Since the 1990s, East Africa has developed what appears to be an impressive
security architecture. Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Johannes Riber Nordby
warn, however, that appearances can be deceptive. The region's security
institutions remain too nationalistic and self-interested for their own
good.
By Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Johannes Riber Nordby for ISN
11 September 2013
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Increased confidence between and among states - not to mention a push from
external donors for 'African Solutions to African Problems'- has, in recent
years, led to the creation of an East African security architecture.
Currently, there are three security institutions that co-exist across the
region: the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (formed in
1996), the East African Community (EAC) (2001), and the East African Standby
Force (EASF) (2004). Each institution has a unique security focus: IGAD is
primarily concerned with addressing drought and famine, EAC with enhancing
economic cooperation, and EASF with military security. And while the
existence of these regional security institutions theoretically provides
opportunities for 'joined-up' activities, internal politics and geopolitical
calculations sometimes prevent coordinated efforts.
Early warnings
In this respect, the establishment of the African Peace and Security
Architecture (APSA) in 2002, and the incorporation of the EASF into this
mechanism two years later, should have presented unparalleled opportunities
for coordination. However, the IGAD and EAC used the APSA to expand their
security ambitions. This, in turn, led to overlap and competition.
A classic example of where cooperation has lost out to competition is the
development of early warning systems for detecting and preventing regional
conflict. At present, the IGAD, EAC and EASF all have very similar ambitions
concerning the development of such a system. However, there are marked
disagreements over where best to anchor regional early warning mechanisms.
Disagreement eventually resulted in the IGAD and EAC developing their own
early warning systems. To further complicate matters, the EASF remains
determined to develop a standalone early warning system instead of utilizing
information provided by the IGAD and EAC.
Nation before region
Failure to develop a 'unified' early warning system reflects concerns that
there is the potential for East Africa's security institutions to be
dominated by the region's more powerful states that may, in turn, use them
to pursue national rather than regional security objectives. It is commonly
held, for example, that Ethiopia exercises considerable influence over the
IGAD, whereas Kenya is a prominent member of the EAC. As a result, the
region's security architecture has often been characterized as a site of
competition between leading states that are nevertheless incapable of
staking a claim to outright regional hegemony.
The region's aborted attempt at coordinating the establishment of the EASF
into the APSA is a case in point. Taken at face value, this decision makes a
lot of sense: in terms of membership, IGAD covers the majority of the East
African region. However, its efforts to bring EASF into the fold were, from
the outset, compromised by concerns over Ethiopia's perceived dominance of
IGAD. Not only did Addis Ababa have a vested interest in several regional
conflicts - most notably in Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia - additional concerns
were raised that influential Ethiopian personalities may end up dominating
the higher echelons of the EASF. As a result, the EASF remains on the
'outside' of East Africa's established regional security architecture and
its activities subject to a memorandum of understanding.
The failure to better integrate the EASF into either the IGAD or the EAC
also suggests that East Africa's security institutions will likely remain at
the mercy of competition for the foreseeable future. Currently, Kenya's
'leading' role in the EAC is closely connected to its relatively strong
financial position and the sea transportation opportunities that Nairobi can
offer its landlocked neighbours. However, Kenya's monopoly on transportation
routes is likely to be challenged over the coming years, most notably by
Ethiopia and Djibouti who have plans to construct and offer alternative
routes to the landlocked states of East Africa. Should this occur, Kenya is
unlikely to favour further institutional integration and may look to
increase the regional significance of the EAC. In an attempt to exclude
Ethiopia from economic development opportunities, Nairobi may, for example,
seek further interdependence with the likes of Rwanda and Uganda.
Looking inwards
As in other parts of the world, East Africa's smaller states often fear
becoming small or insignificant players in institutions that are dominated
by larger counterparts. Tanzania, for example, is particularly wary of
increased interdependence among EAC member-states, which it views as a
threat to its resources and farmland. However, Dodoma is also concerned that
greater integration between the EAC and EASF may not only result in Tanzania
becoming embroiled in security hotspots like Somalia, but regional security
priorities that may differ from its own political outlook. This may explain
why Tanzania currently dedicates very little time to the activities of the
EASF but instead redirects its military effort towards the Southern African
Development Community (SADC).
Tanzania is by no means the only country that lacks the desire to overcome
the inertia so often associated with East Africa's security institutions. In
an interview with a senior policymaker, it became apparent that Uganda - a
member of the IGAD, EAC, EASF and the Great Lakes Initiative - does not view
the duplication of efforts or wasteful overlaps between the organizations as
a matter of concern. Instead, Kampala is more interested in using its
membership of each and every institution to maximize Uganda's regional
influence. In a region where none of the leading organizations are capable
of safeguarding security on their own, this might make a lot of sense.
However, Uganda's, and indeed other states, reluctance to push for regional
security coordination merely perpetuate the wasteful duplication and
overlaps.
To the future
Indeed, a general reluctance to better coordinate activities may result in
in the emergence of a north-south divide within East Africa's security
architecture, with the EAC more concerned with issues affecting the southern
part of the region, and the IGAD with the Horn of Africa. This points to a
future in which the IGAD and EAC become sub-regional, rather than general
trans-boundary organizations, that coalesce around the likes of Ethiopia and
Kenya and their 'rival' security interests. But this might still be a cause
for optimism.
Despite being on the 'outside' of the region's security architecture, the
EASF nevertheless remains the only organization that spans the length and
breadth of East Africa. This means that it could potentially act as a
'bridge' between the rival institutions. While this might lead to the EAC
and IGAD competing for the military capacities that the EASF has to offer,
it may also lead to East Africa's third security actor gaining a
considerable degree of regional legitimacy.
Accordingly, while there are undoubtedly many challenges that stand in the
way of coordination among and between East Africa's security organizations,
the potential for cooperation still exists. However, if potential
opportunities are to become reality, it is vital that the region overcomes
the emerging north-south divide within its security institutions. Attempts
to overcome fragmentation may also help to resolve the closely related
problem of where best to anchor specific defense and security capabilities,
not to mention the region-wide military capacities that currently exist
within EASF. Resolving this conundrum may, in turn, allay region-wide fears
that military capabilities could be used to support the ends and means of
East Africa's more powerful states at the expense of regional stability and
security.
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Katja Lindskov Jacobsen is Assistant Professor at Metropolitan University
College, Copenhagen.
Johannes Riber Nordby is military analyst at the Royal Danish Defence
College, Copenhagen.