Crisis of youth or crisis of society in South Sudan?
Christopher Zambakari
2013-06-26, Issue 635 <
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/issue/635>
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/87916
<
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/87916>
The newly independent nation is beset by a host of problems of
underdevelopment arising from slavery, wars and fragmentation of society.
The serious hardships facing young people, who are the majority of the
population, should be seen in this context and addressed urgently
On July 9, 2013, the Republic of South Sudan will celebrate its second
anniversary. The jubilee that initially welcomed South Sudan into the
community of nations has begun to fade and the reality of crises has
gradually taken front stage. In particular, South Sudan faces two daunting
challenges as it attempts to build a state and bring its diverse
nationalities into the framework of a nation. The first problem is that of
security, law and order. The second is that of building a viable
developmental state capable of spearheading the national objectives
contained in its guiding framework: Vision 2040. The two challenges are
related.
For sustainable development to occur South Sudan must be stabilized and
violence contained. The rule of law must be instituted and enforced. Given
that the majority of the population in South Sudan is under the age of 30,
[1] this paper discusses the youth- who constitute the majority of the
population - and their place in the nation-building process. The first of
several important questions is this: Does South Sudan face a crisis of youth
or a crisis of society? Then, what is the place of this youthful majority in
the emerging nation? The essay will discuss demographics, political violence
and the role of youth, the effects of an ever growing generational gap and
finding the best way forward.
COUNTRY PROFILE AND DEMOGRAPHICS
Given that the conversation concerns the majority, it is counterproductive
to treat an issue of this magnitude in the way one would discuss the problem
of a minority. While it may be popular to talk about a youth problem in
South Sudan, the problem is larger because it affects the country's
majority. I propose that South Sudan does not have a crisis of youth.
Rather, it has a societal crisis involving most of its population. The
tendency to treat the majority as a minority, to divide administratively the
masses into smaller groups, is a colonial mode of governance. Its
consequence is the arrest of social transformation, the stifling of
collective power and the containment of progressive movements. If a durable
solution is to be found, it must be sought from within the parameters of the
problem. That means attention must be kept inside South Sudan. There lie
both the problem and the solution.
A good starting point towards building a strong nation is to look at
characteristics of the country. With an estimated population of 8,260,490
[2] South Sudan is home to 60 different nationalities. [3] When various
clans and sub-clans are taken into account, the number of nationalities
rises to 90 [4] and these nationalities are not homogeneous. Diversity and
plurality are defining characteristics of South Sudan. While women make up
65 percent of South Sudan's total population, they represent 92 percent of
the illiterate. [5] The youth make up the majority of the population with 16
percent of the population under the age of five, 32 percent under the age of
ten, 51 percent under the age of 18, and 72 percent under the age of 30. [6]
A UNESCO report showed that only 38 percent of adults in South Sudan are
literate. [7] A report by South Sudan's National Bureau of Statistics,
however, shows that the percentage of those that are literate is even lower
and estimated to be 27 percent. [8]
While the legacies of slavery, conquest and postcolonial governance have
left South Sudan in ruin, the post-CPA period has shown real evidence of
progress. While violence between North and South has ended, there continues
to be great hostility between the two Sudans. Whereas the confrontation with
Sudan is important, the great threat to the new republic, one that poses an
existential threat, [9] comes from within. [10] Without resolving the
internal problem, South Sudan's future promises even greater instability.
The challenges of development facing South Sudan include at least these: the
"absence of good infrastructure and skilled labor, heavy dependency on oil
revenues, and growing corruption." [11] As a result of decades of war, the
majority of civil servants lack formal education and training. [12]
Furthermore, institutional weakness is exacerbated by violence, [13]
unemployment, illiteracy, extreme poverty affecting predominantly women and
youth, [14] and an inflow of refugees and internally displaced persons. [15]
These myriad of issues form the necessary backdrop to any discussion
concerning the problem of South Sudan's youthful majority.
POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE ROLE OF YOUTH
While violence is the main factor that accounts for the disintegration of
South Sudanese societies, the unraveling of the social fabric and the death
of millions of people is traceable to underdevelopment. The surge in
inter-communal violence involving young people is not a standalone act. It
is driven by issues such as access to pasture, water, and cattle grazing in
the Greater Upper Nile. In the Greater Bahr el Ghazal and in Equatoria, the
issues include access to land and concerns for ethnic homeland. In all three
places, people suffer from: lack of access to basic services, lack of
economic development, denied rights to citizenship, the inability of the
state to provide security, and the lack of law enforcement. Jok M. Jok, the
Executive Director of the Sudd Institute, notes that:
"Insecurity has risen to a level where fear has started to hold people
hostage in their neighborhoods at night. Foreign migrant labourers have been
targeted both by elements in the security agencies and by local unemployed
youth, who only see growing economic and lifestyle disparities between
themselves and the few young people who are relatives of the political
class. There is also increasing xenophobia against migrant youth from East
African countries, as they are seen by the local youth as having stolen
their jobs and living better lives than the citizens." [16]
There are many reasons why the youth resort to violence: lack of development
and education, access to basic services, high unemployment, and increase in
dowry for marriage in certain states. In the states with strong pastoral
communities and cattle-based economies such Jonglei, Unity, Warrap, Lakes,
and Upper Niles, incidents of cattle raiding have been widespread and have
led to the displacement and death of thousands of people. [17] Without any
real alternative, young people, often the most dynamic group in the
population, turn to violence as a means of survival. Given the desperate
circumstances, the youth can easily be mobilized and are often the primary
recruits to join rebel movements. The young are a formidable force for the
government as well as for rebel groups. Without resolving these issues,
violence will continue to create instability and to cost human lives. An
exclusive emphasis on the youth will, however, be counterproductive if that
emphasis alienates or excludes the rest of society. To be sustainable,
policy must include all the key stakeholders. It must straddle the older and
younger generations, making use of the numeric strength of younger people
while harnessing the experience of their elders.
GENERATIONAL GAP AND DISCONTINUITY
A noticeable trend in recent years has been that of disconnection between
generations. While in the past young people could easily be managed by
elders, the legacies of slavery, wars, and the breakdown of clan leadership
in the Sudan have fragmented society, uprooted people, and broken family
links. Elders complain that the youth no longer listen to them. [18] Then,
South Sudanese leaders, like their counterparts in various parts of Africa,
are drawn from those nationalists who fought for independence. Instead of
making room for and tapping the potential of the youth, investing in human
capacities and infrastructure for the future, leaders have instead adopted
an adversarial stance toward the young, viewing them either as incompetent
or as competitors for coveted government positions. Unfortunately, the loss
of faith in the young is a faith lost in the future.
The gap between the older generation and the younger generation is wide and
increasing. As the younger generation loses faith in the older generation,
the older generation further entrenches its place in power and consolidates
its position even deeper. Whenever the majority of any country is excluded
from governance, a country cannot fulfill its fullest potential. A silent
majority cannot demand a majority stake unless that majority realizes its
strengths and develops a consciousness to fight for its rights.
THE WAY FORWARD
The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) noted that "we
need to ensure that young people are equipped with social and market-related
skills which will enable them to be well integrated young adults as well as
being competitive at the national, subregional and global levels." [19] The
role of the state in South Sudan is critical to resolving its societal
problems. Among other things, the government should address issues affecting
the majority of the people in a coherent and consistent manner. These
include establishing law and order, broadening the political community,
strengthening state government, bringing decision-making powers and services
delivery closer to the people, building education infrastructure, creating
jobs and working with communities to increase inter-communal dialogues.
When discussing education, the emphasis must surpass basic literacy to
include tertiary education. This includes skills training, multifaceted
knowledge-building, and a substantial investment in the infrastructure of
local knowledge production. The problems caused by unemployment and
underemployment demand a leadership in South Sudan that can establish an
environment where the majority can thrive politically, economically, and
socially. Lessons from Africa and around the world show that the exclusion
from governance and disenfranchisement of the majority often sow "seeds of
political unrest, economic collapse and war." [20] It was the political
exclusion of the majority from governance and the systematic social and
economic marginalization of the masses that produced systemic poverty
throughout Sudan, which, in turn, created an incentive for armed uprisings.
The late Dr. John Garang, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), noted that "under these
circumstances the marginal cost of rebellion in the South became very small,
zero or negative; that is, in the South it pays to rebel." [21] South Sudan
must learn these important lessons if it is to build a durable democracy.
South Sudan also must work in collaboration with regional and international
partners to address issues related to trans-boundary communities, migrants,
internally displaced populations, and refugees rather than allow unaided
citizens to take matters into their owns hands. The government must take a
leadership role in ensuring access to basic services. While International
Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) can help with the provision of basics
services, they cannot replace the government nor should the government defer
to INGOs those tasks for which it is responsible. Without providing these
services, insecurity will continue in the country and young people will
increasingly find alternative ways to access those services, even if through
violent acts.
Lastly, if the arrogance of youth compels the younger generation to discard
the wisdom of past generations, they will surely repeat the mistakes of the
past. Instead of building on useful past legacies and going beyond past
generations, the likelihood is that they will struggle to match the
contribution of the older generation. If South Sudan is going to have a
chance to compete politically and economically with other nations, it will
require both the contribution of its youth and the experience of its older
generations. South Sudan must harness and build the potential of its people
in order to build a peaceful and prosperous country.
