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref32> [32]
International Climate Conference, Implications of a global climate change of
4+ degrees for people, ecosystems and the earth system, Oxford, 2009,
http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/4degrees/ (accessed 6 April 2013).
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref33> [33]
A group of 17 chemical elements widely used in advanced manufacturing.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref34> [34]
See Bernice Lee, Felix Preston, Jaakko Kooroshy, Rob Bailey and Glada Lahn,
Resource futures, London: Chatham House, Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 2012, 152. The authors forecast both the increased securitisation
of resource politics and the potential for militarised responses.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref35> [35]
The National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global trends 2030: alternative
worlds, 2012. Available at www.dni.gov/nic/globaltrends.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref36> [36]
NIC, Global trends 2030, iv.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref37> [37]
Straus, Wars do end!, 188; Melander, Öberg and Hall, The ‘new wars’ debate
revisited; Lacina Bethany and Nils Petter Gleditsch, Monitoring trends in
global combat: a new dataset of battle deaths, European Journal of
Population, 21(2–3) (2005), 145–66.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref38> [38]
Mark Duffield, Social reconstruction and the radicalization of development:
aid as a relation of global liberal governance, Development and Change
33(5), 1049–1071, cited in Melander, Öberg and Hall, The ‘new wars’ debate
revisited, 8.
<http://word2cleanhtml.com/s/editor-content.html?1336662665#_ftnref39> [39]
Globalisation is increasingly de-Westernised as a result of the rise of the
South and the deleveraging of Western influence.
<http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/0x0/169564/iresourcemultiple
_files/cfe03c24-bc82-4d00-a4d1-58d315dcfb09/en/Figure1.jpg> ISS Africa
Intrastate Conflict Figure 1
Copyright
ISS Africa Intrastate Conflict Figure 1
<http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/0x0/169565/iresourcemultiple
_files/3bc05434-9985-4392-9752-a3a3a763b754/en/Figure2.jpg> ISS Africa
Intrastate Conflict Figure 2
Copyright
ISS Africa Intrastate Conflict Figure 2
(image/jpeg attachment: image002.jpg)
(image/jpeg attachment: image004.jpg)
(image/jpeg attachment: image006.jpg)
- application/pdf attachment: The_Future_of_Intrastate_Conflict_in_Africa.pdf