* Christopher Zambakari is a Doctor of Law and Policy (LP.D.), Northeastern
University, Boston, Massachusetts, and a Rotary Peace Fellow, University of
Queensland, Australia. His work has been published in law, economic, and
public policy journals. He can be reached at: <Zambakari.c_at_husky.neu.edu>.
The author would like to thank Barbara Pine, Nel Hodge, and Dr. Keisha
Haywood for their insightful comments and constructive feedback on the
earlier draft of this article.
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END NOTES
[1] Statistics and Evaluation Southern Sudan Centre for Census, "Key
Indicators for Southern Sudan," (Juba, Sudan: Southern Sudan Centre for
Census, Statistics and Evaluation (SSCCSE). 2010).
[2] See NBS, "Key Indicators for South Sudan," (Juba, South Sudan: National
Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Available at
<
http://ssnbs.org/publications/key-indicators-for-south-sudan.html>, 2012).
for key indicators on South Sudan.
[3] Mwangi S. Kimenyi, "Making Federalism Work in South Sudan.," in SOUTH
SUDAN: One Year After Independence: Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's
Newest Country (Washington, DC.: The Brookings Institution | Africa Growth
Initiative., 2012), 17.
[4] The House of Nationalities, "List of Nationalities.," (South Sudan: The
House of Nationalities. Available at
<
http://houseofnationalities.org/downloads.asp>, 2011).
[5] UNESCO, "Why Education Will Foster Stability in an Independent South
Sudan," (Paris, France - Buenos Aires, Argentina: United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2011).
[6] Southern Sudan Centre for Census, "Key Indicators for Southern Sudan."
[7] UNESCO, "Why Education Will Foster Stability in an Independent South
Sudan."
[8] NBS, "Key Indicators for South Sudan."
[9] Jok Madut Jok, "Insecurity and Ethnic Violence in South Sudan:
Existential Threats to State? ," in Issue Papers (Juba, South Sudan: The
Sudd Institute. Available at
<
http://www.suddinstitute.org/assets/Publications/insecurity-and-ethnic-viol
ence.pdf>, 2012).
[10] Christopher Zambakari, "Post-Referendum South Sudan: Political
Violence, New Sudan and Democratic Nation-Building," The Georgetown Public
Policy Review 18, no. 2 (2013).
[11] DAGNE, T. 2011. The Republic of South Sudan: Opportunities and
Challenges for Africa's Newest Country. CRS Report for Congress: Prepared
for Members and Committees of Congress. Congressional Research Service.
Available at <
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41900.pdf>.
[12] AFDB 2012. The African Development Bank Group in East Africa:
Consolidating the Present and Shaping the Future. Tunis-Belvedere, Tunisia:
African Development Bank (AfDB) Group. Available at
<
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Final%20E
nglish%20version-The%20AfDB%20in%20EA%20publication%20.pdf>.
[13] Madut Jok Jok, "State, Law, and Insecurity in South Sudan," The
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 37, no. 2 (2013); Zambakari,
"Post-Referendum South Sudan: Political Violence, New Sudan and Democratic
Nation-Building."
[14] Christopher Zambakari, "The role of women in nation-building in South
Sudan," Pambazuka News, no. Issue 578, accessible from
<
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/80972> (2012).
[15] IDMC & NRC, "SOUTH SUDAN: New displacement adds to critical
humanitarian situation in the country since independence.," (Geneva,
Switzerland: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre & Norwegian Refugee
Council.Available at
<
http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountrySummaries
)/F119FED29B958D06C1257A2800443BD5?OpenDocument&count=10000>, 2012).
[16] Jok, "State, Law, and Insecurity in South Sudan," 72.
[17] Zambakari, "Post-Referendum South Sudan: Political Violence, New Sudan
and Democratic Nation-Building."; Christopher Zambakari, "Old Sudan and new
Sudan: Political crisis and the search for comprehensive peace," Pambazuka
News, no. 567 (2012); Jok, "State, Law, and Insecurity in South Sudan."
[18] London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), "Southern Sudan
at odds with itself: Dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace,"
(London, UK: London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2010).
[19] UNECA, "African Youth Report 2011: Addressing the Youth Education and
Employment Nexus in the New Global Economy," (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa: Available at
<
http://www.uneca.org/publications/serie/African-Youth-Report>, 2011), vii.
[20] Bronwen Manby, "International Law and the Right to a Nationality in
Sudan," (New York, NY: Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa, 2011), 5.
[21] John Garang, The call for democracy in Sudan (edited and introduced by
Mansour Khalid), ed. Mansour Khalid, 2 ed. (New York Kegan Paul
International, 1992). 21.
Received on Wed Jun 26 2013 - 23:37:03 EDT